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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Overview
Julian M. Alston, Bruce A. Babcock, and Philip G. Pardey
The predominant feature of agricultural commodity markets, since at least 
the 1950s, has been falling real prices, which can only come about if supply 
grows faster than demand. The source of much of the supply growth has been 
rapid growth in agricultural productivity. Recent high commodity prices com-
bined with increased price volatility have raised concerns about whether the 
price structure has permanently changed. Can we expect a return of falling food 
commodity prices to a long-term trend like that of the latter half of the twentieth 
century? Has the path permanently shifted? Or had the trend rate of decline in 
prices already begun to slow before the recent spike in global prices?  
The demand side of the world food equation is relatively uncontroversial and 
reasonably predictable: population and income growth will lead to sustained in-
creases in the demand for food over the next 40 years. The long-term issues turn 
mainly on the future path of agricultural supply, in particular, the growth of ag-
ricultural productivity given increasing constraints on the natural resource base 
available for food production. Can we expect global agricultural productivity to 
grow at rates like those of the second half of the twentieth century or has the 
rate of productivity growth generally slowed? Certainly some evidence has begun 
Julian Alston is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Uni-
versity of California, Davis, and associate director, Science and Technology, at the University of 
California Agricultural Issues Center. Bruce Babcock is a professor of economics and director 
of the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University. Philip Pardey is 
a professor in the Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, and director of 
the International Science and Technology Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center at the University 
of Minnesota.
2  Alston, BABcock, And PArdey
to emerge suggesting a slowdown in agricultural productivity in some parts of 
the world. What is the nature of that evidence? Is the pattern common among 
all, or even many, countries? Such questions, motivated mainly by an interest in 
the long-run supply and demand balance for food commodities, provide one mo-
tivation for this book. Related questions concern the implications of differential 
productivity paths among countries for comparative advantage and competitive-
ness in agricultural commodity markets. 
In this book we assemble a range of evidence from a range of sources with 
a view to developing an improved understanding of recent trends in agricul-
tural productivity around the world. The fundamental purpose is to better 
understand the nature of the long-term growth in the supply of food and its 
principal determinants. We pursue this purpose from two perspectives. One is 
from a general interest in the world food situation in the long run. The other is 
from an interest in the implications of U.S. and global productivity patterns for 
U.S. agriculture. 
The approach in this book is opportunistic. The project was conceived in 
January 2009 as something that could be completed within a year, based primar-
ily on research that was already underway or recently completed. We set out to 
draw on a significant body of such work, conducted in and applying to different 
parts of the world, to provide a reasonably broad picture of global agricultural 
productivity patterns. In such an approach, primarily drawing on independently 
conducted pre-existing works, it is not possible to make the elements totally 
consistent, compatible, and coherent in terms of their methods and emphasis. 
We had to take many aspects of the individual studies as essentially given. In ad-
dition, the nature of available data varies enormously around the world, so even 
if we had the opportunity to design the elements in advance, we would not have 
been able to standardize methods, measures, and approaches very much. Even 
so, the results and stories are to a great extent comparable across the individual 
chapters, though not without some significant differences. 
Almost all of the chapters use datasets that end in the beginning or the middle 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Such a common endpoint anchors 
the chapters and makes the results somewhat comparable. In all of the studies the 
emphasis is on discerning longer-run trends in input, output, and productivity 
(and any systematic shifts in those trends), with some studies providing evidence 
for three to four decades, others extending back to the middle of the twentieth 
century, and some stretching back to almost the beginning of that century. 
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Most of the chapters in this book relate to productivity patterns in individual 
countries or groups of countries. Three of the chapters take a global perspective. 
These three chapters comprise Part 1 of the book. The spatial structure and loca-
tion of agricultural production varies over time both between and within coun-
tries, with implications for agricultural production and productivity. In Chapter 
2, Beddow, Pardey, Koo, and Wood use data on the evolving spatial patterns of 
agricultural production to provide a context for the other chapters that follow. 
Next, in Chapter 3, Alston, Beddow, and Pardey present a range of information 
on prices and productivity around the world. Using U.S. commodity prices as an 
index of global prices, they show that the rate of decline in deflated food and feed 
commodity prices had slowed significantly since 1990. Similarly, various partial 
productivity indexes, such as grain yields or land and labor productivity, showed 
significant slowdowns in their growth rates since 1990, albeit with significant 
exceptions in some places—in particular Latin America and China. In Chapter 
4, Fuglie presents some alternative measures of global, regional, and country-
specific agricultural productivity patterns, based on the use of Food and Agricul-
ture Organization data to compute measures of multifactor productivity or total 
factor productivity (MFP or TFP). He concludes there is no evidence of a general 
slowdown in sector-wide agricultural TFP growth rates. The contrast in results 
between these two chapters is striking and demands an explanation. The role of 
differences in data, estimation methods, and other aspects of the respective treat-
ments of the data in contributing to such contrasts is discussed in Chapter 15. 
The main part of the book is in Part 2, which contains a total of 10 chapters, 
providing country-specific evidence. These chapters cover countries for which 
work had been done recently that we considered to be both of suitable nature 
and quality for inclusion in this volume, and relevant for understanding the phe-
nomena of interest. They cover Australia and New Zealand (Chapter 5, by Mul-
len), Canada (Chapter 6, by Veeman and Gray), the United Kingdom (Chapter 7, 
by Piesse and Thirtle), the United States (Chapter 8, by Alston, Andersen, James, 
and Pardey), China (Chapter 9, by Jin, Huang, and Rozelle), the Former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe (Chapter 10, by Swinnen, Van Herck, and Vranken), 
India (Chapter 11, by Singh and Pal), Indonesia (Chapter 12, by Fuglie), South 
Africa (Chapter 13, by Liebenberg and Pardey), and Argentina (Chapter 14, by 
Lence). The most significant omissions are Brazil and the countries of Western 
Europe as well as most of Africa. Otherwise the coverage is quite broad and rep-
resentative and accounts for a great share of global agricultural production. 
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In a few countries, data are available to allow the computation of indexes of 
MFP using suitable measures of prices and quantities, with reasonably complete 
coverage of inputs and outputs. In the case of the United States, detailed data 
are available to measure aggregate MFP for individual states in long time series 
(Chapter 8). Similarly good aggregate national data are available for the United 
Kingdom (Chapter 7), parts of Canada (Chapter 6), Australia and New Zealand 
(Chapter 5), and South Africa (Chapter 13), although among them there are 
important differences in details. In the case of China (Chapter 9), the authors 
present estimates of TFP at the level of individual commodities whereas for other 
countries such measures are typically available for an aggregate of total agri-
culture or for a substantial aggregate (e.g., “broadacre” agriculture in Australia; 
crops versus livestock in Canada). In other countries, only crop yields and other 
partial productivity measures are available. But for those countries for which we 
have a range of measures available, they tend to tell similar stories—that is, par-
tial productivity measures and MFP or TFP show similar patterns. To the extent 
that this is expected to be true for other places for which we do not have com-
plete measures, we can draw crude inferences from the available evidence for 
what the more complete measures would show. 
Chapter 15 concludes the book with a summary and, to the extent possible, 
a synthesis of findings across the chapters comprising this volume. As noted, 
the different chapters were commissioned from authors who had independently 
conducted the underlying research; they were not coordinated in advance. Con-
sequently the chapters exhibit significant differences in style, coverage, methods, 
and issues, some of which were dictated by the nature of the available data and 
by differences in relevant issues among countries. Across the chapters, along 
with different concepts and measures of inputs, outputs, and productivity, dif-
ferent approaches were used to test for a slowdown, and to some extent different 
approaches may have contributed to some differences in findings. These con-
trasts raise several questions: What is the appropriate measure of productivity? 
What is the appropriate method to test for a slowdown? What is the appropriate 
interpretation of a slowdown and its likely causes? What are the policy implica-
tions? These questions are addressed in Chapter 15.
Part 1
International Evidence 
and Interpretation
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CHAPTER 2
The Changing Landscape 
of Global Agriculture
Jason M. Beddow, Philip G. Pardey,  
Jawoo Koo, and Stanley Wood
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1. INTRODUCTION
Location matters when it comes to assessing agricultural productivity levels 
and trends. Most find familiarity with the notion that the amount and composi-
tion of agricultural output of a particular country or region of the world tends to 
change over time, but many are less familiar with the spatial dynamics of agricul-
ture. The spatial structure and location of agricultural production both between 
and within countries, which we dub the landscape of agriculture, also varies over 
time. Agriculture is an inherently spatial process, with yields (and hence out-
put) being greatly influenced by local factors such as weather and climate, soils, 
and pest pressures. Consequently, agricultural production and productivity are 
especially sensitive to spatial and inter-temporal variations in natural factors of 
production. As we do in this chapter, giving more explicit attention to the spatial 
dimensions of agriculture and how they change over time deepens our under-
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standing of the production and productivity performance and potential of this 
sector. The following section begins by presenting a broad assessment of changes 
in the global footprint of agriculture over the past three centuries. Agriculture is 
continually on the move, and this spatial volatility has profound implications for 
how productivity metrics can and should be interpreted. 
Consideration of explicitly spatial patterns is useful, but additional insights 
can be gained by conducting analyses across meaningful spatial aggregations. 
Such spatial aggregations summarize certain attributes of space that affect ag-
ricultural production and productivity. For example, assessing production in 
terms of geopolitical aggregates is helpful since national or subnational borders 
help delineate the boundaries of economic, political, and social factors that affect 
the production choices made by farmers and other decisionmakers. However, 
geopolitical boundaries provide a poor proxy for agroecology. Thus, a more com-
plete view of agricultural production can be developed by placing production in 
both geopolitical and agroecological space, as we do in Sections 3 and 4, respec-
tively. Since movements in the footprint of agriculture necessarily imply under-
lying changes in the natural and socioeconomic factors that drive productivity, 
thoughtful interpretation of differences in a productivity metric across time or 
space requires consideration of the extent to which such changes might or might 
not be captured by that metric. Therefore, these assessments provide grounding 
and context for the discussions of productivity in the remainder of this volume.
Agricultural statistics are almost always reported on a geopolitical basis, but 
analysts are increasingly placing agricultural production in agroecological space. 
Recent examples include the work of Wood, You, and Zhang (2004) and You and 
Wood (2005) to develop geo-referenced global crop geographies for the world’s 
principal (food) crops. Ramankutty and Foley (1999) and Ramankutty et al. (2008) 
have developed long-run geo-referenced maps of the location of crop production 
worldwide. It is to these sources of data—supplemented with global, commodity-
specific production data from FAO—that we turn to assess the spatial dynamics of 
agriculture from both a geopolitical and an agroecological perspective.
2. SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL CROPPED AREA
While natural inputs play an important, if not defining, role in agricultural 
production, agriculture is the antithesis of natural. The output and productivity 
responses to these natural factors are affected by a myriad of human interven-
tions. Choices about what, where, and when to grow or graze are obvious influ-
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ences. Modifying the physical or environmental landscape—from leveling or 
terracing fields to adding fertilizer, supplemental irrigation water, or herbicides 
and pesticides, all the way to hydroponic production in glasshouse controlled 
environments—is commonplace. Modifying the genetics of crops and animals is 
also common.1 For most of the 10,000-year history of agriculture, the purposeful 
selection and cultivation of crops and animals was without scientific direction. 
The rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of heredity in 1900 gave added impetus to ge-
netic modification in agriculture. The commercialization of hybrid corn in the 
United States beginning in the 1930s and the release of genetically modified (in-
cluding transgenic) crops beginning in the 1990s are a continuation of the long 
history of human-induced genetic modification that is the essence of agriculture. 
It is the continuously evolving interaction between genes and the environment 
that underscores the value of a spatially sensitive perspective on agriculture pro-
duction processes. The history of this evolution begins with the origins of the 
crops themselves.
Where crops, or their precursor plants, originated and where they are now 
principally grown are two sides of the same coin. Identifying the centers of 
origin of cultivated crops, and even whether such centers exist at all, is subject 
to considerable debate. Perhaps the most well-known line of reasoning started 
with the work of Vavilov (1926), who proposed that crops had geographical 
“centers of origin” and identified eight centers of origin based on measures of 
diversity. As summarized by Harlan (1971), it was later recognized that the 
centers of origin may differ from centers of diversity, and further, that the pro-
cess of domestication can be geographically dispersed. A big part of the longer 
history of agricultural innovation has to do with the human-induced spatial 
movement of plants and animals. Candolle (1884, p. 2) noted that when it is 
feasible to do so, people “soon adopt certain plants, discovered elsewhere, of 
which the advantage is evident, and are thereby diverted from the cultivation 
of the poorer species of their own country.” Further, Candolle observed that 
the ancient propagation of a number of useful plants in the Mediterranean (by 
Egyptians and Phoenicians) enabled later migrants to carry West Asian genetic 
material into Europe at least 4,000 years ago, and that there is evidence of 
well-established Chinese cultivation of rice, sweet potatoes, wheat, and millets 
1The domestication of plants and animals distinguishes agriculture from earlier forms of food 
production, which involved hunter-gatherer activities whereby humans did not typically manage 
or in other ways knowingly modify (e.g., genetically) the food sources they sought.
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as early as 2,700 BC.2 It is clear that the pre-history of agriculture was driven 
by human-mediated dispersal and propagation of crop genetic material and 
therefore that the landscape of agriculture is, and has long been, subject to 
near continuous change. 
Most agricultural production today uses genetic material that had its source 
hundreds or even thousands of miles away, but this is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon (Table 2.1). After thousands of years of slow development, slow im-
provement, and gradual movement of plants and animals, all driven by human 
action, the rate of change accelerated in the past 500 years. An important event 
in this history was the “Colombian Exchange” that was initiated when Colum-
bus first made contact with native Americans in the “New World” (Crosby 1987, 
Diamond 1999). Most of the commercial agriculture in the United States today is 
based on crop and livestock species introduced from Eurasia (e.g., wheat, barley, 
rice, soybeans, grapes, apples, citrus, cattle, sheep, hogs, and chickens), though 
with significant involvement of American species (e.g., corn, peppers, potatoes, 
tobacco, tomatoes, and turkeys) that are also distributed throughout the rest of 
the world. The global diffusion of agriculturally significant plants and animals, 
and their accompanying pests and diseases, has been a pivotal element in the 
history of agricultural innovation.
The more recent, but still lengthy, spatial history of cropping patterns 
developed by Ramankutty and Foley (1999) used 1992 satellite-derived land-
cover estimates along with historical (geopolitical) crop inventory data and a 
simple land-cover change model to estimate global cropping patterns back to 
1700. Here, we make use of Ramankutty and Foley’s long-run cropping data 
along with a similar global cropland dataset for 2000 (Ramankutty et al. 2008) 
to draw conclusions about changes in the geography of agricultural production 
over the last three centuries. These datasets are distributed by the Center for 
Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE) at the University of Wis-
consin and for the sake of brevity will hereafter be referred to as the “SAGE” 
series (see the appendix).
We used a variety of techniques to represent the changing spatial patterns 
evident in the SAGE data. Figure 2.1, Panels a and b, give a mapped represen-
tation of the SAGE data for 1700 and 2000 respectively. Darker shades indicate 
that greater percentages of each 55.7-by-55.7 kilometer pixel (projected to the 
2In fact, Fuller et al. (2009) recently reported evidence of the domestication of rice in the Lower 
Yangtze region of Zhejiang that dates to between 6,900 and 6,600 years ago.
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Table 2.1. Regions of origin and current production of major feed, food, and 
fiber crops
  Top Five Producing Countries in 2005-07
Crop Center of Origin Country 
Production 
(mmt) 
Global Share 
(percent) 
Wheat Central Asia China 103.9 17.0
  India 71.0 11.6
  United States of America 53.4 8.7
  Russian Federation 47.4 7.8
  France 35.2 5.8
  Top Five Total 310.8 50.9
Corn South Mexico  
and Central 
America 
United States of America 294.0 40.1
 China 145.7 19.9
 Brazil 43.1 5.9
 Mexico 21.2 2.9
 Argentina 18.9 2.6
 Top Five Total 523.0 71.3
Rice India China 184.4 28.7
  India 139.3 21.7
  Indonesia 55.2 8.6
  Bangladesh 42.3 6.6
  Viet Nam 35.7 5.6
  Top Five Total 456.9 71.1
Barley Abyssinia  Russian Federation 16.5 12.0
 (Ethiopia) Germany 11.5 8.3
  Canada 11.0 8.0
  France 10.1 7.3
  Turkey 8.8 6.4
  Top Five Total 58.0 42.0
Soybeans China United States of America 80.6 37.0
  Brazil 53.9 24.8
  Argentina 41.4 19.0
  China 15.8 7.3
  India 8.9 4.1
  Top Five Total 200.6 92.2
Cassava South America Nigeria 44.3 20.2
  Brazil 26.6 12.1
  Thailand 22.0 10.0
  Indonesia 19.6 8.9
  
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 15.0 6.8 
  Top Five Total 127.5 58.1
Coffee Abyssinia  Brazil 2.3 30.5
 (Ethiopia) Viet Nam 0.9 11.8
  Colombia 0.7 9.3
  Indonesia 0.7 8.7
  Mexico 0.3 4.1
  Top Five Total 4.8 64.3
12  Beddow, PArdey, koo, And wood
Sources:  Centers of origin are from Schery’s (1972) adaptation of Vavilov (1951). See the appendix 
for sources of production shares.
Table 2.1. Continued
  Top Five Producing Countries in 2005-07
Crop Center of Origin Country 
Production 
(mmt) 
Global Share 
(percent) 
Bananas Indo-Malaya India 18.1 23.5
  China 7.0 9.1
  Brazil 6.9 8.9
  Philippines 6.7 8.7
  Ecuador 6.1 8.0
  Top Five Total 44.8 58.3
Tomatoes South America China 32.6 25.8
  United States of America 11.3 8.9
  Turkey 9.9 7.9
  India 8.9 7.0
  Egypt 7.6 6.0
  Top Five Total 70.3 55.6
Potatoes South America China 71.1 22.3
  Russian Federation 37.5 11.8
  India 24.6 7.7
  Ukraine 19.3 6.1
  United States of America 18.9 5.9
  Top Five Total 171.5 53.8
Apples Central Asia China 25.9 40.8
  United States of America 4.4 6.9
  Iran, Islamic Republic of 2.7 4.2
  Turkey 2.3 3.6
  Italy 2.1 3.4
  Top Five Total 37.3 58.9
Oranges India Brazil 18.1 28.4
  United States of America 8.0 12.6
  Mexico 4.1 6.5
  India 3.5 5.6
  China 2.8 4.4
  Top Five Total 36.5 57.5
Grapes Central Asia Italy 8.5 12.7
  France 6.7 10.0
  United States of America 6.3 9.5
  Spain 6.2 9.2
  China 6.1 9.1
  Top Five Total 33.7 50.4
Cotton  South Mexico  
and Central 
America 
 
China 20.1 28.2
 United States of America 12.2 17.1
 India 10.2 14.3
 Pakistan 6.4 8.9
 Uzbekistan 3.5 5.0
 Top Five Total 52.3 73.6 
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Figure 2.1. Panels a and b. The changing global landscape of crop 
production, 1700 to 2000
Source: Derived from SAGE data (see the appendix). 
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Figure 2.1. Panels c and d. The changing global landscape of crop 
production, 1700 to 2000
Source: Derived from SAGE data (see the appendix). 
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equator) are deemed to be cropped. Beginning in 1700, agricultural cropland 
occupied just 9% of the world’s total land area, with most of that cropland lo-
cated in Asia (accounting for 48.5% of the world’s cropped area at that time), 
Europe (28.5%), and Africa (19.6%). Notably, the sparsely settled New Worlds 
of Australia, New Zealand, and the Americas collectively accounted for just 
3.2% of the land worldwide under permanent crops in 1700. By 2000, the New 
World share had grown to 27.1% of the total cropped area. 
The net effect of the movement of land in and out of cropped agriculture 
means that agriculture is geographically mobile, particularly when one takes 
an especially long-run perspective. Figure 2.1, Panel c, provides an indica-
tion of the distance and direction of the spatial relocation of agriculture 
globally by plotting the movement in the “centroids” or centers of gravity of 
production by region for the period beginning in 1700 (when each region’s 
centroid is centered on a zero latitude-longitude grid coordinate) through to 
2000. Each centroid is an estimate of the geographic center (center of mass) 
of the cropped area in the corresponding region. The location of the centroid 
itself is not particularly enlightening, and it could easily be the case that 
a centroid is in a location that does not produce any crops at all, or is oth-
erwise not representative of the general agricultural situation in a country. 
However, movements in the centroid are revealing as an indication of the in-
fluences of changing patterns of settlement, infrastructure, and technologies 
on the location of agriculture.
According to these data, North America and Africa have seen the largest 
movements in their production centroids, both shifting about 1,300 kilome-
ters over the 300-year period. As was the case with the other continents, most 
of this movement occurred after 1900. However, the year 2000 centroids for 
other regions more or less represent a continuation of the trend from 1950 to 
1992; the only anomaly seems to be in Africa, where almost all of the mea-
sured movement in its centroid occurred between 1992 and 2000.3 The Asian 
centroid moved the least, changing by only 15 kilometers to the east and 137 
kilometers to the south.
3It seems more likely that the year 1992 and 2000 datasets were not fully conformable than that 
a massive structural shift in African production occurred during this period. However, the north-
ward movement of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa is consistent with the finding of Liebenberg, 
Pardey, and Kahn (2010) that the farmed area in South African agriculture peaked at 91.8 million 
hectares in 1960, then declined steadily to 82.2 million hectares by 1996, where it has since been 
more or less stable.
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Except in Africa and Asia, the general trend favored movement in longi-
tude rather than latitude. The pronounced northward movement in Africa was 
almost matched by an equivalent move westward, and, while the Asian cen-
troid showed much more absolute movement along the east-west axis, the net 
movement over the period was almost due south. Averaging across all of the 
regions, the net longitudinal movement was 4.6 times as large as the net lati-
tudinal movement. This pattern is related to an argument by Diamond (1999, 
p. 185), who stated that “localities distributed east and west of each other at 
the same latitude share exactly the same day length and its seasonal varia-
tions. To a lesser degree, they also tend to share similar diseases, regimes of 
temperature and rainfall, and habitats or biomes (types of vegetation).” Thus, 
a variety that is successful at a given location is more likely to be successful 
at other locations with similar latitude, and therefore a spread along the east-
west axis is easier than a spread along the north-south axis.4 This argument 
provides insights into the forces underlying the direction of agricultural move-
ments, although the implications for modern movements in overall production 
are less clear. For example, opposite latitudinal movements in different crops 
may be netted out of an assessment of overall production. Second, Diamond 
took a very long-run view, looking back to pre-history. Insofar as crop manage-
ment and varietal improvement technologies are reducing the yield-depressing 
effects of constraints to agricultural production at the more extreme latitudes, 
one might expect more recent data to exhibit relatively more movement toward 
the poles.
Over the past three centuries, agricultural cropland in Asia and Europe 
did move along an east-west axis, but there was considerable movement along 
a north-south axis as well. In addition, the direction of Eurasian development 
changed course. European cropland moved in a northeasterly direction until the 
early 1990s, then took a U-turn, heading southwesterly during the 1990s, no 
doubt the consequence of an implosion in Soviet agriculture during this period 
(see Swinnen and Van Herck in Chapter 10 of this volume). Asia moved simi-
4Diamond couched his discussion in the context of social developments stretching back into pre-
history. Our assessment of the spatial mobility of cropped agriculture begins in 1700. Develop-
ments after 1700 dominate the economic landscape. For example, Maddison (2003) reports that 
global population was just 603 million in 1700 compared with 6.1 billion in 2001, while global 
GDP grew from an estimated 371 billion in 1700 to 37 trillion in 2000 (in constant 1990 interna-
tional dollars). Moreover, most of the increase in the area under crops occurred after 1700, with 
global cropped area expanding by an estimated 253% since then (from 422 million hectares in 
1700 to 1.49 billion hectares in 2000 [Ramankutty and Foley 1999 and Ramankutty et al. 2008]). 
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larly, following a northeasterly trajectory until the 1850s, and then also took a 
southwesterly track. As of 2000, the Asian centroid was in north-central Bhutan 
near the border within China, suggesting that the relative rates and spatial pat-
terns of cropland development in China and India dominate the movement in 
the region’s centroid. However, expanding cropland in Indochina and Indonesia 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth 
century would tend to tug Asia’s centroid southward. 
As one might expect given the way these landscapes were settled (particu-
larly with regard to agriculture), both the North American and Australian cen-
troids moved strongly in a westerly direction. This westward movement came 
with an evident northerly drift that became more pronounced for North America 
beginning in 1900 and in 1950 for Australia. Notably, a more northerly direc-
tion of development for North American agriculture means cooler climates and 
shorter growing seasons while for Australia it means movement toward more 
tropical growing conditions. The more northerly path taken by North American 
agriculture during the twentieth century coincides with the massive ramping up 
of institutions and investments pertaining to agricultural research and develop-
ment (see Alston et al. 2010), suggesting that technological factors began playing 
a more prominent role in the location of crop production.5 The same forces may 
have also been operative in Australia, with increasing attention given to tropical 
technologies by Australian agricultural research institutions during the twentieth 
century, overlaid with (and part of) a broader government-sponsored program of 
infrastructure and economic development that put greater emphasis on the more 
northerly parts of the country (Davidson 1966 and 1981). 
Cropland in Central America6 shifted northwesterly, as developments 
in Mexico increasingly dominated that landscape. In stark contrast, South 
American cropland moved strongly in a southerly direction from 1700 to 
the 1950s, then dramatically changed course, heading northeast for much 
of the latter half of the twentieth century as Brazilian agriculture occupied 
5Settlement patterns and the importation of cold-tolerant varieties help to explain the northerly 
movement of North American agriculture during the nineteenth century. Twentieth century ex-
pansion was much less dependent on opening of new lands and importation of germplasm, and 
much more dependent on the homegrown development and uptake of new corn varieties, notably 
the rapid uptake of short-duration hybrid varieties beginning in the 1930s that allowed for more 
intense production, and that spurred a movement into more northerly areas. 
6Central America is typically defined as the area of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. We also include Mexico because of its climatic and 
agricultural-historical similarities with the Central American countries. 
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an increasing share of the region’s cropland (an estimated 25.3% in 1950 
and 46.7% in 2000). As in Australia, the South American reversal of direc-
tion may stem largely from technological and economic policy developments 
in Brazil. The country rapidly ramped up its agricultural research capacity 
during the latter half of the twentieth century (Beintema, Avila, and Pardey 
2001), and increasingly targeted that effort to more northerly climes. Spill-
over technologies from other countries—most notably day-length insensitive 
soybean varieties developed in the United States (Pardey et al. 2006)—en-
abled large tracts of land to be opened up for agriculture in the Cerrados 
region of Brazil. These technological factors were reinforced by a series of 
national development strategies that also targeted more northerly regions of 
the country. 
Panel d of Figure 2.1 uses the SAGE series to show the change in cropped 
area over the four decades spanning 1960 to 2000. It indicates the localized 
movement of acreage in and out of agriculture since 1960, or, more specifi-
cally, the change in the area share dedicated to crop production for each of 
the 259,200 mapped pixels (i.e., a value of -50% indicates that half the acre-
age in that pixel shifted out of cropping agriculture since 1960). The darker 
the red shading, the greater the percent decline in cropped area per pixel; the 
darker the green shading, the greater the percent increase in cropped area per 
pixel. The collapse of the former Soviet Union is evident in terms of substan-
tial declines in cropped area throughout Eastern Europe. The SAGE data also 
indicate declines in cropped area in parts of Western Europe, northeastern, 
southern, and southeastern United States, and significant parts of China.7 
There was a substantial increase in cropped areas throughout the Indochina 
Peninsula, Indonesia, West Africa, Mexico, and Brazil. The overall picture 
is one of contracting area under crops in temperate regions and increasing 
cropped area in tropical parts of the world during the last four decades of the 
twentieth century. 
While the centroid of production provides a sense of the “average” location 
of production for a region, it is also useful to characterize the spatial disper-
sion of production. One can summarize spatial dispersion in a variety of ways, 
7Wood, Sebastian, and Scherr (2000, p. 28) document the reduction in cultivated land in China 
during the first half of the 1990s, largely attributing this to expanded industrial and urban uses 
of land. Zhang et al. (2007) imply that this trend continued into at least the early part of the 
twenty-first century. For example, the authors estimate that 260,000 hectares of Chinese culti-
vated land was converted to non-agricultural uses between 1991 and 2001.
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most commonly by assessing whether observations seem to be correlated with 
other nearby observations by calculating test statistics such as Moran’s I (Moran 
1950) and Geary’s C (Geary 1954) metric.8 In the present case, these statistics 
were calculated for each region in each year and the null hypothesis of spatial 
homogeneity was rejected for any reasonable degree of certainty, confirming the 
common-sense expectation that agriculture was not distributed uniformly across 
any of the continents.9
For our purposes, it is perhaps more useful to consider metrics of dispersion 
that are not explicitly spatial. Economists often analyze income distributions 
using a methodology first described by Lorenz (1905), who graphed cumula-
tive income distribution against population percentiles. If income were equally 
distributed among the population, the Lorenz curve would be a 45-degree line 
through the origin, and the degree to which the curve departs from that line is 
usually summarized by the Gini coefficient (Gini 1912). Here, we make use of 
the pixilated landscape (30 arc-minute or 5 arc-minute pixels) inherent in the 
SAGE series and use Gini’s procedure to assess the degree to which crop produc-
tion is concentrated within each region.10  
In this spatial context, the calculated Gini coefficients will equal zero if each 
of a region’s pixels contains the same share of the region’s agricultural area; the 
value of the coefficients will increase as agriculture becomes more concentrated 
in fewer pixels, and a coefficient of unity indicates that all production is in a 
single pixel.11 In general, Gini coefficients differ more across regions than within 
regions over time. In every period, crop production was most spatially concen-
trated in North America and Australia and was least concentrated in Asia and 
Central America (Table 2.2). The relatively high coefficients for North America 
and Australia reflect a relatively low ratio of arable to total land, while the low 
Central American coefficients reflect the opposite, along with a tendency for 
8Indeed, it is generally assumed that spatial autocorrelation is present unless there is evidence to 
the contrary. For example, the “first law of geography” states “Everything is related to everything 
else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970, p. 236). 
9To reduce the scope of the problem, the spatial weights required for the calculations were 
defined using rook contiguity rather than an inverse distance metric. In general, these yield 
similar results but can differ, especially if production tends to exhibit more global autocorrelation 
than local autocorrelation. This does not affect the present conclusion.
10A 5 arc-minute grid yields pixels (cells) that are of about 86 square kilometers at the equator.
11Technically, the Gini coefficient calculated over discrete units (e.g., grid cells) cannot equal one; 
however, under perfect inequality the Gini coefficient approaches unity as the number of units 
approaches infinity. 
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relatively non-intensive production. Over time, the Gini coefficients for Africa 
and Central America were stable, while those for the other regions reflected a 
decreasing spatial concentration of production, as the agricultural footprint of 
these areas expanded.  
Table 2.2 also displays production quartiles which, as implied by the rela-
tively stable Gini coefficients, are also fairly stable over time. The third quartile 
shows the percentage of the region’s total land area that contains 75% of the crop 
area. By this measure, the largest changes occurred in North America, which 
concentrated three-quarters of its cropped area in only 4.5% of its land area in 
1800. By 2000, 9.6% of the region’s land area constituted the same portion of 
overall cropped area. However, the increased (but still rather concentrated) spa-
tial dispersion of cropped area in North America is a special case, as the interior 
of the continent, which is generally favorable for agricultural production, was 
not heavily settled until after 1800. By contrast, Central American and Asian 
production remained relatively spatially dispersed over the entire period, while 
South American, European, and African agriculture all became more concen-
trated after 1900.
3. SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL CROP PRODUCTION
The previous section explored the long-run, spatially explicit view of agri-
cultural change provided by Ramankutty and Foley (1999) and Ramankutty et 
al. (2008). We now turn to alternative empirical views of global production for 
more recent decades by first exploring the commodity- and country-specific data 
Table 2.2. Spatial dispersion of production by year and region
Sources: See the appendix.
Note:  The third quartile shows the percentage of each region’s total area accounting for one-
quarter of cropland.
 Gini Coefficient 3rd Quartile
Region 1800 1900 2000 1800 1900 2000 
North America 0.94 0.88 0.87 4.54 8.71 9.56 
Central America 0.68 0.68 0.68 24.77 24.77 25.05 
South America 0.77 0.75 0.73 18.17 18.73 13.33 
Europe 0.80 0.78 0.76 16.07 16.72 11.47 
Africa 0.78 0.78 0.79 16.11 15.99 13.21 
Asia 0.75 0.74 0.70 18.41 19.72 20.63 
Australia 0.93 0.93 0.90 5.37 5.52 4.96 
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assembled by FAO. These data enable a crop-level assessment of the changing 
landscape of production within and among countries. Throughout the section, 
simple economic concepts are employed to provide additional insights that could 
not otherwise be gleaned from a geopolitical assessment, namely, by considering 
the interactions between geography, economic development (as measured by in-
come per person), and crop values.
3.1. Global Changes in What Is Produced
Since 1961, a large area has been devoted to the production of cereal crops 
worldwide, increasing from about 648 million harvested hectares in 1961 to 
about 700 million hectares in 2007 (roughly 5.6% of the world’s ice-free land 
area, and 55.8% of global harvested hectares).12 In 2007, oil crops (such as soy-
beans and rapeseed) had the second-largest physical footprint, with harvested 
area for these crops totaling around 250 million hectares—more than double the 
113 million hectares of oil crops that were harvested in 1961. Over half (52%) 
of the increased area in oil crops reflects a nearly fourfold increase in the area 
devoted to soybeans. Table 2.3 shows the trends in area devoted to each of the 
major crop categories used by FAO. Notably, while area devoted to production 
of oil crops increased steadily over the period, the area under cereals production 
increased to a maximum of about 720 million hectares by 1985, then generally 
decreased until an increasing trend again took hold during the new millennium. 
Category 
Area (million ha) and Trend 
1961 Trend 2007 
Fiber 38.7  35.8 
Fruits 24.5  47.1 
Oil crops 113.4  250.5 
Pulses 64.0  73.3 
Root crops 47.6  54.6 
Vegetables 23.7  52.4 
Cereals 648.0  699.8 
Table 2.3. Global harvested area by crop category
Sources: See the appendix.
12This value was calculated based on Ramankutty et al. (2008), who reported that 15 million km2 
of cropland accounted for about 12% of the total ice-free land area in 2000 (which implies that 
there are roughly 125 million km2 of ice-free land area).
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Further, the total area devoted to pulses, fiber crops, and root crops was little 
changed, while the areas under fruit and vegetable crops both increased fairly 
rapidly (with the latter increasing at an increasing rate). 
While the land area under cereal production increased from 1961 to 2007, 
total harvested area over all crops increased even more, so the share of land de-
voted to cereal production shrank from 67.5% in 1961 to 57.7% in 2007. This 
was a widespread development, such that the harvested area dedicated to cereals 
decreased relative to other crop categories in every region of the world except 
Eastern Europe. The largest changes were in Latin America and North America, 
which reduced the share of their cropland devoted to cereals by 17.6 and 14.0 
percentage points, respectively (Table 2.4). Offsetting this reduction, the same 
two regions devoted relatively more of their land to oil crops, and in both re-
gions nearly all of the increase in land devoted to oil crops is accounted for by 
increased soybean production.
3.2. Changes in Where Crops Are Produced 
Changes in the global crop mix have been accompanied by changes in the 
distribution of production among and within countries and regions. Over the 
past four and a half decades, global cereal output became increasingly concen-
trated in Asia. This region increased its share of global cereal production from 
37.6% in 1961 to 47.2% by 2007, most of which resulted from relatively fast 
growth of wheat and corn production in China.13 Over the same period, North 
American output of cereals grew at about the global average rate, while output 
in the Former Soviet Union and Europe increased at a slower-than-average rate 
(2.0%, 0.6%, and 1.4% per year, respectively). Similar patterns were seen for 
13Here the aggregate production of cereals, fiber crops, fruits, vegetables, roots, and pulses is a 
simple sum of the quantity of production (by weight) of each crop in a particular crop category. 
This measure of the aggregate quantity of production is affected by changes in the composition 
of the aggregate, with subtle but substantive implications for assessing changes in crop produc-
tivity (and, notably, aggregate cereal yields). For example, average wheat yields in Minnesota 
in 2007 were 3.0 tons per hectare while corn yielded 9.8 tons per hectare on average. Forming 
a “total cereals” perspective by simply summing 10 hectares of wheat output (by weight) and 
10 hectares of corn output (by weight) would imply a cereal yield of 6.4 tons per hectare. If all 
the wheat acreage were switched to corn, estimated cereal yields would increase to 9.8 tons per 
hectare, absent any change in the average yield of corn (or wheat). These compositional effects 
will confound efforts to interpret changes in measures of aggregate crop productivity when the 
aggregate quantities of crop output are formed by simply summing the components of the ag-
gregate (as done by FAO and many other analysts). Alston et al. (2010) explore the empirical 
implications of alternative aggregation methods when analyzing productivity developments in 
twentieth century U.S. agriculture.
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other types of crops, with Asia increasing its share of fiber, fruit, and vegetable 
production, again reflecting large increases in Chinese production of these types 
of commodities (Table 2.5). 
In addition to considering geopolitical boundaries, it is also useful to delin-
eate the agricultural landscape according to economic factors. To get a sense of 
how economic development is related to agricultural production, we grouped 
countries into two categories, “lower income” and “upper income,” according to 
their income per person.14 Between 1961 and 2007, the lower-income countries 
increased their share of production of all types of crops except oil crops. These 
14The World Bank (2009) classifies countries according to their 2008 per capita gross national in-
come expressed in U.S. dollars. The income groups are high income, greater than $11,905; upper-
middle income, $3,856-$11,905; lower-middle income, $976-$3,855; and low income, less than 
$976. To simplify the presentation, we group the low and lower-middle income countries into one 
category called “lower income” and the upper-middle and high income countries into a second 
aggregate called “upper income.” It may be helpful to keep in mind that the upper-income group 
includes Brazil and Russia while China and India are included in the lower-income group. 
Sources: See the appendix.
Table 2.4. Share of cropland devoted to various crop types, by region
Region Year Fiber Fruits Vegetables Roots Pulses 
Oil 
Crops Cereals 
  (percentage) 
North 
America 
1961 5.6 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.7 18.0 72.5 
2007 3.2 0.9 1.1 0.5 2.6 33.3 58.5 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
1961 7.2 3.6 2.2 5.2 9.2 13.7 58.9 
2007 1.7 5.2 2.1 3.7 6.4 39.5 41.4 
Europe 
1961 1.0 7.7 4.0 8.3 6.6 3.9 68.4 
2007 0.6 7.6 3.3 2.6 1.7 18.0 66.2 
Former 
Soviet 
Union 
1961 2.8 1.2 1.3 6.0 2.9 6.4 79.4 
2007 2.5 1.9 2.0 5.0 1.8 13.9 72.9 
Africa 
1961 4.5 4.3 2.0 8.3 7.1 16.8 57.1 
2007 2.6 4.5 2.9 12.0 10.5 13.7 53.9 
Asia 
1961 4.3 1.6 3.0 4.1 9.3 12.8 65.0 
2007 3.9 4.0 6.9 3.3 6.9 18.2 56.8 
Oceania 
1961 0.2 2.2 1.0 2.0 0.4 4.4 89.8 
2007 0.6 1.8 0.7 1.2 6.0 7.8 81.9 
World 
1961 4.0 2.6 2.5 5.0 6.7 11.8 67.5 
2007 3.0 3.9 4.3 4.5 6.0 20.6 57.7 
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countries markedly increased their share of fruits, vegetables, cereals, fiber, and 
root crops. By 2007, lower-income countries produced 55.1% of the world’s fruits 
(by weight), up from 34.1% in 1961. Indeed, the global growth in the quantity 
of fruit production was driven by a 361% increase in fruit production by lower-
income countries (most of which occurred in the richer countries of this group). 
The lower-income countries also increased their share of vegetable output from 
47.3% of production by weight in 1961 to 72.3% in 2007. By contrast, the upper-
income countries increased only their share of oil crop production, from 51.3% 
to 56.2%, largely reflecting changes in Brazil.
The spatial concordance between (changes in) crop area and crop output are 
not always close. For example, in 2007 nearly 44% of the world’s corn output 
came from North America while that region accounted for only 23.0% of the 
area devoted to corn. More strikingly, China increased its global share of wheat 
Table 2.5. Share of world crop production, by commodity type, 1961 
versus 2007
Sources: See the appendix.
Region Year Fiber Fruits Vegetables Roots Pulses 
Oil 
Crops Cereals
  (percentage) 
North 
America 
1961 20.7 10.0 9.1 3.5 2.8 19.4 20.6 
2007 15.5 5.1 4.5 3.1 10.3 13.3 19.8 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
1961 12.1 16.7 4.1 7.1 8.6 7.9 5.4 
2007 6.2 20.5 4.5 7.8 11.2 17.6 7.4 
Europe 
1961 3.6 30.7 21.6 30.3 9.6 9.8 16.5 
2007 1.7 12.6 7.6 8.5 5.5 8.3 11.7 
Former 
Soviet 
Union 
1961 13.8 2.9 8.3 18.5 9.0 10.4 13.5 
2007 6.5 2.2 4.4 9.8 3.8 4.3 6.7 
Africa 1961 7.9 13.9 6.1 10.5 8.7 15.4 5.3 
2007 6.0 12.6 6.2 28.4 18.9 5.6 6.3 
Asia 1961 42.0 24.5 50.3 29.7 61.0 36.3 37.6 
2007 63.2 45.9 72.3 41.8 48.3 50.1 47.2 
Oceania 1961 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.1 
2007 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.5 2.1 0.8 1.0 
Lower 
Income 
1961 48.9 34.1 47.3 37.6 67.6 48.7 37.6 
2007 66.1 55.1 72.3 69.4 65.5 43.8 51.0 
Upper 
Income 
1961 51.1 65.8 52.7 62.3 32.3 51.3 62.4 
2007 33.9 44.9 27.7 30.6 34.5 56.2 49.0 
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production from 6.4% in 1961 to 18.1% in 2007, while its share of land devoted 
to wheat shrank slightly. Such differences in output and area shares reflect differ-
ences in average yields (land productivity) across regions. They also reinforce the 
findings previously mentioned of the substantial spatial relocation in cropped 
area worldwide, pointing to even greater movement in the location of production 
for specific crops both among and within countries. This movement has many 
important economic implications, not least in relation to understanding the fun-
damental forces driving observed changes in (aggregate) crop production and 
productivity estimates.15 
Between 1961 and 2007, the world’s fruit and vegetable production area be-
came more concentrated in Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa (Table 2.6). Asia 
now accounts for 45.5% of the land devoted to fruit production and 71.5% of the 
15A more in-depth assessment of productivity developments worldwide and in specific countries 
is provided in the following chapters. 
Table 2.6. Share of world crop area, by commodity type, 1961 versus 2007
Sources: See the appendix.
Region Year Fiber Fruits Vegetables Roots Pulses 
Oil 
Crops Cereals
 (percentage) 
North 
America 
1961 16.4 4.8 6.5 1.7 1.3 17.9 12.6 
2007 11.9 2.6 2.7 1.2 4.7 17.8 11.2 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
1961 11.8 9.2 5.8 7.0 9.1 7.6 5.8 
2007 5.8 13.4 4.9 8.1 10.5 19.1 7.1 
Europe 
1961 2.8 33.7 18.1 18.7 11.1 3.7 11.3 
2007 1.4 14.3 5.6 4.3 2.1 6.4 8.4 
Former 
Soviet 
Union 
1961 10.8 7.0 8.3 18.7 6.7 8.4 18.2 
2007 7.8 4.7 4.4 10.4 2.7 6.2 11.7 
Africa 
1961 11.6 17.7 8.4 17.4 11.1 14.8 8.8 
2007 14.0 18.7 10.6 42.8 27.7 10.6 15.0 
Asia 
1961 46.6 26.8 52.4 36.2 60.6 47.1 42.0 
2007 58.7 45.5 71.5 32.8 50.5 39.2 43.9 
Oceania 
1961 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 1.3 
2007 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.9 0.7 2.7 
Lower 
Income 
1961 56.9 37.2 55.1 52.4 70.7 59.7 46.6 
2007 71.6 60.4 78.2 76.1 77.4 48.8 56.0 
Upper 
Income 
1961 43.1 62.8 44.8 47.5 29.3 40.3 53.4 
2007 28.4 39.6 21.7 23.8 22.5 51.2 44.0 
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land devoted to vegetable production, versus 26.8% and 52.4% in 1961, respec-
tively. This change resulted mostly from increases in Asian fruit production area 
rather than from decreases elsewhere. Europe’s fruit area decreased by 18.5% 
overall over the period, the net result of a 30.5% decrease in Western Europe 
and a 62.3% increase in Eastern Europe.
Over the same period, Asia increased its vegetable production area by a 
remarkable 202.4%. Increased vegetable area in China (18.3 million additional 
hectares) contributed to this change, although Asia without China still more 
than doubled its land devoted to vegetable production. A similar percentage in-
crease in vegetable land area was seen in Africa (179.2%), although the continent 
only managed to keep pace with worldwide increases, maintaining a global share 
of production of slightly more than 6% during both periods. 
3.3. Global Crop Production: An Economic View  
In the preceding analyses, the crop categories used to describe changes in 
the cropped areas and amounts produced were based on quantities (by weight) 
of crop production aggregated into standard crop categories conceived on the ba-
sis of the biology of each crop (e.g., cereals, fruits, root crops, and so on). In this 
section we re-aggregate the crop quantities into crop categories conceived on the 
basis of the per unit value of each crop. 
To conduct our analysis of the shifting landscape of crops grouped on eco-
nomic criteria, all 157 crops (and crop products) in the FAO database (FAOSTAT) 
were classified into three groups, low, medium, and high unit-valued crops ac-
cording to their average international price during 1999-2001 as reported by 
Wood-Sichra (2005).16 Crop values ranged from about $20 per metric ton for 
sugarcane to nearly $4,500 per metric ton for vanilla. Acreage in low unit-valued 
crops is dominated by the cereals (wheat, corn, rice, and barley) and soybeans, 
which account for about 70% of the area in low-value crops. The most important 
high unit-valued crops (by area) were cotton, coffee, sesame seeds, cocoa, tobacco, 
and tea while the acreage in medium unit-valued crops was dominated by com-
modities such as dry beans, various peas, pulses, groundnuts, and olives. 
16Prices reported by Wood-Sichra are the 1999-2001 average international prices used by FAO to 
form their production indices (see http://faostat.fao.org/site/612/default.aspx). Crops with an average 
price greater than $700 per metric ton were classified as high-value crops, while those with prices  
under $250 per metric ton were classified as low-value crops. Most livestock products would fall in the 
high-valued class, but here we limit our analysis to a consideration of plant products (not least because 
area under production is a more straightforward concept for crops versus livestock production).
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Between 1961 and 2007, the global share of total cropped area devoted to 
low- and high-value crop production increased by about the same percent-
age, 24.2% and 28.5%, respectively. Over the same period, the area devoted 
to medium-value commodities increased by 68.8% (Table 2.7). Thus, there 
was a slight shift toward production of medium-value crops, and that shift 
was evident in both lower- and upper-income countries. However, the nature 
of the change was different for different types of countries: the importance 
of medium-value crops increased in the upper-income countries in part be-
cause of reductions in high-value crop area, while lower-income countries 
increased the area of all three classes of crops. This analysis reveals that the 
decline in harvested area in the Former Soviet Union and Europe resulted 
from decreases in area under low-value crops (by 38.9 and 20.7 million hect-
ares, respectively) combined with small increases in the area under medium- 
Table 2.7. Area by crop value class and region, 1961 and 2007
Sources: See the appendix.
Region Year 
Value Class 
Low Medium High 
  (million ha) 
North America 
1961 97.4 3.3 7.2 
2007 115.6 10.4 5.2 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
1961 51.3 7.9 13.2 
2007 115.1 12.1 10.6 
Europe 1961 91.2 16.5 2.1 
2007 70.5 19.1 2.2 
Former Soviet 
Union 
1961 142.7 4.3 2.6 
2007 103.8 5.0 3.1 
Asia 1961 333.6 58.7 24.4 
2007 421.1 95.1 39.6 
Africa 1961 76.5 16.0 11.3 
2007 149.1 36.8 17.1 
Oceania 1961 9.7 0.2 0.1 
2007 21.5 2.0 0.4 
World Total 1961 802.9 106.9 60.9 
2007 996.4 180.4 78.2 
Lower Income 1961 380.3 70.0 35.2 
2007 548.5 126.2 56.6 
Upper Income 1961 422.6 36.9 25.7 
2007 448.0 54.2 21.6 
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and high-value commodities. Nevertheless, low-value crop area increased 
overall because of substantial increases in every other region.
4. AN AGROCLIMATIC PERSPECTIVE ON CROP LANDSCAPES
The spatial lens through which we have examined patterns of agricul-
tural production is explicitly geopolitical. Both the national and subnational 
production data that underpin our analysis are collected and reported accord-
ing to administrative (geopolitical) boundaries that, while not arbitrary, are 
demarked with little or no consideration of the agroecological variation that 
directly affects crop location choices and the production and productivity po-
tentials of these crops. Thus, considering crop production totals aggregated 
over geopolitical space masks significant spatial heterogeneity within these ag-
gregates that can have important policy and practical consequences.
To illustrate this issue, consider two countries: country A has spatially 
uniform growing conditions for its 200,000 hectares of rain-fed corn that each 
yield around 1.5 tons per hectare, while country B contains large extents of 
more arid areas where 160,000 hectares of production yield a meager 700 kg 
per hectare under rain-fed production and other more-favored areas where 
around 40,000 hectares yield 4.7 tons per hectare under irrigation. Both coun-
tries report identical national corn production statistics: 200,000 hectares of 
corn averaging around 1.5 tons per hectare (Table 2.8, Panel a). While the 
reported corn yields for both countries are identical, this masks the spatial 
heterogeneity inherent in these geopolitical aggregates, thereby compromising 
efforts to understand the factors that affect productive performance and varia-
tions in productivity over time and among countries. 
For example, consider two adjacent countries that equally share 400,000 
hectares of corn across a well-watered plain cut by national boundaries that 
yield some 2 tons per hectare. Additionally one has a further 200,000 hect-
ares under dryland conditions yielding 800 kg per hectare, while the second 
has some 50,000 hectares of land under irrigation yielding 5 tons per hect-
are. When presented as national aggregates, their respective average yields 
of 1.4 tons per hectare and 2.6 tons per hectare suggest quite different pro-
duction contexts (with perhaps little scope for technology spillover between 
these two countries) (Panel b of Table 2.8). Yet the common agroecological 
domain they share is the largest single productive resource, and so the pro-
ductivity potentials of the two countries have much more in common than 
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would be inferred from a consideration of yield relativities absent the agro-
ecological information.
Panels a through d of Figure 2.2 show the year 2000 estimates of the global 
crop geographies for corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans, respectively. In these plots, 
the larger the share of cropped area per pixel in the indicated crop, the darker 
the shade. Panel e of Figure 2.2 shows 16 agroecological zones based on moisture 
and temperature. To reveal some of the within-country variation in the produc-
tion landscape of agriculture, we overlaid the agroclimatic representation on the 
respective 2000 global crop geographies for corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans to 
generate production area and quantity estimates for these four crops stratified by 
agroclimatic regions within countries. For each crop this generated a spatial re-
grouping of the area and quantity data for a total of 785 agroclimatic-by-country 
classifications. To simplify the presentation of these data, the countries were re-ag-
Table 2.8. Spatial aggregation bias: geopolitical versus agroecological units
Source: Developed by the authors.
Geopolitical Aggregation 
Agroecological 
Aggregation Implications 
Panel a  
Country A:  
    200,000 ha, 1.5 ton ha-1  
 
 
Country B:  
    200,000 ha, 1.5 ton ha-1 
Country A:  
Warm, wet lowlands – 
200,000 ha, 1.5 ton ha-1 
 
Country B:  
Hot, semi-arid, poor soils – 
160,000 ha, 700 kg ha-1 
Hot, irrigated, good soils – 
40,000 ha, 4.7 ton ha-1 
Geopolitical aggregations 
infer similar production 
contexts. Agroecological 
aggregations reveal large 
differences. 
Panel b 
 
Country A: 
   400,000 ha, 1.4 ton ha-1 
 
 
 
 
Country B: 
   250,000 ha, 2.6 ton ha-1     
Country A: 
Warm, wet plains—
200,000 ha, 2 ton ha-1 
Hot, semi-arid— 
200,000 ha,  800 kg ha-1 
 
Country B: 
Warm, wet plains—
200,000 ha, 2 ton ha-1 
Warm, irrigated, good 
soils—50,000 ha, 5 ton ha-1 
Geopolitical aggregations 
infer dissimilar 
production contexts. 
Agroecological 
aggregations reveal 
extensive commonalities. 
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Figure 2.2. Panels a and b. Global agroclimatic zones and year 2000 crop 
geographies 
Sources: Crop allocation data are documented by You and Wood (2005). Global agroecological 
zones were modified from Sebastian (2006).
Panel a: SPAM Modeled 
Wheat Distribution, 2000
Panel b: SPAM Modeled 
Rice Distribution, 2000
Thousand Ha. per
Grid Cell
0
<20
20 to 40
40 to 70
70 to 110
110 to 180
>180
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Figure 2.2. Panels c and d. Global agroclimatic zones and year 2000 crop 
geographies 
Sources: Crop allocation data are documented by You and Wood (2005). Global agroecological 
zones were modified from Sebastian (2006).
Panel c: SPAM Modeled
Corn Distribution, 2000
Panel d: SPAM Modeled
Soybean Distribution, 2000
Thousand Ha. per
Grid Cell
0
<20
20 to 40
40 to 70
70 to 110
110 to 180
>180
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Figure 2.2. Panel e. Global agroclimatic zones and year 2000 crop 
geographies 
Sources: Crop allocation data are documented by You and Wood (2005). Global agroecological 
zones were modified from Sebastian (2006).
gregated into two geopolitical groups, lower income and upper income (as defined 
in Section 3), and the pixilated crop geographies within countries were collapsed 
into three agroclimatic groups: temperate, subtropical, and tropical. 
Figure 2.3 summarizes the results of this analysis, with Panel a showing 
the global area and production shares for each crop for the year 2000, strati-
fied into three agroclimatic regions. Panels b and c preserve the structure of 
Panel a but include only lower- and upper-income country area and produc-
tion shares, respectively. The percentages in brackets under the area and 
output labels at the bottom of these two panels indicate the respective lower- 
and upper-income country crop shares overall. The preponderance of global 
rice production in 2000—be it assessed in terms of area harvested or quan-
tities produced—occurred in tropical or subtropical areas, whereas global 
wheat production and soybean production were split more evenly between 
temperate and tropical areas. Two-thirds (66%) of the world’s corn produc-
tion came from temperate areas, which accounted for just 43% of the global 
Panel e: Global Agroecological Zones
Arid
Tropical
Subtropical
Temperate
BorealTropical
Subtropical
Temperate
Semi-arid
Tropical
Subtropical
Temperate
Sub-humid
Tropical
Subtropical
Temperate
Humid
Tropical
Subtropical
Temperate
Irrigated
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Figure 2.3. Corn, soybean, rice, and wheat production and area by 
agroclimatic zone
Sources: Developed by the authors using data from FAO and Sebastian (2006).
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area under corn. This implies that corn yields in temperate zones are much 
higher on average than corn yields in tropical and subtropical areas, which 
accounted for 57% of the global area in corn but produced only 34% of the 
world’s corn output. The temperate area and output shares for global soybean 
production were more evenly split, at 51% and 56% respectively, implying 
a comparatively small variation in average soybean yields in tropical versus 
temperate areas.17  
A comparison of the data represented in Panels b and c is revealing. As one 
might expect, less than 40% of the lower-income country areas planted to all 
four crops were located in temperate zones, and only 8% of the rice area is clas-
sified as temperate (Panel b). In contrast, most of the corn, soybean, and wheat 
cropped area in the upper-income countries was in temperate zones, although 
there was a significant share (65%) of rice acreage located in tropical and sub-
tropical landscapes (Panel c). Even with this rather coarse representation of ag-
roclimatic patterns of production, it is evident that the agroclimatic landscape of 
agriculture is substantially more heterogeneous in lower-income countries than it 
is in higher-income countries. 
Comparison of the area shares with output shares reveals that all four com-
modities have higher yields in temperate areas than in tropical areas in both 
upper- and lower-income countries. This indicates that at least some of the 
productivity disparity between upper- and lower-income countries is driven 
by agroecology. As a result, inter-regional comparisons of partial productivity 
metrics are often implicitly qualified by assumptions about the comparability of 
agroecologies across regions. Further, the ever-changing spatial footprint of agri-
cultural production requires that inter-temporal comparisons—even within the 
same country or region—be subject to similar caveats. 
5. CONCLUSION
Subtle but substantial forces shape the spatial landscape of global agricul-
ture. The comparative stability of total harvested area for many crops (and, nota-
bly, the cereals) worldwide over the latter half of the twentieth century belies the 
significant spatial relocation in crop production. Our analysis shows that global 
agriculture is spatially mobile, both over the long run stretching back several 
17Global soybean production is highly concentrated in just a few countries. In 2007, Brazil, Ar-
gentina, China, and the United States collectively accounted for 88% of world soybean produc-
tion, and 80% of area.
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centuries (and into prehistory) and during more recent decades. Further, both 
the location of cropped areas and the quantity of crop production vary among 
countries as well as across (agroecological) areas within countries. 
The sizeable shifts in the spatial structure of agriculture revealed by our 
analysis adds substantial complexity to understanding the fundamental forces 
that affect changes in past (and potential future) agricultural productivity. This is 
particularly so when the location of crop production shifts over time and among 
agroecologies both within and among countries. A distinguishing attribute of 
agriculture is that its production processes are greatly affected by a host of natu-
ral inputs, such as sunlight, temperature, and rainfall (including daily, weekly, 
monthly, and yearly averages as well as variations in the intensity and incidence 
of these factors among and within these periods of time), day length, and wind 
speed. Typically these inputs go unmeasured, at least by economists trying to 
quantify agricultural production and productivity trends. Putting agriculture in a 
spatial-cum-agroecological setting, as well as tracking movements in that setting, 
provides for a more meaningful assessment of productivity trends, which are 
typically assessed at much coarser spatial scales, such as the state, country, or 
regional aggregates reported throughout the remainder of this book. 
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS
Many of the results presented in this chapter required extensive manipula-
tion of the referenced datasets. The following subsections provide additional de-
tails on how the data were processed.
Calculation of Production and Area Shares
The base area and production data are from FAO. Country designations used 
in both periods pertain to 2008 geopolitical boundaries. Country-specific values 
were estimated using a decomposition procedure for states that were previously 
part of a statistical or national aggregation. Subnational data were obtained for 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Foreign Agricultural Service (2008). Otherwise, data were estimated using the 
decomposition procedure for a number of countries, including those that made 
up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Montenegro, the Belgium-Luxembourg 
statistical unit, and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). This decomposition allows 
for direct comparison of current and historical values.
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Countries were aggregated into regions using a modified version of country 
aggregations developed by Wood-Sichra (2005). In order to render an analysis 
that is consistent with the remainder of the volume, the values presented in Sec-
tion 2 include FSU separately. Thus, FSU production and area are netted out of 
both Europe and Asia. 
Calculations Using Global Land-Use Data
The base data are described by Ramankutty et al. (2008) and Ramankutty 
and Foley (1999) and were downloaded from the SAGE Web site (www.sage.
wisc.edu) in May of 2009. The pixilated land-use data in the 2000 series from 
Ramankutty et al. are based on an underlying set of cropland and pasture inven-
tory data consisting of observations for 15,990 administrative (i.e., national and 
subnational) units worldwide, compared with information from just 348 admin-
istrative units that were used by Ramankutty and Foley to estimate crop cover 
for the 1700-1992 period. In addition, the pixilated data in the 2000 series are 
reported on a 5 arc-minute grid, which we aggregated to a 30 arc-minute grid 
for consistency and to facilitate processing with the pre-2000 series. These data 
are intended to represent “permanent croplands” (excluding shifting cultivation), 
which corresponds to FAO’s notion of “arable lands and permanent crops.” Al-
though the SAGE authors make no claims about the conformability of their two 
series, we implicitly assume that the year 2000 values are a continuation of the 
1700-1992 series. Given the inherent limitations of the underlying administra-
tive data and the long period of backcasting involved to generate the 1700-1992 
series, any results derived from these pixilated data should be used with cau-
tion, but we nonetheless deem them informative of likely broad-brush, long-run 
changes in the global landscape of agriculture.
To calculate centroids, a modified version of the HarvestChoice raster-to-
country mappings from the International Rice Research Institute (2008) was 
used to assign the SAGE data to countries. The countries were assigned to re-
gions using a modified version of region definitions developed by Wood-Sichra 
(2005). Grid cell sizes were approximated using the Haversine formula as given 
by Sinnott (1984) after Snyder (1987), and the center of gravity (“centroid”) of 
each region was then calculated by weighting the product of the estimated area 
and the estimated portion under cropping for each cell. 
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CHAPTER 3
Global Patterns of Crop Yields and 
Other Partial Productivity Measures 
and Prices
Julian M. Alston, Jason M. Beddow, and Philip G. Pardey
1. INTRODUCTION
More than 50 years ago Schultz (1953) and Griliches (1961) suggested that 
an interest in productivity stems from more fundamental concerns about the 
rate and sources of growth in output. The relative rates of growth of the sup-
ply and demand for food, feed, and fiber have far-reaching economic and social 
consequences, most readily observed through changes in commodity prices.1 
These issues have been in the background for some time—as food and fiber have 
Julian Alston is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Univer-
sity of California, Davis, and associate director, Science and Technology, at the University of Cali-
fornia Agricultural Issues Center. Jason Beddow is a PhD candidate in the Department of Applied 
Economics at the University of Minnesota. Philip Pardey is a professor in the Department of Ap-
plied Economics, University of Minnesota, and director of the International Science and Technol-
ogy Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center.
The authors are grateful for research assistance provided by Connie Chan-Kang. The work for 
this project was supported by the University of California, the University of Minnesota, the 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and 
the USDA’s Economic Research Service, Agricultural Research Service, and CSREES National 
Research Initiative. 
1Economists have long been interested in analyzing commodity price trends and the sources 
of change in these trends. Among the earliest such studies in the U.S. literature are articles 
by Veblen (1892 and 1893) on (relative) wheat price trends and a 1922 article by Taylor titled 
“The Decline of Prices of Cereals.” In his 1945 book Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Schultz 
explored the nature and causes of commodity price variability during the first half of the 
twentieth century, notably in a chapter titled “The Unequal Growth of the Supply and Demand 
for Farm Products.” Johnson (1948 and 1975) addressed similar themes, and Hathaway (1959) 
revisited Schultz’s 1945 work. Tomek and Robinson (1977) provide a comprehensive review of 
the literature on agricultural prices to that point in time. 
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seemed abundant and other agricultural issues have dominated the media and 
policy debates—but the recent turbulence in food commodity markets reminded 
commentators and policymakers that food prices matter and that their causes 
deserve attention. 
During the past few years we have seen soaring food and commodity pric-
es globally and an increase in the dismal tally of hungry people in the world.2 
Driven in part by the demand for biofuels, stimulated by high and rising oil 
prices and government responses to them, prices of corn and soybeans also 
rose rapidly to historical highs (at least in nominal terms) in early 2008.3 The 
rising prices of these and other staple commodities, in particular wheat and 
rice, were also stimulated by the growing demand for food in India and China 
fueled by the general economic growth that had contributed to a rundown 
of grain stocks over the previous several years. These factors, combined with 
some unfavorable weather in important wheat-producing regions in Russia and 
Australia, constituted the “perfect storm” that gave rise to the spike in grain 
prices in mid-2008. 
In a reversal of the rapid rise in the beginning of the year, between July and 
November 2008 the price of oil fell back to around $50. Prices of food and feed 
grains have also fallen significantly. Consequently, and especially in view of 
financial and stock market events since mid-September 2008, the attention of 
many commentators has shifted from the food price crisis to the global financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, food commodity prices remain high relative to the experience 
of the past several decades, and concerns continue to be raised about the future 
prospects for food prices. In December 2007, The Economist magazine published a 
briefing note titled “Cheap No More” with the leader “Rising incomes in Asia and 
ethanol subsidies in America have put an end to a long era of falling food prices.” 
This view has been echoed in a range of other media and at a host of symposia on 
the causes and consequences of the so-called food price crisis.  
2In September 2008, the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) released a 
provisional set of estimates (FAO 2008) indicating that “the number of undernourished people 
in 2007 increased by 75 million over and above FAO’s estimate of 848 million undernourished 
in 2003-05, with much of this increase attributed to high food prices. This brings the number 
of undernourished people worldwide to 923 million in 2007, of which 907 million [are] in the 
developing world.” More recently, FAO (2009) estimated that an additional 100 million people are 
now undernourished, increasing the total to over one billion.
3The price of Brent crude oil reached an all-time high of almost $145 per barrel in July 2008—
almost twice the value in July 2007, which itself was historically high. The oil price cited here was 
obtained from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/prices.html on November 16, 2008.
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Most of the discussions have focused on the demand side of the story, em-
phasizing the role of economic growth in the fast-growing economies of Asia 
coupled with the new demand for biofuels, and treating the supply side as given. 
In this chapter we use graphical approaches in conjunction with newly compiled 
data to consider the nature of the long-term growth in the supply of food and its 
principal determinants to see what may be implied for the availability and price 
of food over the coming decades. Key to our understanding of these longer-run 
trends is to distinguish between possible structural shifts and realignments in 
the relative growth of global food supply and demand from transient factors that 
contribute to shorter-run instability in food prices. We document a global slow-
down in growth of agricultural productivity and commodity yields, and thus in 
the long-term downward trend of real food commodity prices.4 Before turning to 
the productivity evidence, we review trends in food prices throughout the twen-
tieth century. This review helps not only to place recent commodity price spikes 
in a longer-run context but also to provide indirect evidence on productivity pat-
terns and their main consequences.
2. TRENDS IN COMMODITY PRICES
Over the past 50 years and longer, the supply of food commodities has 
grown faster than the demand, in spite of increasing population and per capita 
incomes. Consequently, the real (deflated) prices of food commodities have 
steadily trended down. Figure 3.1 shows long-term trends in indexes of average 
annual U.S. prices of major food and feed commodities (rice, wheat, corn, and 
soybeans) for the period 1924 to 2008, with an insert to show price movements 
over more recent months. These U.S. price indexes can be used as indicators of 
world market prices of these commodities. The commodity price indexes gen-
erally move together over the long term, but with significant differences over 
shorter periods, especially for rice. 
These indexes all start at 100 in the base year of 1924. After a great deal of 
movement over the next 45 years, by the late 1960s the prices of wheat, soy-
beans, and corn had roughly returned to a nominal value of 100, but the rice 
4In making this assessment we drew on a range of evidence and used the graphical techniques 
recommended by Waugh, who wrote, “Fancy, super-refined mathematics and electronic computa-
tions are wonderful things, but they are of little practical use unless they describe relationships 
that actually exist in the real world. One of the main ways to find out about these relationships is 
through graphics” (1966, p. 1). Evident structural changes, especially in the price and crop yield 
series, limit the applicability of formal econometric approaches to analyzing these trends.
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price remained much higher. The intervening years included a period of a gen-
eral downward trend during the 1920s and through the early 1930s (including 
the effects of the Great Depression), and some rapid growth during the latter 
1930s and early 1940s (including the effects of World War II), after which the 
prices fluctuated around a relatively flat trend. The commodity price spike in the 
early 1970s brought about a distinct shift in the pattern.5 Following that price 
spike, the trends were again essentially flat in nominal terms but at a higher level 
than before 1970 (perhaps slightly trending down) until the recent price spike. 
Since 1975 the prices of all four commodities have tended to move together more 
closely than in the previous decades.
Figure 3.2 shows the price indexes for wheat, corn, and soybeans over the 
period 1924 to 2008, expressed in real terms by deflating by the index of prices 
paid by farmers. (Rice was omitted to improve the clarity of the plots. The rice 
prices follow a similar overall pattern to the commodity prices shown here.) 
Figure 3.1. Nominal U.S. prices of corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat, 1924-2008
Sources:  Compiled by the authors with data from Olmstead and Rhode 2006, FAOSTAT Database 
and USDA-NASS Agricultural Prices.
Notes:  Data in the body of the graph represent annual averages of prices paid to farmers. Inset data 
are corresponding monthly average prices.
5Eckstein and Heien (1978) examined the food price inflation of 1973 and concluded that, in 
approximate rank order of importance, the causes were domestic monetary policy, government 
acreage restrictions, the Soviet grain deal, world economic conditions, devaluation of the dollar, 
and price control policies. Our emphasis in this chapter is on the long-term trends rather than 
the short-term deviations from these trends.
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The deflated series provides some perspective on the latest price spike, in which 
commodity prices roughly doubled in real terms compared with the 1970s and 
mid-1930s when they more than doubled. Moreover, at their recent peak, real 
commodity prices fell well short of the prices that prevailed during the previ-
ous price spikes. In the case of corn, for example, in real terms the peak price 
in June 2008 was 50% below the peak price in 1974, 66% below the peak price 
in 1936, and nearly 80% below the peak price in 1947. Questions remain about 
whether the general path of the previous price trend will be restored. 
The longer trends are of interest, too. In real terms, commodity prices 
trended up generally (albeit with some major fluctuations during and after the 
Great Depression) from 1929 through the end of World War II, after which they 
have trended generally down. This downward trend was interrupted by the ma-
jor price spike in the 1970s and again at the end of the series by the latest price 
spike. The trend lines in the figure show the real prices declining at different 
rates during the period 1950-1970, as they converged toward equality. Then fol-
lowing the 1970s price spike, over the period 1975-2005, they trended down at 
roughly equal rates.
Figure 3.2. Real U.S. prices of corn, soybeans, and wheat, 1924-2008
Sources: Compiled by the authors with data from Olmstead and Rhode 2006, FAOSTAT Database 
and USDA 2009b.
Notes: Nominal prices were deflated using an index of farm input prices. Trend lines represent lines 
of OLS best fit where the respective commodity price was regressed against a linear time trend 
during each period.
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Table 3.1 includes measures of rates of change in real and nominal prices 
of the four commodities over the entire period and several subperiods. The 
long-term trend in deflated prices has been remarkable. Over the 55 years be-
tween 1950 and 2005, in real terms rice prices fell at an average annual rate of 
2.9%. On average, wheat prices declined by 2.7% per year, soybean prices by 
2.1% per year, and corn prices by 3.2% per year. After the jump in the early 
1970s, over the 30 years between 1975 and 2005, in real terms rice prices fell 
at an average rate of 4.1% per year, wheat prices by 4.0% per year, soybean 
prices by 3.2% per year, and corn prices by 4.7% per year. These changes in 
prices of staple commodities are cumulative, enduring, and economically im-
Table 3.1. Average annual percentage changes (% per year) in U.S. 
commodity prices, 1866-2008
Sources: Calculated by the authors based on data compiled from Olmstead and Rhode 2006, 
FAOSTAT Database and USDA 2008b.
Note: Deflated prices were computed by deflating nominal commodity prices by an index of farm 
input prices.
 Commodity 
Period Corn Wheat Rice Soybeans 
Nominal Prices 
1866-2008 1.25 0.84 n.a. n.a. 
1924-2008 1.55 2.03 2.03 1.56 
 1950-2005 0.46 0.94 0.74 1.60 
  1950-1970 -0.67 -2.04 0.08 0.72 
  1975-2005 -0.87 -0.20 -0.29 0.64 
   1990-2005 -1.02 1.66 0.90 0.25 
   2000-2005 1.07 5.38 6.03 5.07 
 1950-2008 1.62 2.11 2.03 2.28 
  1975-2008 1.30 1.97 2.06 1.91 
   1975-1990 -0.72 -2.05 -1.47 1.03 
   1990-2008 2.98 5.32 5.01 2.65 
   2000-2008 9.29 12.22 13.35 8.66 
Deflated Prices 
1924-2008 -1.70 -1.22 -1.22 -1.69 
 1950-2005 -3.20 -2.72 -2.91 -2.05 
  1950-1970 -2.67 -4.04 -1.92 -1.29 
  1975-2005 -4.66 -3.99 -4.08 -3.15 
   1990-2005 -3.43 -0.75 -1.51 -2.16 
   2000-2005 -2.30 2.01 2.66 1.70 
 1950-2008 -2.27 -1.79 -1.87 -1.62 
  1975-2008 -2.90 -2.23 -2.14 -2.29 
   1975-1990 -5.89 -7.22 -6.64 -4.15 
   1990-2008 -0.41 1.93 1.62 -0.74 
   2000-2008 4.09 7.01 8.15 3.45 
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portant.6 For comparison, Table 3.1 also includes price trends for the periods 
ending 2008, which includes the price increases that started in about 2006. 
The long-run trend of declining real prices since 1975 is muted by the recent 
price increases but not reversed. 
It is useful to split the period 1975-2005 into two subperiods, before and after 
1990. This break point was identified in previous work by Alston et al. (2010) look-
ing at U.S. productivity patterns. For all four commodities the real rate of decline of 
prices was substantially slower over the period 1990-2005 than for the previous pe-
riod 1975-1990 and for the 30-year period 1975-2005. This slowdown of the rate of 
price decline was more pronounced for the food grains, wheat and rice, than for the 
feed commodities, corn and soybeans, consistent with a faster rate of productivity 
growth in the feed commodities that have disproportionately benefited from private 
research by biotech firms and seed companies. Toward the end of the period, but 
still before the onset of the recent price spike that became evident after 2005, the 
rate of decline of real prices slowed even more—in fact, between 2000 and 2005, 
prices increased in real terms for rice, soybeans, and wheat. Prices increased mark-
edly for all four commodities after 2005, including the recent price spike.
In summary, the period since World War II includes three distinct subperi-
ods. First, over the 20-year-period 1950-1970, prices for rice, corn, and soybeans 
declined relatively slowly, while wheat prices declined fairly rapidly. Next, fol-
lowing the price spike of the early 1970s, over the years 1975-1990, real prices 
for all four commodities declined relatively rapidly. Finally, over the years 1990-
2005, the rate of price decline slowed for all four commodities, especially toward 
the end of that period. The question yet to be resolved is whether, in general, we 
have entered a new era in which real commodity prices will no longer be falling 
rapidly or even a new era of rising real commodity prices.
Figure 3.3 shows some comparable price indexes for field crops, specialty 
crops, and livestock products over the period 1949-2004 for which detailed in-
dex numbers are available from the work of Alston et al. (2010). Panel a shows 
the nominal indexes. The prices of specialty crops have grown both absolutely and 
6As Hulten (1986) and Roeger (1995) illustrate, under certain conditions, the rate of decline of an 
output-input price ratio such as the deflated commodity price series presented here corresponds to 
a dual measure of the rate of multifactor productivity growth, and so the declines in these deflated 
price trends reflect substantial and rapid productivity growth. The correspondence is closer if the 
deflator corresponds more closely to the appropriate price index for the inputs used to produce the 
output. Deflating by the implicit GDP deflator or the consumer price index rather than the index of 
prices paid by farmers for inputs in practice results in generally similar patterns of change overall 
in the real price trends for each commodity (but with differences in some of the details). 
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relative to field crops and livestock products, which have had fairly static nomi-
nal prices for the 20 years prior to 2004 in spite of general input price inflation. 
As discussed by Alston, Sumner, and Vosti (2006), some of the price increases 
for specialty crops might reflect premia for changes in quality, variety, or sea-
sonal availability that were not fully addressed in the indexing procedure. Figure 
3.3, Panel b, shows the same price series deflated by an index of prices paid by 
farmers for inputs. Real prices received by farmers for all crop categories trended 
down, but at different rates. Over the period 1949-2004, in real terms prices for 
field crops fell by 64.5%, prices for livestock fell by 42.7%, and prices for spe-
Figure 3.3. U.S. prices of specialty crops, field crops, and livestock, 1949-2004
Source:  Adapted from Alston and Pardey 2008.
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cialty crops fell by 5.3% (8.6% for vegetables, 3.0% for fruits and nuts, and 0.2% 
for nursery and greenhouse). 
These price trends reflect the fact that global supply has been growing 
faster than global demand, and that supply and demand have been growing at 
different rates for the different categories of products. Here we are focusing on 
the supply side. Growth in supply reflects the increased use of some inputs, 
especially increases in land, water, and chemical inputs (including fuels, fertil-
izers, and pesticides). This is balanced partly by labor savings in many places, 
combined with increases in productivity of inputs. Major increases in produc-
tivity and changes in input combinations around the world and over time have 
been associated with changes in technology, along with other changes that 
contributed to enhanced efficiency of production. 
3. U.S. AND GLOBAL YIELD TRENDS
Table 3.2 includes growth rates of yields for selected U.S. crops, including 
corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans for various time periods. The yield growth accel-
erated in the second half of the twentieth century relative to the first half. But for 
corn, rice, and wheat (and to a lesser extent for soybeans), average annual rates 
of yield growth were much lower in 1990-2008 than in 1950-1990. These U.S. 
yield patterns are consistent with the price patterns discussed previously, but of 
course prices depend on global supply and demand, not just U.S. yields.7
 Crop Yields 
Period  Corn Wheat Rice Soybeans 
1866-2008a 1.30 0.99 1.58 n.a. 
1900-2008a 1.57 1.21 1.50 1.52 
1900-1950a 0.61 0.60 1.33 2.61 
1950-2008 2.40 1.73 1.86 1.04 
1950-1990 2.83 2.18 2.12 1.13 
1990-2008 1.45 0.71 1.19 0.83 
Table 3.2. Rates of growth (% per year) of yield for selected U.S. crops, 
1866-2008
Sources: Calculated by the authors based on data reported in Beddow, Hurley, and Pardey 2009 
derived from Alston and Pardey 2006 and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
a Rice yields start in 1895, soybeans in 1924.
7See Chapter 8 in this volume for more detail on U.S. yield growth and developments generally 
regarding agricultural productivity growth in the United States. Alston et al. (2010, Chapter 5) 
provide even more detail on U.S. agricultural productivity patterns and examine the slowdown in 
crop yields in terms of both the absolute and proportional growth in yields.
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Figure 3.4 plots average global yields for corn, rice, and wheat (in metric 
tons per harvested hectare) since 1961 (the earliest year for which global yield 
estimates are reported by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion [FAO], whence most of these data were drawn). Corn and wheat yields 
each grew by a factor of 2.6 from 1961 to 2007; over the same period, rice 
yields increased by a factor of 2.2. Corresponding annual average rates of yield 
growth are reported in Table 3.3. Separate estimates of average growth rates of 
yields are reported for North America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, 
for high-, middle- and low-income countries, and for the world as a whole, for 
two subperiods: 1961-1990 and 1990-2007.8 The slowdown evident for the 
global averages (Table 3.3) mirrors the slowdown in U.S. crop yield growth (in 
Table 3.2), although the low-income countries have seen increasing rates of 
growth in wheat and rice yields. 
For all four commodities, in both high- and middle-income countries, 
average annual rates of yield growth were lower in 1990-2007 than in 1961-
1990. The growth of wheat yields slowed the most and, for the high-income 
countries as a group, wheat yields barely changed over the 1990-2007 period. 
8Low-income countries are those with a per capita gross national income (GNI) of $975 or less, 
high-income countries are those with a per capita GNI greater than $11,905, and middle-income 
countries are those with a per capita GNI that falls between these values (World Development 
Indicators Database). 
Figure 3.4. Average global yields for selected crops, 1961-2007
Source:  Compiled by the authors from FAOSTAT Database.
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Global corn yields grew during 1990-2007 at an average rate of 1.77% per year 
compared with 2.20% per year for 1961-1990. Likewise, rice yields grew at 
less than 1.0% per year after 1990, less than half their average growth rate for 
the period ending 1990. Again, paralleling productivity developments in the 
United States, the slowdown in crop yields is quite pervasive. In more than 
half of the countries growing these crops, yields for rice, wheat, corn, and soy-
beans grew more slowly during 1990-2007 than during 1961-1990 (Table 3.4). 
More critically, among the most important producers (i.e., the top 10 produc-
ing countries worldwide) the slowdown was generally more widespread than 
among all producing countries. 
The interpretation of average global crop yields is problematic for several rea-
sons. For one, countries located in tropical and temperate regions of the world 
differ considerably in terms of their propensity to plant multiple crops per year, 
and cropping intensities have changed considerably over time for certain regions 
of the world.9 The yield data used here (and by most other observers) report 
9Wood, Sebastian, and Scherr (2000) developed measures of cropping intensities worldwide that 
expressed the annual harvested area as a proportion of total crop land (including land in use 
and fallowed land). Swidden agriculture, for example, relies on maintaining a significant share of 
production in fallow every year (thus having a cropping intensity of less than one) whereas some 
irrigated areas in the tropics can produce up to three crops a year from the same physical area 
(thus having a cropping intensity of three). In 1997, the global average annual cropping intensity 
was estimated to be about 0.8 (Wood, Sebastian, and Scherr 2000, p. 23). In South Asia, with its 
extensive use of irrigation, the average intensity was 1.1, whereas in Western Europe and North 
America the intensities were between 0.6 and 0.7.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT Database and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
Table 3.3. Global yield growth rates (% per year) for selected crops, 1961-2007
 Corn Wheat Rice Soybeans 
Group 
1961-
1990 
1990-
2007 
1961-
1990 
1990-
2007 
1961-
1990 
1990-
2007 
1961-
1990 
1990-
2007 
World 2.20 1.77 2.95 0.52 2.19 0.96 1.79 1.08 
N. America 2.20 1.40 2.23 0.01 1.67 1.54 1.05 0.04 
W. Europe 3.30 1.81 3.31 0.63 0.38 0.55 1.64 0.05 
E. Europe 1.91 0.97 3.18 -1.69 -0.41 1.07 1.90 2.29 
Per capita income        
High  2.34 1.48 2.47 0.06 1.07 0.54 1.14 0.02 
Middle  2.41 2.12 3.23 0.85 2.54 0.81 3.21 2.08 
Low  1.07 0.65 1.32 2.15 1.46 2.16 2.63 0.00 
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yields on the basis of harvested area, which will count the same land twice if it 
is cropped twice in a given calendar year. An alternative is to report yields on the 
basis of arable area, which will count the land area only once per year regardless 
of how often it is cropped. Reporting yields on the basis of harvested area would 
understate the rate of growth in crop yields compared with crop yields mea-
sured on the basis of arable area if the intensity of crop plantings per year had 
increased over time.10  
Another confounding factor when interpreting changes in global or regional 
yield aggregates (as well as national aggregate yields for that matter) is the effects 
of the changing spatial location of production (see also Chapter 2 of this vol-
ume). Table 3.5 illustrates that the location of worldwide wheat production, for 
example, has moved markedly, even since the early 1960s. During the three-year 
period 1961-1963, Russia accounted for 15% of the world’s wheat production 
(35.4 million metric tons) and ranked first among wheat producers worldwide. 
By 2005-2007, Russia had slipped to the world’s fourth-ranked wheat producer, 
accounting for 7.8% (47.4 million metric tons) of world wheat production during 
those years. The massive increases in production by India and, especially, China 
are particularly evident in Table 3.5. These changes in location of production im-
ply changes in average productivity (yields) to the extent that different locations 
have different endowments of soils and climate, different incentives, and differ-
ent technological opportunities.11
10For example, if rice yields averaged 2 tons per harvested hectare in 1961 and doubled to 4 tons 
per harvested hectare by 2007, that would be equivalent to an average annual yield growth of 
1.5% per harvested hectare per year. In contrast, if yields per harvested area doubled from 2 to 4 
tons per hectare from 1961 to 2007 while the cropping intensity also increased from one to two 
crops per calendar year, yields reported on the basis of arable area would have grown from 2 to 8 
tons per arable hectare, or 3.1% per year.
11Olmstead and Rhode (2002) discuss and document this phenomenon in the context of the 
early development of the U.S. wheat industry.
Table 3.4. Percentage (%) of countries with slower yield growth since 1990 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT Database and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
Notes: 155 countries are included for corn, 114 for wheat, 108 for rice, and 55 for soybeans. 
Only countries with area and production data for both periods are included.
Grouping Corn Wheat Rice Soybeans 
All countries 56 78 56 65 
Top 10 producers 60 100 60 78 
Top 25 producers 60 88 48 71 
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Table 3.5. Changing spatial location of global wheat production, 1961-63 
and 2005-07
Source: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT Database and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
Notes: The country designations used in both periods pertain to 2008 geopolitical boundaries. 
For states that were previously part of a statistical or national aggregation, country-specific values 
were estimated using a decomposition procedure when reliable subnational area and production 
data were unavailable. Subnational data were obtained for Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. 
Otherwise, data for a number of countries were estimated using the decomposition procedure, 
including those of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Montenegro, the Belgium-Luxembourg aggregation, and 
the Former Soviet Union.
1961-1963  2005-2007 
Rank Country 
Production 
(mmt) 
Share 
(%) 
 
Rank Country
Production
(mmt) 
Share 
(%) 
1 Russia 35.4 15.0 
 
1 China 103.9 17.0 
2 U.S. 31.5 13.4 
 
2 India 71.0 11.6 
3 China 16.5 7.0 
 
3 U.S. 53.4 8.7 
4 Canada 14.3 6.0 
 
4 Russia 47.4 7.8 
5 France 11.3 4.8 
 
5 France 35.2 5.8 
     
Top 5 Total 109.0 46.3  Top 5 Total 310.8 50.9 
      
6 India 11.3 4.8 
 
6 Canada 23.9 3.9 
7 Ukraine 10.5 4.5 
 
7 Germany 22.5 3.7 
8 Kazakhstan 9.9 4.2 
 
8 Pakistan 22.1 3.6 
9 Italy 8.6 3.7 
 
9 Turkey 19.7 3.2 
10 Turkey 8.6 3.7 
 
10 Australia 16.3 2.7 
     
Top 10 Total 157.9 67.1  Top 10 Total 415.4 68.0 
     
Top 20 Total 201.8 85.7  Top 20 Total 521.9 85.5 
4. LAND AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
Moving beyond crop yields to more broadly construed productivity mea-
sures, global productivity trends show a 2.4-fold increase in aggregate output 
per harvested area since 1961 (equivalent to annual average growth of 2.0% 
per year) and a corresponding 1.7-fold increase (or 1.2% per year growth) in 
aggregate output per agricultural worker. These productivity developments re-
flect a comparatively faster rate of growth in global agricultural output against 
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relatively slower growth in the use of agricultural land and labor (0.3% and 
1.1% per year, respectively).
In parallel with the foregoing global crop yield evidence, the longer-run 
growth in land and labor productivity masks a widespread slowdown in the rate 
of growth of both productivity measures during the post-1989 period compared 
with the previous three decades. Among the world’s top 20 producers (accord-
ing to their 2005 value of agricultural output), land and labor productivity 
growth in the period 1990-2005 was significantly slower than in 1961-1990, 
once the large, and in many respects exceptional, case of China is set aside 
(Table 3.6). Across the rest of the world (i.e., after setting aside the top 20 
producing countries), on average, the slowdown is even more pronounced. 
Table 3.6. Growth in agricultural land and labor productivity worldwide, 
1961-2005
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT Database and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
Notes: Labor is measured as economically active workers in agriculture. Land is the sum of area 
harvested and permanently pastured areas. Output is a value of production measure developed 
by the authors by weighting a time series of country-specific commodity quantities (spanning 155 
crop-related and 30 livestock-related commodities) with an unpublished 1999-2001 global average 
of commodity-specific international prices developed by FAO. 
Group 
Land Productivity Labor Productivity 
1961-90 1990-05 1961-90 1990-05 
World 2.03 1.82 1.12 1.36 
     Excl. China 1.90 1.19 1.21 0.42 
     Excl. China & FSU 1.91 1.57 1.13 0.73 
Latin America 2.17 2.83 2.15 3.53 
Asia 2.56 3.01 1.83 2.72 
      Excl. China 2.45 1.83 1.69 1.24 
     China 2.81 4.50 2.29 4.45 
 Africa 2.18 2.21 0.68 0.90
Low-Income Countries 2.00 2.39 0.46 1.03 
Middle-Income Countries 2.35 2.30 1.51 2.02 
      Excl. China 2.18 1.37 0.39 0.81
 High-Income Countries 1.61 0.72 4.26 4.18
Top 20 Producers 2.11 2.16 1.17 1.77 
      Excl. China 1.98 1.38 1.33 0.63 
Other Producers 1.74 0.88 1.00 0.07 
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12While notable in their own right and of significance in terms of global totals, developments in 
the FSU and China are exceptional, with unique, essentially one-off attributes. The impacts on 
agricultural productivity growth and downsizing of agriculture in the FSU economies following 
the break-up of the Soviet Union are documented and discussed by Mathijs and Swinnen (1998), 
Macours and Swinnen (2002), and Brooks and Gardner (2004) among others. The massive insti-
tutional changes in China (notably the introduction of the household responsibility system into 
Chinese agriculture in the late 1970s) also had a sizable, one-shot, albeit enduring, effect on pro-
ductivity developments in that country (see for example, Lin 1992 and Fan and Pardey 1997).
For this group of countries land productivity grew by 1.83% per year during 
the period 1961-1990 but by only 0.88% per year thereafter; labor produc-
tivity grew by 1.08% per year prior to 1990, but barely budged during the 
period 1990-2005. 
Worldwide, land productivity grew at a slower pace in the period 1990-
2005 (1.82% per year) than during earlier decades (2.03% per year), whereas 
labor productivity increased at a faster rate for the period 1990-2005 than 
for 1961-1990 (1.37% versus 1.12% per year). Once again these world totals 
are distorted by the significant and exceptional case of China. Netting out 
China, global land and labor productivity growth has been slower in the pe-
riod 1990-2005 than during the prior three decades. The same period rela-
tivities prevail if the former Soviet Union (FSU) is also netted out, although 
the magnitude of the global (net of China and FSU) productivity slowdown 
is less pronounced because both partial productivity measures for the FSU 
actually shrank during the period 1990-2005.12 
Figure 3.5 draws on the FAOSTAT database to report land and labor pro-
ductivity measures for 212 countries (some of which no longer exist) grouped 
into various aggregates according to regions and per capita income. Here we 
use the graphical technique developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1971), where 
the horizontal axis measures labor productivity (in logarithms) and the ver-
tical axis measures land productivity (in logarithms). The productivity loci 
were formed by taking ratios of the value of aggregate output to the quantity 
of land input and to the quantity of labor input. Output is an estimate of the 
total value of agricultural output (spanning 155 plant commodities and 30 
animal commodities) expressed in 1999-2001 average purchasing power par-
ity agricultural prices obtained from FAO. Land is a measure of harvested and 
permanently pastured area, and labor is a head count of the economically ac-
tive workers in agriculture. These ratios were then scaled by the corresponding 
value ratios of output and input in the base year 1961, and the natural loga-
rithms of the scaled index ratios were then taken. Since both axes are mea-
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sured in natural logarithms, a unit increase in either direction is interpreted 
as a proportional increase in land or labor productivity, and the length of the 
productivity locus is an indication of the average annual rate of change in pro-
ductivity. All of the productivity paths move generally (but not uniformly) in 
a northeasterly direction, starting in 1961 and ending in 2005, indicating pro-
ductivity growth. 
The diagonals indicate constant land-to-labor ratios. As the productivity lo-
cus for a particular country or region crosses a diagonal from left to right, it indi-
cates a decrease in the number of economically active workers in agriculture per 
harvested hectare in that region. Substantive but gradually changing differences 
can be seen in the land-labor ratios among countries and regions. In Japan’s case, 
land-labor ratios rose from 0.6 hectares per worker in 1961 to 1.6 in 2005. Land-
labor ratios in Australia and New Zealand have changed little, whereas they have 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT Database and USDA-FAS unpublished data.
Notes: The land-labor ratio is constant along each grey diagonal line, and values for those ratios are 
given at the terminus of the respective diagonal line on the top and right axes. Notably, any arbitrary 
45 degree line represents a constant land-labor ratio, so regional plots with slopes greater than 45 
degrees (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa and the middle-income countries) indicates increased land use 
relative to labor use while the opposite is true for regions with plots that have a slope of less than 45 
degrees (e.g., North America and Western Europe).
Figure 3.5. Land and labor productivity by region, 1961-2005 
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risen by some 83% in North America. They also rose, albeit very slowly, for the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, consistent with the region’s labor produc-
tivity growing slightly faster than its land productivity. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
become much more labor-intensive so its land-labor ratios have declined. In 
1961 the region averaged 10.0 hectares per agricultural worker, but by 2005 the 
land-labor ratio had halved to 5.0 hectares per worker.
The relative positions of the productivity loci are revealing as well. In the 
terminal year of the data series, 2005, low-income countries as a group aver-
aged just $331 of output per agricultural worker, compared with $1,032 per 
worker for middle-income counties and $26,975 per worker for high-income 
counties when taken as a group. The land productivity relativities are less 
clearly tied to per capita incomes. For example, middle-income countries as a 
group had similar output per hectare in 2005 ($381) as the high-income coun-
tries ($405 per hectare). According to these data, in 2005 the average land 
productivity in sub-Saharan Africa ($88 per hectare) exceeded that of Australia 
and New Zealand ($64 per hectare). Clearly, broad, regional productivity trends 
mask significant local variation caused by a host of agro-ecological, market-
related, and policy-related factors. 
5. INTERPRETATION AND INFERENCES
Much of the dramatic transformation of global agriculture over the past 
100 years, as well as before that, can be traced to the adoption of new technolo-
gies that allowed more to be produced with less. The increases in agricultural 
productivity have been impressive and enormously valuable. It can be difficult 
to partition the past productivity growth accurately between elements associ-
ated with new technology and elements attributable to other sources (including 
weather and infrastructure), but technological change has surely been the main 
source. Technological change itself can come from multiple sources, but orga-
nized research undertaken by governments and industry has played a central 
role, especially over the past 150 years. 
In this chapter we have presented a range of different measures of productiv-
ity across many countries, and the counterpart patterns of commodity prices. 
This evidence consistently indicates that the long-term downward trends in real 
prices of food and feed commodities, like their counterpart measures of par-
tial and multifactor productivity, accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s and then 
slowed in the 1990s and the first half-decade of the twenty-first century. Such 
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patterns are difficult to discern precisely given the effects of temporary fluctua-
tions associated with year-to-year variations in weather, and more-enduring but 
still temporary departures from trend, such as the price spike in the early 1970s. 
Additionally, measured growth rates are sensitive to the choices of starting and 
ending dates, and more so when the intervals are shorter.
The compilation of country-specific studies reported in Alston et al. (2000) 
reveals a strong association between lagged research and development (R&D) 
spending and agricultural productivity improvements. We suspect that a sub-
stantial share of past agricultural productivity growth resulted from agricultural 
R&D. Consistent with that view, and the fact that research affects agricultural 
productivity with a long lag, we also suspect that the reduced growth in produc-
tivity observed during the past decade or two may be attributable in significant 
part to a slowdown in the rate of growth in spending on agricultural R&D a de-
cade or two previously.13
An implication of our analysis is that a restoration of the growth in spending 
on agricultural R&D may be necessary to prevent a longer-term food price crisis 
of a more enduring nature. This message may be discounted or dismissed on the 
grounds that, if necessary, science can solve this problem, as it did in the 1970s, 
proving false the prophecy of the doomsayers of the time such as the “Club of 
Rome.”14 Optimism about the potential for science to contribute to solving our 
problems may well be justified, but an appropriate investment in science and the 
translation of that scientific know-how into technological changes on farms is 
required to realize that potential—it should not be forgotten that the 1960s and 
1970s witnessed a very rapid growth in spending on agricultural science around 
the world, including the creation of the Consultative Group on International 
13See also von Braun 2007 and Trostle 2008. 
14For example, in The Population Bomb, published in 1968, the eminent ecologist Paul Ehrlich 
predicted that in the 1970s “the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people 
are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late 
date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate….” (p. 11). William and 
Paul Paddock’s 1967 Famine 1975! America’s Decision: Who Will Survive? had a similar message. 
They advocated a triage approach to foreign aid, in which countries in need of food aid should 
be divided into three groups, as are soldiers injured in battle. The “can’t be saved” group, which 
should receive no aid, included India and the Philippines, both of which have since had years of 
food surplus from their own harvests. Biologist Garrett Hardin, famous for coining the phrase 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” to describe the very real problems that can arise when there 
is open access to exploitation of a natural resource, published The Limits of Altruism in 1977 in 
support of a “tough-minded” approach that recognized that countries like India had exceeded 
their “carrying” capacity.
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15The Schickler quote is available at http://www.pioneer.com/web/site/portal/menuitem.
d4f86eb536a8ca24c5892701d10093a0/ and the Pollack article is at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/06/05/business/worldbusiness/05crop.html?pagewanted=print. 
Agricultural Research, which played an instrumental role in the green revolution 
(Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey 2006). 
Some may suggest that we can count on the private sector to solve the prob-
lem. Indeed, seed and biotech firms have a range of technologies in prospect if 
not already in the pipeline. For instance, speaking at the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture’s Agricultural Outlook Forum in February 2008, DuPont Vice President 
and General Manager and Pioneer Hi-Bred President Paul Schickler said, “We 
expect the traits and technologies in our product pipeline to help meet that de-
mand by doubling the rate of genetic gain—targeting a 40% yield increase in our 
corn and soybean products over the next 10 years.” More recently, in an article 
in the New York Times in June 2008, Andrew Pollack reported that “Monsanto, 
the leader in agricultural biotechnology, pledged Wednesday to develop seeds 
that would double the yields of corn, soybeans, and cotton by 2030 and would 
require 30% less water, land, and energy to grow.”15  
Such prospects might provide grounds for optimism about the potential of 
agricultural supply to more than keep pace with demand. But even if the tech-
nology possibilities can be realized (and adopted in some parts of the world), 
there are big differences between what is possible in the laboratory and what 
happens in farmers’ fields. We have to remember that the regulatory approval 
process is long and expensive and getting longer and more expensive for new 
biotech crop varieties, so the rates of innovation will be slower in farmers’ 
fields than in the laboratories. And it is still the case that much of the world 
has not begun to adopt biotech varieties because of perceived market resis-
tance or other political barriers, so the benefits from any rapid yield gains in 
biotech crop varieties will accrue only on a fraction of farmers’ fields around 
the world. 
Relative to past performance, the claims by Monsanto and DuPont about 
potential yield gains seem very optimistic. The rates of yield gain realized in 
farmers’ fields would have to match the highest ever, as recorded in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and recent yield growth rates have not been nearly so fast. Both 
claims imply a sustained compound growth rate of about 3.4% per year, a rar-
ity in recent history. Figure 3.6 identifies the number of years for which corn 
yield growth averaged 3.4% per year over the previous decade. This occurred 
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in only 28 instances during the past 133 years, and about half of those in-
stances were for 10-year periods ending in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast, 
only one-sixth of the years during the 1990s and since 2000 had corn yield 
growth rates in excess of 3.4% per year over the preceding 10 years. While it is 
feasible to sustain (global) growth rates that would achieve the Monsanto and 
Du Pont targets, it seems improbable, especially given recent trends in crop 
yields.16 To do so would mean the future must be substantially different from 
the more recent past. 
Figure 3.6. Number of 10-year periods since 1875 when growth in corn 
yields exceeded 3.4% per year
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data reported in Beddow, Hurley and Pardey 2009, derived 
from Alston and Pardey 2006 and QuickStats: Agricultural Statistics Database.
Note: Values are attributed to the end of each 10-year period. For example, the 1950-1970 category 
includes all 10-year periods ending between 1950 and 1969 (thus starting between 1941 and 1960).
16The more-recent evidence further lengthens the odds of achieving a 3.4%-per-year worldwide 
growth rate of crop yields. World average yield growth rates exceeded that target for corn for 
only two decade periods ending after 1961 (i.e., the decades ending in 1973 and 1979); wheat for 
seven decade periods (four of which terminated in years during the 1970s); and soybeans only 
once. Rice yields never sustained that average rate of growth for a 10-year period. Moreover, aver-
age growth in crop yields for all fours crops never exceeded the 3.4%-per-year threshold for any 
decade period ending after 1990. Further, the Monsanto claim suggests that yield growth rates in 
excess of 3.4% per year can be sustained over a period of two decades, which, historically, even 
in the United States has not occurred since the decade ending in 1960.
 
Growth rate less than 3.4
percent: 106 periods. 
Before 1950: eight
periods. 
1950-1970: 13 
periods.
1970-1980:  four
periods. 
1990-2008:  three
periods. 
Growth rate greater than
3.4 percent: 28 periods. 
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CHAPTER 4
Total Factor Productivity in the Global 
Agricultural Economy: 
Evidence from FAO Data
Keith O. Fuglie
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent assessments of the global agricultural economy have expressed con-
cerns of a significant slowing down in productivity growth, which raises the 
specter of heightened supply-side constraints at a time when population, income, 
and energy drivers are raising agricultural demand. The World Bank Development 
Report 2008 identified a halving of the growth rate in grain yields in develop-
ing countries between 1970-1989 and 1990-2005 (World Bank 2007). Case 
studies in this volume from the United States (Chapter 8), Australian broadacre 
agriculture (Chapter 5), and the Canadian Prairie Provinces (Chapter 6) report a 
slowing of the growth rate in agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) in these 
regions. Yet, evidence from major developing countries such as Brazil (Avila 
2007; Gasquez, Bastos, and Bacchi 2008) and China (Chapter 9 in this volume) 
suggest productivity growth has accelerated there. This contrasts with earlier 
studies of global productivity growth, which found agricultural land and labor 
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productivity rising faster in developed than in developing countries (Hayami and 
Ruttan 1985; Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom 1997). Another confounding factor is 
the uneven performance of agriculture in the transition countries of the former 
Soviet block (Chapter 10 of this volume). Thus, the national and regional evi-
dence is mixed on recent trends in agricultural productivity. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present a comprehensive global and regional picture of agricultural 
TFP growth between 1961 and 2007. This assessment relies heavily on data from 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (in some 
cases supplemented with data from national sources), and draws upon the find-
ings of several country-level case studies of agricultural TFP for input cost-share 
information to construct a model of global agricultural productivity growth.
The necessary ingredients for an assessment of agricultural TFP are measures 
of aggregate outputs and inputs and their economic values. To measure output 
growth in global agriculture, I use the FAO output index, which is a Laspeyres 
index valuing about 195 crop and livestock commodities at a fixed set of average 
global prices (Rao 1993). Periodically, the FAO brings together national-level com-
modity price data to construct a globally representative set of prices weighted by 
the Stone-Geary method. It then uses these prices to construct agricultural out-
put indexes for each country of the world. Its latest price update is for the 1999-
2001 period, expressed in 2000 U.S. dollars. Although prices differ over time 
and across space, the important feature of commodity prices for output index 
construction is their value relative to each other, which, given substitution pos-
sibilities, tends to be fairly stable over time. Thus, the growth rate in agricultural 
output reported by an individual country (using annual domestic price data ap-
propriately deflated) is generally close to the growth rate in the FAO output index 
for that country. It should be noted, however, that changes in real output often 
differ substantially from changes in the World Bank’s estimates of real agricultur-
al value-added, or gross domestic product (GDP). Agricultural GDP is estimated 
by taking agricultural output net of feed and seed, valued at current national pric-
es, and then subtracting payments for materials provided by other sectors (e.g., 
fertilizers, chemicals, and energy). Deflating this value by a general price index 
introduces terms-of-trade effects into the output series: if agricultural prices are 
changing faster than the average price level in the whole economy, then that will 
be reflected in the rate of change in agricultural GDP. The FAO output price series 
is a better measure of changes in the real economy since it does not include these 
terms-of-trade effects.
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The major challenge in using FAO data for assessing changes in agricultural 
TFP is measuring changes in aggregate input in a consistent fashion. Since TFP 
is usually defined as the ratio of aggregate output to aggregate input (i.e., as 
the average product of aggregate input), it is necessary to account somehow for 
the sum total of changes of services of land, labor, capital, and material inputs 
used in production. The “growth accounting” method measures aggregate input 
growth as the weighted sum of the growth rates of the quantities of the individ-
ual factors of production, wherein the weights are the cost shares. But for most 
countries of the world we lack representative data on input prices and therefore 
cost shares. This is especially true for developing countries where the most im-
portant inputs are farm-supplied, like land and labor, but where wage labor and 
land rental markets are thin, thus making it difficult to assess the share of these 
inputs in total costs. 
To circumvent the lack of price or cost data, most previous assessments 
of global agricultural TFP have relied on distance function measures like the 
Malmquist index to compare productivity among groups of countries. Distance 
functions are derived from input-output relationships based on quantity data 
only. Recently, Ludena et al. (2007) used this method to estimate agricultural 
productivity growth for 116 countries and found that average annual agricultural 
TFP growth increased from 0.60% during 1961-1980 to 1.29% during 1981-
2000. But this methodology is sensitive to the set of countries included for com-
parison and the number of variables in the model, or the dimensionality issue 
(Lusigi and Thirtle 1997). Coelli and Rao (2005) have also observed that the in-
put shadow prices derived from the estimation of this model vary widely across 
countries and over time and in many cases are zero for major inputs like land 
and labor, which does not seem plausible. 
In this chapter I bring together several country-level case studies that have 
acquired representative input cost data to construct Tornqvist-Theil growth ac-
counting indexes of agricultural TFP growth and apply their average cost-share 
estimates to other countries with similar agriculture in order to construct aggre-
gate input indexes for these countries. For some regions for which reliable input 
cost data are not available (namely, Sub-Saharan Africa and the countries of the 
former Soviet Union), I use econometrically estimated input production elastici-
ties as weighting factors for input growth aggregation. Theoretically, production 
elasticities and corresponding cost shares should be equal, so long as produc-
ers maximize profit and markets are in long-run competitive equilibrium. With 
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growth rates in aggregate output and input thus constructed, I derive growth 
rates in agricultural TFP by country, region, and for the world as a whole for 
each year from 1961 to 2007. 
In the next section of the chapter I discuss the methodology and sources of data 
in more detail. In particular, I describe a method of adjusting agricultural land area 
for quality differences to obtain a better accounting of changes in “effective” agricul-
tural land over time. I then present results of the model, showing how input accu-
mulation and input (total factor) productivity have contributed to agricultural output 
growth over time, in the global and regional agricultural economies. 
2. MEASURING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN AGRICULTURE
2.1 Methods for TFP Measurement
Productivity statistics compare changes in outputs to changes in inputs in 
order to assess the performance of a sector. Two types of productivity measures 
are partial and multifactor indexes. Partial productivity indexes relate output to 
a single input, such as labor or land. These measures are useful for indicating 
factor-saving biases in technical change but are likely to overstate the overall 
improvement in efficiency because they do not account for changes in other in-
put use. For example, rising output per worker may follow from additions to the 
capital stock, and higher crop yield may be due to greater application of fertil-
izer. For this reason, a measure of TFP relating output to all of the inputs used 
in production gives a superior indicator of a sector’s efficiency than do indexes of 
partial productivity. 
TFP is usually defined as the ratio of total output to total inputs in a produc-
tion process. In other words, TFP measures the average product of all inputs. Let 
total output be given by Y and total inputs by X. Then TFP is simply
 .YTFP X=  (1)
Taking logarithmic differentials of equation (1) with respect to time, t, yields
 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )d TFP d Y d X
dt dt dt
= −  (2)
which simply states that, for small changes, the rate of change in TFP is equal 
to the difference between the rate of change in aggregate output and the rate of 
change in aggregate input. 
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In agriculture, output is composed of multiple commodities produced by 
multiple inputs in a joint production process, so Y and X are vectors. Chambers 
(1988) showed that when the underlying technology can be represented by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function and where (i) producers maximize profits 
and (ii) markets are in long-run competitive equilibrium (total revenue equals 
total cost), then equation (2) can be written as
 
1 1 1
, ,
, ,
ln ln lni t j tt i j
i jt i t j t
Y XTFP
R S
TFP Y X− − −
    
= −             
∑ ∑  (3)
where Ri is the revenue share of the ith output and Sj is the cost share of the jth 
input. Output growth is estimated by summing over the output growth rates 
for each commodity after multiplying each by its revenue share. Similarly, input 
growth is found by summing the growth rate of each input, weighting each by 
its cost share. TFP growth is just the difference between the growth in aggregate 
output and the growth in aggregate input. The principal difference between this 
measure of TFP growth and theoretically preferred measures like the Tornqvist-
Theil index is that a Tornqvist-Theil index takes account of the fact that cost and 
revenue shares vary over time. Using fixed revenue and factor shares results in 
“index number bias” in cases in which either the revenue or the cost shares are 
changing significantly. But the extent of the bias is usually unknown. It should 
be pointed out as well that cost shares are partly dependent on output prices 
themselves, since a part of agricultural output is used as inputs (seed and feed) 
in production. 
A key limitation in using equation (3) for measuring agricultural pro-
ductivity change is that we lack data on input cost shares for most countries. 
There is simply no internationally comparable information on input prices, 
especially for inputs that may not be widely exchanged in the market such as 
farm land and labor. Some studies have circumvented this problem by estimat-
ing a distance function, such as a Malmquist index, which measures produc-
tivity using data on output and input quantities alone (Coelli and Rao 2005). 
But this method is sensitive to aggregation issues as well as data quality (es-
pecially differences in agricultural land quality across countries) and can give 
unbelievably high or negative growth rates. To address this problem, I use the 
approach originally suggested by Avila and Evenson (2004). They constructed 
careful estimates of input cost shares for two large developing countries (India 
and Brazil) from agricultural census surveys and from these derived represen-
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tative cost shares for other developing countries. I extend this approach by as-
sembling cost-share estimates for seven additional countries (China, Indonesia, 
Mexico, South Africa, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 
then assume that these cost shares are representative of agricultural produc-
tion for different groups of countries. For two global regions, Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and the former Soviet Union, in place of cost shares I use econometrically 
estimated production elasticities (with constant returns to scale imposed) as 
weights for input aggregation. I describe this more thoroughly in the section 
on “input cost shares.” 
To summarize, the theory underpinning the TFP productivity index as-
sumes that producers maximize profits so that the elasticity of output with re-
spect to each input is equal to its factor share. It also assumes that markets are in 
long-run competitive equilibrium (where technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale) so that total revenue equals total cost. If these conditions hold and the un-
derlying production function is Cobb-Douglas, then this index provides an exact 
representation of Hicks-neutral technical change.
 
2.2. Output and Input Data
To assess changes in agricultural productivity over time, I use FAO annual 
data on agricultural outputs and inputs from 1961 to 2007 and in some cases 
augment these data with updated or improved statistics from other sources. 
For output, FAO publishes data on production of crops and livestock and ag-
gregates these data into a production index using a common set of commodity 
prices from the 1999-2001 period and expresses the index in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. What is important for estimating output growth are the relative prices 
of these commodities (since this determines the weights on the commodity 
growth rates used for deriving the growth rate for total output). In relative terms, 
the 1999-2001 FAO commodity prices are fairly close to the “wheat equivalent” 
prices developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985, pp. 453-454) in their seminal 
study on international agricultural productivity (the FAO relative prices have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.86 with the Hayami-Ruttan wheat-equivalent prices). 
The FAO index of real output excludes production of forages but includes crop 
production that may be used for animal feed. 
To disentangle long-run trends from short-run fluctuations in output due to 
weather and other disturbances, I smooth the output series for each country us-
ing the Hodrick-Prescott filter setting λ=6.25 for annual data as recommended 
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by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). This filter is commonly used to remove short-run 
fluctuations from macroeconomic time series in business cycle analysis. How-
ever, this process does not completely remove the effects of multiyear shocks 
such as war or a prolonged drought, so it is still necessary to evaluate observed 
changes in the rate of TFP growth with auxiliary information about extended 
periods of unusual weather or other disturbances. 
For agricultural inputs, FAO publishes data on cropland (rain-fed and ir-
rigated), permanent pasture, labor employed in agriculture, animal stocks, 
the number of tractors in use, and inorganic fertilizer consumption. I supple-
ment these data with better or more up-to-date data from national or indus-
try sources whenever available. For fertilizer consumption, the International 
Fertilizer Association has more up-to-date and more accurate statistics than 
does FAO on fertilizer consumption by country, except for small countries. For 
agricultural statistics on China, a relatively comprehensive dataset is available 
from the Economic Research Service (ERS 2009b), with original data coming 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). For Brazil, I use results 
of the recently published 2006 Brazilian agricultural census (IPGE 2008), and 
for Indonesia, I compiled improved data on agricultural land and machinery 
use (Fuglie 2004, 2010). For Taiwan, I use statistics from the Council of Agri-
culture. Finally, since FAO reports data on countries that made up the former 
Soviet Union only from 1991 and onward, I extend the time series for each of 
the former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) back to 1965 from Shend (1993). 
Also, since FAO labor force estimates for former SSRs and Eastern Europe are 
not reliable for the post-1991 years (Lerman et al. 2003; Swinnen, Dries, and 
Macours 2005), I use Eurostat data for the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, 
CISSTAT data for other former SSRs except Ukraine, and the International La-
bor Organization’s LABORSTA database for Ukraine for estimates of the size of 
the agricultural labor force since 1990.
Inputs are divided into five categories. Farm labor is the total economically 
active adult population (males and females) in agriculture. Agricultural land is 
the area in permanent crops (perennials), annual crops, and permanent pasture. 
Cropland (permanent and annual crops) is further divided into rain-fed cropland 
and cropland equipped for irrigation. However, for agricultural cropland in Sub-
Saharan Africa I use total area harvested for all crops rather than the FAO series 
on arable land (see Fuglie 2009 for a discussion of why this series appears to be a 
better measure of agricultural land in this region). I also derive a quality-adjusted 
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measure of agricultural land that gives greater weight to irrigated cropland and less 
weight to permanent pasture in assessing agricultural land changes over time (see 
the next section on “land quality”). Livestock is the aggregate number of animals 
in “cattle equivalents” held in farm inventories and includes cattle, camels, water 
buffalos, horses and other equine species (asses, mules, and hinnies), small rumi-
nants (sheep and goats), pigs, and poultry species (chickens, ducks, and turkeys), 
with each species weighted by its relative size. The weights for aggregation based 
on Hayami and Ruttan (1985, p. 450) are as follows: 1.38 for camels, 1.25 for water 
buffalo and horses, 1.00 for cattle and other equine species, 0.25 for pigs, 0.13 for 
small ruminants, and 12.50 per 1,000 head of poultry. Fertilizer is the amount of 
major inorganic nutrients applied to agricultural land annually, measured as metric 
tons of N, P2O5, and K2O equivalents. Farm machinery is the number of riding trac-
tors in use. All of these series are available through 2007 except for farm machin-
ery, which ends in 2006. I estimate tractors in use for 2007 by taking the average 
rate of growth in this variable over 2003-2006, except for China, the United States, 
and Brazil for which these are from government statistical sources.
While these inputs account for the major part of total agricultural input us-
age, there are a few types of inputs for which complete country-level data are 
lacking, namely, use of chemical pesticides, seed, prepared animal feed, veteri-
nary pharmaceuticals, other farm machinery besides riding tractors, energy, 
and farm structures. However, data on many of these inputs are available for the 
nine country case studies I use for constructing the representative input cost 
shares. To account for these inputs, I assume that their growth rate is correlated 
with one of the five input variables just described and include their cost with the 
related input. For example, services from capital in farm structures as well as ir-
rigation fees are included with the agricultural land cost share; the cost of chemi-
cal pesticide and seed is included with the fertilizer cost share; costs of animal 
feed and veterinary medicines are included in the livestock cost share, and other 
farm machinery and energy costs are included in the tractor cost share. So long 
as the growth rates for the observed inputs and their unobserved counterparts 
are similar, then the model captures the growth of these inputs in the aggregate 
input index. 
2.3. Land Quality
The FAOSTAT agricultural database provides time-series estimates of 
agricultural land by country and divides these estimates into cropland (ar-
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able and permanent crops) and permanent pasture. It also provides an esti-
mate of area equipped for irrigation. The productive capacity of land among 
these categories and across countries can be very different, however. For ex-
ample, some countries count vast expanses of semi-arid lands as permanent 
pastures even though these areas produce very limited agricultural output. 
Using such data for international comparisons of agricultural productivity 
can lead to serious distortions, such as significantly biasing downward the 
econometric estimates of the production elasticity of agricultural land (Pe-
terson 1987; Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom 1997). In two recent studies of 
international agricultural productivity, Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997) 
and Wiebe et al. (2003) took considerable effort to include in their regres-
sion models variables that could account for differences in land quality (such 
as indexes of average rainfall and soil type, the proportion of irrigated or 
pastureland in total agricultural land, and fixed-effect models with regional 
or country dummies), and obtained estimates of production elasticities that 
were more in line with observed land cost shares.
In this study, because I estimate only productivity growth rather than pro-
ductivity levels, differences in land quality across countries is less problematic. 
The estimates depend only on changes in agricultural land and other input 
use within a country over time. However, a bias might arise if changes occur 
unevenly among land classes. For example, adding an acre of irrigated land 
would likely make a considerably larger contribution to output growth than 
adding an acre of rain-fed cropland or pasture and should therefore be given 
greater weight in measuring input changes. To account for differences in land 
type, I derive weights for irrigated cropland, rain-fed cropland, and permanent 
pastures based on their relative productivity and allow these weights to vary 
regionally. In order not to confound the land quality weights with productiv-
ity change itself, the weights are estimated using country-level data from the 
beginning of the period of study (i.e., I use average annual data from the 1961-
1965 period). I first construct regional dummy variables (REGIONi, i=1,2,…5, 
representing developed and Former Soviet Union countries, Asia-Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, West Asia and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Af-
rica), and then regress the log of agricultural land yield against the proportions 
of agricultural land in rain-fed cropland (RAINFED), permanent pasture (PAS-
TURE), and irrigated cropland (IRRIG). Including slope dummy variables allows 
the coefficients to vary among regions:
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The coefficient vectors α, β and γ provide the quality weights for aggregating 
the three land types into an aggregate land input index. Countries with a higher 
proportion of irrigated land are likely to have higher average land productiv-
ity, as will countries with more cropland relative to pastureland. The estimates 
of the parameters in equation (4) reflect these differences and provide a ready 
means of weighting the relative qualities of these land classes. Because of the 
limited amount of irrigated cropland in some regions, the coefficient on IRRIG 
was held constant across all developing country regions.
The results of the regression in equation (4) are shown in Table 4.1. All the 
coefficients are statistically significant and the variables explain about 75% of 
the cross-country variability in land productivity. The lower part of the table 
translates the estimated coefficients into average land productivities in dollars of 
output per hectare by land type. The results show that, on average, one hectare 
of irrigated land was more than twice as productive as rain-fed cropland, which 
in turn was 10-20 times as productive as permanent pasture, with some varia-
tion across regions. The results appear to give plausible weights for aggregating 
agricultural land across broad quality classes. In fact, this approach to account 
for land quality differences among countries is similar to one developed by Pe-
terson (1987). Peterson regressed average cropland values in U.S. states against 
the share of irrigated and unirrigated cropland and long-run average rainfall. He 
then applied these regression coefficients to data from other countries to derive 
an international land quality index. The advantage of my model is that it is based 
on international rather than U.S. land yield data and provides results for a larger 
set of countries. Moreover, what are important for the growth accounting exer-
cise are only the relative productivities, as these become the quality weights for 
aggregating land changes within a country.
The effects of this land quality adjustment are shown in Table 4.2. When 
summed by their raw values, total global agricultural land expanded by about 
10% between 1961 and 2007, with nearly all of this expansion occurring in 
developing countries. When adjusted for quality, “effective” agricultural land ex-
panded by two and a half times this rate. Globally, irrigated cropland expanded 
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Table 4.1. Estimation of land quality weights
Regression estimates    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t Stat 
SSA*rainfed 6.840 0.299 22.868 
SSA*pasture 2.674 0.163 16.422 
ASIA-OCEANIA*rainfed 6.300 0.239 26.404 
ASIA-OCEANIA*pasture 3.427 0.367 9.333 
WANA*rainfed 7.024 0.582 12.069 
WANA*pasture 3.290 0.267 12.331 
LAC*rainfed 7.387 0.411 17.987 
LAC*pasture 3.873 0.270 14.329 
LDC*irrig 7.396 0.601 12.304 
DC*rainfed 7.087 0.280 25.291 
DC*pasture 4.725 0.329 14.362 
DC*irrig 7.850 1.072 7.325 
Note: All coefficients significant at the 1% level.  
Regression statistics    
Multiple R 0.875   
R Square 0.765   
Adjusted R Square 0.747   
Standard Error 0.752   
F-statistic 42.596   
Significance of F 0.000   
Observations 156   
Notes: Dependent variable: log of the average output per hectare of agricultural land (cropland and 
permanent pasture) during 1961-1965 where output is measured in 1,000s of constant US$ (using 
1999-2001 international average prices) according to the FAO value of agricultural output measure. 
SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa;  WANA=West Asia & North Africa; LAC=Latin America & Caribbean; 
LDC=less developed countries; DC=developed countries. 
The intercept term was excluded from the regression above. To get a meaningful R-squared, an 
intercept term was included and one of the other variables dropped from the regression. 
Implied average productivities from the regression estimates 
 
Average Productivity of 
Agricultural Land during 
1961-65 ($/ha) 
Land Quality Weights 
Relative to Rain-Fed 
Cropland 
Region 
Rain-
fed  Irrigated Pasture 
Rain-
fed  Irrigated Pasture 
Developed countries 1,196 2,566 113 1.000 2.145 0.094 
Sub-Saharan Africa 935 1,629 14 1.000 1.743 0.016 
Asia-Oceania 544 1,629 31 1.000 2.993 0.057 
West Asia-North Africa 1,123 1,629 27 1.000 1.451 0.024 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1,614 1,629 48 1.000 1.009 0.030
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by 148 million hectares, and this accounted for virtually all of the change in 
“effective” agricultural land over this period. For the purpose of our TFP calcu-
lation, accounting for the changes in the quality of agricultural land over time 
should increase the growth rate in aggregate agricultural input and commensu-
rately reduce the estimated growth in TFP.
2.4. Input Cost Shares
To derive input cost shares or production elasticities, I draw upon other 
studies that reported relatively complete measurements of these items for select-
ed countries and then use these cost estimates as “representative” of agriculture 
in different regions of the world. In Table 4.3 I show the input cost shares from 
nine country studies (five developing countries: China, India, Indonesia, Bra-
zil, and Mexico; and four developed countries: Japan, South Africa,1 the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) as well as econometric estimates of production 
elasticities for Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union. Table 4.3 also 
shows the regions to which the various cost-share estimates were applied for 
constructing the aggregate input indexes. For instance, the estimates for Brazil 
were applied to South America, West Asia, and North Africa, and the estimates 
for India were applied to other countries in South Asia. These assignments 
were based on judgments about the resemblance among the agricultural sectors 
of these countries. Countries assigned to cost shares from India, for example, 
tended to be low-income countries using relatively few modern inputs. Countries 
assigned to the cost shares from Brazil tended to be middle-income countries 
having relatively large livestock sectors. 
While assigning cost shares to countries in this manner may seem fairly ar-
bitrary, an argument in favor is that there is some degree of congruence among 
the cost shares reported for the country studies shown in Table 4.3. For the 
developing-country cases (India, Indonesia, China, Brazil, Mexico, and Sub-
Saharan Africa), cost shares or production elasticities ranged from 0.31 to 0.46 
for labor, 0.22 to 0.29 for land, and 0.14 to 0.33 for livestock, while cost shares 
for fertilizer and machinery inputs were not more than 14% of total output in 
1I have classified South Africa as a developed country despite the dualist structure of this coun-
try’s agriculture, which consists of a “modern” sector of commercial farms and a “peasant” sector 
of smallholder subsistence-oriented farms. Since 1960, smallholders’ share of cropland planted 
has never exceeded 17%, and, given their prevalence on marginal lands, they account for an even 
smaller share of agricultural output (Liebenberg, Pardey, and Kahn 2010). 
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any of the countries. There was a tendency for the labor cost share to fall and the 
fertilizer and machinery cost shares to rise with the level of agricultural develop-
ment, reflecting embodiment of new technology in these inputs and substitution 
for labor. The nine countries and two regions for which direct estimates of cost 
shares or production elasticities are observed are also relatively large producers, 
together accounting for two-thirds of global agricultural output in 2005-2007, 
according to the FAO data.
2.5. Limitations
Some limitations of these calculations should be noted, given the nature of 
the data on which they are based. The first limitation is that I only compute rates 
of change in TFP. TFP “levels” cannot be compared across countries with this 
method. A second limitation is that I do not make adjustments for input quality 
changes other than for land. A third limitation is that revenue and cost shares are 
held constant over time. However, an examination of the output data shows that 
for major commodity categories (cereal crops, oil crops, fruits and vegetables, 
meat, milk, etc.), the global output growth rates were similar over the 1961-2007 
period. On the input side there has been more movement in cost shares among 
the major categories, but these changes occur gradually over decades. Thus, the 
likelihood of major biases in productivity measurement over a decade or two is 
not large, although this does remain a potential source of bias for longer-term 
comparisons. The principal advantage of these TFP growth estimates, however, 
is that the calculations have a standardized quality. I use a common method, a 
common period of time, and a consistent set of definitions for determining ag-
gregate input and output for all countries. Moreover, I include 171 countries in 
the assessment, a nearly complete accounting of global agricultural production of 
crops and livestock.2 I assess growth in individual countries as well as regions, 
and while regional averages may mask differences in performance among the 
2For the purpose of estimating long-run productivity trends, I aggregate some national data 
to create consistent political units over time. For example, data from the nations that formerly 
constituted Yugoslavia were aggregated in order to make comparisons with productivity before 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution; data were aggregated similarly for Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia. Because 
some small island nations have incomplete or zero values for some agricultural data, I constructed 
three composite “countries” by aggregating available data for island states in the Lesser Antilles, 
Micronesia, and Polynesia, respectively. This also enables a more detailed examination of regional 
patterns of agricultural productivity growth. The only countries or regions not included in the 
analysis are the Palestinian Territories, Western Sahara, Greenland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, and a 
number of very small urban or island states and dependencies.
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countries within a region, the choice of aggregation into regions does not affect 
individual country results, unlike distance function measures. See Table 4.4 for a 
complete list of countries included in the analysis and their regional groupings. 
3. RESULTS
As a gauge of how well the described approach captures the main move-
ments in agricultural productivity, it is useful to compare results with those 
of country-level case studies that estimated agricultural TFP using Tornqvist-
Theil index methods. As a general rule the results of these country case studies 
should be viewed as superior because they (i) employ a richer set of country-
level data (especially using national rather than global prices), (ii) allow rev-
enue and cost shares to vary over time (rather than holding shares fixed), 
and (iii) use a more disaggregated set of inputs or other means to control for 
changes in input quality over time. Table 4.5 compares the average annual 
growth rates in agricultural output, input, and TFP between eight country-lev-
el studies and the results found here, estimated over the same period of time. 
Figure 4.1 plots the TFP indexes from the referenced studies (solid line) and 
the present study (dashed line) for the six largest countries. In spite of the data 
and the methodological differences, my results conform remarkably well to the 
estimates reported in the country studies. For four of the eight countries there 
are no significant differences in the growth estimates for agricultural output, 
input, or TFP. In another three cases (Brazil, Mexico, and China), my estimates 
of TFP growth were significantly lower than those of the country studies. My 
results show slightly slower output growth and slightly faster input growth 
(neither significantly different from the country studies), but the compounded 
effect of these differences caused the TFP growth rates to vary more than the 
critical value of a means difference test. Nevertheless, both my results and 
those of the country studies find that the TFP growth of Brazil and China was 
in the “high” range and that of Mexico was in a mid-range relative to the global 
economy. Finally, for India my results show significantly higher input growth, 
but output and TFP growth are very similar to the Tornqvist-Theil index esti-
mated for this country. The similarity of my results with those of the country 
studies strengthens my confidence in the results for global agricultural produc-
tivity trends in what follows. 
Table 4.6 shows a set of productivity indicators for the global agricultural 
economy over the 1961-2007 period and by decade. Global indexes are derived 
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of agricultural TFP indexes (index equals 100 in 
initial year)
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by adding up output and input quantities to the global level and then con-
structing a new set of cost shares for aggregating inputs. The cost shares are the 
weighted average of each country’s cost share (weighted by the country’s global 
share in total cost or revenue). The agricultural output, input, and TFP growth 
estimates in Table 4.6 are derived using “raw” data—without the agricultural 
land quality adjustment or the output series filtered to reduce annual devia-
tions from trends. Thus, these estimates are more easily comparable with other 
studies. I also show the average growth rates for output per worker, output per 
unit of agricultural land, and the average rate of yield increase in cereal grains 
(corn, rice, and wheat). The estimates show that global agricultural output grew 
at 2.8% per year in the 1960s and then maintained a fairly steady growth rate of 
slightly over 2% per year each decade since 1970. Over time, an increasing share 
of output growth was due to improvements in TFP rather than input accumula-
tion. Input growth slowed significantly, from over 2.3% per year in the 1960s to 
only 0.74% per year during 2000-07 (and even lower in the 1990s when agricul-
tural severely contracted in the transition economies of the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe). Improvements in TFP kept global output growth steady as 
the rate of input accumulation fell. 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate by 
Period (%) Output Input TFP 
Output 
per 
Worker 
Output 
per 
Hectare 
Grain 
Yield 
(t/ha) 
1961-1969 2.81 2.31 0.49 0.96 2.39 2.84 
1970-1979 2.23 1.60 0.63 1.46 2.21 2.62 
1980-1989 2.13 1.21 0.92 0.97 1.72 2.00 
1990-1999 2.01 0.47 1.54 1.15 1.74 1.61 
2000-2007 2.08 0.74 1.34 1.72 2.10 1.01 
    
1970-1989 2.18 1.40 0.77 1.22 1.97 2.31 
1990-2007 2.04 0.59 1.45 1.40 1.90 1.35 
    
1961-2007 2.23 1.24 0.99 1.25 2.01 2.02 
Sources: FAOSTAT and author’s calculations.
Notes: Output per worker: FAO gross output index divided by number of persons working 
in agriculture. Output per hectare: FAO gross output index divided by total arable land and 
permanent pasture. Grain yield: Global production of maize, rice and wheat divided by area 
harvested of these crops. Total agricultural output is unfiltered and land input is not adjusted 
for quality.
Table 4.6. Productivity indicators for world agriculture
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The partial productivity indexes in Table 4.6 show continued growth over time 
but mixed trends in the rates of growth. Average output per worker rose by 1.25% 
per year and output per hectare by just over 2% per year over the entire 1961-2007 
period. Note that growth in TFP is generally lower than growth in both land pro-
ductivity and labor productivity. This reflects an intensification of capital improve-
ments and material inputs in agriculture, which contribute to growth of the partial 
productivity indicators but are removed from growth in TFP. While there is no 
clear evidence of a productivity slowdown in either of these indicators, and espe-
cially not since 1980, there is a clear decline in the rate of increase in cereal yield, 
as has been noted by others (see Chapter 3 in this volume). What the evidence in 
Table 4.6 suggests is that the decline in growth in cereal yields has been offset by 
productivity improvements elsewhere—in other crops and in livestock—so that 
productivity growth in the total agricultural economy has not suffered overall.
Figure 4.2 plots the sources of agricultural growth by decade, showing the 
contribution of TFP and each of the five input categories (land, labor, livestock 
Figure 4.2. Sources of growth in global agriculture
Source: Author’s estimates.
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capital, machinery capital, and material inputs) by decade. In this figure, land 
is quality adjusted and the output trend has been filtered (but the filtering has 
a negligible effect on average global growth rates). Growth in material inputs, 
especially in fertilizers, was a leading source of agricultural growth in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when green revolution cereal crop varieties became widely available 
in developing countries. Fertilizer use also expanded considerably in the Soviet 
Union during these decades, where they were heavily subsidized. The long-run 
pattern shows that growth in agricultural production inputs gradually slowed, 
however, and the rate of increase in TFP accelerated to maintain real output 
growth at about 2% per annum. The exceptionally low rate of capital formation 
in global agriculture during the 1990s was due primarily to the rapid withdrawal 
of resources from agriculture in the countries of the former Soviet block. But 
many of the inputs used in these countries were apparently not efficiently ap-
plied, as their withdrawal significantly increased the average productivity of re-
sources remaining in agriculture, evidenced by the high TFP growth rate in this 
decade. By 2000 agricultural resources in this region had stabilized and there 
was a recovery in the rate of global input growth compared with the 1990s. 
The estimates of global agricultural output and TFP growth are disaggregat-
ed among regions and sub-regions in Table 4.7 (see Table 4.4 for the list of coun-
tries assigned to each region).3 The regional results reveal that the global trend is 
hardly uniform, with three general patterns evident.
1. In developed countries, resources were being withdrawn from agricul-
ture at an increasing rate; TFP continued to rise but the rate of growth in 
2000-07 was under 0.9% per year, the slowest of any decade since 1961. 
2.  In developing regions, productivity growth accelerated in the 1980s and 
the decades following. Input growth steadily slowed but was still posi-
tive. Two large developing countries in particular, China and Brazil, have 
sustained exceptionally high TFP growth rates since the 1980s. Several 
other developing regions also registered robust TFP growth. The major 
exceptions were the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, West 
Asia, Oceania, and the Caribbean. 
3Annual indexes of TFP growth were estimated for each country for the entire 1961-2007 period 
(except for countries that made up the former Soviet Union, for which TFP indexes were esti-
mated only for 1965-2007). Due to space limitations, Table 4.6 only reports averages by decade 
by region. Note that the growth rate in inputs can be derived simply by taking the difference 
between the output and TFP growth rates. Country-specific results are available from the author 
upon request.
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3.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 imparted a major shock to 
agriculture in the countries of the former Soviet block. In the 1990s, 
agricultural resources sharply contracted and output fell significantly. 
However, by 2000, agricultural resources had stabilized and growth re-
sumed, led entirely by productivity gains in the sector.
The strong and sustained productivity growth described here for a number 
of important developing countries, such as Brazil and China, is broadly consis-
tent with results from other studies. Brazil is reaping the benefits from a strong 
agricultural research system and, since the mid-1990s, macroeconomic stabil-
ity (Avila 2007). Using the Tornqvist-Theil index method, Gasquez, Bastos, and 
Bacchi (2008) estimated average annual agricultural TFP growth in Brazil to 
have averaged 3.26% over 1975-2008, even higher than my estimate of 2.80%, 
and both studies show an acceleration of TFP growth over time. China has had 
success since 1978 with both institutional reform and technological change 
(Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). Fan and Zhang (2002) estimated average annual 
Tornqvist-Theil TFP growth for Chinese agriculture at 2.6% during 1961-1997 
with relatively slow growth until 1980, after which TFP rapidly accelerated. The 
present study also shows an accelerating pace to TFP growth in China, although 
at a lower average rate. My lower estimates of TFP growth could reflect an “index 
number bias” from the use of fixed factor and revenue shares in countries under-
going rapid structural and technological change.
A fair number of mid-size countries also recorded respectable levels of agri-
cultural productivity growth, according to my estimates. Peru, Malaysia, Chile, 
South Africa, Iran, Mexico, Vietnam, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan all 
achieved average agricultural TFP growth rates of at least 2.5% per year during 
1990-2007. However, with few exceptions, developing countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,4 West Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania continued to rely on resource-
led agricultural growth rather than productivity, and as a consequence their 
agricultural sectors have performed poorly. Using the TFP estimates reported 
here, Evenson and Fuglie (2010) found TFP performance in developing-country 
agriculture to be strongly correlated with national investments in “technology 
capital,” which they defined by indicators of a country’s ability to develop and 
4The estimates in Table 4.6 suggest Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa is also a leader in agricultural 
productivity growth, achieving average TFP growth over 2.5% since 1990. However, my recent 
assessment (Fuglie 2009) of agricultural productivity performance in this region casts doubt on 
this finding for Nigeria and uncovers serious data discrepancies. 
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extend improved agricultural technology to farmers. Countries that had failed to 
establish adequate agricultural research and extension institutions and extend 
basic education to rural areas were stuck in low-productive agriculture and were 
falling further behind the rest of the world. 
4. CONCLUSION
Contrary to some other authors, I find no evidence of a general slowdown 
in sector-wide agricultural productivity, at least through 2007. If anything, 
the growth rate in agricultural TFP accelerated in recent decades, in no small 
part because of rapid productivity gains in several developing countries, led 
by Brazil and China, and more recently to a recovery of agricultural growth 
in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. However, the results do show clear 
evidence of a slowdown in the growth in agricultural investment: the global 
agricultural resource base is still expanding but at a much slower rate than in 
the past. These two trends—accelerating TFP growth and decelerating input 
growth—have largely offset each other to keep the real output of global agri-
culture growing at slightly more than 2% per year since the 1970s. This find-
ing has important implications for the appropriate supply-side policy response 
to the recent rise in real agricultural prices. 
One implication is that we should be optimistic about the prospects for 
global agriculture to respond to the recent commodity price rises by increasing 
supply in the short run. If TFP were slowing down, it would likely take several 
years for policy responses to influence this trend. The principal policy lever to 
increase TFP growth is to increase spending on agricultural research, but there 
are long time lags between research investments and productivity growth. But 
the main trend identified in this chapter is a slowdown in the rate of growth in 
agricultural capital formation. This is at least in part a consequence of a long 
period of unfavorable prices facing producers, who found better opportunities 
for their capital outside of agriculture. It was also in part a consequence of the 
institutional changes in the countries of the former Soviet block that precipi-
tated a rapid exit of resources from agriculture in the 1990s. The incentives af-
forded by the current high commodity prices and a resumption of agricultural 
growth in the former Soviet countries should positively affect the rate of agri-
cultural capital formation at the global level. So long as TFP growth continues 
at its recent historical pace, this should lead to an increased rate of real output 
growth in global agriculture in a relatively short period of time. 
92  fuglIe
Despite this generally optimistic conclusion, it is also clear that agricul-
tural productivity growth has been very uneven. The evidence in this chapter 
suggests TFP growth may in fact be slowing in developed countries while ac-
celerating in developing countries. This is in marked contrast to the early find-
ings of Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997), 
which found developing countries to be falling further behind developed 
countries in agricultural land and labor productivity. Nonetheless, it remains 
true that many developing countries have not been able to achieve or sustain 
productivity growth in agriculture and as a consequence suffer from low levels 
of rural welfare and food security. This has not contributed to a slowdown in 
global TFP growth of the sector because their growth rates were never high 
to begin with. But this certainly has led to agriculture performing below its 
potential and has kept these countries poor. The largest group of countries in 
this low-growth category is in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also included are many 
countries in West Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania as well as some others. 
There is also evidence that agricultural productivity growth has been un-
even across commodities. However, our ability to assess productivity growth 
at the commodity level is limited mainly to examining land yield trends since 
labor and capital inputs tend to be shared across multiple commodities in the 
production process. Thus, the slowing growth in cereal grain yield that was 
identified in the World Bank Development Report 2008 (World Bank 2007) does 
raise concerns that there is underinvestment (or low returns) to research di-
rected at these commodities. But even here the picture is uneven, as decompos-
ing cereal yield trends reveal that the slowdown affected primarily wheat and 
rice yields, with corn yield growth continuing to perform well after 1990. It is 
possible that the relatively strong performance in corn yield growth is due to 
the historically higher level of investment in research and development (R&D) 
for this crop because of the strong private-sector interest in breeding for hybrid 
corn (Fuglie et al. 1996). In any case, the implication for R&D policy is quite 
different than if a sector-wide productivity slowdown were occurring. Rather 
than comprehensive changes to agricultur al R&D or investment policies, the 
uneven performance within the agricultural sector suggests a more selective 
approach that requires a clear understanding of the causes of low productivity 
growth in particular commodities and countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Productivity growth in Australian agriculture has been an important source of 
wealth in Australia. The real value of agricultural production in Australia has been 
over $40 billion (2008 Australian dollars) per year since the late 1990s (Figure 
5.1). If productivity has grown at a rate of 2% per year, as some estimates indicate, 
then about two-thirds of the value of production in recent years can be attributed 
to productivity growth since 1953. Productivity growth has been strong in Austra-
lian agriculture relative to other sectors of the Australian economy and relative to 
the agricultural sectors of other rich countries (Mullen and Crean 2007). 
Recent data, however, suggest that productivity growth in at least some im-
portant sectors of Australian agriculture may be slowing. Public investment in 
agricultural research in Australia, always the predominant source of funding in 
Australia, has been falling for several decades. Other causes of the decline in the 
rate of productivity growth are a series of bad seasons extending back to 2001, 
which may, in part, be attributed to climate change. 
The objectives of this chapter are as follows:
•	To	review	productivity	growth	in	the	Australian	agriculture,	fisheries,	and	
forestry sector as a whole relative to the Australian economy as an indicator 
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of the competitiveness of the sector domestically and internationally using 
value-added estimates of productivity growth from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS). The performance of the agricultural sector within the 
New Zealand economy is also briefly reviewed.
•	To	review	productivity	growth	within	the	cropping	and	livestock	indus-
tries that comprise broadacre agriculture and within the dairy industry in 
Australia using gross output measures from farm survey data of the Aus-
tralian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE).
•	To	assess	whether	productivity	growth	in	agriculture	has	slowed	and	re-
view potential sources of this slowdown.
2. AGRICULTURE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY
The ABS uses national income accounting data to estimate and report value-
added measures of productivity for sectors in the Australian “market” economy, 
in which the inputs are labor and capital.1 Estimates of multifactor productivity 
Figure 5.1. Value of productivity growth in Australia: 1953 to 2008
Source: Adapted from Mullen and Crean (2007) using data from 2003. 
1In the value-added approach, the value of intermediate inputs is deducted from the gross value of 
output, and inputs are a correspondingly reduced set—often only labor and capital used in the sector. 
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(MFP) growth for the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sector and other sectors 
are provided at five-year intervals from 1986 (Table 5.1) (ABS 2007).2,3
The agricultural sector has been ranked with the communication services sector 
and the finance and insurance sector as high-growth sectors in the Australian econ-
omy. Productivity in the Australian market economy grew at a rate of 1.2% per year 
2The ABS also presents MFP estimates for the market economy for growth cycles in which growth 
peaks are estimated as local maximum divergences in the MFP from a trend MFP estimated 
used a smoothing process such as an 11-term Henderson moving average. However, productivity 
cycles at an industry level are unlikely to coincide. 
3Most often the data in ABS 2007 refer to financial years, but the convention of referring to the 
1985-86 year as 1986, for example, has been adopted.
Source: Adapted from ABS 2007, available at http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/
DetailsPage/ 5260.0.55.0022007-08?OpenDocument.
Table 5.1. Compound annual percentage change in value added–based MFP, 
market sector industries
 1985–86 
to 
1990–91 
1990–91 
to 
1995–96 
1995–96 
to 
2000–01 
2000–01 
to 
2005–06 
1985–86  
to 
2005–06 
 percent
High 
Communication 
services  4.7  4.7  2.2  2.7  3.6  
Agriculture, forestry, 
& fishing  2.3  1.8  5.3  2.5  3.0  
Finance & insurance  3.1  2.0  2.0  0.2  1.8  
Medium       
Transport & storage  0.7  2.9 1.7 1.6 1.7  
Wholesale trade  -1.8  3.9 2.9 1.3 1.5  
Electricity, gas, & 
water  6.0  2.6  0.5  -3.2  1.4  
Low       
Retail trade  -1.0  1.1 2.2 0.7 0.7  
Manufacturing  0.9  0.5 1.1 0.4 0.7  
Construction  -1.8  0.2  — 4.5  0.7  
Mining  3.5  2.3 1.1 -5.9 0.2  
Accommodation, 
cafes, & restaurants -3.8 — 1.4 2.5 — 
Cultural & 
recreational services  -0.9  -2.2  0.8  -0.2  -0.6  
Market sector  0.8  1.6  1.6  0.8  1.2  
Ratio of agriculture 
to market 2.9 1.3 3.3 3.1 2.5 
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over the entire period from 1986 to 2006. It surged strongly in the 1990s, growing 
by 1.6% per year, but slowed to 0.8% per year for the five years leading up to 2006. 
Over the 1986-2006 period, productivity in the agriculture, fisheries, and for-
estry sector grew at an annual rate of 3.6%, 2.5 times that of the market economy. 
In three of the four subperiods, MFP in the agriculture sector grew at about 3 
times the rate of the market economy. 
Studies by Bernard and Jones (1996) and Martin and Mitra (2000) suggest that 
the agricultural sectors in few OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries have performed as well relative to their economies as has 
the Australian agricultural sector. Hence, productivity growth in the Australian 
agricultural sector has likely been strong enough to enhance the sector’s competi-
tiveness relative to other sectors of the Australian economy and relative to the agri-
cultural sectors in many other countries.4 
Despite this apparently strong productivity performance of the agriculture, 
fisheries, and forestry sector relative to the market economy, the share of the sector 
in total Australian gross domestic product (GDP) has continued to decline (from 
9.8% in 1964 to 2.5% in 2008) although the rate of decline has eased markedly 
since the late 1980s. 
Over the longer period, 1978 to 2007, the average annual rate of growth in 
productivity in the agricultural sector at 2.4% was twice that of the market econo-
my, at 1.2%.5,6 Labor productivity in agriculture (value-added output per unit of la-
bor [hours worked]) grew at a rate of 2.1% per year, faster than capital productivity 
(value-added output relative to a flow of services from a measure of the productive 
capacity of capital), and the capital-to-labor ratio (the ratio of these two partial pro-
ductivity indexes) increased from less than 70 in 1978 to 100 in 2007, consistent 
with capital being substituted for labor.
To provide some perspective, real GDP (in 2008 Australian dollars) in the 
Australian economy in 2008 was $1,037 billion with the contribution of agricul-
4The qualification here is that the market economy estimates do not include property and busi-
ness services, government administration and defense, education, health and community ser-
vices, and personal and other services, sectors for which output is valued at cost. The relative 
performance of the agriculture sector may be overstated if productivity in these sectors not pres-
ently included has grown at a faster rate than the market economy. 
5MFP growth rates were estimated as the coefficient on a time trend in a regression of the log of 
MFP against a constant and the time trend.
6ABS data are now available to 2008 (Figure 5.6) but ABARE data are only available to 2007. The 
extra year does not alter these estimated growth rates. 
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ture being $21.7 billion (2.1%) and that of fisheries and forestry being $2.3 bil-
lion (0.2%) (ABARE 2008). 
There is an important distinction between value-added measures of MFP 
(reported in Table 5.1) and gross output measures of MFP (also reported by ABS 
for the period 1995-2004 and used exclusively by ABARE) (ABS 2007). The 
gross output measure is based on the total value of production of firms engaged 
in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. The input measure used in estimating MFP 
is the total value of labor, capital, and all intermediate inputs. The value-added 
measures exclude the value of intermediate inputs both from the measure of out-
puts and the measure of inputs. The gross output measure has the attraction of 
attributing efficiency gains across all inputs and hence is more closely interpreted 
as Hicks-neutral technical change in an industry. The value-added measure is 
more partial in nature, attributing efficiency gains to labor and capital. However, 
the attractions of the value-added measure include ease of aggregation from in-
dustries to a market-economy measure of MFP and the timeliness by which the 
measure can be derived from national accounts data. 
The growth in the gross output MFP measure can be derived as the growth 
in the value-added MFP measure times the ratio of nominal value-added to nom-
inal gross output (ABS 2007). This relationship means that the growth in the 
gross output measure is flatter than the growth in the value-added measure. This 
will be an important consideration when comparing the ABS value-added and 
ABARE gross output measures of MFP in the following sections. 
3. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURE
There have been a number of studies of productivity growth for the New 
Zealand economy and its agriculture sector (including Philpott and Stewart 1958; 
Diewert and Lawrence 1999; Black, Guy, and McLellan 2003; Hall and Scobie 
2006; Cao and Forbes 2007; and Mullen, Scobie, and Crean 2008). These studies 
are difficult to compare because of the different datasets and methodologies used 
to compute MFP. Statistics New Zealand did not start reporting productivity 
measures until 2006 and then only for the market economy (defined similarly 
to ABS). Attention here is confined to the Hall and Scobie research, because of 
its longer historical perspective, and the most recent analysis by Cao and Forbes 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), which is based on Statistics 
New Zealand data. All of the studies used value-added measures of MFP, and MFP 
growth was estimated as a compound annual growth rate. 
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Hall and Scobie (2006) constructed an MFP series for the years 1927-2001 
using a value-added approach. They estimated that, over the entire period 1927–
2001, their measure of MFP grew at a rate of 1.8% per year. The average annual 
growth rates by subperiod were 1.0% (1927-56), 2.2% (1957-83), and 2.6% 
(1984-2001).7 The trend in productivity in New Zealand agriculture is graphed 
in Figure 5.2 for the period 1953 to 2001. It is noteworthy that this period of 
accelerating MFP from 1984 coincides with a period of major economic reform 
within the New Zealand economy. 
The MAF publishes a value-added series (based on Statistics New Zealand 
data) for the years 1978 to 2007. Hall and Scobie have not updated their series, 
and the two series are unlikely to be perfectly consistent. 
Using this MAF series, Cao and Forbes estimated that for the period 1988-
2006, MFP in agriculture (not including forestry and fisheries) grew at a rate of 
2.7% per year, which was 1.8 times faster than MFP growth of 1.5% per year for 
the market economy as estimated by Statistics New Zealand (Figure 5.3).8 As for 
Australia, labor productivity in New Zealand agriculture grew more quickly than 
capital productivity, and input use declined. There is little evidence that growth 
in productivity in New Zealand agriculture has slowed.
Given that the Cao and Forbes measure of MFP is a value-added measure 
(expected to be steeper than a gross output measure) and that MFP growth 
in New Zealand agriculture has not been as fast relative to the New Zealand 
market economy as has been the case in Australia, it seems most probable that 
productivity growth has been faster in Australian agriculture than in New 
Zealand agriculture. The most recent multilateral study by Rao, Coelli, and 
Alauddin (2004) found that MFP growth rates in Australia and New Zealand 
over the period 1970-2001 were 2.0% and 0.8% per year, respectively. 
In each of the figures for the Hall and Scobie and MAF series on MFP in 
agriculture, a terms-of-trade index has been graphed (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
For Hall and Scobie this index was estimated as the ratio of an index of output 
prices to an index of input prices from their productivity database. The Hall and 
Scobie (2006) series declined from around 176 in 1953 to 100 in 2004. This is 
a much slower rate of decline than that faced by Australian farmers as will be 
7Mullen, Scobie, and Crean (2008) reported lower growth rates because they re-estimated them 
from a regression of the log of MFP against a constant and time trend. 
8The MAF series now extends back to 1978, but when Cao and Forbes did their analysis only 
data from 1988 were available.
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Figure 5.2. Productivity growth and terms of trade in New Zealand 
agriculture from Hall and Scobie: 1953 to 2001
Source: Hall and Scobie 2006: terms of trade is estimated as the ratio of an index of output prices 
to an index of input prices, and MFP is a value-added measure.  
Figure 5.3. MFP for New Zealand agriculture and the New Zealand market 
economy from MAF: 1978 to 2007
Source: MAF, available at http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/statistics-and-forecasts/ 
sonzaf/2008/tables/A-4.xls. Terms of trade is estimated as the ratio of an index of prices received 
for exports to an index of prices paid for imports, and MFP is a value-added measure.
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seen in what follows. Cao and Forbes estimated the terms of trade as the ratio 
of an index of prices received for exports to an index of prices paid for imports. 
The two series are different, but both suggest that there has been no trend in 
the terms of trade for the New Zealand farm sector since the late 1980s, similar 
to the experience of Australian farmers. As a consequence, the gains to New 
Zealand (and Australian) farmers from productivity growth were not offset by 
unfavorable price changes during this recent period. 
Mullen, Scobie, and Crean (2008) suggested that while public research 
intensity in Australia has been about twice that in New Zealand, returns to 
agricultural research in the two countries seemed similar, and hence relative 
levels of research investment seemed appropriate. The speculation that Australia 
has a larger agricultural sector and larger share of broadacre cropping (where 
MFP growth was most rapid, at least until 2000) may partly explain Australia’s 
better performance. 
4. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AUSTRALIAN 
BROADACRE AGRICULTURE
ABARE has conducted farm surveys over many years for broadacre ag-
riculture, the extensive grazing and cropping industries, and for dairying. 
Data from these surveys are used to follow trends in productivity using gross 
output measures. Most farms in Australia jointly produce several crop and 
livestock commodities. ABARE monitors the productivity of segments within 
broadacre agriculture—such as specialist sheep (meat and wool) producers 
or specialist crop producers—but does so using stratified samples from their 
overall farm survey. 
In 2008 the total value of crop production (Australian dollars) was $21.4 bil-
lion, of which grains and oilseeds comprised $9 billion. The total value of live-
stock production was $19.8 billion, of which dairying contributed $4.6 billion, 
wool, $2.6 billion, and livestock slaughtering (including extensive and intensive 
stock), $12.1 billion (ABARE 2008).  
I assembled an MFP series for the years 1953 to 1994 using ABARE farm 
survey data, which I extended subsequently in a piecemeal fashion, again using 
ABARE data, as reported in several papers, most recently a 2007 article in the 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. Recently, the dataset was 
updated by integrating it with ABARE’s complete MFP data for the period 1978 
onward to yield a consistent productivity dataset for 1953 to 2007.
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Alongside yearly additions to ABARE’s dataset (as each survey is completed), 
ongoing revisions to previous years are made in “cleaning” the data. The ac-
cumulated effect of these small changes over a number of years means that re-
estimating earlier estimates can yield substantially different results. For example, 
using the new dataset, average MFP growth between 1978 and 2004 is estimated 
at 1.7% a year, compared to 2.7% using the dataset from Mullen 2007. As new 
estimates reflect the latest data revisions, it appears that my earlier estimates and 
those of ABARE most likely overstated broadacre productivity growth.
There have also been changes in ABARE’s survey and survey methodology 
over time, which can influence MFP estimates. For example, the sampling frame 
adjusts from year to year based on a population drawn from the ABS Australian 
Business Register, and hence individual farms are not consistently surveyed. 
Also, the target population is revised over time to reflect changes in the value of 
farm production. Since 2004-05, the ABARE survey has included farm establish-
ments with an estimated value of agricultural operations of $40,000 or more. In 
earlier years, excluding the smallest farms required a smaller cut-off. Finally, in 
2002, the survey definitions of farm capital inputs were changed.9 These changes 
mean that in evaluating differences in the rate of agricultural productivity 
growth across time periods it is important to use a consistent dataset, and com-
paring reported estimates across a range of literature can be misleading.
The index of MFP for Australian broadacre agriculture increased almost 
threefold, from 100 in year 1953 to 288 in 2000. It then declined to 193 in 2003, 
reflecting the drought in that year, before reaching 277 in 2006 and then falling 
to 215 in the drought year of 2007 (Figure 5.4). The index is highly variable, fall-
ing in 20 of the 55 years, reflecting seasonal conditions (Figure 5.5). Such vari-
ability makes it difficult to discern trends in the underlying, more stable rate of 
technological change. The average annual rate of MFP growth over the entire pe-
riod was 2.0% per year, 0.5% per year lower than the long-term rate I previously 
reported (in Mullen 2007, for example). 
Changes in productivity can be compared with changes in the terms of trade 
faced by farmers10 as a partial indicator of whether Australian agriculture is 
becoming more or less competitive. The conventional wisdom is that the terms 
of trade facing Australian agriculture have been declining inexorably. However, 
9Further details of ABARE survey methods can be found in ABARE 2009.
10Reported in ABARE 2008 and estimated as the ratio of an index of prices received by farmers to 
an index of prices paid by farmers. 
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Figure 5.4. Broadacre MFP and terms of trade in Australian agriculture: 
1953 to 2007
Source: Terms of trade is estimated as the ratio of an index of prices received by farmers to an 
index of prices paid by farmers (ABARE, Australian Commodity Statistics, 2008) and MFP is a 
gross output measure. 
Figure 5.5. Annual growth rates for MFP in Australian broadacre agriculture
Source: Adapted from Mullen and Crean 2007.
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while the terms of trade declined for about 40 years from 1953 (Figure 5.4), since 
the early 1990s, the rate of decline has been much slower, at least for the sec-
tor as a whole. While the MFP index grew from 100 in 1953 to 215 in 2007, the 
terms of trade declined from about 335 to 100, at a rate of 2.3% per year over the 
period 1953 to 2007, faster than the rate of productivity growth in broadacre ag-
riculture. However, the rate of decline was 2.6% per annum from 1953 to 1990, 
and from 1991 to 2007, it was less than 1.0% per annum. 
The ABARE estimates of productivity growth in broadacre agriculture can 
also be compared with the ABS estimates for agriculture, fisheries, and forestry 
(Figure 5.6). For the period 1978 to 2007, the ABARE and ABS estimates of av-
erage annual productivity growth rates were 1.5% and 2.4%, respectively. The 
ABARE and ABS series tracked each other closely except from 2001 when the 
ABARE series dipped while the ABS series continued to rise. 
The most important reason for the much faster growth rate of the ABS mea-
sure is that it is a value-added measure. The ABS also report a gross output 
measure for the years 1995 to 2004, which is noticeably flatter than the ABS value-
added series over the same period and similar to the ABARE series (Figure 5.6). In 
fact, the annual growth rates over this 10-year period were 2.1%, 2.2%, and 4.4% 
for the ABARE, ABS gross output, and ABS value-added measures, respectively. 
Figure 5.6. MFP trends as estimated by ABARE for broadacre agriculture 
and by the ABS for agriculture, fisheries, and forestry using value-added and 
gross-output measures
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In addition, the industry coverage of the ABS and ABARE series is different. 
The ABS measure includes all agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, whereas the 
ABARE measure covers broadacre including extensive livestock and cropping in-
dustries but not including important industries like dairying, intensive livestock, 
horticulture, and viticulture. The share of broadacre agriculture in total value of 
output from agriculture (not including forestry and fisheries) has fallen to about 
60%. Because of the run of poor seasons over the past decade, which has had 
more severe impacts on broadacre agriculture than other components of the sec-
tor, there has been a divergence in the growth of MFP for broadacre agriculture 
and that for the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sector. 
Productivity growth in broadacre agriculture since 1978 reflects output 
growing by 0.8% per year combined with input use declining by 0.6% per year 
(Nossal et al. 2009). Labor use declined (1.7%) faster than the use of capital 
(1.2%) and land (0.7%) while the use of purchased inputs increased (2.4%), 
resulting in higher rates of growth in partial factor productivity (PFP) of labor 
(2.5%) and capital (2.1%). 
As noted earlier, the ABARE broadacre dataset was stratified based on the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) system to 
provide estimates of productivity growth by the enterprise or industry.11
Here I have adopted the same stratification: cropping, mixed crop–livestock, 
beef, and sheep. Alternative definitions have been used for specific industry analy-
ses (as in Nossal, Sheng, and Zhao 2008), but the findings were not dissimilar.
Since 1978, cropping specialists have achieved much higher rates of MFP 
growth (2.2% per year) than have beef specialists (1.5% per year) and sheep spe-
cialists (0.3% per year) (Table 5.2). Generally output grew while input use stayed 
static or declined. In particular, cropping specialists greatly increased their use 
of purchased inputs (4% per year) and reduced their use of labor (-0.2% per 
year) and capital (-0.4% per year), resulting in strong growth in partial produc-
tivity of labor and capital (Nossal et al. 2009). A switch toward reduced-tillage 
cropping—which is also associated with more diverse cropping rotations and 
more opportunistic cropping to exploit available soil moisture (as opposed to 
fixed rotations and fallows)—partly explains the changes in input use and the 
strong rate of productivity growth. 
11ANZSIC is consistent with international standards and permits comparisons between indus-
tries, both within Australia and internationally. Farms assigned to a particular ANZSIC class have 
a high proportion of their total output characterised by that class (ABS 2006, cat. no. 1292.0).
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12How wool cut per head translates into wool cut per hectare depends on stocking rate. Stocking 
rates typically decline during drought years but often not at a rate to maintain wool cut per head. 
Wheat yield, about 2 tons per hectare in good years, grew by 0.9% per 
year on average since 1972, or by 1.5% per year if the drought years of 2007 
and 2008 are omitted (Figure 5.7). Wool cut per head, which in good years ap-
proaches 6 kilograms per head, grew by 0.2% per year.12 Perhaps growth in 
these yields has slowed since the mid-1990s, but a run of poor seasons con-
founds any firm conclusions. 
It is not clear why MFP has grown more quickly in cropping than in live-
stock, particularly in sheep production (Mullen 2007). The production cycle is 
much longer in livestock than in cropping, which may mean it is more difficult 
to demonstrate to farmers the benefits from new technologies. Perhaps genetic 
gains have been more rapid in crops than in livestock over this period. Perhaps 
specialist crop farmers have a greater range of input substitution and output 
transformation opportunities than specialist wool growers, for example. However 
my analysis with Crean (Mullen and Crean 2007) pointed out that the productiv-
ity gains of mixed farmers (who presumably have the greatest opportunities for 
economies of scope), while greater than those of specialist livestock farms, were 
less than those of specialist crop farmers. The Productivity Commission (2005) 
pointed to a rapid advance in cropping technologies as an explanation for this 
Table 5.2. Average annual growth in broadacre MFP, by industry and by 
state, 1978 to 2007 
Sources: Nossal et al. 2009 for the industry data. The state data come from the same database but 
were not published in Nossal et al. 2009. 
 Percentage Growth
 MFP Output Input
Total broadacre 1.5 0.8 -0.6
Cropping  2.1 3.1 1.0
Mixed crop/livestock 1.5 0.1 -1.5
Beef 1.5 1.7 0.1
Sheep 0.3 -1.4 -1.8
 
New South Wales 1.2 0.3 -0.9
Victoria 1.4 0.6 -0.8
Queensland 0.8 0.6 -0.2
South Australia 2.0 1.5 -0.5
Western Australia 2.4 1.8 -0.6
Tasmania 0.8 -2.1 -2.9
Northern Territory (Beef)  1.7 1.6 -0.1
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divergence in MFP growth. These technologies included higher-yielding, disease-
resistant varieties; improved fertilizers and pesticides; and reduced tillage. 
Productivity growth has also varied by state, with productivity growth 
much faster in Western Australia and South Australia than in New South Wales 
and Victoria. Hailu and Islam (2004), using a multilateral approach to compare 
broadacre MFP (based on ABARE data) across states from 1977 to 1999, found 
that faster growth in Western Australia and South Australia meant that MFP in-
dexes were converging across states.  
In several papers, Knopke and colleagues (1995, 2000) enquired into sources 
of Australian agricultural productivity growth. The most robust of their findings 
was that scale matters. Large farms have higher rates of productivity growth than 
small farms. Dividing the farms into three groups by size (measured in terms of 
livestock carrying capacity), Knopke et al. (1995) found that productivity grew 
by 3.1% per year for the group of largest farms, 1.9% per year for the group of 
medium-sized farms, and 0.9% per year for the group of smallest farms. In the 
2000 study, Knopke et al. found that productivity grew by 3.5%, 2.7%, and 2.4 
% per year respectively for the three groups of farms.13
Figure 5.7. Yields of milk, wheat, and wool in Australia: 1970-2008
Source: Derived from data in ABARE 2008.
13Note that the study by Knopke et al. (1995) analyzed the performance of broadacre farms 
generally, not just grain farms, as in later studies. The 2000 study did not include specialist 
livestock producers. 
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The most thorough attempt to quantitatively examine the sources of agri-
cultural productivity in Australia was the study of the Australian grains indus-
try by Alexander and Kokic (2005). Theirs was a cross-sectional study using 
individual farm data for Victorian grain farms from the ABARE broadacre sur-
vey for the years 1999 and 2002, as well as for 2001. Using an adjustment to 
the Fisher total factor productivity (TFP) formula to ensure transitivity,14 they 
were able to compare the absolute level of productivity between farms. Their 
measure of TFP represents the extra output some farms gain holding constant 
the quantity of inputs. 
Given the earlier findings that the key factor associated with higher levels 
of productivity was farm scale, with larger farms being more productive, Alex-
ander and Kokic (2005) undertook regression analysis (M-quartile regression) 
to estimate unit production costs and their relationship with size. Their find-
ings confirmed that costs per hectare were negatively related to farm size and 
productivity, meaning that smaller farms had higher costs per hectare and lower 
productivity.
Soil moisture generally had a statistically significant, positive effect on pro-
ductivity in all regions and years. While farmers may be able to manage available 
soil moisture to some degree, rainfall is outside their control.
Other factors that generally had a positive and significant influence on pro-
ductivity for grain farms in all regions included the use of reduced-tillage tech-
nologies, the extent of specialization in cropping, farmer education, and farmer 
participation in training. Off-farm income had a negative effect on productivity, 
but perhaps farm size is confounding this relationship, as small farms rely much 
more heavily on off-farm income. 
While some other factors were significant in one or more regions in one or 
more years, their impact on productivity (either positive or negative) was not 
consistent. For example, soil acidity was negatively related to productivity in the 
northern and western regions in some years and positively related in the south-
ern region in 2001-02. 
In these studies, potential economies of scale were identified as a source 
of productivity growth. The Productivity Commission (2005) noted that aver-
age farm size in Australian agriculture (not just broadacre farming) has been 
increasing. In 1983 there were 178,000 farms and the average size was 2,720 
14See Coelli et al. 2005, for example.
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hectares. The ABS (2009) reported 141,000 farms in 2008 and an average size 
of 2,959 hectares.15 The rate of increase in farm size was initially about 1% per 
year, but it has slowed in recent years. Hence, some share of estimated growth 
in Australian agricultural MFP may be attributable to increasing farm size. The 
policy implications of productivity growth relating to farm adjustment should 
be considered. That noted, changes in farm size occur quite slowly and, hence, 
may not have been a major contributor to recent productivity growth in Austra-
lian agriculture.
A major source of productivity growth has been from technical change 
arising from investment in research and development (R&D). The public sec-
tor, financed to a significant degree in recent decades by levies on production, 
has been the major provider of R&D services in Australia. In a series of analy-
ses (most recently Mullen 2007) I found that the returns to this investment in 
broadacre agriculture have remained high (an internal rate of return of 15%-40% 
per year). However the downward revision of the ABARE productivity series for 
broadacre agriculture, previously noted, is likely to mean that my estimates are 
likely to be biased upward. 
5. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AUSTRALIAN DAIRYING
Aside from the broadacre agricultural sector, ABARE data also enable pro-
ductivity analysis of the dairy industry. The most recent study based on the re-
vised ABARE dataset was reported in Nossal et al. (2009). MFP in dairying grew 
by 1.2% per year over the period 1989–2007, with output growing at a rate of 
5.9% per year and inputs growing at a rate of 3.9% per year, a different experi-
ence from that of broadacre agriculture.16 The dairy industry has responded to 
significant deregulation of marketing (particularly since July 2000), with small 
farms leaving the industry and the remaining farms growing in size and inten-
sity.17 Milk yields per cow grew at an average rate of 2.4% per year since 1972 
and are approaching 5.5 kiloliters per cow per year. Total production of milk fell 
from 11.3 billion liters in 2002 to 9.1 billion liters in 2008. 
15The ABS and Productivity Commission estimates may not be consistent but there is no doubt-
ing the trend.
16Note the shorter observation period—from 1989 for dairying as compared to 1978 for 
broadacre. 
17Dairy farms now rely more heavily on purchased feed and irrigated pastures and are more likely 
to specialize in dairying. 
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Productivity grew the fastest in New South Wales, arguably where the 
gains from deregulation have been greatest (Zhao et al. 2008). In their data 
envelopment analysis of a cross-section of dairy farms, Fraser and Graham 
(2005) noted that dairy farms in New South Wales and Queensland in 2000 
were farther from the efficiency frontier than those in Victoria, implying great-
er scope for productivity growth in those states as dairy farmers adjusted to 
deregulation. 
6. HAS PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE SLOWED? 
In Australia, a decade of poor seasonal conditions has made it difficult to 
discern whether and why agricultural productivity growth has slowed. Accord-
ing to the ABS valued-added measure, productivity growth in the agriculture, 
fisheries, and forestry sector has remained strong despite a weakening in the rest 
of the economy (Table 5.1), growing at a rate of 2.5% per year in the 10 years 
leading up to 2007. 
However, ABARE estimates for broadacre agriculture suggest that produc-
tivity growth slowed in the 10 years leading up to 2007.18 In this period, MFP 
peaked at 288 in 2000 and the next peak was 276 in 2006 (Figure 5.6). The an-
nual growth rate from 1998 to 2007 was -1.4% (Table 5.3). 
Recall that, were a gross output measure for the agriculture, fisheries, and 
forestry sector available for this period, its growth rate would be much flatter 
and more similar to the ABARE measure. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely 
that because of the different industry composition of the two measures and the 
greater susceptibility of broadacre industries to the impact of drought, MFP 
18Trends within enterprises that make up broadacre agriculture are reviewed in the next section.
Table 5.3. Trends in MFP for broadacre industries, 1978 to 2007
Source: Nossal et al. 2009. 
 
All 
Broadacre Cropping 
Mixed 
Crop-
Livestock Beef Sheep 
 percent
1979-80 to 1988-89 2.2 4.8 2.9 -0.9 0.4 
1984-85 to 1993-94 1.8 4.7 3.2 3.1 -1.7 
1988-89 to 1997-98 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.6 -1.2 
1993-94 to 2002-03 0.7 -1.2 0.0 1.0 3.4 
1997-98 to 2006-07 -1.4 -2.1 -1.9 2.8 0.5 
1977-78 to 2006-07 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.5 0.3 
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growth in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sector has been faster than that 
in broadacre industries over the past decade. 
Trends in productivity have not been even across industries within broadacre 
agriculture (Table 5.3). For cropping specialists, MFP grew by 4.8% per year from 
1980 to 1994 but declined by 2.1% per year from 1998 to 2007. There seems much 
less evidence of a slowing in MFP growth for beef and sheep specialists. Nossal et 
al. (2009) speculated that productivity growth of sheep specialists, usually ranking 
the lowest among the industry groups, might finally be catching up. 
Why might broadacre productivity be slowing? Some argue that it is not sur-
prising that productivity growth in agriculture is drifting down because “all the 
big gains have been made.” However, Australian research agronomists seem confi-
dent that there are still practical research opportunities to develop new technolo-
gies that would allow farmers to grow crops more efficiently. For example, Angus 
(2001) argued that trends in Australian wheat yields showed little signs of slowing 
down (Figure 5.8). Anderson and Angus (World Wheat Book, in press) said:
“Despite the new technology, the mean yield is only 2.0 tons 
per ha, about half of the water-limited potential…. Further 
research will be needed to increase yield closer to the water-
limited potential. The gains are most likely to come from tac-
tics that enable crops to take advantage of the more favorable 
seasons in the variable climate, and concentration of inputs 
on the parts of farms with the highest yield potential.” 
Figure 5.8. Trends in average wheat yield in Australia: 1860 to 2000
Source: Donald 1965, modified by Angus in 2001.
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Two other factors likely to explain a significant portion of productivity growth in 
broadacre agriculture (at least at the aggregate level) are climate or seasonal con-
ditions and public investment in agricultural research.
The annual rainfall anomaly for the Murray Darling Basin (Figure 5.9) pub-
lished by the Bureau of Meteorology for the period 1900-2008 shows the annual 
deviation in rainfall from average annual rainfall between 1961 and 1990. There 
have now been eight consecutive years of below-average rainfall. No judgment 
is made here about the extent to which long-term climate change has contrib-
uted to this run of poor seasons. If farmers are using inputs in expectation of a 
normal season but a dry season eventuates, then MFP falls. In addition, perhaps 
farmers’ expectations about seasons are now more conservative such that they 
are operating on a less efficient part of the production function. 
Total public expenditure on agricultural R&D (not including fisheries and 
forestry) in Australia has grown from $140 million in 1953 to almost $830 million 
in 2007 (in 2008 Australian dollars) (Mullen 2010). Figure 5.10 shows that expen-
diture growth was strong to the mid-1970s. The trend in expenditure has essen-
tially been static since that time, although there was a spike in investment (nearly 
$950 million) in 2001. Likewise, agricultural research intensity, which measures 
the investment in agricultural R&D as a percentage of GDP, grew strongly in the 
Figure 5.9. Annual rainfall anomaly, Murray Darling Basin, 1900 to 2008
Source: The Bureau of Meteorology, available at http://reg.bom.gov.au/cgi-bin/climate/change/
timeseries.cgi?graph=rranom&area=mdb&season=0112&ave_yr=0.
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1950s and 1960s but has been drifting down from about 4.0%-5.0% annually of 
agriculture GDP in the period between 1978 and 1986 to about 3.0% per annum 
in recent years (as compared to 2.6% per annum in developed countries). 
 Sheng, Mullen, and Zhao (2009) found that based on an analysis of the 
stability of the MFP index for broadacre agriculture from 1953 to 2007 using the 
adjusted cumulative sum square index, climate alone did not explain the slow-
down in broadacre productivity growth. Rather, the slowdown can be attributed 
to both poor seasons and the lagged impact of the stagnation in public invest-
ment in agricultural R&D since the 1970s. 
7. CONCLUSION
MFP in agriculture in New Zealand had been growing slowly relative to 
the New Zealand economy, but recent estimates from the MAF suggest that 
this is no longer true. MFP in agriculture since 1988 grew by 2.7% per year 
and shows no sign of slowing, whereas the MFP growth rate for the economy 
as a whole was 1.5%.
In Australia, productivity growth in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry 
sector has remained strong and shows little indication of slowing. Since 1978 it 
has grown at a rate of 2.4% per year (using a value-added measure) and has often 
Figure 5.10. Real public investment and research intensity in Australian 
Broadacre Agriculture: 1953 to 2007 (2008 dollars) 
Source: Mullen 2010, derived from public financial statements of public research institutions and 
the ABS.
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exceeded growth in the market economy by a factor of 3. Nevertheless agricul-
ture’s share in the economy’s GDP has continued to fall, though at a slower rate 
in recent decades. It seems likely that productivity growth in agriculture has 
been faster in Australia than in New Zealand. 
Productivity growth in broadacre industries, on the other hand, while strong 
to 1998, has been negative in the 10 years leading up to 2007 (-1.4%). Reconcil-
ing the ABS and ABARE measures is difficult because the industry coverage is 
different and the ABS reports a value-added measure for the sector as a whole 
whereas ABARE reports a gross output–based measure for broadacre industries. 
Value-added measures exceed gross output measures to the extent that, for the 
period 1995 to 2004, the growth rate for the ABS series, when converted to an 
equivalent output-based measure, was similar to the ABARE measure. 
Prior to the poor seasonal conditions since 1998, MFP in the broadacre in-
dustries was growing at a rate of about 2% per year. Hence, it seems likely that 
MFP growth in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sector also grew at about 
this rate in terms of an output-based measure and that it continued to grow at 
about this rate through to 2007. 
The performance of industries within the broadacre grouping is diverse. 
Since 1978, MFP for cropping specialists grew at a rate of 2.1% per year on aver-
age but in some subperiods it grew at a rate approaching 5%, and after 1998 it 
decreased at 2.1% per year. Long-term average MFP growth for livestock special-
ists was much lower than for crop specialists; however, this trend appears to 
have reversed for the past 10-15 years. Generally within these industries, output 
has grown while labor and capital use has been static or declining, with partial 
productivity measures for these inputs rising. However, for cropping there was a 
large increase in the use of purchased inputs (4%). 
The better performance of cropping specialists and their increased use of 
purchased inputs is likely explained by a switch toward reduced-tillage cropping 
also associated with more diverse cropping rotations and greater opportunities 
to exploit available soil moisture (as opposed to fixed rotations and fallows). 
Scale economies have likely been an important source of productivity growth in 
broadacre industries, particularly among crop specialists. Livestock specialists 
seem to have less scope to switch between enterprises in response to changing 
economic and climate conditions. 
MFP growth in dairying was 1.2% per year over the 1989-2007 period with 
output growing at a rate of 5.9% per year and inputs growing at a rate of 3.9% 
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per year, a different experience from broadacre agriculture. The dairy industry 
has responded to significant deregulation of marketing (particularly since July 
2000), with small farms leaving the industry and the remaining farms growing 
in size and intensity.
An obvious reason for the slowdown in MFP growth for cropping specialists, 
and broadacre industries more generally, has been the run of poor seasons. Rain-
fall in the Murray Darling Basin has been below the average for the 1960-1990 
period for the eight years starting in 2001. 
Public investment in agricultural research has also stagnated since the 
1970s. There is a long lag between investment in research and increased produc-
tivity on farms. There is concern that this stagnation in investment is now being 
reflected in the downturn in MFP.
Recent econometric research to disentangle climate and investment factors 
confirms that there has been a slowdown in broadacre MFP growth and that 
slowdown can only be explained by the effects of both poor seasons and declining 
public investment in R&D, not by either of these singly. Australian agronomists 
are confident that good research opportunities remain to develop technologies 
that will advance the growth of MFP in Australian broadacre agriculture. 
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CHAPTER 6
The Shifting Patterns of Agricultural 
Production and Productivity in Canada
Terrence S. Veeman and Richard Gray
1. INTRODUCTION
Canadian agriculture has been substantively transformed over the past centu-
ry. In absolute terms, agricultural production has increased considerably over time. 
For example, the production of wheat, a major Canadian crop, based initially on 
the improved variety Marquis, tripled from 1908 to 2008 (Statistics Canada 2009). 
New crops, such as canola on the Prairies and soybeans in Ontario, have captured 
significant acreage. The livestock numbers have greatly increased since World War 
I, the number of cattle and calves nearly doubling, the number of pigs growing 
about fourfold, and the number of chickens tripling (Statistics Canada 2009).
In relative terms, however, primary agriculture’s share of the Canadian econ-
omy has shrunk to account for 1% to 2% of gross domestic product and some 2% 
of national employment. Such structural change has been common in developed 
nations. Agriculture’s role in the economy overall is, of course, somewhat larger 
if the related input- and output-processing industries of the entire agricultural 
and agri-food system are considered. 
Associated with economy-wide changes in the structure of agriculture, ag-
ricultural productivity has increased considerably over time, whether measured 
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in terms of increases in crop yields, livestock yield gains, or estimated growth in 
agricultural total factor productivity. For instance, during the previous century, 
as a result of crop breeding, increased use of agro-chemicals, and improved prac-
tices and technology, the crop yields for wheat, barley, oats, and grain corn grew 
moderately, leading each of these to more than double (Statistics Canada 2009). 
Similarly, cattle carcass weights and piglets per sow have risen over time because 
of improved genetics and management. More specific estimates of overall total 
factor productivity growth suggest that agricultural productivity in Western 
Canada increased by more than 1.5% per annum from 1940 to 2004, with crop 
productivity growth considerably outdistancing livestock productivity growth in 
much of this period, but not since 1990 (Stewart 2006).
1.1. An Overview of Canadian Agriculture
Nearly 40% of Canadian farms are designated as crop farms, followed in im-
portance by beef farms, which comprise 26.6% of all farms. However, the mix of 
agricultural commodities varies across the country (AAFC 2005). Production of 
red meats, along with dairy, is most important in Ontario and Quebec. Red meats, 
grains, and oilseeds typically account for over 80% of market receipts in the Prai-
ries. In British Columbia, where a range of commodities is produced, fruits and 
vegetables are somewhat more important, whereas in Atlantic Canada, potatoes and 
dairy predominate. In 2006, nearly 7% of the farms in Canada reported growing or-
ganic products for sale, but only one-quarter of these farms were actually certified.
Agriculture uses only 7% of Canada’s land mass and is concentrated in the 
southern portion of the country, chiefly in the Canadian Prairies and the south-
erly reaches of Ontario and Quebec. The current Canadian farmland area of 67.8 
million hectares has remained relatively constant since World War II, although 
the land area in crops has crept upward to some 36 million hectares (Statistics 
Canada 2007). Other significant land-use changes include continuing decline, 
for more than three decades, in the area of summer fallow and an increase in 
improved (versus unimproved) pasture. In Western Canada there has been a sig-
nificant move away from cereal-crop rotations that primarily included wheat and 
barley, to rotations that include more broadleaf crops such as oilseeds (chiefly 
canola) and pulse crops (such as field peas and lentils). In terms of cropped 
area, King Wheat continues to retain the crown, with spring wheat still leading 
planted acres. This is followed by hay and other fodder crops, with canola now 
ahead of barley in third place as the second most important cash crop. Since 
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1990 farmers have also adopted no-till farming techniques, and no-till acreage 
now covers roughly half the crop area.
Beef production shifted somewhat from eastern to western Canada, and the 
Prairie region experienced the largest growth in pig production, at least until 
2006. Farm size has also increased in terms of herd size; from 1971 until 2001, 
the average number of cows per dairy farm more than tripled, while the num-
ber of pigs per hog farm rose by more than 10-fold (AAFC 2005). But the cattle 
and hog sectors have experienced considerable structural change, especially 
in hogs, with falling farm numbers but rising animal numbers. The number of 
farms reporting cattle and calves dropped 41% between 1981 and 2006, while 
cattle numbers rose to 15.8 million by 2006 (Mitura 2007) but declined there-
after. Beef cattle production became increasingly specialized into two distinct 
operations: cow/calf ranching and cattle feedlot finishing. The majority of beef 
cattle farms—some three-quarters—are now cow/calf operations. The number 
of farms reporting hogs decreased greatly from 1981 to 2006, dropping 80% 
to only 11,500 farms, each with an average of 1,162 pigs. In 1992 Canada had 
31,200 dairy farms with an average herd size of 44 cows. By 2008, the number 
of dairy farms in Canada had decreased by 56.5%, to 13,587 dairy farms, with 
an average herd size of 67 cows. These trends were evident in the latest Census 
of Agriculture (2006) with fewer and larger farms in Canada recorded, reflecting 
continuing consolidation and specialization in Canadian agriculture. The num-
ber of farms had dropped to 229,000, continuing the steady decline since 1941 
(Statistics Canada 2007; Mitura 2007). Average farm size recorded in the 2006 
Census was 295 hectares. This average, of course, masks considerable differ-
ences across Canada, ranging from more intensive 100-hectare farms in Central 
Canada (Ontario and Quebec) to more extensive farms in Saskatchewan, which 
average nearly 600 hectares in size (AAFC 2007).
Agricultural production, as in the United States, is increasingly concentrated 
on larger farms. In 2005, there were some 5,900 “million-dollar” farms (with 
gross farm receipts exceeding this figure), representing only 2.6% of all farms in 
Canada and earning nearly 40% of total receipts. In contrast, the farms with less 
than Can$100,000 in farm receipts comprised 65.6% of all farms and generated 
only 9.9% of all farm receipts (Mitura 2007).
Concurrently, farm operators in Canada are an aging demographic, now 
averaging 52 years of age (Statistics Canada 2007). Fewer young farm operators 
are being attracted to and retained in the industry. Some 28% of the 327,000 
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farm operators recorded in the latest (2006) census were women. Increasingly 
the economic well-being of farm households is linked to the nonfarm economy, 
with nearly half of all farms reporting off-farm income (Mitura 2007). Further, 
for unincorporated farms in 2006, off-farm income from all sources was four 
times as important to farm family income as net operating income from farming 
(AAFC 2009). In terms of operating arrangements, 57% of Canadian farms were 
sole proprietorships, 27% were partnerships, and 16% were incorporated. This 
corporate share has been rising, but an important distinction is the fact these 
“corporate” operations are still largely family incorporations.
Trade, particularly with the United States, is very important to Canadian ag-
riculture. The red meat sectors became increasingly integrated within the North 
American market in the past 15 years. Some 70% of Canadians’ food purchases 
are produced domestically, with the United States providing 57% of Canada’s 
food imports (Statistics Canada 2009). Further, slightly over half of Canada’s 
food exports go to the United States. Canadian farm producers are more export-
dependent than American or European producers. Canadian grain and oilseed 
farmers have long relied on export sales, and red meat producers are increasingly 
export oriented (AAFC 2005).
1.2. Crops and Livestock in Canada: Shifting Patterns over Time 
Canada is ranked eighth in world cereal production and tenth in world meat 
production (Statistics Canada 2009). During the decade from 1999 to 2008, on 
average about 48% of total farm cash receipts in Canada came from livestock 
receipts, some 41.3% from crop receipts, and the remaining 10.7% from govern-
ment program payments (CANSIM Database).1 The changing relative impor-
tance of these three major shares (crops, livestock, and direct payments) from 
1971 until 2008 is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Livestock receipts, at roughly half 
the total, have generally exceeded crop receipts over this period, with 2007 and 
2008 being recent notable exceptions, associated with stronger grain prices and 
adverse fortunes for red meat producers. Government payments have tended to 
increase, often on an ad hoc basis, in years of drought, animal disease, border 
problems, and financial stress.
Some features of the changing crop acreages over time have already been 
mentioned. It is also of interest, and even more revealing, to examine the chang-
1Note that indirect transfers from consumers, arising from Canada’s supply management systems 
for dairy and poultry products, are reflected in the receipts for these sectors. 
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ing pattern of crop receipts over time, as shown in Figure 6.2. The large share 
of the “other crops” category (which had been rising, at least until 2004) reflects 
the wide range of crop commodities grown across Canada and the increasing 
diversification of Canadian crop production. The considerable relative decline of 
wheat (excluding durum) as a source of farm crop receipts is clearly evidenced 
in Figure 6.2. Similarly, the significant relative rise in canola receipts and the 
relative decline in barley are portrayed. Corn and soybeans have both risen in 
relative importance, but they still only contribute approximately 6% and 5%, 
respectively, to Canadian crop receipts. Corn for biofuel production is not cur-
rently significant in Canada.
The relative breakdown of livestock receipts in Canada from 1971 to 2008 is 
shown in Figure 6.3. In the last decade of this period, cattle and calves contrib-
uted nearly 33% of total livestock receipts in Canada, with hogs providing 19%, 
dairy 26%, and chickens and hens 9%. The share of receipts from cattle and 
calves has dropped somewhat over time (especially since 2002) while the hog 
share of total livestock receipts increased from the 1990s until 2004 but sharply 
dropped thereafter. 
Figure 6.1. Shares of total farm cash receipts from crops, livestock, and 
direct payments, Canada, 1971-2008
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CANSIM Database.
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Figure 6.2. Shares of total crop receipts by individual crops, Canada, 
1971-2008
Source: Authors’ calculations from CANSIM Database.
Figure 6.3. Shares of total livestock receipts by individual livestock 
categories, Canada, 1971-2008
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CANSIM Database.
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1.3. Key Socioeconomic Factors Underlying These Changes 
Many factors underlie the changes in Canadian agriculture and its crop and 
livestock production, and of these, only a few can be briefly highlighted. On the de-
mand side, declining responsiveness of demand to global income growth (reflected 
in Engel’s Law) has been important for many agricultural commodities, particularly 
for food staples such as wheat. Red meat demand and production have seen nega-
tive influences, from shifts in domestic consumers’ preferences toward chicken and 
fish, and positive influences, as Canadian red meat production increasingly became 
integrated into the North American market (subject, of course, to market access at 
the border). On the supply side, Canadian agricultural production has been subject 
to the pervasive historical forces of capital-for-labor substitution and technological 
change. Crop production has become increasingly consolidated into large-scale farm-
ing operations, especially in Western Canada. Over time, most Canadian red meat 
production, particularly cattle feeding and hog production, has also become increas-
ingly concentrated in intensive livestock operations.
2. PARTIAL PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES FOR 
CANADIAN AGRICULTURE
The Canadian agricultural sector has changed significantly in many ways 
during the past 50 years. Despite long-term declines in globally determined real 
prices the output of the sector has increased through improvements in productiv-
ity, which have lowered the cost of production. In this section we examine some 
partial measures of productivity improvement and describe some of the changes 
in technology that have contributed to productivity improvement. Changes in total 
factor productivity for Canadian agriculture are reported in the third section of this 
chapter. The remainder of this section is organized in two parts, each representing 
an important aspect of productivity improvements. The first part describes crop 
yields and changes in the crop sector over time, while the second describes chang-
es and productivity gains specific to the livestock sector. Changes to labor produc-
tivity that are common to both crops and livestock in the Canadian context are 
briefly discussed in a subsequent section in which total factor productivity growth 
rates, from Statistics Canada time-series data, are introduced and compared. 
2.1. Crop Yields (Land Productivity)
Changes in crop yields are the most readily available measures of productiv-
ity gains in Canadian agriculture. In Canada and elsewhere, slowly increasing 
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crop yields have allowed the sector to feed a growing population on a relatively 
finite land base. As shown in Figure 6.4, the yields of the major field crops 
grown in Canada, (wheat, barley, canola, corn, soybeans, and peas) all increased 
from the 1960s until the present. Several features are noteworthy, including the 
volatile nature of yields even at the national level, highlighting the important 
continuing role of weather in influencing annual yields. Further, indexed against 
a base of the 1960-64 average, yields of all these crops follow a similar trend, 
increasing by about 60% during the 47-year period, to the point that statistical 
testing could not reject an identical linear trend coefficient for corn, wheat, cano-
la, and peas.2 This is remarkable considering the varying locations, biological 
properties, farming systems, and research institutions associated with each crop. 
The linear trend suggests a constant absolute growth in yields, which implies a 
declining proportional growth rate, since the same absolute increase per year is 
a smaller percentage of the growing base—in fact, a 60% decline in the propor-
tional rate of growth over the period.
The yields shown in Figure 6.4 are based on yield per seeded acre and do 
not reflect changes in cropping intensity that have occurred in Western Canada, 
Figure 6.4. Canadian crop yields, 1960-2007 (base 1960:1964 = 100)
Source:  CANSIM Database.
2Yield index data (1960-64 =100) were pooled and each index was estimated as a simple linear 
function of time. A cross-equation restriction that all trends were equal across crops could not be 
statistically rejected, with the exception of soybeans, which had a slower trend.
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which have been a major factor in increased productivity within the crops sec-
tor. During the 1960s summer fallow was a dominant cultural practice in much 
of Western Canada. In a summer-fallow rotation the land is left fallow for 18 
months after harvesting a crop, and weeds are controlled by tillage or herbicides 
for the summer in between cropping years. While this practice releases nitrogen 
from the soil organic matter and accumulates more moisture in the soil, it also 
reduces cropping intensity by postponing production by an additional year. As a 
result of the decline in summer-fallow area, annual cropping intensity in West-
ern Canada has increased from 62% to 87% of cultivated area. If this increase in 
cropping intensity was reflected in yields, the yield growth per cultivated area of 
wheat, barley, canola, and peas would be closer to 100% over the 47-year period. 
In contrast to trends in actual farm crop yields, acreage-weighted research 
trial yield indexes diverge markedly among Canadian crops (Figure 6.5). Both 
wheat and durum yields in experimental trials3 exhibited slow linear trends, 
increasing to 122% of the 1960-64 base yield over the period to 2006. Canola 
yields in experimental trials grew rapidly until 1972, but this growth was re-
versed from 1975 to 1983 as canola, with low glucosinolate and low eurcic acid 
replaced rapeseed, with the accompanying yield drag of any major crop trans-
formation. Canola trial yields then increased significantly from 1986 to 1994, 
only to retreat in the late 1990s as herbicide-tolerant varieties were adopted, with 
major agronomic benefits to growers in terms of weed control but again with the 
accompanying yield limitations of a major change in the available varieties. Since 
1998, canola yields have again grown rapidly, as hybrid varieties have been de-
veloped and widely adopted. 
In experimental trials, pea yields tracked wheat yields until 1994, but since 
1994 pea yield growth has accelerated significantly. The period of rapid trial 
yield growth for peas corresponds to the pea research output of the Crop De-
velopment Center, which is funded by research check-offs from Saskatchewan 
pulse growers. The cumulative result of these changes is that, compared with 
the base yield indexes in 1960, in 2006 the canola yield index was 180%, the 
peas index was 148%, and the wheat and durum yield indexes were just over 
120% of the base. 
The contrast between the growth patterns in the acreage-weighted experi-
mental yield indexes and the Canadian average realized yields of these various 
3New varieties of grain are tested in experimental cooperative trials that use side-by-side com-
parisons with established varieties to establish a yield index of each new variety.
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crops is most intriguing. Despite very different patterns of growth in experimen-
tal yield indexes across crops, the trends in the actual farm crop yields of peas, 
wheat, and canola could not be statistically distinguished from each other. One 
could speculate that changes in seeded area and disease pressures have caused 
convergence in the actual crop yields. Further analysis is needed to reconcile the 
differences between the experimental yield indexes and the patterns in Canadian 
average realized yields of various crops.
Important quality changes, which increase value but are not captured in 
the yield figures, have also occurred for many crops. Spring wheat varieties 
were confined to hard red spring wheat in the 1960s. While hard red spring 
wheat still dominates planting, new classes of wheat have been introduced 
over time, with each wheat class made up of varieties that can be visually dis-
tinguished from other wheat classes. Durum wheat now includes extra-high-
gluten varieties. Even hard red spring wheat has seen some quality attributes 
such as protein levels reflected in payment premiums. Canola was transformed 
from rapeseed in the early 1970s by reducing the level of glucosinolates and 
erucic acid. Since 2000, new canola varieties high in oleic acid have been in-
troduced. The pulse industry has introduced a wide variety of new types of 
lentils, chickpeas, and field peas, in some cases targeting high-value niche 
markets. While feed is the primary use of barley, plantings continue to be 
Figure 6.5. Research trial yield indexes for selected Canadian crops, 1960-
2006 (1960-1964=100)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on research trial data and seeded area.
 AgrIculturAl ProductIon And ProductIvIty In cAnAdA  133
dominated by two-row malting varieties, which replaced earlier six-row malt-
ing varieties.4
The balance of types of crops grown has shifted significantly since 1960. 
In particular, farmers in Western Canada have moved from a wheat, oats, and 
barley cereal monoculture to more robust rotations that include broadleaf crops 
such as canola and pulse crops, while farmers in Ontario and Quebec have in-
troduced soybeans into their rotations. The magnitude of these changes is illus-
trated in Figure 6.6, using the percentage of acres seeded to non-cereal crops as a 
measure of diversification.
Discussion of productivity enhancement in cropping systems would be in-
complete without mention of the dramatic change in tillage systems (Zentner et al. 
2002). In the 1960s, fields were tilled extensively during the summer-fallow period 
in much of Western Canada and tilled again prior to seeding. In the more-humid 
regions of Central Canada, land was tilled with a moldboard plough to bury the 
stubble residue from the previous crop. While these intensive tillage practices 
4Farmer and research preoccupation with malting varieties has often been alleged as a reason 
why barley yields have not advanced as rapidly as they might have, had more attention been 
placed on the breeding and growing of superior feed barley varieties (see Ulrich, Furtan, and 
Schmitz 1986).
Figure 6.6. Land use cultivated and seeded area and diversity of crops, 
selected regions of Canada by decade, 1960-2007
Source: Authors’ calculations from CANSIM Database.
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controlled weeds, they also contributed to soil erosion and a general loss of soil 
organic matter. Beginning in the 1970s, some farmers and industry groups began 
developing seeding systems and weed control systems that required less tillage. 
By the 1990s, very effective low-disturbance seeding systems had been developed, 
and they were rapidly adopted, as illustrated in Figure 6.7. All areas of Canada are 
adopting reduced-tillage systems, with the highest adoption rates occurring in Sas-
katchewan. These cropping systems reduce the demand for diesel, fuel, and labor, 
while increasing the demand for glyphosate herbicide and nitrogen fertilizer. 
The adoption of low-disturbance seeding systems and the introduction of more 
intensive, and diverse crop rotations have also had a significant impact on the envi-
ronment. These systems have reversed the long-term decline in soil organic matter 
and have resulted in a significant amount of carbon sequestration in the growing 
pool of organic matter. The reduction in tillage has significantly reduced both wa-
ter and wind erosion. To the extent these environmental benefits are excluded in 
productivity measurement, the recent gains in productivity are understated.
Finally, it is important to note that the impact of changes in yield, cropping 
intensity, cropping diversity and tillage systems on productivity cannot be eas-
ily separated from one another. Each of these aspects of the cropping system has 
complemented the others. Similarly, a better use of available moisture has re-
duced the need to summerfallow, while increasing the demand and opportunity 
Figure 6.7. Adoption of low-disturbance seeding as a percentage of seeded 
area, Canada and selected provinces
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Agriculture, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006.
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for growing other crops in the rotation. The access to higher-yielding pulse and 
canola crops has made these rotations more attractive.
2.2. Livestock Partial Productivity Measures
Livestock yields have risen over time as a result of improved genetics, feed con-
version, and management practices, as well as the exploitation of economies of scale 
in production. In recent years, as noted, Canada’s livestock industry has shifted to-
ward more intensive livestock operations with a much smaller number of farms (ex-
cept for the supply-managed poultry sector), an increase in the number of animals 
per farm, and many productivity-related improvements. For example, in Ontario, 
the efficiency of feed conversion for most livestock operations is estimated to have 
tripled between 1950 and 2000. Given that the yields per acre of feed grains dou-
bled in Ontario in this period, each acre could effectively support six times as much 
livestock production in 2000 as in 1950 (White, Dalrymple, and Hume 2007).  
In the case of cattle, beef production per cow has risen from about 170 kilo-
grams in 1972 to approximately 272 kilograms in 2006. As well, during the 23-
year period from 1980 to 2003, cattle carcass weights increased by 34% (AAFC 
2005). Hybrid vigor from crossing traditional with newer European breeds was a 
major factor in this improvement. There are no Brahma or Cebu breeds in Can-
ada’s beef herd, unlike arid regions of Australia or the United States, so Canada 
has no concerns about reduced meat tenderness from this factor.
The Canadian hog industry has experienced notable productivity improve-
ments arising from new genetics, new technologies, and economies of scale. 
Following the trend in other nations, Canada has seen the benefits of increased 
production from monogastric animals, such as hogs, which can utilize concen-
trated feeds very efficiently and which have shorter life cycles that foster faster 
genetic advance. From 1990 to 2003, larger litter sizes, more litters per year, and 
heavier carcass weights resulted in a 38% rise in production per sow (AAFC 
2005). Genetic improvement in swine is reflected in the reduction in age at 
which hogs in Ontario reach 100 kg, which fell from 183 days in 1980 to 157 
days in 2006 (White, Dalrymple, and Hume 2007). Despite the major advances 
in Canadian hog production and productivity up to 2006, the hog industry has 
been struggling economically since then, citing problems with global demand, 
trade barriers, and environmental constraints.
The Canadian dairy industry has also experienced some structural change 
and productivity increases. Increases in milk production per dairy cow have 
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accompanied the increase in herd size. In 1991-92, milk production per cow 
was 5,456 kg whereas by 2007-08, average milk production per cow was 
9,538 kg, representing almost a 43% increase in productivity from 1991 to 
2007, an increase of 2.5% per year during this period (Canadian Dairy Com-
mission 2009). 
The poultry industry also changed structurally, with farm size increasing 
35% from 1990 to 2007. In contrast to other sectors, the number of chicken pro-
ducers increased slightly during this time period (Chicken Farmers of Canada 
2009). Broiler chicken production experienced remarkable changes in produc-
tivity, as feed conversion rates improved sharply and the number of days for a 
broiler to reach market weight fell dramatically. Despite significant prior gains, 
the average number of eggs per layer has remained fairly stable since 1990, rang-
ing from 265 to 270 eggs per year. 
3. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES AND GROWTH 
RATES FOR CANADIAN AND PRAIRIE AGRICULTURE
Partial productivity measures such as yield per unit of land can certainly 
be informative and useful, as we have seen in the preceding section. However, a 
better indicator of productivity performance, if it is available, is total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), particularly where substantial input substitution is occurring 
over time. TFP or multifactor productivity is the ratio of aggregate output to ag-
gregate input, wherein as many inputs in the production process as possible, and 
not just a single input, are counted in evaluating productivity performance. TFP 
growth, then, is the growth in aggregate output that is not explained by growth 
in all measured inputs (for example, land, labor, capital, and materials).
3.1. Total Factor Productivity Growth in Canadian Agriculture
There is modest historical literature on productivity growth in Canadian 
agriculture. However, the extensive body of agricultural-specific productivity 
analyses undertaken in the United States has not been replicated in Canada at 
the national level. Some useful empirical information on TFP in Canadian agri-
culture does exist as an ancillary product of the extensive work on productivity 
in the Canadian economy and its sectors undertaken by Statistics Canada, espe-
cially in the past decade.
In CANSIM Table 383-0022, Statistics Canada provides time-series data 
relating to agriculture, from 1961 to 2005, on TFP based on gross output, 
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TFP based on value added, and labor productivity. The most appropriate 
agriculture-related output variable available for our analysis is the combined 
crop and livestock production index. Over the period 1961 to 2005, TFP 
(based on gross output) for crop and animal production in Canada increased 
by 0.6% per year. Over the same time period, TFP (based on value added) for 
crop and animal production grew somewhat more rapidly, at some 1.4% per 
year. Following Christensen (1975), we prefer TFP measures based on gross 
output rather than on value added. However, the productivity growth rate 
estimate based on the preferred measure is appreciably lower than the esti-
mates of agricultural productivity found in prior studies of the United States, 
the Canadian Prairies, or Australia. One possible reason why the growth rate 
in TFP reported by Statistics Canada based on gross output is comparatively 
low is that the annual compound growth rate for all inputs combined in crop 
and livestock production based on Statistics Canada’s evidence is 2.4%, a rate 
considerably higher than in comparable American and Australian studies for 
aggregate input use in agriculture.
Finally, labor productivity in Canadian crop and animal production grew 
even more rapidly from 1961 to 2005, at 4.7% per year. Indeed, labor productiv-
ity growth in agriculture has tended to be considerably faster than in other sec-
tors of the Canadian economy. However, the concern is that labor productivity 
growth considerably overstates the total overall productivity gains in agriculture, 
given the substantive increases in the use of material inputs and the historical 
capital-for-labor substitution in production.
3.2. Productivity (TFP) Growth: The Case of Prairie Agriculture  
in Western Canada
The Prairie provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba are the “bread 
basket” of Canadian agriculture, comprising nearly half of Canada’s farms and 
much larger shares of its cropland and grassland base. A lengthy time-series 
study of productivity growth in Prairie agriculture, using TFP measures based 
on Tornqvist-Theil indexing procedures, was recently completed (Stewart 2006). 
Using this detailed case study, we can focus on the estimates of output, input, 
and productivity growth for Prairie agriculture from 1940 to 2004, including the 
disaggregation of the analysis to the crop and livestock sectors (Stewart, Veeman, 
and Unterschultz 2009; Veeman, Stewart, and Unterschultz 2006). We can also 
assess how and why productivity growth has occurred.
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3.2.1. Prairie Agricultural Production over Time 
The measurement of productivity growth in Prairie agriculture requires the 
construction of a comprehensive and lengthy data set of both quantities and 
prices for agricultural inputs and outputs. Beyond its use in measuring produc-
tivity growth, the data set also points to overarching trends in Prairie agricul-
tural production over 65 years. In terms of input use, technological change in 
Prairie agriculture has been strongly labor saving and materials using. This is a 
reflection of the rapid mechanization of agriculture, gains in labor productivity, 
and the increasing use of pesticide, fertilizer, and energy inputs.
Agricultural outputs have also changed substantially over time. The Prairie 
crops sector typically produces in excess of 60% of the total value of Prairie agri-
cultural production, although the livestock sector increased its share of total ag-
ricultural production from the 1980s onward. As evident in Figure 6.6, there has 
been a decline in the share of cereal crops being produced (e.g., wheat, barley, 
and rye) and an increase in production of canola and specialty crops (e.g., lentils, 
peas). Barley, until lately, nearly retained its share, and tame hay increased its 
share, principally as feed for the growing Prairie livestock sector.
Cattle’s share in total Prairie livestock production increased from 1940 until 
1980, as a feed lot industry was established in southern Alberta. By 1980 cattle’s 
share began to stabilize, and then it declined somewhat as swine production 
expanded rapidly (principally in Manitoba). The cattle share also declined sub-
stantially following the 2003 finding of BSE in an Alberta cow and subsequent 
international trade restrictions. Poultry and dairy’s share of livestock production 
declined relatively steadily from 1940 to 2004.
3.2.2. Prairie Productivity Growth and Its Measurement
Törnqvist-Theil indexes were employed to obtain the estimates of output 
growth, input growth, and TFP growth presented in Table 6.1. This “superlative” 
indexing methodology has been widely used since the 1970s (Christensen 1975), 
subject to the availability of data (notably input price data). 
Considering average growth rates, computed as compound annual rates of 
growth by fitting trends to the respective underlying index numbers, Prairie 
agriculture displayed relatively strong overall productivity and output growth 
of 1.56% and 2.43% per annum, respectively, over the period 1940 to 2004 (see 
Table 6.1). Aggregate input growth is more modest at only 0.86% a year. Ac-
cordingly, productivity growth (on a gross output basis) accounts for the lion’s 
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share of the considerable growth in Prairie agricultural output over this 65-
year period. However, growth rates measured over various subperiods indicate 
substantial variation over time. Of particular significance is the decline in pro-
ductivity growth over the 15 years prior to 2005, and the associated decline in 
output growth, partly but not solely due to the bad drought years of 2001 and 
2002. Other factors may include the emergence of new disease and pest pres-
sure such as fusarium head blight and wheat midge, and major cultural changes 
such as the widespread adoption of zero tillage. The historical trends of Prairie 
agricultural output, input, and productivity growth over time are shown in 
Figure 6.8. The considerable year-to-year variations in output and productivity 
growth are largely associated with weather and climatic factors, chiefly summer 
(June and July) rainfall and temperature, as was noted in the prior discussion of 
crop yield variation.
To assess the aggregate productivity growth measures in more detail, esti-
mates are also obtained at the provincial and sectoral (i.e., crops and livestock) 
levels. Census data information is used to allocate shared inputs between the 
crops and livestock sectors, with shares being interpolated for intercensal years. 
A number of noteworthy trends can be discerned from Table 6.2. First, produc-
tivity growth in the crops sector over the 65-year period is substantially (some 
two to three times) higher than that in the livestock sector, a result also found 
in the United States (Huffman and Evenson 1993). The stronger growth path 
of productivity in the Prairie crops sector relative to the livestock sector is also 
evidenced in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. Second, productivity growth in Manitoba ag-
riculture was considerably higher than in Alberta or Saskatchewan agriculture, 
and productivity growth in Saskatchewan agriculture was slightly higher than 
in Alberta agriculture (see Stewart 2006). Third, while crop productivity growth 
declined considerably over the final 15 years of the study, livestock productivity 
growth accelerated (at least in Manitoba and Saskatchewan). The slight decline in 
aggregate Prairie agricultural productivity growth then was the result of slower 
Table 6.1. Average annual compound percentage growth rates for Prairie 
aggregate agricultural inputs, outputs, and productivity (TFP), 1940-2004
 1940-2004 1940-1959 1960-1979 1980-2004 1990-2004 
TFP growth 1.56 1.25 1.48 1.80 1.46 
Input growth 0.86 -0.03 1.45 0.57 0.21 
Output growth 2.43 1.22 2.95 2.38 1.67 
Source: Stewart 2006.
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productivity growth for crops, while the acceleration of livestock productivity 
growth moderated the slowdown in aggregate Prairie productivity.
The stronger productivity performance in the Prairie crops sector from 1940 
to 2004 does not mean, however, that the sectoral profitability of the crops sector 
has been better than that in the Prairie livestock sector. A crude measure of change 
in sectoral profitably is provided by change in its returns-to-cost ratio (Py.Y/Px.X) 
which, in turn, is the product of TFP (Y/X) and the sector’s terms of trade (Py/Px) 
where Y is aggregate output, X is aggregate input, Py is the aggregate output price 
index, and Px is the aggregate input price index (Krishna 1982). Because the sec-
toral terms of trade facing the crops sector has deteriorated more rapidly over time 
(at −2.57% per annum versus only −0.29% for the livestock sector), the returns-to-
Figure 6.8.  Törnqvist-Theil  Indexes of Prairie aggregate agricultural inputs, 
outputs, and productivity, 1940-2004
Source: Stewart 2006.
Table 6.2. Average annual compound productivity percentage growth rates 
for Prairie provinces by crops and livestock sectors
Source: Stewart 2006.
 Crops Livestock
 1940-2004 1990-2004 1940-2004 1990-2004 
Alberta 1.65 -0.33 0.54 0.58 
Saskatchewan 1.76 0.39 0.59 4.28 
Manitoba 2.12 2.70 0.97 5.33 
Prairies 1.77 0.51 0.65 2.27
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cost ratio for the crops sector has declined by 0.85% per year while the same ratio 
has actually increased somewhat in the Prairie livestock sector, at 0.36% per year 
over the 1940 to 2004 time period (Stewart 2006). In short, historically, produc-
tivity advance has slightly outpaced cost-price squeeze pressures in the livestock 
sector but has fallen behind in the crops sector on the Canadian prairies. It must 
be recognized that the terms of trade for prairie farmers is largely influenced by 
productivity growth outside Canada, which drives relative prices globally, rather 
than the smaller influence of productivity growth inside Canada.
Figure 6.9. Törnqvist-Theil Indexes of crops and livestock total factor 
productivity for the Prairies, 1940-2004
Figure 6.10. Productivity growth rates for the Prairies, 1940-2004 and 
1990-2004
Source: Stewart 2006.
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The relative agricultural productivity growth performance of the three Cana-
dian Prairie Provinces is quite consistent with that of the 10 Great Plains states in 
the United States, as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture online in 2007 
(Stewart, Veeman, and Unterschultz 2009). For the comparable period of 1960 to 
1999, the average productivity advance in the Canadian prairie provinces of 1.6% 
per year is only slightly higher than the annual average 1.4% growth rate in TFP in 
the Great Plains states. Moreover, for the more immediate and shorter time period of 
1980 to 1999, the average Great Plains rate of 2.0% per year is very slightly higher 
than the Canadian prairie rate of 1.9%. A major caveat, however, to this bilateral 
comparison is that some of the input data, such as labor, are quality adjusted in the 
work by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the United States, an adjustment that 
would lead to somewhat lower productivity growth rates for the Great Plains states. 
3.3. How Prairie Productivity Growth Happened
In this section, the empirical results of decomposing estimated productivity 
growth in the crops and livestock sectors into their constituent parts are very 
briefly summarized (Stewart 2006; Stewart, Veeman, and Unterschultz 2009). 
Productivity growth can be ascribed to one of three influences: technical change, 
increases in the degree of technical efficiency, or greater economies of scale in 
production. By using a translog cost function, productivity growth can be econo-
metrically decomposed to reveal the respective roles of technology and econo-
mies of scale in productivity growth (Capalbo 1988). Efficiency changes are 
reflected along with measurement errors in the reported residual. 
In the case of Prairie agriculture, the crops sector has been better able to 
leverage productivity growth from technological advances, since for Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, respectively, 94.7%, 84.5%, and 80.4% of the re-
corded productivity growth since 1940 has been generated by technical change 
(Stewart, Veeman, and Unterschultz 2009). In contrast, the livestock sector has 
been more effective in generating increasing returns to scale over time, with 
about half of its productivity advance attributable to scale impacts historically. 
Accordingly, the recent slowdown in crops productivity growth can be largely 
attributed to limited technological advances in this sector. The accelerating live-
stock productivity growth can be attributed in part to technological gains accru-
ing to the sector, but more importantly to the economies of scale realized from 
the rapid increase in livestock output over the 15 years to 2005 and the increas-
ing shift to intensive livestock operations.
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4. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH SLOWDOWN AND LINKS TO RESEARCH
In this section, we briefly assess whether there has been a recent slow-
down in agricultural productivity growth in Canada and in the Prairie region 
of Western Canada. Linkages of productivity change in primary agriculture to 
expenditures on agricultural research and development (R&D) are also explored. 
Whether agricultural productivity growth has slowed down or not in the past 
two decades is an open question in many nations, Canada included. 
Although crop yields are only a partial productivity measure, changes in 
crop yields provide the most readily available and long-standing measures of 
productivity gains in Canadian agriculture. As we have noted, aggregate crop 
yields have followed a linear pattern of growth since the early 1960s such that 
the proportional rates of growth of the yields of the major Canadian grain and 
oilseed crops—wheat, canola, corn, and peas—declined over time. 
The TFP growth estimates available for agriculture that are most convincing 
are those for the Prairie region of Western Canada. Structural change (Chow) 
tests were undertaken for each of the crop, livestock, and aggregate (multiout-
put) agricultural productivity growth for this region to see if a structural break 
occurred in 1990. Such a structural break is statistically confirmed for livestock 
productivity growth, with the rate of growth being faster after 1990. For crops 
productivity, the rate of growth is lower after 1990, but this is not statistically 
significant. It is possible that the shift to zero-till and greater cropping intensity 
partially compensated for the declining yield growth rates in crops. For crops 
and livestock taken together, the rate of productivity growth is actually higher 
after 1990, but the structural break is not statistically significant.
If a productivity slowdown has occurred in the past two decades in Cana-
dian agriculture, this has occurred in the crops sector. The evidence for this 
is most convincing from the crop yield trends, and somewhat less so for TFP 
growth in crops grown in Prairie agriculture. Complicating the assessment over-
all of recent productivity trends is that the year 2008 saw record or near-record 
crop production levels and yields in Canada but continuing poor economic and 
financial conditions for the red meat sectors.
There is reasonable qualitative evidence and some econometric evidence to 
support the view that lagging agricultural R&D is adversely influencing agricul-
tural productivity growth, especially in crops. Real public agricultural research 
expenditures in Canada for both crops and livestock declined between 1996 
and 2004 (Gray 2008). The impact of variety improvement is most apparent in 
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wheat, for which there has been little private research activity. The extent that 
canola and pea variety improvement may have recently accelerated has been 
offset by other factors in production, as historical average yields follow strikingly 
similar linear growth patterns across all major crops. Specific explanations for 
productivity growth and its variability over time among provinces and between 
the livestock and crop sectors can be advanced for Prairie agriculture (Stewart 
2006). Following Huffman and Evenson’s methodology (1993 and 2001), Stewart 
(2006) estimated a three-equation SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) model, 
using indexes of aggregate agricultural, crop, and livestock productivity (TFP) 
as dependent variables. Explanatory variables tested included measures of do-
mestic prairie agricultural research and development, terms of trade (following 
Cochrane 1958), farm specialization, farm size, education, extension, off-farm 
labor, farm/manufacturing wage ratio, and support payments.
Domestic research and development, a “knowledge stock” variable, is calculat-
ed as a 20-year stock of federal, provincial, and private sector research and develop-
ment expenditures. This “knowledge stock” variable leveled off for both crops and 
livestock in Prairie agriculture since 1990 (Stewart 2006). For both livestock and 
crops, domestic research and development displayed a positive relationship and 
was the largest absolute value among the reported coefficients. This finding points 
to the fundamental role that previous domestic research and development invest-
ments have played in productivity growth in both the crop and livestock sectors.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
With increasing consolidation and specialization, Canadian primary agricul-
ture has evolved over time to a sector dominated by fewer and larger farms, which 
account for most agricultural production, although a number of smaller farms con-
tinue to operate. As in many developed nations, large farms in Canada account for 
most of the agricultural production. In terms of farm receipts, red meats, grains and 
oilseeds (led by wheat and canola, respectively), and dairy are Canada’s most impor-
tant agricultural commodities. However, Canadian farmers have been diversifying 
their production mix to reach niche markets, increase value added, and spread risk. 
Since the early 1960s, the yields of several major crops have increased by ap-
proximately 60%. Yield trends for corn, wheat, canola, and peas are remarkably 
similar, exhibiting consistent absolute growth but declining proportional rates of 
growth over the period. The assessment of yield changes, however, is complicated 
by increased cropping intensity (reduced summer fallow), more cropping diver-
 AgrIculturAl ProductIon And ProductIvIty In cAnAdA  145
sity, and ongoing changes in cropping technology (reduced tillage and low-dis-
turbance seeding systems), particularly in Western Canada. Interesting evidence 
from crop field trials shows that trial yields for canola and peas have grown more 
rapidly than for wheat since 1960. This raises the perplexing question of why ac-
tual realized yield growth trends have been so similar across these crops.
An assessment of partial productivity measures for the Canadian livestock 
sector indicates many areas in which production efficiency has improved substan-
tially: higher carcass weight for beef animals, much more production per sow, and 
major increases in milk production per dairy cow. These “yield” improvements 
have occurred as Canada’s livestock production has become concentrated, in 
more intensive operations, on many fewer but generally much larger farms. 
Based on national time-series data reported by Statistics Canada, labor pro-
ductivity in crop and animal production in Canada grew rapidly, at 4.7% per 
year from 1961 to 2005, reflecting, at least in part, the considerable substitution 
of capital for labor that continued during this period. It is possible to infer from 
Statistics Canada’s national accounts data that TFP growth for crops and live-
stock, considered together, was considerably slower, ranging from less than 1.0% 
per year (based on gross output measures) to some 1.4% per year (based on val-
ue added measures). More research on productivity estimation and analysis that 
is directed explicitly to the agricultural sector could clarify these differences and 
strengthen understanding of agricultural productivity in Canada.
There are major advantages and insights in more detailed assessment of 
production structure, its evolution, and productivity performance for a major 
agricultural region such as Western Canada’s Prairies over a lengthy time span 
(Stewart 2006). Productivity growth, exceeding 1.5% per year, has been very im-
portant historically in Prairie agriculture, generating nearly two-thirds of output 
growth. Crop productivity growth outpaced that of livestock, but not in the past 
10 or 15 years. The decomposition of estimated productivity growth suggests 
that technical change has been critical in the crops sector, whereas the roles of 
technical change and scale impacts have been roughly equal in the livestock sec-
tor. R&D expenditures have been a key causal factor underpinning productivity 
growth in agriculture. 
Slower growth in agricultural R&D in Canada seemingly underlies slower 
productivity growth in the past 10 to 15 years. It is possible that the upswing 
in livestock productivity, relative to slower growth in crop productivity in the 
last decade, may be associated, at least in part, with elimination of the Crow 
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Rate subsidy on grain moving to export position. This change in policy pro-
vided more economic incentives for livestock feeding in Western Canada, but 
more work is needed on this front to fully ascertain the full impact of this policy 
change. Similarly, more research is needed on whether agriculture in Alberta 
and western Saskatchewan has suffered from the recent energy/oil boom and 
adverse “Dutch disease” impacts. A final caveat is that the TFP growth measures 
reported here are “private” and not “social” or environmentally adjusted produc-
tivity measures (Hailu and Veeman 2001). The incorporation of environmental 
externalities such as nitrate leaching, pesticide damage, and air and water pol-
lution from agricultural production poses difficulties but would provide a better 
indication of productivity performance from a social perspective.
In summary, overall the study of Canadian crop yields (a partial productivity 
measure) and, to a lesser degree, the analysis of total factor productivity growth 
in the crops sector in the Prairie region of Western Canada indicates a slowdown 
of productivity growth in crop production in the past two decades. Increased 
funding for agricultural research would help to counter the productivity slow-
down in crops and to ensure that future productivity growth in the livestock 
sector could be based relatively more on technical change and less on scale econ-
omies associated with output expansion. Improved productivity performance, 
led by increased funding for R&D, is critical to the future competitiveness and 
economic sustainability of Canada’s primary agriculture.
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CHAPTER 7
Agricultural Productivity in the 
United Kingdom
Jenifer Piesse and Colin Thirtle
1. INTRODUCTION
For much of 2008, soaring food commodity prices made headlines in the 
news. Rising prices are the market’s signal that supply is not keeping pace with 
demand, so the events of 2008 have led to a reappraisal of the world’s ability to 
feed itself. In a recent review (Piesse and Thirtle 2009) of the events of 2008, 
we showed that world food security is not a foregone conclusion. The long-
standing conventional wisdom that science increases supply faster than popu-
lation and income growth increase demand has to be questioned. With this in 
mind, we distinguish between three productivity measures, as their implica-
tions differ. These are yields, which, with area harvested, determine output; 
labor productivity, which correlates with incomes; and total factor productivity 
(TFP), which distinguishes between technical progress, efficiency change, and 
input intensification. Hence TFP growth has different implications depending 
on the cause.
2. OUTLINE
To put the chapter in context, the next section gives a very brief account of 
the main policy changes in the United Kingdom that have affected agricultural 
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productivity since the Second World War. Section 4 is historical, covering partial 
measures, that is, yields and labor productivity. Section 5 explains the current 
UK TFP methodology, followed by the full TFP results and analysis. The limita-
tion of the national TFP is that it cannot be decomposed by region or crop. Thus, 
Section 6 presents regional data, but only for the eastern counties of England 
and only from 1970 to 1997. This is at the crop level and shows the importance 
of crop switching to increasing TFP. Then, Section 7 covers the international 
productivity comparisons that are most relevant. These are for the United States 
and the European Union (EU) countries and for the older EU members and 
those that acceded in the last few years. Section 8 offers explanations of the pro-
ductivity changes in the United Kingdom, and the final section summarizes the 
results and notes the limits of our knowledge in this area.
3. POLICY CHANGES AND LIVESTOCK DISEASES
During the Second World War (WWII), agriculture was subjected to state 
control, which included compulsory cropping orders, land reclamation, and the 
eviction of inefficient farmers. Food was rationed and animals were slaughtered 
because feed was too scarce to keep them. Thus, arable output was maximized, as 
the main objective was to reduce imports to save shipping space, which was essen-
tial to the war effort. By the end of the war the United Kingdom was bankrupt and 
in debt, so recovery was slow, and state control of agriculture and food rationing 
was not ended until 1953-54 (Self and Storing 1962). This was followed by a long 
period typified by cooperation between the state and agricultural organizations, 
and support was provided by producer subsidies and marketing boards.
This situation persisted until UK membership in the European Commu-
nity, and new arrangements were phased in beginning in 1973 (Hill 1984). 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) replaced subsidies with variable lev-
ies, which in most cases increased prices for producers as well as consumers. 
The increased profitability may be expected to have an impact on agricultural 
investment and productivity. The CAP levels of support were extremely expen-
sive for the taxpayer and led to surpluses that exacerbated the situation because 
of high storage costs. This led to restrictions such as milk quotas beginning in 
1984, which heralded a new era of low profits. Policy moved away from encour-
aging production and toward environmental stewardship. EU policies such as 
the set-aside requirement followed in 1992 under the MacSharry reforms and 
led to the decoupling of output and agricultural support payments.
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These policy changes were accompanied by a marked change in agricultural 
R&D expenditures, which had grown at 7% per annum from the end of the 
war to the early 1980s but then dropped in real terms because of the Thatcher 
government’s antipathy to the public sector. By the end of the decade, expen-
ditures were fairly steady, but then in the 1990s there was a clear retargeting of 
agricultural R&D away from productivity-enhancing research and near-market 
research, which were deemed to be the responsibility of industry, and toward 
areas of public interest (Thirtle, Palladino, and Piesse 1997). The effects of these 
changes in policy can be seen in the analysis of agricultural productivity that 
follows. The Animal Disease Laboratory at Pirbright suffered heavy funding cuts 
in the 1980s before the appearance of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
commonly known as mad cow disease, in 1996 and foot-and-mouth disease in 
2001, both of which prolonged the United Kingdom’s slump in TFP growth.
4. PARTIAL AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The agricultural history of the United Kingdom has attracted considerable at-
tention since the realization that the world’s first industrial nation had an agrarian 
revolution prior to the industrial transformation. From Karl Marx onward, the na-
ture of these two revolutions that ushered in the era of modern economic growth 
has been hotly disputed. In fact, it is generally agreed that this was the second UK 
agricultural revolution, the first being much earlier in medieval times.
Historians estimate that the population of England may have tripled be-
tween 1100 and 1340, from 1.5 million to 4.5 million, and that such an increase 
was made possible by agrarian changes that can be claimed to constitute a revo-
lution. Duby (1954) dated the revolution from about 800 to 1100, while White 
(1962) suggested 700 to 1000. Both placed most emphasis on improvements to 
the plough, the replacement of oxen by horses, and the switch from a two-course 
to a three-course rotation system. The two-course rotation reflects Mediterranean 
practices and means half the land is left fallow each year, while in England there 
is actually enough rain to sow a spring crop of oats, peas, or beans and get two-
thirds of the land under cultivation in any year. Possibly the imperialist Roman 
invaders imposed the two-field system brought from their homeland, believing 
that all things Roman were of course superior to the habits of the barbarians.
The dating of the second agrarian revolution varies from 1760 to 1815 
in early works covered by Grigg (1982) to 1750 to 1880 in later assessments 
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(Chambers and Mingay 1966). The advances most discussed include further 
plough improvements, use of seed drills (associated with agriculturist Jethro 
Tull), and more hoeing to control weeds. However, the mechanical innovations 
were not intended to be labor saving, as they were in America. Rather, labor use 
increased with a view to getting more output. Other key improvements were 
changes in crop rotations that featured nitrogen-fixing legumes like turnips 
(wrongly attributed to Viscount Townsend), which also helped feed the increas-
ing number of animals following improved selective breeding (associated with 
Robert Bakewell). There was also a new development in the large-scale purchase 
of off-farm inputs, such as field drainage and the construction of new buildings, 
as well as purchased fertilizer and feed.
The changing rotations and selective breeding were made much easier by 
the change in land tenure arrangements as the open fields were converted into 
self-contained farms with fee simple tenancy. This allowed those who wanted 
to innovate to do so without the need for general agreement. At the same time 
the ownership changes were causally prior to capital expenditures, as owners 
could now appropriate the full returns to their investments. Thus, whereas Marx 
believed technical change was the driving force, modern institutionalists such 
as North (1990) make a convincing case that all else followed from getting the 
incentives right.
These stories are entertaining, but the statistical data on changes in output, 
yields, labor productivity, and TFP leave a lot to be desired. It was not until 1866 
that the Board of Agriculture began an annual publication of labor force, land 
use, and livestock data, adding crop yields in 1885. Thus, there is little evidence 
on the output and productivity effects of the medieval agrarian revolution. Grigg 
(1982) reported a 200% increase in the population of England and Wales from 
1700 to 1850 and a 264% increase in arable output. He estimated that 62% or 
almost two-thirds of this came from area expansion (including the reduction in 
fallow land), rather than yield increases. This is despite data that show that grain 
(mainly wheat) yields in East Anglia approximately doubled over the period, as 
the average would have been much lower.
Labor use and productivity is more emotive; Marx and others painted a grim 
picture of smallholders losing their common land to enclosures and being forced 
to seek work in the dark Satanic mills of Manchester and other rapidly growing 
industrial centers. There is now evidence that the agricultural labor force in-
creased until 1850, which marks the turning point in the structural transforma-
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tion at which point the decline in agricultural employment began. Even so, labor 
productivity grew as output outstripped labor growth. Grigg (1982) reported 
that output tripled from 1700 to 1850, while the labor force increased by be-
tween 50% and 75%, giving an annual labor productivity growth rate of 0.83% 
to 1.0%. He also stated that labor productivity grew at 1% per annum from 1800 
to 1850, because of output growth, and then grew at the same rate from 1850 
to 1900, mostly because of the decline in labor, as industrial employment out-
stripped population growth. This implies that labor productivity grew at almost 
1.0% per annum in the 1700s and then accelerated slightly in the 1800s. There 
is plenty of disagreement on labor productivity. For instance, Brunt (2003) esti-
mated that labor productivity grew at only 0.29% per annum from 1700 to 1775 
and declined at 0.06% per annum from 1775 to 1845.
From 1880 on there are sufficient data to construct estimates per decade, 
and these are reported in Table 7.1. In the 1880s the decline in ocean freight rates 
opened the United Kingdom up to competition that had been expected ever since 
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, which signaled the end of protectionism. 
First grain imports from Russia and the North American prairies and then meat 
from the antipodean dominions ended the age of high farming. Labor productivity 
stuttered and then rose at an increasing rate as the mechanical revolution allowed 
increasing amounts of labor to enter industrial employment. However, it is not un-
til WWII that growth exceeded 1%, making the earlier estimate seem high.
Data on yields are patchy before 1850, and we rely on Grigg’s (1982) best guess 
that arable yields in England grew at 0.5% per annum from 1700 to 1850. Brunt 
(2003) was again less optimistic, putting yield growth from 1705 to 1775 at 0.3% per 
annum and, importantly, arguing that it stayed the same from 1775 to 1845, which 
must include the key period of the agrarian revolution. The even more contentious 
issue is the previous century, in which data from Norfolk and Suffolk suggest a 1% 
per annum growth rate in the first two-thirds of the century, before legumes and 
clover were added to the rotations. The data again cover the post-revolution period, 
showing low and erratic growth rates, averaging 0.15% per annum for the periods 
before WWII. Then, yield growth jumped to new levels entirely (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.1. Output rate of increase per male worker, 1880-1960 (% per annum)
Sources: Grigg 1982; Hayami and Ruttan 1971.
 
1880- 
1890 
1890- 
1900 
1900- 
1910 
1910-
1920 
1920-
1930 
1930-
1940 
1940-
1950 
1950- 
1960 
Increase 0.8 0.25 -0.2 0.7 0.7 2.2 2.4 2.9 
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Yield data are available for the main crops from 1885 onward, and as Figure 
7.1 shows, these data confirm the impression given by Table 7.2 that yields of 
wheat, barley, oats, and potatoes grew very little prior to the end of WWII. The 
mean growth rate, reported in Table 7.3, is only 0.27% per annum. Only sugar 
beets, which was then a new crop, had a higher growth rate of 0.79% per annum 
from 1925 for the period reported.
Thus, the first structural break appears with the application of plant science 
after WWII, when research-led productivity growth had its golden age. Until the 
1990s, the growth rate of the four major crops was about 2% per annum, rather 
than 0.2%. Sugar fared even better, growing at almost 5% per annum until 1973 
and then at almost 2% for the rest of the period. Sugar is a separate crop, grown 
under the auspices of the British Sugar Corporation (BSC), which has become part 
Figure 7.1. Yields of main crops and milk, United Kingdom
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Table 7.2. Rate of increase in output per hectare, 1880-1960 (% per annum)
 
1880-
1890 
1890-
1900 
1900- 
1910 
1910-
1920 
1920-
1930 
1930-
1940 
1940-
1950 
1950- 
1960 
Increase 0.2 -0.5 0.35 0.2 0.5 1.7 1.4 1.9 
Sources: Grigg 1982; Hayami and Ruttan 1971.
 AgrIculturAl ProductIvIty In the unIted kIngdom  155
of Associated British Foods. Here, R&D was funded by BSC, with a matching levy 
(mandatory check-off scheme) imposed on farmers. The success of this arrange-
ment, with most of the research being conducted at the Broom’s Barn research 
station of the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), 
which is dedicated to sugar, is reported in Thirtle 1999.
Aside from sugar beets, the other main crops have a second break point in 
1996, or 1993 for potatoes. After these dates, the growth rate for potatoes falls to 
0.58% and for the cereals it returns to about 0.2%, just as it was before the advent 
of publicly funded research after WWII. The reasons for this reversal have been in-
vestigated previously by Thirtle et al. (2004a) and will be considered in Section 10. 
With the benefit of hindsight and more data, it can be said that UK R&D expendi-
tures declined from 1982 and were targeted away from productivity enhancement, 
so it seems likely that after 14 years this policy change has had a serious impact. 
However, there are other explanations, including the possibility that ongoing, rapid 
Table 7.3. Annual growth rates of crop yields (% per annum)
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Years Crop Growth Rate t Stat Adj R2 
1885-1945 Wheat 0.24 4.24 0.22 
 Barley 0.14 2.78 0.1 
 Oats 0.37 8.39 0.54 
1948-1996 Wheat 2.31 20.73 0.94 
 Barley 1.76 26.4 0.94 
 Oats 2.02 34.88 0.96 
1996-2008 Wheat 0.12 0.33 0.01 
 Barley 0.27 0.89 0.07 
 Oats -0.29 -01.13 0.1 
1961-1987 Rapeseed (Canola) 1.25 3.0 0.24 
1987-2008 Rapeseed 0.38 1.25 0.03 
1985-2008 Linseed -0.09 -1.21 0.02 
1884-1945 Potatoes 0.34 5.26 0.3 
1948-1992 Potatoes 1.98 18.29 0.89 
1993-2008 Potatoes 0.58 2.1 0.19 
1973-2008 Milk 1.53 27.16 0.96 
1925-1945 Sugar 0.79 1.61 0.08 
1945-1973 Sugar 4.94 5.69 0.57 
1976-2008 Sugar 1.91 12.08 0.82 
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productivity growth is a passing phase and not a foregone assumption. The recent 
scientific revolution has lasted no longer than its predecessors in the UK case, but 
is this caused by the funding cuts, or is there a return to the historical growth path 
as the scientific revolution enters its late phase?
The final issue is total factor productivity (TFP), or appropriately weighted 
aggregate output per unit of appropriately weighted aggregate inputs. Brunt 
(2003) estimated TFP growth despite the lack of data. His estimates show a rate 
of TFP growth of 0.17% for the period 1705 to 1775 and -0.01% (that is zero, 
statistically speaking) from 1775 to 1845. Other estimates of TFP growth for 
the second period range from 0.24% per annum to 0.67%. We noted earlier one 
reason why they are fairly low, namely, that there was an increase in non-farm 
inputs and some level of capital accumulation, which Grigg (1982) showed more 
than tripled from the 1760s to the 1850s.
5. RECENT PARTIAL AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
The crop-specific data reported in the previous section straddles the ancient 
past and recent times, as it begins in 1884 and continues to 2008. From 1953 on-
ward it is possible to report consistent series on outputs, inputs, yields (measured 
as value of output per hectare), output per worker, and TFP using decent annual 
data and established methods (Tornqvist-Theil index and Fisher’s ideal index). This 
is an update of a report by Thirtle et al. (2004b), which in turn was extracted from 
a report (Thirtle et al. 2003) to the Department of the Environment, Food and Ru-
ral Affairs (DEFRA). The older material was first published in an article by Thirtle 
and Bottomley (1992).
From 2000 to 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF, 
replaced in 2001 by DEFRA) funded a project to upgrade the statistics used for 
productivity measurement. Details are in the report by Thirtle et al. (2004b) but 
the methodology is briefly noted in this chapter. The result is that DEFRA now 
uses methods almost identical to those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), as we advised DEFRA in conjunction with Eldon Ball. The only major dif-
ference is that the USDA uses Fisher’s ideal index rather than the Tornqvist-Theil 
index, because it better fit the USDA’s system. This does not affect results much in 
our experience, so our TFP is our own Tornqvist from 1953 to 2000, updated to 
2008 using the DEFRA index.
We begin by reporting the output, input, TFP, land, and labor productivity in-
dexes and then look at outputs and inputs at various levels of aggregation. Table 7.4 
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Table 7.4. Output, input, TFP, labor, and land productivity indexes, 
1953-2008
Years Output Index Input Index TFP 
Labor 
Productivity
Land  
Productivity 
1953 100 100 100 100 100
1954 105.7 105.1 100.5 107.3 105.9
1955 103.7 103.2 100.5 110.8 103.9
1956 110.7 104.6 105.9 122.4 111.0
1957 112.2 107 104.9 125.5 112.7
1958 113 106 106.6 129.1 113.6
1959 118.3 107.1 110.4 139.3 119.5
1960 122.5 106.8 114.7 150.1 123.8
1961 127 108.6 117 162.4 129.2
1962 133.8 109.6 122 173.9 136.1
1963 135.3 109.6 123.5 181.3 137.7
1964 131.3 105.3 124.7 186.1 133.4
1965 133.1 104 128 194.7 135.3
1966 133.5 101.3 131.7 207.5 135.6
1967 137.8 99.9 137.9 225.4 140.2
1968 138.9 100.2 138.5 228.6 142.2
1969 143.7 103.1 139.4 244.6 145.8
1970 148.7 105.8 140.6 268.5 154.6
1971 152.7 105.5 144.8 260.1 158.8
1972 153.9 106 145.1 268.4 160.7
1973 155.7 105.2 148.1 266.7 163.0
1974 160 106 151 279.4 167.3
1975 154.4 109.5 141.1 274.5 161.7
1976 149.4 109.6 136.3 270.9 156.4
1977 159.3 108.5 146.8 296.2 168.1
1978 166.6 108.8 153.1 312 175.7
1979 169.1 111.7 151.3 323.4 178.5
1980 173.6 110.3 157.4 340.9 182.1
1981 173.4 107.6 161.2 350.1 183.3
1982 182.3 110.3 165.3 374.8 192.9
1983 181.8 113.4 160.3 377.6 192.9
1984 195.7 112.7 173.6 420.8 207.8
1985 190.6 113.5 168 415.5 202.6
1986 191.4 113.8 168.2 437.4 203.7
1987 190.3 113.7 167.5 441.7 203.2
1988 189.3 113.7 166.5 453.4 202.6
1989 191.6 111.9 171.2 476.9 205.3
1990 190.9 110.8 172.2 486.1 205.0
1991 194.1 111.2 174.5 510.8 208.8
1992 194.7 109.5 177.8 532 210.9
1993 189.2 108.2 174.8 533.1 210.7
1994 191.1 108.4 176.3 556.5 213.4
1995 192.6 111 173.6 578.2 215.4
1996 190.8 111.3 171.4 584.3 211.8
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begins with the output index, which starts from the conventional arbitrary value 
of 100 and rises to 188.9, so output increased by 89% over the full period. Inputs, 
in the second column, actually fell by 2.6%, so productivity has increased, as the 
third column shows, to 196, which is a gain of 96%. Output per unit of land, or 
yields, more than doubled, and labor productivity increased enormously, to 1108, 
or a little over 11 times its initial value. The huge difference between TFP and 
yields relative to labor productivity results from the substitution of other inputs for 
labor, which is a leading feature of developed country agricultural progress.
Figure 7.2 plots all the indexes except labor productivity (which has a 
larger scale) and makes interpretation much easier. The decline in output and 
TFP caused by the droughts of 1975 and 1976 can be seen clearly in the yield 
and output series, but apart from this period of unusually poor rainfall, out-
put, yield, and TFP rise at a fairly steady rate until 1984. At that point, output 
and yield growth ceased and the TFP grows much more slowly, powered by 
the slight decline in inputs. Output does not recover until the last food price 
crisis year of 2008, and even then it is still below the average levels for the 
1980s and 1990s. Yields do not recover at all and in 2008 were still as low as 
in 1984. However, comparison with Figure 7.1 and Table 7.3, for individual 
crop yields, suggests that 1984 was in fact a particularly good year and that 
the yield decline may be better dated from the mid-1990s. Until then growth 
was slower but positive, whereas after that date it appears to actually be nega-
tive. For inputs, the structural break seems to be at 1996, when slow growth 
turned to quite rapid decline.
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Table 7.4. Continued
Years Output Index Input Index TFP 
Labor 
Productivity
Land  
Productivity 
1997 188.4 109.6 171.9 587.4 208.2
1998 188.6 108.6 173.6 601.4 205.1
1999 189.9 107.2 177.2 627.9 209.6
2000 187.2 105.5 177.5 679 209.7
2001 179.7 104.0 172.9 609.1 198.6
2002 186.6 101.1 184.8 900.4 206.8
2003 184.8 98.5 187.6 911.9 205.4
2004 186.1 99.5 187.3 894.2 207.1
2005 188.7 97.4 193.8 1040.2 209.2
2006 182.7 94.8 192.6 1048.4 199.5
2007 180.5 94.7 190.6 985.2 198.0
2008 188.9 96.4 196.0 1108.8 207.1
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1This does appear to be a clear break in both the output and TFP series. However, statistical tests, 
based on the latest techniques in time-series econometrics, fail to determine that there is a break. 
This suggests that the length of series that is required for such tests makes them of little value in 
this type of investigation. 
Having identified these turning points in the series,1 we use this information 
to construct the annual average growth rates in Table 7.5. Over the full period, 
output grew at 1.10% per annum, while inputs were unchanged, with a nega-
tive growth rate of 0.04% per annum, which is statistically insignificant (note 
the lack of fit too: the adjusted R2 is 0.004). Since TFP is the ratio of these series 
in logarithms, it grows at 1.14% per annum, which is a lower growth rate than 
earlier studies reported. Thirtle and Bottomley (1992) estimated TFP growth at 
1.77% per annum up to 1990, and Amadi (2000) and Barnes (2002) both cov-
ered the period to 1995, with estimates of 1.81% and 1.93%, respectively.
The reason for lower growth rates of output and yields in this study is the 
poor recent performance. The first column of Table 7.5 shows that since 1984 
output has declined at 0.02% per annum, and the fourth column shows that 
yields declined at 0.03% per annum over the same period. Note too that output 
follows yields very closely, which is because the area harvested varies very little. 
Indeed, the adjusted R2 is 0.995, so the variance in output is almost entirely ex-
Figure 7.2. Output, input, and TFP indexes
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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plained by yield changes. However, the lower TFP growth rate is more complicat-
ed. Column three of Table 7.5 shows that TFP growth was slower than the older 
estimates even over the period from 1953 to 1984, when it was growing fastest, 
at 1.67% per annum. Then the rate fell to only 0.3% per annum until 1996. It has 
recovered to 1.21% since 1996. The decline in TFP growth in the early period re-
Table 7.5. Annual average growth rates (% by period)
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Years 
Output 
Index 
Input 
Index 
TFP 
Index 
Output per 
Unit of 
Land 
Output per 
Unit of 
Labor 
1953-2008 
Growth rate 1.1% -0.04% 1.14% 1.31% 3.96% 
t Statistic 15.54 -0.88 24.31 18.10 58.17 
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.004 0.91 0.85 0.98 
1953-1984 
Growth rate 1.87%  1.67% 2.08%
t Statistic 29.65  22.23 32.78
Adjusted R2 0.96  0.94 0.97
1953-1996 
Growth rate  0.19%
t Statistic  6.06
Adjusted R2  0.45
1953-2000 
Growth rate   3.86% 
t Statistic   51.53 
Adjusted R2   0.98 
1984-2008 
Growth rate -0.02%  -0.03%
t Statistic -4.88  -0.52
Adjusted R2 0.49  0.01
1984-1996 
Growth rate   0.30%
t Statistic   2.30
Adjusted R2   0.26
1996-2008 
Growth rate  -1.42% 1.21%
t Statistic  -15.13 9.53
Adjusted R2  0.95 0.88
2000-2008 
Growth rate   6.40% 
t Statistic   4.59 
Adjusted R2   0.71 
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flects the complete overhaul of the UK productivity data reported in Thirtle et al. 
(2004b), which gave a growth rate from 1953 to 2000 of 1.26% per annum. The 
increased level of detail in the new DEFRA data picks up more quality change, 
and when this is properly measured, less is attributed to TFP growth.
Figure 7.2 also shows that the recent recovery in TFP is not driven by output 
growth but by falling inputs. The second column of Table 7.5 reports that inputs 
grew at 0.19% per annum until 1996, and since then they have fallen at 1.42% 
per annum, which is a rapid decline in TFP accounting terms. The last column 
of Table 7.5 is also relevant here, as it reports labor productivity growth, and it is 
the rapid fall in labor inputs that drives TFP growth in the developed counties. 
Labor productivity is plotted in Figure 7.3, along with the yield index, to show 
how much faster it has grown. This was at 3.86% per annum until 2000, but 
since then it has jumped to 6.4% per annum. Labor productivity can be expect-
ed to rise when machinery and equipment are increasingly being substituted for 
labor, but this has not been the case. Indeed, Fuglie (2008) identified a decline 
in agricultural investment as a key driver of productivity growth in the recent 
past. Since a large part of investment is machinery, it seems likely that this has 
been decreasing, and we investigate this next.
The changes in the component parts of the output and input indexes are shown 
in the columns on the left side of Table 7.6. We begin by reporting average shares 
Figure 7.3. Land and labor productivity
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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in total revenue, from 1953 to 2000, so that the relative importance of each output 
can be judged. The shares show that animal products have declined in importance 
while crops have become more important, but even so this has only reduced the 
share of animals and animal products from 67% of total revenue to 63%. Updating 
to 2008 shows that by the final year, animals and animal products had declined 
further, to only 58% of total revenue, but we will see next that this is the result of 
an unusually high level of cereal output in response to the high prices of 2008.
The columns on the right side of Table 7.6 report that over the full period, 
from 1953 to 2008, crop output grew at 1.68% per annum, livestock at 1.16%, 
and livestock products at 0.43%, while horticulture and fruit output was vir-
tually stagnant, growing at only 0.12% per annum. UK producers have lost 
market share to imports, as these items have increased their share in consumer 
expenditures. Even in the early period, prior to 1984, there was little growth 
in horticulture and fruit, while the other three outputs grew at a minimum of 
Table 7.6. Shares in revenue or costs and annual mean growth rates 
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
aFor livestock output the sub-periods are 1953-1995 and 1995-2008.
bNot significantly different from zero.
 
Shares in Revenue 
or Cost (%) 
Annual Average
Growth Rates (%) 
 
1953-
2000 
1953-
1984 
1984-
2000 2008 
1953-
2008 
1953-
1984 
1984-
2008 
Outputs        
Crop outputs 22 20 26 29 1.68 1.70 0.04b 
Horticulture     
& fruit 11 10 11 13 0.12 0.55 -0.68 
Livestock 38 38 39 36 1.16 1.83a 0.63 
Livestock   
products 29 32 24 22 0.43 1.67 -0.53 
Inputs     
1953-
2008 
1953-
1996 
1996-
2008 
Seeds 2 2 2 4.5 0.84 1.00 -0.60 
Fertilizers 7 7 7 11.0 1.13 2.20 -5.90 
Pesticides 2 1 4 4.7 2.85 3.37 -0.69 
Feed  23 25 20 28.3 1.00 1.24 0.85 
Miscellaneous 6 6 7 9.4    
Machinery 20 19 20 9.0 -0.37 -0.10 -1.39 
Buildings  9 7 14 5.1 2.30 3.28 -0.57 
Labor 22 26 14 18.2 -2.10 -2.04 -3.21 
Land  4 3 6 9.7 -0.13 -0.19 0.22 
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1.67%, as can be seen in Figure 7.4. After 1984, only livestock output grew, 
with crops stagnant, livestock products falling at 0.5% per annum, and horti-
culture and fruit output falling at 0.68% per year. This sector has experienced 
the most rapid and severe withdrawal of public R&D and the biggest gains in 
exports. The intermediate inputs are reported next in Table 7.6 and plotted in 
Figure 7.5. The figure shows that the two rapidly growing inputs were fertil-
izer and pesticides. Growth of pesticides overtakes that of fertilizer in the early 
1980s, but by the early 1990s growth has peaked for both. The feed index 
includes other animal inputs, such as veterinary expenses. Table 7.6 shows 
that feed inputs began as a big share and retained that importance despite slow 
growth, while fertilizer and pesticides are relatively unimportant. The rise in 
the shares of the intermediate inputs in 2008 is mostly due to the huge fall in 
the capital items, which we cover next.
The structural breaks in the input series occur around 1996, which is when 
the aggregate input index turned down, so for simplicity this is the date used 
in Table 7.6. The outcome is not affected, since it is clear that growth was faster 
before 1996 and since then only feed continued to grow, while fertilizer declined 
rapidly, at over 5% per annum. This decline is exacerbated by the high prices in 
the final year, but this is a minor point.
Figure 7.4. Output indexes
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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Figure 7.6. Land, labor, and capital indexes
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Figure 7.5. Intermediate input indexes
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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Finally, Figure 7.6 plots the inputs of land and labor and the capital in-
puts. It clearly shows the rapid growth of buildings and land improvements, 
in contrast with the rapid reduction in labor, which typifies developed country 
agriculture. Thus, in Table 7.6, the share of buildings and land improvements 
in total costs doubles over the two periods, while that of labor is practically 
halved. Machinery maintains its share but grows very little, while land’s share 
doubles by 2000.
Table 7.6 reports that inputs for buildings grew at 3.28% in the early pe-
riod while labor fell at over 2% per annum. Land is almost constant throughout 
and machinery declines slightly. A startling aspect of these data are the results 
from 1996 to 2008, which show that labor’s rate of decline has risen to over 
3% per annum. It is difficult to conclude how this is being achieved, since the 
machinery input is itself declining at 1.39% per annum and buildings and land 
improvements at 0.57% a year. Could it be that the influx of labor from the new 
EU member states has not been fully recorded?2 Thus, by 2008, the shares of the 
capital investment items are incredibly low by historical standards. There ap-
pears to have been a dramatic decrease in investment, which also shows in the 
capital assets section of DEFRA’s (2008) accounts.
6. CROP-LEVEL TFP FOR SUGAR AND THE EASTERN UK COUNTIES
The previous section is a traditional analysis of aggregate TFP growth at the 
national level, which serves as a summary, but if the objective is to cast light on 
competitiveness, it leaves many questions unanswered. The Tornqvist-Theil in-
dex measures the average output, input, and TFP at any point in time but takes 
no account of dispersion or variance.3 But there will be variance, between crops 
and other enterprises, among regions, and between more efficient and less ef-
ficient farms. Thus, many recent U.S. productivity studies are at the state level, 
and Conradie, Piesse, and Thirtle (2008) report TFPs for the Western Cape Prov-
ince of South Africa at the magisterial district level. Also, nobody trades aggre-
gate agricultural output. A country will tend to export those products in which 
3In this it is inferior to the Malmquist index, which separates technical change (the movement of 
the best-practice frontier) and efficiency change (the distance of observations from the best-prac-
tice frontier). This is important, as lack of movement of the frontier suggests that R&D is having 
no impact, whereas an increasing number of farms being left behind the frontier indicates that 
extension is not working well. 
2Refer back to the erratic increases in labor productivity referred to in Figure 7.3 and discussed 
in the text, which raised the issue of accuracy of the data. 
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it has the most comparative advantage, and import, or at least not export, those 
in which it is not competitive. Also, the more efficient farms will be in the best 
position to export, perhaps even to other jurisdictions where the farms are less 
efficient. Thus, we now show that these variances matter and try to take them 
into account.
The United Kingdom does not have county-level data, and crop-specific 
TFPs normally cannot be constructed, as the allocation of some inputs (such as 
labor) among crops is usually not known. However, there are some exceptions, 
which serve to demonstrate the importance of variation across crops. First, we 
have data for sugar beets from Associated British Foods, from 1953 to 1992. The 
data cannot be feasibly extended to the present, but in Figure 7.7 we demon-
strate how different crops can be. The figure shows the difference between the 
aggregate UK agricultural TFP, which grew at 1.88% per annum, and the sugar 
beet TFP, which grew at 3.46% per annum (Thirtle 1999).
There are also crop-specific data for sugar, potatoes, oilseed, rape (canola), 
wheat, and barley for the eastern counties of England, which cover most of the 
best arable land in the United Kingdom (Murphy 1998 and previous). These data 
are for 1970-97 only, as collection of suitable data was discontinued. Over this 
Figure 7.7. Difference between UK aggregate and sugar TFP
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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period, the eastern region accounted for an average of 56% of UK sugar produc-
tion; 30% of winter wheat output; 26% of oilseed, rape, and potatoes; and 21% 
of spring barley. Thus, the TFP of these crops, which is a value-weighted aggre-
gate of these indexes, is a reasonable sample of UK crop production. This can be 
compared to the UK aggregate TFP to see how productivity in crops has differed 
from that in horticulture and animal production. The more novel aspect of the 
study is that the sources of aggregate crop TFP can be decomposed into the in-
nate productivity growth of the five crops and the effect of switching from crops 
with low TFP growth to those that have grown faster.
Figure 7.8 shows that after a poor start, the eastern region had far better 
TFP growth, at 2.87%, than the UK growth in aggregate, which was only 1.5% 
per annum. Unfortunately there is no way of comparing the starting levels, 
which were both set at 100, and this can also be crucial for comparison pur-
poses. The eastern counties aggregate also conceals the very different growth 
rates across the crops. Oilseed rape grew at 5.77% per annum (but from a low 
base), sugar at 3.39%, wheat at 2.49%, barley at 1.89%, and potatoes at 1.19% 
(but from a high base). These comparisons are sufficient to expose the weak-
ness of national aggregate TFPs for investigating relative competitiveness.
TFP growth results from the productivity growth of individual crops 
and from shifting from crops with low TFP growth to those with higher TFP 
growth rates. Baily, Bartlesman, and Haltiwanger (1996), and Baldwin (1996), 
Figure 7.8. Eastern region and UK TFP indexes
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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use plant-level data for the industrial sector to analyze the effect that compo-
sition changes have on the translation from plant-level to aggregate productiv-
ity data. They show that growth in aggregate TFP can be the result of changes 
in output share among plants rather than within-plant increases in TFP.
Amadi, Piesse, and Thirtle (2004), following Baily, Bartlesman, and 
Haltiwanger (1996), calculate the contribution that each crop makes to the 
proportional annual change in the eastern region TFP, reflecting changes in 
the productivity of individual crops and the land area weighting, as shown 
in equation (1): 
   
 (1)
where 
i
i
i
A
A
Φ =
∑  
is the area share of the crop. Thus, regional TFP change is decom-
posed into three terms. The first term indicates how much of the productivity 
change reflects increases within individual crops and is the change in the TFP of 
crop i, relative to the regional TFP, with the area share held constant. The second 
and third terms, in which the area shares change, pick up the changes in produc-
tivity due to changes in crop mix. The second term is the product of the change 
in the area share and the difference between the crop TFP and the regional TFP, 
relative to the regional TFP value. This can be positive or negative depending on 
whether the average productivity crops are increasing or decreasing their area 
shares. The third term is the second crop mix effect, called the cross term by 
Baily et al. (1996), which is the product of the change in area and the change in 
the regional TFP, relative to the TFP for crop i. It is positive or negative depend-
ing on whether the crops that have positive productivity growth have increasing 
or decreasing area shares. Thus, each crop contributes not only through its own 
change in productivity but also because its area share is changing.
The contributions of each crop to overall productivity growth in the east-
ern region are reported in Table 7.7, where the first term in (1) corresponds to 
the productivity column. The second term is the input share column, and the 
cross-effects column corresponds to the third term in (1). The most interesting 
result, because it has not been previously measured, is shown in the last row, 
which attributes 77% of growth to the direct, within-crop TFP changes and 23% 
to crop switching. The input share effects exactly cancel out, leaving the cross 
term to capture this crop mix effect. The last column shows that wheat made the 
5 5 5
1, , , 1, 1 , ,
1 1 1
1 1
( )t i t i t i t i Et t i Et i
Et i i i
Et Et Et i i
TFP TFP TFP TFP
TFP
TFP TFP TFP TFP
− − −
= = =
− − −
Φ ∆ ∆Φ − ∆Φ ∆
∆
= + +
∑ ∑ ∑
 AgrIculturAl ProductIvIty In the unIted kIngdom  169
largest total contribution to the regional TFP, because of its dominance in the 
region, but oilseed rape, with less than 10% of the acreage, contributes almost as 
much, followed by sugar beets, while barley adds less than 5%, and potatoes ap-
proximately zero. The rest of the table shows the crop-level contributions, so the 
first row shows that sugar’s contribution is entirely due to the direct effect of its 
rapid TFP growth. The area effect is small and negative, which is not surprising, 
as yields increased and the crop is subject to quantity quotas. The small contri-
bution of potatoes is also composed of a positive, direct TFP effect and a small 
negative area effect, which is for the same reasons, as quotas were in force much 
of the time.
For oilseed rape, the minute area in 1970 results in a very small attribution 
to the direct effect of TFP change, with the large contribution being recorded 
under the crop mix effect, as the crop grew in importance to cover almost 10% of 
the area. For wheat, over two-thirds of the contribution is attributed to the direct 
TFP growth effect because of the large starting area, but as the area expanded, 
there is also a crop-switching contribution. Barley shows that the decomposition 
has to be carefully interpreted. Because of the large area share in 1970 and rea-
sonable TFP growth, barley is recorded as making the largest direct contribution 
to TFP, which is somewhat counterintuitive, but the effect of the area decline is 
almost as large, leaving a very small total contribution.
7. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF PRODUCTIVITY
International productivity comparisons that include the United Kingdom 
and the United States resulted from a USDA project and began with an analysis 
by Thirtle et al. (1995). The analysis compared the agricultural TFPs of the 10 
countries that then comprised the European Community with the TFP of the 
Table 7.7. Direct and crop mix contributions of the crops to regional 
TFP growth, 1970-1995
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Crop Productivity Input Share Cross Term Total Total % 
Sugar 17.92 -0.01 -1.73 16.17 17.55 
Potatoes 0.51 -0.01 -0.08 0.42 0.46 
Oil seed rape 0.46 0.10 33.94 34.50 37.45 
Wheat 25.32 0.20 11.30 36.82 39.96 
Barley 27.09 -0.28 -22.60 4.21 4.57 
Total 71.31 0.00 20.83 92.13 100.00 
Total % 77.39 0.00 22.61 100.00  
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United States from 1973 to 1989. At the beginning of the period, with the aver-
age of the 10 EC counties set at 100, the range was from 141 for the Netherlands 
and 135 for Belgium down to 86 for Greece and 81 for Italy. The United States 
was placed third in this ranking, with a TFP of 124, and the United Kingdom 
was fifth, with 110. By the end of the period, the Netherlands still led, followed 
by the United States, and the United Kingdom had fallen to sixth in the spatial 
ranking. This was because the UK TFP had grown at only 1.7% per annum, as 
compared with the EC-10 average of 2.1% per annum, which was also the U.S. 
growth rate. The TFP changes were explained by public R&D expenditures, pri-
vate patents, extension expenditures, education, spillovers of public R&D among 
national jurisdictions, and the weather. The main finding was that the average 
spillover effects were bigger than the average of the direct effects of national agri-
cultural research systems within the countries of origin.
Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1999) updated this work to 1993 and with the 
extra years of data found that the United States was the leading country in TFP 
by 1993, as illustrated in Figure 7.9. Advances in the measurement of convergence 
showed that the United States and the leading northern European countries were 
converging in TFP to a high-level growth club, while the southern European coun-
tries were falling behind and themselves converging on a low-growth equilibrium.
Figure 7.9. Comparing TFP in the United States and the European 
Community 10
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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The most recent update is from Eldon Ball of the USDA and is associated 
with the competitiveness study of Ball, Butalt, and Mendosa (2004). Figure 7.10, 
which was constructed from Ball’s data, shows that when the TFP comparison 
is updated to 2002, the United States retains its lead while the United Kingdom 
has declined to the same level as Sweden, Ireland, and Greece. The lengthy pe-
riod of stagnation in the United Kingdom is quite clear in Figure 7.10.
A report to DEFRA on the impact on UK agriculture of increasing agri-
cultural productivity in EU acceding countries (Thirtle et al. 2004b) included 
farm-level data. These data were included because the aggregate results for 
the study showed that even the most advanced new member states were on 
average not competitive with the United Kingdom. However, on the basis 
of the farm-level data, we argued that the top end of the distribution in the 
new member states would be more efficient than the bottom end of the dis-
tribution of UK farms, as shown in Figure 7.11. Foreign-owned, large-scale, 
advanced technology enterprises in countries like Poland and Hungary had 
very little in common with those countries’ average farms and were almost 
certainly far more efficient than the tail end of small UK farms, which were 
struggling. This should be kept in mind when reviewing the work on interna-
tional comparisons.
Figure 7.10. TFPs for the EU countries, 1973-2002
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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The national aggregate comparisons in the DEFRA report by Thirtle et al. 
(2004a) used Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2005) data to compare 
aggregate yield in value terms, labor productivity, and TFP. Yields for the United 
Kingdom and the new member states are in Figure 7.12, which shows that the 
UK yields were actually considerably lower than those for Poland, Hungary, and 
Figure 7.11. Distribution of UK and Hungarian farms
Figure 7.12. Yields, United Kingdom and potential European Union entrants
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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the former Czechoslovakia, until these countries suffered setbacks during the 
transition in the early 1990s. By 2002, yields in the United Kingdom, Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were all grouped at around $800-
$900 per hectare, while Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey were only at around 
$500 per hectare. It is apparent that aggregate yield values generally declined in 
the 1990s, with Turkey the only exception.
Yields are of great interest to agricultural scientists, but as Hayami and Rut-
tan’s (1985) comparisons of Japan and the United States showed, maximizing 
yield is of major interest only to countries where land is scarce. The majority of 
productivity growth in the advanced countries comes from shedding labor. This 
is reflected in Figure 7.13, which shows the value of annual output per agricul-
tural worker for the full sample of incumbent, new, and potential EU states, in 
$1,000 U.S. purchasing power parity, 1990 base. The leading country in this 
dimension is Belgium/Luxembourg, which by 2002 had output per worker of 
Figure 7.13. Labor productivity for the European Union and entrants
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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$65,000, followed by Denmark, at $54,000. The UK level at $28,000 is just over 
50% that of the Danes, but this is still almost triple the levels of the two leading 
entrants, Bulgaria and Hungary, which are about $11,000 per worker. Notice 
too, that the growth rates of the leading countries have, if anything, increased, 
but the UK growth rate slows after 1984. Since labor reduction dominates TFP 
growth, this turning point will come up again in the TFP section.
Figure 7.14 shows the United Kingdom and the new entrants only, as the 
larger scale allowed by the smaller dispersion makes the differences clearer. Now 
it is very clear that the United Kingdom may be well behind the EU leaders, but 
it is still in a different league from the potential entrants. In turn, even Poland, 
which is the worst of the Central and Eastern European countries, has output 
of almost $3,900 per worker, whereas Turkey is still in the emerging economy 
range at just over $1,400 per worker.
Since the lack of prices and hence factor shares precluded the Tornqvist-Theil 
approach, the methodology for TFP measurement was to generate the Malmquist 
index using both data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier estima-
tion. The resulting indexes are shown in Figure 7.15 for the full sample, and the 
Figure 7.14. Labor productivity in the United Kingdom and potential European 
Union entrants
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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results are quite clear.4 There are two distinct groups, with the northwestern EU 
countries making up the successful upper group and the rest confined to the low 
TFP growth group. The only exception to this regional division is the Republic of 
Ireland, which is in the low-growth group, finishing behind Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
and Hungary, all of which have final values of around 1.1. These are followed by 
Italy and the Czech Republic, then Romania, Spain, Greece, and Poland, which are 
still ahead of Cyprus and Portugal, with Turkey consistently last.
Do any of the new entrants seem likely to catch up with the northwest EU 
group in the foreseeable future? The gap between the leading accession coun-
tries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary at 1.1) in 2002 and the 
last country in the northwest EU group is 0.5. Now compare this with the best 
progress made by any of the lower group. Hungary has gone from 0.56 to 1.01, 
Figure 7.15. Malmquist TFP for the European Union and entrants
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
4If Belgium, which has the highest levels and growth rates, is excluded, the outcome is clearer 
because of the larger scale on the graph.
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which is a gain of 0.45 in 42 years. Thus, unless there are organizational changes 
that give massive growth, it seems unlikely that the agricultural sectors of the 
potential entrants could achieve the TFP levels of the northwest EU group in less 
than 40 years, or by about 2050. A slightly more sophisticated calculation can be 
made by looking at a series for each of these countries determining any discern-
able trend during the last few years and using just these years to estimate growth 
projections. The results of this exercise are in Table 7.8.
The potential entrant that is in the leading group and has the best growth 
rate is Hungary, which is growing 2.2% faster than the United Kingdom on 
these projections. At that differential growth rate, Hungary should catch up in 
36 years. Of course, this is a matter of the whole sector catching up, since in this 
analysis we can only look at all outputs relative to all inputs. This is useful but 
hardly an adequate answer, especially since the countries in central and eastern 
Europe have dualistic agricultural systems, to differing extents. If a country has 
a backward sector of small peasant farmers and co-operatives or formerly state-
owned farms that are larger and better endowed with resources, then we need 
to be able to separate the better enterprises and compare them with UK or U.S. 
farms. That is why the previous section considered farm-level data.
8. EXPLAINING CHANGES IN UK TFP GROWTH: 
CAUSES OF THE DECLINE
The UK track record on productivity growth is sufficiently poor that it is 
worth considering the causes to avoid making the same mistakes. The causes of 
the decline can be divided into two types: some are an illusion, caused by better 
measurement of the same reality, while others actually result from real changes. 
Table 7.8. TFP growth projections 
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Country Years TFP Growth Rate (%) 
United Kingdom 1984-2002 0.39 
Bulgaria 1997-2002 1.85 
Cyprus 1994-2002 1.67 
Czech Republic 1995-2002 2.31 
Hungary 1993-1998 2.62 
Poland 1994-2001 1.90 
Romania 1994-2001 1.25 
Slovakia 1993-1999 1.39 
Turkey 1995-2002 0.47 
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It is possible that there has not been any decline but only if less conventional 
measures are used. Thirtle et al. (2004a) reports two cases in which the decline 
practically disappears, and we begin with these. Then, there are two reasons 
why the measurements have changed, one due to better data and the other to the 
increasing appropriability of biological innovations. The main causes of the real 
decline are then covered, which are the lack of investment in UK agriculture, 
cuts in public R&D, the effect this had on private sector patents, and the slow-
ing of the growth of farm size. Concerning the effect of the demise of the public 
extension service in 1988, it is only possible to speculate on the effect. Finally, 
there are four other possible causes, two that are external to the sector, which are 
unlikely to have had large effects.
1. Correction of the TFP calculation when technological change is biased. 
The calculation of TFP assumes that technological change is Hicks neutral (that 
is, it saves all the inputs in the same proportion as they are being used) and 
imposes this condition. It has now been shown that when technical change 
is actually biased, as it is in UK agriculture, this can lead to serious errors in 
measurement, which get worse over time. Thirtle et al. (2003) and Bailey, Irz, 
and Balcombe (2004) show that if the factor shares used in aggregation are 
adjusted to allow for biased technical change, the resulting TFP index shows 
almost no sign of decline after 1984. Although a paper on this subject won the 
best contributed paper prize at the meetings of the International Association of 
Agricultural Economists in 2000, this correction is certainly not yet accepted as 
conventional wisdom.
2. A social TFP adjusted for environmental externalities. Conventional 
measures of TFP do not take into account inputs and outputs that are externali-
ties in the production process. Hence these measures do not account for the 
potentially polluting substances that are produced by agriculture alongside food 
and other products. These substances include nitrates, pesticides, and green-
house and other gases, and their emission can potentially contribute to biodiver-
sity loss and climate change, among other negative environmental impacts.
Total social factor productivity is estimated using the conventional produc-
tivity measures calculated by Thirtle et al. (2004a) and incorporating emissions 
of various polluting gases from UK agriculture for the period 1970 to 1999. This 
new measure showed that total social factor productivity has grown at 1.7% 
per annum since 1984, as compared with 0.26% for the conventional TFP. This 
reflects a decline in emissions of polluting gases, as farms have switched fuel 
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types over the period, and since the 1990s, because of the ban on field burning 
of crop residues.
This is a very sensible outcome, in view of the fact that the reforms of public 
R&D in the 1980s and 1990s made productivity-enhancing research the respon-
sibility of the industry. Public money was redirected toward the production of 
public goods, which meant lessening pollution, and increasing countryside stew-
ardship, animal health and welfare, and food safety. Thus, it is hardly surprising 
that this is where the growth is.
3. Detailed data and quality change. Why would the new DEFRA data 
give lower growth of TFP than the old data? The quality adjustment reason 
raised earlier harks back to the important debate that centered on Jorgenson and 
Griliches’s (1967) criticism of Dennison’s (1962) growth accounting for the U.S. 
economy. Dennison showed substantial productivity growth, but this was the 
residual, not accounted for by inputs, which Jorgenson and Griliches dismissed 
as measurement error. They argued that if all outputs and inputs were included 
and correctly measured in efficiency units, thus allowing for quality change, TFP 
growth should be exactly zero, as inputs must explain outputs. This rests on the 
notion that all technical change is embodied in inputs, and Jorgenson and Grili-
ches did back down somewhat in later papers. For example, in agriculture, there 
can be disembodied technical change, due to differences in managerial ability. A 
better farmer can produce more with exactly the same inputs, by planting, fertil-
izing, weeding, and harvesting at the right time.
The Jorgenson and Griliches argument is relevant here, since the old MAFF 
data were far cruder than the new DEFRA data, so there must be a tendency for 
less of the output to be properly accounted for. The results reported by Barnes 
(2002) support this supposition. Barnes constructed a TFP directly from the 
Central Statistical Organization data published in the Annual Abstract of Sta-
tistics. This gives very little detail, and he used four output categories and eight 
inputs. These data were much less detailed than those used by MAFF or Amadi 
(2000) and the result is that Barnes’s TFP fails to show any kind of decline in 
the 1990s. The annual growth rate of TFP from 1972 to 1995 is 3.25%, which 
is huge relative to the results based on the old MAFF index, let alone the new 
DEFRA results.
4. The switch from public to private R&D. It is possible to build on the 
work of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) by asking what an agricultural TFP 
index measures. Most of what it measures are the effects of the technology 
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produced by the public sector and made available almost free of charge. This 
“public good” is a gift to the private sector input suppliers and for that reason 
does not get included in attempts at quality adjustment of inputs. This is why 
Griliches (1964) included public R&D in the production function, but neither 
he nor Evenson (1967) included private R&D. Thus, as appropriability has im-
proved and the private sector has increased its share of technology generation, 
now outspending the public sector, the improved technology is more likely to 
be accounted for in the quality-adjusted input series, which should decline less 
or grow more rapidly. Thus, measured TFP growth should decline continually 
as this process advances. If the public sector withdrew completely and quality 
adjustment of inputs was accurate, Jorgenson and Griliches’s claims would prove 
almost to be true.
5. Lack of investment in UK agriculture. The structural break in UK TFP 
comes in the mid-1980s, immediately after the peak in public R&D expenditure 
in 1982. Since the peak effect comes with a lag of 12 or more years and the initial 
effects tend to be very small or even non-existent (Thirtle, Piesse, and Schimmelp-
fennig 2008), it seems likely that other real causes need to be examined. A leading 
candidate, at least according to the agricultural scientists, is the lack of profitability 
of the sector, which by the mid-1980s was reflected in a lack of investment. This 
suggestion is worthy of examination, as it must have some credence.
6. Reduction and retargeting of public agricultural R&D. The next three 
reasons are quantified and can be shown to account for the decline. Thirtle et al. 
(2004a) showed that TFP growth has actually fallen from 1.68% per annum be-
fore 1984 to 0.26% thereafter, and thus there is a reduction of 1.42% to account 
for. Figure 7.16 shows that public agricultural R&D grew at 6% per annum until 
1982, when growth ceased. Then, the fall in TFP follows after two years, which is 
perhaps too soon to be feasible. The elasticity of 0.13 for R&D reported in Thirtle 
et al. (2004a) allows a rough calculation of the impact of the R&D cuts on TFP. 
With R&D growing at 6% per annum this should have accounted for 0.8% per 
annum of TFP growth, which leaves a further 0.62% to be accounted for.
This section has suggested that TFP growth may also be reduced by the fol-
lowing: using the Tornqvist-Theil index and including the animal capital stocks, 
but this caused only small reductions; using better data combined with quality 
adjustment; measurement errors combined with the switch toward private R&D; 
and ignoring the biases in technological change. The rest of this section adds other 
possible explanations that could account for the remaining 0.62% per annum of 
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lost growth. The first follows from the analysis of the effects of public R&D in the 
previous section. The Office of Science and Technology (1995) subtitled its Tech-
nology Foresight publication Progress through Partnership. The argument was that 
technological goals should be achieved through public and private sector collabora-
tion, in which the public institutions produce basic scientific and public interest 
research and the private sector is responsible for product development, and near-
market and productivity-enhancing research. The public sector should provide the 
scientific base for the applied research and development of the private institutions. 
The relationship between public and private R&D has been studied, and the usual 
suggestion is that the two activities are complements. Thus, the reduction in public 
R&D is highly likely to have reduced private R&D, and this effect also needs to be 
estimated and taken into account.
In sum, there is strong evidence of market failure and the need for continued 
and increased public funding of agricultural research. Yet critics of the reforms 
of agricultural research over the past 25 years have noted that neither the word 
agriculture nor food appears in the title of the BBSRC, and that DEFRA is no 
longer involved in promoting more efficient production of food on British farms. 
This, together with the reluctance of the private sector to fill the gap, makes it 
difficult to disagree with Spedding’s (1984) assertion that publicly funded agri-
cultural research in the United Kingdom no longer exists. The soundness of this 
situation is unclear. One might ask, for example, on whom will the now very 
Figure 7.16. Public R&D and TFP
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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important food industry rely for research on the commodities that constitute 
its raw materials? The government needs to reconsider policies to better ensure 
sensible allocation of resources between the public and private sectors. Needless 
to say, there may be lessons here for the many other governments, such as those 
of Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States, that have 
similarly sought to reduce public spending, to shift any remaining funds toward 
areas in which there is clear evidence of market failure, and to enact legislation 
promoting greater private funding of agricultural research (Alston, Pardey, and 
Smith 1999). Yet, the complexity and unequal distribution of the reallocations in 
the United Kingdom (Thirtle, Palladino, and Piesse 1997) should warn against 
superficial comparisons of the experience in countries in which agricultural re-
search has historically been organized very differently.
7. Private sector patents. The evidence on recent private sector activity is 
limited, but there are good data on patents pertaining to agriculture from the 
Yale Technology Concordance. The first column of Table 7.9 reports the total 
number of patents granted by the United Kingdom to all the major foreign ap-
plicants from 1969 to 1995. The number increases until 1978, when it reaches a 
peak of 923, before falling to an all-time low of 449 in 1988 and then recovering 
to its earlier levels by 1995.
The lower numbers coincide with the decline in public R&D, but the patent 
series declines first, suggesting that the United Kingdom was becoming a less 
attractive market before the R&D cuts began. The behavior of foreign patent 
applicants is important, but the key point here is the relationship between UK 
R&D and UK patents, as the UK patent series is quite different. From 1978 to 
1983 the level of UK patents is consistently high, at well over 300. Then, from 
1984 onward, the number declines, falling to 70 in 1988, or barely 20% of what 
it was before the cuts began. This relationship is shown in Figure 7.17. Regress-
ing patents on R&D, with a one-period lag (so that R&D is predetermined and 
hence weakly exogenous) shows that a 1% reduction in R&D leads to a 1.62% 
reduction in domestic patents.5 This suggests that public R&D and domestic 
patents are complements rather than substitutes, and when the growth of public 
R&D was cut from 6% per annum to zero, the effect on private activity would 
have been a reduction of 9.6% (6*1.6). The elasticity of TFP with respect to pat-
ents is about 0.07 (from Thirtle et al. 2004a), so this would have reduced TFP 
5Note that the patents are both private and public, so some of the decline is due to less public sec-
tor activity.
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by a further 0.67% per annum. This estimate is a bit crude, but it says that the 
total effect on TFP of the cut in UK public R&D was 1.47%. Thus, the public 
R&D cuts and their effects on private activity are alone sufficient to explain the 
1.42% reduction in TFP growth. However, there are other possible impacts that 
need to be considered.
Table 7.9 also suggests that the relationship between UK R&D and patents 
is negatively related to foreign patents. By 1989, when there are only 79 UK 
Table 7.9. Patents registered in the United Kingdom, by applicant country 
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
Year Total 
All 
Foreign UK U.S. Germany Japan France Holland
Switzer
-land Italy
GB/ 
Foreign 
1969 542 310 232 115 61 11 31 40 12 5 0.748 
1970 883 533 350 176 95 23 40 95 20 5 0.657 
1971 827 499 328 157 108 16 56 51 33 9 0.657 
1972 816 518 298 170 118 29 37 57 25 12 0.575 
1973 716 441 275 150 101 27 39 27 22 11 0.624 
1974 664 405 259 126 82 22 38 50 16 11 0.640 
1975 806 513 293 177 107 22 43 52 24 9 0.571 
1976 780 488 292 148 109 31 64 46 18 5 0.598 
1977 769 515 254 147 109 28 39 87 18 9 0.493 
1978 923 589 334 169 129 42 40 87 22 6 0.567 
1979 845 502 343 153 118 44 38 70 20 7 0.684 
1980 767 421 345 138 107 44 36 55 18 9 0.820 
1981 688 348 341 123 96 44 34 42 16 9 0.979 
1982 610 281 329 108 85 43 32 30 15 10 1.169 
1983 532 222 310 93 74 41 29 20 13 10 1.400 
1984 515 259 257 84 73 50 29 19 12 10 0.991 
1985 499 293 206 75 72 59 30 17 12 10 0.702 
1986 482 324 158 67 71 67 30 16 11 11 0.486 
1987 465 353 112 59 70 74 31 14 11 11 0.318 
1988 449 379 70 51 68 81 31 13 10 11 0.185 
1989 476 397 79 65 79 81 35 15 10 13 0.199 
1990 658 542 116 105 120 107 52 23 13 20 0.214 
1991 530 431 99 96 104 81 44 20 10 17 0.229 
1992 557 448 109 114 118 80 49 22 10 19 0.244 
1993 584 463 120 132 133 79 54 25 10 22 0.260 
1994 733 622 111 185 108 102 50 28 11 23 0.179 
1995 883 781 102 237 83 124 46 31 12 25 0.131 
Total 18000 11877 6122 3420 2598 1452 1076 1051 426 321  
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patents, this figure is matched by the Germans and exceeded by the Japanese, 
which is quite remarkable. The last column of Table 7.9 shows that whereas 
UK patents exceeded all foreign patents in 1982 and 1983, by 1995 the United 
Kingdom was only registering 13% of the number of foreign patents. Thus, it 
looks as if the demise in UK activity has led to a vast increase in the relative 
importance of foreign multinational company activity. This is also a result that 
seems not to have been noted before. It suggests that cutting back the UK R&D 
effort may well lead to a greater level of foreign technology entering UK agricul-
ture. Imported private sector technology is a substitute for national public and 
private R&D and may be a partial cure for slow TFP growth. The figures show 
that from 1983, the result of a 1% reduction in UK patents is a 0.54% increase 
in foreign patents registered in the United Kingdom. If foreign patents have the 
same impact on TFP as domestic patents, a further effect of the public R&D 
cuts would be to increase TFP by 0.22% per annum because of the increase in 
foreign activity.
8. Farm size. Thirtle et al. (2004a) showed that growth in farm size also 
affected TFP growth, but the coefficients on the two policy variables were very 
small indeed. Figure 7.18 shows that farm size practically ceased growing in the 
1990s, when the rate fell from 1.0% per annum to 0.1%. The elasticity of 0.21 
from Thirtle et al. (2004a) suggests that this cut of 0.9% could have reduced TFP 
growth by 0.19%. Set this against the extra 0.22% due to foreign activity and the 
numbers add up almost perfectly to explain the decrease in TFP growth.
Figure 7.17. Public R&D, UK patents, and foreign patents
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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9. Extension. Extension expenditures could not be included in this section, 
because there are no data after 1988, when free public extension services ceased, 
but it is possible to speculate as to the effects. The conventional wisdom (Thirtle, 
Piesse, and Turk 1996) suggests that R&D creates technology that moves the 
frontier forward, while extension spreads the knowledge to farmers to ensure 
that they adopt the new techniques and stay close to the efficiency frontier. Had-
ley (2006) used farm-level data to study efficiency change and showed positive 
technical change but considerable decreases in efficiency as farms fail to keep up 
with the advancing frontier. These results suggest that the demise of the public 
extension service has also reduced TFP growth.
10. The long-run growth path. There is reason to believe that past levels of 
growth cannot be maintained. Jones (1999), in a paper first presented at the Al-
lied Social Sciences annual conference in Chicago in 1998 under the title “The 
Upcoming Slowdown in US Economic Growth” (Jones 1997), pointed out that 
the U.S. growth rate from the 1950s cannot be maintained. Rapid growth has 
been driven by increases in educational levels, increases in research intensities, 
and increased openness of the world economy. These are all one-off changes, in 
the sense that it will not be possible to continue doubling the proportion of the 
population attending universities, which has reached about half, or doubling 
research intensities, which are already over 20% of sales for high-tech industries 
Figure 7.18. Farm size (log scale)
Sources: See Data References Appendix.
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like pharmaceuticals. Neither can the world economy be opened up a second 
time. Thus, Jones showed that the U.S. economy is far from its long-run balanced 
growth path. His calculations showed that 35% of U.S. growth is attributable to 
the rise in education levels, 40% to increases in research intensity, and only 25% 
to the components of long-run growth. Thus, at some stage in the relatively near 
future, growth must fall from close to 3% per annum to less than 1%.
The same is true of productivity growth in agriculture. Education levels need 
improving but cannot grow forever, and the multinational input companies must 
be getting close to the maximum possible research intensities, so TFP growth 
must slow down in the long run.
11. Asset fixity. There are three other possible causes, which are worthy of 
mention. One is the well-known proposition that when farmers reduce output, 
costs will not fall as much as they rose during expansion. Asset fixity and the 
lack of perfect secondary markets for capital items account for this, and, simi-
larly, TFP growth may be more easily achieved when output is expanding, so 
that capital is fully utilized and purchased only when needed. When output is 
contracting, capital goods are likely to be underutilized and the stock can only 
be reduced at the rate of depreciation. Output data for a sample of countries 
is needed to test this proposition, but it is obvious from Figure 7.2 that output 
ceased growing in the United Kingdom in 1984.
12. Convergence. The remaining two possible causes seem to be unlikely. 
First, regressions to explain TFP in panel data usually include starting values, 
since catching up tends to be easier than leading. This can hardly apply to the 
United Kingdom, which has not been a leader in productivity terms for a very long 
time, and the current leading countries are doing far better.
13. Ozone pollution. Finally, industrial pollution affects yields. There is now 
substantial evidence that low-level ozone pollution reduces cereal yields, and we 
suspect that ozone has contributed to the decline in yields in other crops. The 
plant biologists have conducted controlled experiments on cereal yields, which 
show that low-level ozone pollution levels that are not damaging to human health 
severely affect crop yields. Experiments in the United Kingdom show that ozone 
dispersion is wide, so most areas are affected, and yields are reduced. However, al-
though the plant breeders have not recognized the problem, their trial plots are in 
affected areas, and they have inadvertently limited the damage by selecting ozone-
tolerant varieties. The evidence to date (Shankar and Neeliah 2005; Kaliakatsou, 
Thirtle, and Bell forthcoming) suggests that the yield losses due to ozone are no 
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more than about 2%-3%. Also, the United Kingdom is no more affected than oth-
er EU countries, so it is unlikely that this can be the cause of its relatively poor 
performance in terms of yield growth, which was noted earlier.
9. CONCLUSION
This chapter began with a brief review of policy changes in UK agriculture, 
changes that are used later in explaining technical and efficiency change at the 
farm level. The history of yield changes in the United Kingdom shows that the 
notion of an agricultural revolution from about 1750 is too simplistic. There 
were more prior changes of perhaps equal consequence. What is beyond doubt 
is that the massive increase in the growth rate of yields only occurs with the 
application of modern science after WWII. However, in the United Kingdom 
the increase in yield growths from the historical rate of around 0.2% per an-
num to 2% per annum lasted less than half a century. Since 1996, cereal yield 
growth is actually lower than between 1885 to 1945.
In the period beginning in 1953, for which good data are available, yields, 
output, and TFP grew at unprecedented respective rates of 2.08%, 1.87%, and 
1.67% until 1984. Since 1984, output and yields have fallen slightly, and TFP 
grew at an average of only 0.3% until 1996. Since then, TFP has increased to 
1.2% growth per annum. Only labor productivity has continued to grow really 
rapidly, at 3.86% per annum until 2000, and at 6.4% since that date. However, 
we question this last figure as there is no substitution of machinery, equipment, 
and buildings. Indeed, all the capital inputs have declined since the mid-1990s 
following reported low levels of investment from the mid-1980s. These declines 
are thought to be a cause of the United Kingdom’s recent poor productivity 
growth, so the big jump in labor productivity suggests possible undercounting 
of workers from the new EU member states and elsewhere.
The aggregate TFP suffers from the limitation of ignoring variance across 
regions, crops, and farms, which limits its usefulness for comparisons of 
competitiveness. Thus, the next step is to consider crop- and region-specific 
TFPs for the eastern counties of England, which is the prime arable area. The 
TFP for sugar grew considerably faster than the aggregate UK index, and the 
eastern counties’ aggregate index for sugar, oilseed rape, wheat, barley, and 
potatoes grew at 2.87% per annum as compared with 1.5% per annum for the 
UK average for the same period. Crop-specific TFP growth rates varied from 
5.8% for oilseed rape to 1.19% for potatoes.
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The farm-level studies of the United Kingdom decompose the rates of tech-
nical change and efficiency change, which both vary with farm type. They show 
that while there has been substantial technical progress, average farm-level effi-
ciencies have fallen, which means that the laggards are not keeping up and will 
drag down average productivity. This suggests that the demise of free extension 
advice may be a factor in poor productivity growth. The analysis at the farm 
level also contributes to our understanding of TFP change by measuring the 
effects of policy changes and exogenous shocks such as animal disease epidem-
ics, like BSE, and by showing the variance in efficiency within farm types. The 
variance in efficiency across farms needs to be kept in mind when comparing 
aggregate TFP levels as a guide to competitiveness.
Productivity comparisons between the EC-10 countries and the United 
States show that the United States does tend to have higher productivity than its 
nearest European rivals. However, Section 8 shows that there are other factors 
involved in competitiveness. Productivity comparisons across the EU countries, 
intended to assess the impact on UK agriculture at the accession of new member 
states, show that UK yields were actually lower than those of the leading new 
members such as Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia. However, 
labor productivity and TFP was much higher for the United Kingdom and other 
incumbent EU member states. A rough estimate of the time it will take for fast-
growing Hungary to catch the United Kingdom in TFP is 36 years.
These aggregates conceal the fact that the best producers in these coun-
tries are way above the national averages and are more productive than the 
bottom end of the UK farm distribution. Particularly, agriculture in countries 
like Hungary is dualistic, with some large, modern, efficient farms using the 
latest technology, while the majority of small-holding farms are backward and 
drag the average way down. Thus, aggregate TFP and even the competitive-
ness study reported in this paper are of dubious value in predicting the ex-
porting ability of some emergent European countries.
Even so, the competitiveness of the United States, taking input prices and 
exchange rates into account, as well as TFP, is normally better on average than 
even the leading EU countries. The exceptions are brief periods in the early 
1970s and mid-1980s, when Denmark, Belgium, and Germany had a slight ag-
gregate price advantage.
The last section of the chapter considers the reasons why the UK’s TFP 
performance has been so poor. Clearly, the United Kingdom dropped from 
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one of the better EU countries in TFP terms to sharing last place with Sweden, 
until the recent accession of new members that have far lower TFP levels. The 
United Kingdom’s failure in this area has been well recorded and should serve 
as a warning that the agricultural sector does need public support, or some vi-
able alternative means of producing public goods to support farmers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The structure of U.S. agricultural production changed dramatically during 
the twentieth century. The changes were associated with major technological in-
novations that transformed the relationship between agricultural inputs and out-
puts, contributing to rapid increases in agricultural productivity. In this chapter 
we examine trends and major structural changes in input use and the resulting 
changes in agricultural outputs and productivity in the United States over the 
past 100 years. Our detailed analysis emphasizes the years since the Second 
World War and gives attention to the spatial patterns of changes in agricultural 
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input use, outputs, and productivity that are concealed by consideration of the 
aggregate national data alone.1 
As in many other places around the world during the twentieth century, in 
the United States productivity grew relatively rapidly in the agricultural sector 
compared with other sectors of the economy. As stated by Jorgenson and Gollop 
(1992, p. 748): “There is little doubt that productivity growth is the principal fac-
tor responsible for postwar economic growth in agriculture, accounting for more 
than 80% of the sector’s growth. This contrasts with 13% and 25% levels for pro-
ductivity’s contribution to economic growth in the private nonfarm economy and 
manufacturing, respectively.” However, this “golden age” of agricultural productiv-
ity growth may have ended. Evidence is mounting that suggests we have entered 
a new era, with substantially lower rates of productivity growth. The chapter con-
cludes with an analysis of rates of productivity growth for different periods, find-
ing a statistically significant slowdown in productivity growth after 1990. 
2. MEASURES OF INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY
The main analysis in this chapter uses data developed under the leadership of 
Philip Pardey at the University of Minnesota’s International Science and Technol-
ogy Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center as a joint effort with colleagues now at 
Oberlin College (Barbara Craig), the University of Wyoming (Matt Andersen), and 
the University of California, Davis (Julian Alston). The InSTePP production ac-
counts consist of state-specific measures of the prices and quantities of 74 catego-
ries of outputs and 58 categories of inputs for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The 
input series covers the period 1949-2002 while the output series runs from 1949 
to 2006. This version of the data represents a revised, expanded, and updated 
version of the series published by Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey (2003), which ran 
from 1949 to 1991. Here we provide a brief overview of the InSTePP production 
accounts, emphasizing some of the more important data construction choices used 
to assemble the series. More complete details can be found in Pardey et al. (2009). 
In developing the InSTePP data, special attention was given to accounting 
for variation in the composition of input and output aggregates, with particular 
reference to the quality of inputs (and outputs) and the spatial dimension. Star 
(1974) showed that it is safe to use pre-aggregated data only if all of the inputs 
1This chapter is based on work in the book by Alston, Andersen, James, and Pardey (2010), espe-
cially Chapters 2 through 5. Those chapters provide more complete details on data and sources, 
and more complete analysis of the issues raised and discussed in summary terms here.
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(and outputs) in the class are growing at the same rate or are perfect substitutes 
for one another. If, for example, the rate of growth of the higher-priced inputs 
(outputs) exceeds the rate of growth of the lower-priced inputs (outputs), the 
estimated rate of growth of the group will be biased downward when pre-aggre-
gated data are used. Hence, growth rates of agricultural productivity will tend 
to be overstated if the quantities of higher-priced (i.e., higher-quality) inputs are 
growing relatively quickly. 
Here, the 58 categories of inputs are grouped into four broad categories: 
land, labor, capital, and materials inputs. The land input is subdivided into 
service flows from three basic types of land, namely, pasture and rangeland, 
non-irrigated cropland, and irrigated cropland. The price weights used for aggre-
gation of the land input are annual state- or region-specific cash rents for each of 
the three land types. The labor data consist of 30 categories of operator labor by 
age and education cohort, as well as family labor and hired labor. State-specific 
wages were obtained for the hired and family labor, whereas implicit wages for 
operators were developed using national data on income earned by “rural farm 
males,” categorized by age and educational attainment.
Capital inputs include seven classes of physical capital and five classes of 
biological capital. A physical inventory method, based on either counts of assets 
purchased or on assets in place, was used to compile the capital series as de-
scribed in some detail in Andersen, Alston, and Pardey (2009) and Pardey et al. 
(2009).2 In addition, we adjusted inventories of the physical capital classes to re-
flect quality change over time depending on the nature of the data available and 
the service flow profile of each capital type. Rents for capital items were taken 
to be specific fractions of the purchase price, fractions that varied among capital 
types. Purchase prices were assumed to reflect the expected present value of real 
capital services over the lifetime of the specific type of capital.
Eleven types of materials inputs are included in this data set. Apart from fer-
tilizers, measured as quantities of elemental nitrogen, phosphorous, and potash, 
the purchased input quantities were implicit quantities derived by dividing state-
specific expenditure totals by the corresponding national average price. The mis-
2The capital series was identified as a particular source of discrepancies between the InSTePP 
measures of multi-factor productivity growth and the counterpart measures published by the 
USDA (see, for instance, Ball, Butault, and Nehring 2001). These discrepancies are more pro-
nounced for particular states and subperiods than for the aggregate U.S. series over the full 
period for which both measures are available (see Andersen, Alston, and Pardey 2009 for details 
and discussion). 
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cellaneous category was pre-aggregated and included a list of disparate inputs, 
such as fencing, irrigation fees, hand tools, veterinary services, and insurance 
costs, among others. In this category, state-specific prices were available only for 
electricity; all other input prices were national prices or price indices based on 
national prices paid by farmers.
In the disaggregated form, the output data cover 74 output categories, includ-
ing 16 field crops, 22 fruits and nuts, 22 vegetables, implicit quantities of green-
house and nursery products, 9 livestock commodities, and 4 miscellaneous items 
that include implicit quantities of machines rented out by farmers, and Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) acreage. The prices used as weights to form aggregate 
output are state-specific prices received by farmers for all commodities, except 
machines for hire and greenhouse and nursery products. Table 8.1 summarizes the 
input and output variables and their groupings into various categories. Table 8.2 
summarizes the groupings of states into the regions used in this chapter. 
The major sources of the price and quantity data for agricultural outputs are 
annual estimates from the Economic Research Service (ERS) and National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 
estimates come principally from two publications, Agricultural Statistics and Statisti-
cal Bulletins, supplemented with NASS and USDA occasional commodity reports. 
The output price and quantity data are all state- and commodity-specific except for 
the “machines hired out” category, which uses a national average price. 
The agricultural input data come from a host of sources, including and most 
importantly from various issues of the U.S. Census of Agriculture. Most of the 
input data are constructed using Census estimates that are supplemented with 
annual data from numerous other sources, including the USDA-ERS, the Asso-
ciation of Equipment Manufacturers (AEM), and the Census of Population. For 
example, Census estimates of operator labor on farms were disaggregated by age 
and education cohort using data from the ERS Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey. Also, Census data on the counts of tractors and combines used in 
production were disaggregated into different horsepower and width classifica-
tions using proprietary data from the AEM. 
Bias from the procedure used to aggregate inputs and outputs can be kept to 
a minimum by choosing an appropriate index, carefully selecting value weights 
for all inputs and outputs, and disaggregating inputs and outputs as finely as 
possible. The InSTePP indexes of quantities and prices of output and input, as 
used here, were formed using a Fisher discrete approximation to a Divisia index 
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Table 8.1. InSTePP input and output classes
Input and Output 
Categories Subcategory Details 
Inputs (58) 
  
Land (3) Cropland  
 Irrigated cropland  
 Pasture and Grassland  
Labor (32) Family Labor  
 Hired Labor  
 Operator Labor (30) Thirty classes characterized by the 
following: 
  Education:  0-7 years, 8 years, 1-3 
years of high school, 4 years of high 
school, 1-3 years of college, 4 years or 
more of college 
  Age:  25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 
or more years of age 
Capital (12) Machinery (6) Automobiles, combines, mowers and 
conditioners, pickers and balers, 
tractors, trucks 
 Biological Capital (5) Breeding cows, chickens, ewes, 
milking cows, sows 
 Buildings  
Materials (11)  Electricity, purchased feed, fuel, hired 
machines, pesticides, nitrogen, 
phosphorous, potash, repairs, seeds, 
and miscellaneous purchases 
   
Outputs (74)   
Crops (61) Field Crops (16) Barley, corn, cotton, flax, field beans, 
oats, peanuts, rice, rye, sugar beets, 
sugarcane, sorghum, soybeans, 
sunflowers, tobacco, wheat 
 Fruits and Nuts (22) Almonds, apples, apricots, avocados, 
blueberries, cherries, cranberries, 
grapefruit, grapes, lemons, nectarines, 
oranges, pears, peaches, pecans, 
pistachios, plums, prunes, raspberries, 
strawberries, tangerines, walnuts 
 Vegetables (22) Asparagus, bell peppers, broccoli, 
carrots, cantaloupes, cauliflower, 
celery, cucumbers, garlic, honeydews, 
lettuce, onions, peas, potatoes, snap 
beans for processing, spinach 
(processed), sweet corn (fresh and for 
processing), sweet potatoes, tomatoes 
(fresh and for processing), 
watermelons 
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for the years 1949 through 2002. An index of multifactor productivity (MFP) 
for each state and region and the nation was then constructed as the ratio of the 
index of aggregate output to the index of aggregate input. Estimates of annual 
productivity growth were constructed as logarithmic differences.
3. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS: TRENDS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
During the twentieth century, revolutionary technological advancements 
transformed inputs such as seed, fertilizers, and agricultural chemicals, and 
the “quality” of agricultural inputs—notably capital, labor, and land—in-
creased generally, especially during the latter half of the century. The apparent 
decline in the use of conventional agricultural inputs, particularly over recent 
decades and especially of labor, is offset somewhat when we account properly 
for the changing composition and quality of inputs over time. For example, 
Table 8.1. Continued
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of items in each category.
Region States in Region 
Pacific California, Oregon, Washington
Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, 
Wyoming 
Northern Plains Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
Southern Plains Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas
Central Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, 
Wisconsin 
Southeast Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia    
Northeast Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont 
Table 8.2. Regional groupings of states 
Input and Output 
Categories Subcategory Details 
 Nursery and 
Greenhouse  
Products (1) 
Aggregate of nursery and greenhouse 
products 
Livestock (9)  Broilers, cattle, eggs, hogs, honey, 
milk, sheep, turkeys, wool 
Miscellaneous (4)  Hops, mushrooms, machines rented 
out, Conservation Reserve Program 
acreage 
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farmers are much better educated and more experienced on average compared 
with 50 years ago, and a higher proportion of cropland is irrigated. Identifying 
these important structural changes in the nature of inputs helps construct an 
informative picture of U.S. agricultural production and the sources of output 
growth during the twentieth century, particularly developments during the pe-
riod after World War II.
During the period 1949 to 2002, while the quantity of U.S. agricultural 
output grew by nearly 250%, the aggregate input quantity declined marginally—
even after adjusting for quality changes, which typically consisted of improve-
ments in the quality of inputs.3 This aggregate trend was the net effect of a large 
increase in the quantity of materials inputs, a very large decrease in labor inputs, 
and little or no trend in inputs of services from land and services from capital 
stocks (Figure 8.1). 
3As Star (1974, p. 129) observed, “The great advantage of using disaggregated data is that qual-
ity changes are transformed into quantity changes” [emphasis in the original]. In the same article he 
also observed that “in order to be able to add together different units of items, the items must be 
homogenous: each unit must be a perfect substitute for any other unit, i.e., the marginal rate of 
substitution is constant and the units of measurement are chosen so that the marginal products of 
every unit are equal” (p. 125).
Figure 8.1. Quantity of capital and land services, labor, and materials inputs 
used in U.S. agriculture, 1949-2002
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
Note: Fisher index of input quantity aggregates indexed at 1949 = 100.
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Over the period 1949 to 2002, the aggregate quantity of input fell at an aver-
age rate of 0.11% per year for the United States as a whole, but rates of change in 
input use were widely dispersed around this average. In fact, as Figure 8.2 (Panel 
a) reveals, states were fairly evenly distributed around the mean of this distribu-
tion: 22 (46%) of the states had an input growth rate above this national average 
rate; and of these states, 15 (31%) experienced an overall increase in input use 
during this period. However, the dispersion among states in the rate of growth of 
aggregate input use is not at all representative of the dispersion among states in 
growth rates for specific categories of inputs. Relative to the distribution of total 
input growth rates, the distribution of growth rates for labor is positioned to the 
left (with all of the states experiencing a decline in aggregate labor use) and the 
distribution for materials is to the right (with 90% of the states increasing their use 
of materials inputs), while the capital and land distributions indicate that 63% and 
50% of the states reduced their use of land and capital services inputs, respectively.
Figure 8.3, Panel a, shows the input-use paths of selected states. Aggregate 
input use grew fastest in Florida (1.18% per year from 1949 to 2002) and de-
clined the most in Massachusetts (shrinking by 1.99% per year, such that aggre-
gate input use in 2002 was just 35% of the 1949 amount). Minnesota’s pattern 
was characteristic of the midwestern states, tracking the national trend fairly 
closely. The Northeast region experienced the slowest growth in materials inputs 
and the fastest decline in the use of land, labor, and capital of all the regions in 
the United States (Figure 8.3, Panel b). The rates of decline in labor use were 
most pronounced in the Southeast and Northeast regions. The Pacific region, 
dominated by developments in California, increased its use of materials and 
capital inputs the fastest and had the smallest rate of decline in the aggregate use 
of labor. After adjusting for quality-cum-compositional changes, notably those 
brought about by the growth in irrigated acreage, measured land use grew by 
0.25% per year in the Northern Plains and by 0.02% per year in the Mountain 
region but declined across the 48 states. Likewise, even after adjusting for the 
changing composition of capital services used in U.S. agriculture (in particular 
factoring in the changes in vintage, durability, and quality of the machines used 
on farms), aggregate capital use declined by 0.67% and 0.51% per year in the 
Northeast and Central regions respectively. 
Aggregating among all measured inputs, the quantity of total input use in 
U.S. agriculture changed little in well over half a century. In contrast, the compo-
sition of input use changed dramatically, with U.S. agriculture now much more 
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Figure 8.2. Distribution among states in the growth of input use, 1949-2002
Source:  Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
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Figure 8.3. State and regional patterns of changes in input use, 1949-2002
Source:  Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
Note:  Regional rates of change represent the average annual rates of growth of regional input 
quantity indexes, 1949-2002.
 ProductIon And ProductIvIty In the unIted stAtes  203
reliant on materials inputs purchased off farm and less reliant on labor. Total use 
of land and capital inputs was about the same in 2002 as it was in 1949. And, 
while aggregate labor use has declined substantially, the labor used in agriculture 
is now very different. A much greater proportion of the labor consists of hired 
workers with much less operator and family labor. Moreover, those farm operators 
remaining in agriculture are generally older and much more educated than they 
were decades ago. The spatial structure of aggregate input use in U.S. agriculture 
also has changed markedly, especially over the past 50 years or so. The spatial 
pattern of use of individual inputs has changed even more dramatically. 
4. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUTS: TRENDS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
U.S. agricultural production grew rapidly over the past 100 years, with con-
comitant marked changes in the composition and location of production. The total 
nominal value of U.S. agricultural production grew from $12.3 billion in 1924 
to $229.1 billion in 2005 (equivalent to compound growth of 3.6% per year). In 
real terms, the growth rate in the value of production was much slower. Over the 
period 1929-2005 the implicit price deflator for GDP grew by 3.0% per year. The 
value of U.S. agricultural production has varied over space and time, reflecting the 
impacts of changes in prices and quantities of inputs and outputs, and changes 
in technologies, and the host of factors that directly or indirectly affect these vari-
ables. In this section we present a brief summary of the long-term trends, followed 
by a more detailed look at the more recent period for which we have more detailed 
data: 1949-2006. The analysis includes a consideration of the changing mix of out-
puts among states and over time, as well as changes in the value of the output.
While the value of agricultural output grew overall, regional and state 
shares had not changed much by the middle of the twentieth century. Changes 
in domestic and export demand as well as changes in off-farm technology con-
tributed to changes in the composition of demand for U.S. agricultural output, 
which in turn contributed to the changes in the composition and location of 
production. The shifting geography of population (as well as a substantial mi-
gration off farms)—combined with improved communications, electrification, 
transportation, and logistical infrastructure, which meant that perishables and 
pre-prepared foods could be moved efficiently over much longer distances—also 
contributed to this changing spatial pattern of production in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Substantial on- and off-farm technological innovation un-
derpinned much of these changes. 
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During the second half of the 20th Century, U.S. agricultural production 
shifted generally south and west and became more spatially concentrated. In 
the mid-1920s, Texas and Iowa were the largest states in terms of agricultural 
production (with an average of 6.9% and 6.7% of the 1924-26 value of U.S. 
production, respectively). The Central region produced around one-third of 
the entire U.S. agricultural output at this time. This region includes Iowa and 
Illinois (then the third-largest producer with a state share of 5.5%) along with 
the rest of the heartland of the United States. California was the third-ranked 
state in the mid-1920s, with 5.4% of national production. The regional shifts 
were substantial. The Central region lost some ground (averaging 27.0% of the 
total value of output in the 2003-05 period compared with 32.4% in 1924-26), 
while the Northeast region’s share of national agricultural output fell more 
markedly, from 11.2% in 1924-26 to 6.2% in 2003-05. The biggest increase 
was in the Pacific region, whose share more than doubled over the almost 80 
years since 1924-26 to average 18.3% of U.S. agricultural output in 2003-05. 
Part of the shift south and west in the value of production was a quantity ef-
fect, but part was a move to a larger share of higher-valued output nationally, 
combined with a massive increase in the share of that higher-valued output 
being produced in the Pacific region. In the mid-1920s, the Pacific region pro-
duced 29% of the country’s specialty crops (including fruits, vegetables, and 
ornamental crops); by the beginning of the twenty-first century that share had 
grown to more than 50% (Table 8.3).  
Over the almost 80-year period from the mid-1920s to 2003-05, for all the 
output categories in Table 8.3, the share of national output from the Northeast 
region declined, and by 2003-05 this region produced just 6.2% of the total U.S. 
value of agricultural production. The Central region produced a much larger share 
of U.S. output of “other crops” (including field crops such as corn, soybeans, and 
wheat), up from 24.3% in the mid-1920s to almost 44% by 2003-05, such that 
“other crops” accounted for 51% of the region’s total agricultural output. Livestock 
production moved strongly out of the Central and Northeast regions to become 
increasingly concentrated in the Southern Plains and Southeast.4
Table 8.4 shows summary information for the outputs included in the data 
set. Along with the averages of annual values over the period of the data set (from 
1949 to 2006), for each of the variables the average annual percentage changes are 
4Chapter 2 of this volume documents the spatial relocation of production from a global perspective.
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Table 8.4. Summary of production by output category, average of annual 
values, 1949-2006
Output 
Value 
(billions 
2000 $) 
Share 
of Total 
Value 
(%) 
Number of States 
with 
Share (%) of 
Production from 
Value  
> 0 
Value 
> 1% 
Top 4 
States 
Top 10 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 (average annual percentage change in parentheses) 
Livestock 
(9 outputs) 
91.5 
(-0.19) 
48.0 
(-0.27) 
48 
(0.00) 
31
(0.06) 
27
(0.07) 
51
(-0.01)
Cattle 32.7 17.0 48 30 35 61
 (0.47) (0.39) (0.00) (-0.18) (0.67) (0.33)
    
Milk 25.0 13.1 48 26 40 64
 (-0.55) (-0.63) (0.00) (-0.54) (0.72) (0.42)
    
Hogs 15.4 8.0 48 17 53 80
 (-1.23) (-1.31) (0.00) (-0.59) (0.46) (0.28)
Field Crops 
(16 outputs) 
72.0 
(-0.28) 
37.2 
(-0.36) 
46 
(-0.11) 
28
(-0.35) 
33
(0.45) 
59
(0.37)
    
Corn (grain) 24.6 12.7 43 17 55 81
 (0.12) (0.04) (-0.28) (-0.39) (0.39) (0.25)
    
Soybeans 13.5 6.8 30 16 55 84
 (3.06) (2.98) (0.12) (0.93) (-0.67) (-0.25)
    
Wheat 10.4 5.4 42 19 45 73
 (-1.20) (-1.28) (0.09) (0.00) (0.30) (0.11)
Fruits and Nuts 
(22 outputs) 
9.4 
(1.41) 
5.0 
(1.33) 
43 
(-0.08) 
11
(-1.10) 
79
(0.39) 
90
(0.21)
Oranges 1.8 1.0 4 3 100 100
 (0.11) (0.03) (-0.39) (-0.71) (0.01) (0.00)
Grapes 1.7 0.9 14 5 96 100
 (2.80) (2.72) (-0.63) (-0.98) (0.07) (0.02)
Apples, all 
varieties 
1.4 
(0.92) 
0.7 
(0.84) 
35 
(-0.16) 
17
(-1.40) 
64
(0.71) 
82
(0.28)
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included (in parentheses). Column 1 shows the average annual value of produc-
tion of each aggregated output category and the three individual outputs in that 
category with the highest value of production, measured in billions of real 2000 
dollars (i.e., nominal prices adjusted for inflation by dividing the nominal values 
by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product; in short, the implicit 
GDP deflator). Column 2 shows the same value of production, expressed as a 
percentage of the national total. For instance, field crops accounted for approxi-
mately $72 billion in annual production value, averaged across the time period. 
On average from 1949 to 2006, field crops accounted for 37.2% and livestock 
outputs accounted for 48.0% of the U.S. value of production of all agricultural 
outputs included in the dataset. Fruits and nuts accounted for 5.0% of U.S. pro-
duction value, and vegetables also accounted for about 5.0%.
The next two columns in Table 8.4 indicate the degree to which the produc-
tion of each output was spread among states. Column 3 indicates the average num-
ber of states with some measured production of the output indicated. Column 4 
indicates the number of states that accounted for more than 1% of the total value of 
production, on average. For instance, on average, 46 states reported some produc-
tion of field crops, but only 28 states contributed more than 1% of the total U.S. 
value of production of field crops. The bulk of the production value was concen-
Table 8.4. Continued
Source:  Alston et al. 2010 using InSTePP data.
Output 
Value 
(billions 
2000 $) 
Share 
of Total 
Value 
(%) 
Number of States 
with 
Share (%) of 
Production from 
Value  
> 0 
Value 
> 1% 
Top 4 
States 
Top 10 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 (average annual percentage change in parentheses) 
Vegetables 
(22 outputs) 
9.5 
(1.01) 
5.0 
(0.93) 
46 
(-0.23) 
19
(-0.53) 
56
(0.63) 
77
(0.35)
Potatoes 2.8 1.4 40 17 51 77
 (-0.20) (-0.28) (-0.69) (-0.59) (0.52) (0.37)
Lettuce 1.1 0.6 13 6 93 99
 (1.44) (1.36) (-2.32) (-1.93) (0.11) (0.02)
Tomatoes, 
fresh 
1.0 
(1.54) 
0.5 
(1.46) 
23 
(-0.98) 
13
(-0.14) 
78
(0.09) 
91
(0.11)
Nursery and 
Greenhouse  
6.9 
(3.14) 
3.7 
(3.06) 
48 
(-0.04) 
24
(0.00) 
45
(0.47) 
68
(0.15)
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trated in about 30 states for both field crops and livestock. Production of fruits, 
nuts, and vegetables was much more spatially concentrated. Only 11 states individ-
ually contributed more than 1% of the value of production of fruits and nuts, and 
only 18 states individually contributed more than 1% to the value of production of 
vegetables. The last two columns of Table 8.4 provide another measure of the de-
gree of concentration of production of a particular output among states—the aver-
age share of production value from the 4 (column 5) and 10 (column 6) states with 
the greatest production of that output. For instance, the top four states accounted 
for only 33% of the total value of field crop production (on average), whereas the 
top four states accounted for 79% of total fruit and nut production. While some of 
the aggregate measures reveal interesting differences (e.g., between livestock versus 
fruits and nuts), the aggregate measures mask variation among outputs. Data pre-
sented in Table 8.4 also indicate the relative importance and concentration of indi-
vidual outputs within aggregates. For instance, while the top four states accounted 
for only 27% of total U.S. production of livestock, production of broilers and hogs 
was much more concentrated, with the top four states accounting for roughly half 
of the value of production of these two commodities. 
Figure 8.4 shows how the value shares of the output categories changed 
after 1949. The value share of field crops jumped to more than 40% in the 
1970s and 1980s when commodity prices were high. Aside from that period 
Figure 8.4. Value shares of output categories, 1949-2006
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
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of time, the share of agricultural output value coming from field crops fluctu-
ated around a generally downward trend, declining from approximately 40% 
of the total value of agricultural output in this data set in 1949 to around 30% 
in more recent years. The value of livestock as a share of agricultural produc-
tion also trended down, declining from about half the value of production in 
the 1950s to around 45% in more recent years. Mirroring the declining shares 
of output value contributed by livestock and field crops was an increase in the 
value shares for fruits and nuts, vegetables, and greenhouse and nursery prod-
ucts. The value shares for vegetables and the fruit and nut group followed very 
similar paths over the latter half of the twentieth century—they both increased 
from about 3.5% in 1949 to 6.5% in recent years. The value share of green-
house and nursery products increased much more quickly, from less than 1.5% 
in 1949 to around 8% in 2006.
5. U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
In this section, we present an analysis of national, regional, and state-specific 
measures of input use, outputs, and MFP in which we pay some graphical and 
statistical attention to the hypothesis that productivity growth has recently 
slowed. The results of this analysis suggest a general slowdown of productivity 
growth toward the end of the period. At the end of the section we briefly con-
sider other measures of productivity (partial factor productivities including crop 
yields) as supplementary evidence relative to the slowdown conjecture.
A number of statistical databases of inputs, outputs, and productivity 
in U.S. agriculture have been constructed over the past half century or so, 
no two of which used exactly the same methods. Significant refinements in 
methods have increased the accuracy of measures of inputs and outputs in 
U.S. agriculture. Some of these improvements include refinements to index-
ing procedures, the incorporation of quality changes, utilization adjustments, 
and the use of disaggregated data. Table 8.5 lists studies that reported es-
timates of U.S. agricultural productivity growth, classified in the table by 
whether index number (or growth accounting) approaches or parametric ap-
proaches were used to estimate productivity. 
Across all of the 32 studies listed in the table, estimates of the average an-
nual rate of productivity growth range from 0.21% to 3.50% per year; the simple 
average of these estimates is 1.75% per year. The wide range of the estimates of 
productivity growth reflects differences in time periods, databases, and estima-
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Table 8.5. Estimates of multifactor productivity growth in U.S. agriculture 
Study 
Method
Sample 
Period
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate  
(% per year) Authors Date 
Index number (growth accounting) approaches   
Barton and Cooper 1948 Fixed-weight 1910-1945 1.65a
 
Loomis and Barton 1961 Fixed-weight 1870-1958 0.80 
Brown 1978 Tornqvist-Theil 1947-1974 1.42 
Kendrick 1983 Tornqvist-Theil 1948-1979 3.50 
Ball 1984 
and 
1985 
Tornqvist-Theil  1948-1979 1.75 
Capalbo and Vo 1988 Tornqvist-Theil 1948-1983 1.22 
Cox and Chavas 1990 Tornqvist-Theil 1950-1983 1.89 
USDA-ERS 1991 Tornqvist-Theil 1948-1989 1.58b
 
U.S. BLS 1992 Tornqvist-
Theil/Fisher Ideal 
1948-1990 3.06b
 
Jorgenson and Gollop 1992 Tornqvist-Theil 1947-1985 1.58 
Huffman and Evenson 1993 Tornqvist-Theil 1950-1982 1.84 
Craig and Pardey 1996 Tornqvist-Theil 1949-1991 1.76c
 
Ball et al. 1997 Fisher Ideal 1948-1994 1.94c
 
Ball et al. 1999 Tornqvist-Theil 1960-1990 2.00 
Schimmelpfennig and 
Thirtle 
1999 Fisher Ideal 1973-1993 3.00 
McCunn and Huffman 2000 Tornqvist-Theil 1950-1982 2.00 
Ball, Butault, and Nehring 2001 Fisher Ideal 1960-1996 1.94c
 
Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey 2003 Fisher Ideal 1949-1991 1.90c
 
Ball et al. 2004 Malmquist 1960-1996 1.54 
USDA-ERS 2008 Fisher Ideal 1960-2004 1.70c 
USDA-ERS 2008 Fisher Ideal 1948-2004 1.77 
Alston et al. 2010 Fisher Ideal 1949-2002 1.78 
    
Parametric approaches    
Ruttan 1956 Cobb-Douglas 
production 
1919-1950 1.23 
Ray 1982 Translog cost 1939-1977 1.80 
Capalbo and Denny 1986 Translog production 1962-1978 1.41 
Capalbo 1988 Translog cost 1950-1983 1.4-1.6d
 
Jorgenson 1990 Translog production 1948-1979 1.61 
Dorfman and Foster 1991 Translog production 1948-1983 0.21 
Luh and Stefanou 1991 Generalized Leontief 
Value 
1948-1982 1.50 
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tion procedures among the listed studies. Two of the estimates of rates of pro-
ductivity growth are very small and three are very large, and these are probably 
outliers, which we can discount for one reason or another—such as the time pe-
riod to which they apply. Excluding these five outliers, the remaining 27 studies 
reported estimates ranging between 1.00% and 2.00% per year. Among these, 
the more recent estimates, especially for the more recent period, probably have 
greater reliability as a result of their use of better data and better methods; these 
estimates are typically in the range of 1.50% to 2.00% per year. 
Our own estimates, using the InSTePP data, fall within the range of the 
more recent studies. Figure 8.5 plots the average annual growth rate of ag-
ricultural output against the corresponding annual average growth rate of 
agricultural input, state by state and for the nation as a whole over the 53 
years, 1949-2002. Points on the 45-degree line that pass through the origin 
have output growing at the same rate as input and thus have zero productivity 
growth. All states had positive productivity growth, with input-output-growth 
coordinates above and to the left of the 45-degree line through the origin. 
Some states had both inputs and outputs growing, some had both falling, but 
the majority had output growing against a declining input quantity. In a few 
(mostly northeastern) states, productivity growth reflected a contraction in 
Source: Amended version of Alston et al. 2010 (Table 5-4).
aCalculated as the growth in output minus the growth in inputs from 1910 to 1945, divided by the 
number of periods.
bCalculated from multifactor productivity indexes using the regression formula, ln(Z) = β0 + β1(T), 
where Z = productivity index and T = year.
cRepresents the average of 50 states.
dData range represents a 95% confidence interval.
eEstimates represent an input-based and an output-based measure, respectively.
Table 8.5. Continued
Study 
Method
Sample 
Period
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate  
(% per year)Authors Date 
Karagiannis and Mergos 2000 Profit function 1948-1994 1.91 
       and 
 1.99e
 
Acquaye 2000 Translog cost 1949-1991 1.99
Andersen 2005 Translog production 1949-1991 1.31
Andersen, Alston, and 
Pardey 
2007 Translog production 1949-2002 1.55
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input use that outweighed declining aggregate output. The 45-degree line in 
Figure 8.5 that passes through the observation for the national aggregate cuts 
the vertical axis at 1.78% per annum, the national aggregate annual average 
productivity growth rate. A point above that line indicates a relatively fast out-
put growth rate for the given input growth rate (or a relatively fast reduction 
in inputs for a given rate of output growth), and a point below the line, the 
converse. In turn, we can think of the points above the line as reflecting faster-
than-average productivity growth.5
Figure 8.6 provides a mapped representation of the input, output, and MFP 
growth rates and serves to further clarify the geographical structure of the rates 
of change in these variables during the latter half of the twentieth century. These 
maps reveal a tendency for higher rates of input growth as one moves westward, 
with states east of the Mississippi River generally exhibiting smaller rates of 
growth in input use than those to the west. 
The pattern of MFP growth has varied widely over time. Year-to-year varia-
tions in measured productivity growth might reflect the influences of short-term, 
transient factors such as weather impacts or policy changes; they might also be the 
Figure 8.5. Input versus output growth rates, by state, 1949-2002
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
5Appendix Table 8.A1 includes more complete details for states and regions on the average an-
nual rates of growth of inputs, outputs, and MFP.
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Figure 8.6. The geography of input, output, and productivity growth, 
1949-2002 
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data. 
Note: Shading denotes designated range of average annual growth rates for the period 1949 
to 2002.
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result of measurement errors such as those associated with variable capital utiliza-
tion rates. However, secular long-term changes in patterns of productivity growth 
are of greater interest in the present context. In particular, accumulating evidence 
suggests that the rate of U.S. agricultural productivity growth may have slowed in 
recent years, perhaps as a reflection of a slowdown in the growth of total spending 
on agricultural R&D starting in the late 1970s or a reduction in the share spent on 
productivity-enhancing agricultural research and development (Alston, Beddow, 
and Pardey 2009; Alston et al. 2010). It is not a trivial matter to detect structural 
changes in the process of productivity growth, given the substantial year-to-year 
movements and spatial differences, but our richly detailed data make it possible to 
test for structural changes.
Evidence of a recent productivity slowdown can be seen in Figure 8.7, which 
shows distributions of average annual state-specific MFP growth rates over 10-
year periods since 1949.6 Each of the distributions refers to a particular period, 
and the data are the state-specific averages of the annual MFP growth rates for 
the period, a total of 48 growth rate statistics. By inspection, it can be seen that 
the general shape and position of the distribution of state-specific MFP growth 
rates seems reasonably constant across periods until the last one, 1990-2002, 
when it shifts substantially to the left, indicating a widespread slowdown in 
productivity growth. In what follows we present various measures, all of which 
point to a substantial slowdown of productivity growth in the period 1990-2002 
compared with the prior period 1949-1990. 
We calculated and compared state-specific rates of productivity growth for 
the period 1949-1990 and the remaining period, 1990-2002. Figure 8.8 plots 
state-specific MFP growth rates for these two periods. As shown in Panel b, dur-
ing the period 1949-1990, MFP grew positively in all 48 states, whereas during 
the period 1990-2002, MFP growth was negative for 15 states, mostly in the 
Northeast. MFP grew faster in the more recent period compared with the earlier 
period in only 4 states (8% of the total), with 44 states experiencing lower rates 
of productivity growth. U.S. agricultural productivity grew on average by just 
0.97% per year over 1990-2002 compared with 2.02% per year over 1949-1990. 
The simple average of the 48 state-specific MFP growth rates indicates a larger 
difference between the two periods, a paltry rate of 0.54% per year for 1990-
2002 compared with 2.02% per year for 1949-1990. 
6 The periods are decades beginning in the year ending in zero except for the first period, which 
includes one extra year, and the last, which is extended by two years to 2002.
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Figure 8.7. Distribution of average annual MFP growth rates across states, 
by decade
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
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Figure 8.8. Distribution of MFP growth, 1949-1990 and 1990-2002 
Source: Alston et al. 2010, based on InSTePP data.
Note: In Panel a, the three dots represent the minimum, mean, and maximum growth rates 
among states in the respective regions.
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Figure 8.8, Panel a, plots linearized distributions (showing the minimum, 
maximum, and mean) of state-specific MFP growth rates grouped by regions. 
These linearized distributions reveal a comprehensive and significant slowing in 
the rate of growth in MFP in 1990-2002 compared with 1949-1990. The region-
al means all moved leftward (indicating a contraction in the average rate of MFP), 
as did the mass of most of the regional distributions. The productivity slowdown 
was most pronounced in the Northern Plains, Southeast, and Northeast regions. 
Figure 8.9 gives a geographical perspective on the same story. Panel a de-
picts the state-specific average annual input, output, and MFP growth rates for 
1949-1990; Panel b depicts the same information for 1990-2002. Aggregate input 
growth was generally higher in the 1949-1990 period compared with the 1990-
2002 period (and notably so for most western states), whereas output growth gen-
erally slowed in the later period. The combination of these reinforcing input and 
output trends resulted in the pervasive slowdown in MFP growth that is especially 
evident in comparing the lowest map of Panel b with its counterpart in Panel a. 
The slowdown in MFP is also reflected in measures of partial factor produc-
tivities. In Table 8.6, the average U.S. productivity of capital, labor, land, and 
materials grew respectively by 1.78% per year, 3.42% per year, 1.74% per year, 
and -0.20% per year over the period 1949-2002; the materials outlier reflects the 
very substantial substitution of materials inputs for other inputs, especially labor. 
Over the period 1990-2002, the corresponding partial productivity growth rates 
for capital, labor, land, and materials were respectively 0.78% per year, 1.54% 
per year, 1.50% per year, and 0.35% per year. A substantial slowdown is evident 
in the growth rates of productivity of both capital and labor. Only materials pro-
ductivity grew more rapidly over 1990-2002, reflecting a slower rate of increase 
in the use of materials input in this period compared with the several decades 
immediately following the Second World War. The crop yield evidence in Table 
8.7 reinforces the slowdown in growth evident in the measures of MFP and par-
tial factor productivity. For the four major crops shown in this table, yields grew 
at a much slower rate over the period 1990-2006 than they did in the period 
1936-1990 (and, not shown, 1949-1990).7  
Returning to the most meaningful measures pertinent to the issue of a 
slowdown, we conducted more formal statistical tests for a productivity slow-
7See Alston, Beddow, and Pardey (2009 and Chapter 3, this volume) for more detail on the crop 
yield evidence for the United States and some comparable (and to some extent reinforcing) infor-
mation for other countries.
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Figure 8.9. Input, output, and productivity growth rates, 1949-1990 versus 
1990-2002
Source: Alston et al. 2010.
Note: Shading denotes designated range of average annual growth rates for the period 1949 
to 2002.
down using the state-specific MFP data for 1949-2002, and comparing growth 
rates for various subperiods. Cognizant of the possibility that different mea-
sures of MFP growth may imply different findings, we tried two measures of 
growth combined with two methods for estimating the growth rate. The first 
measure of growth was linear, calculated as the annual change in the level of 
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Measure 
and Perioda 
Commodity
Wheat Corn Cotton Tobacco Rice 
Average rate of change (% per year)  
Entire period 0.9 1.3 1.4 0.7 1.6 
Through 1935 0.2 -0.4 0.7 0.0 1.5 
1936-2006 1.6 3.0 2.0 1.4 1.6 
1936-1990 2.1 3.4 2.1 1.9 1.6 
1990-2006 -0.1 1.4 1.6 -0.2 1.4 
1980s 1.6 2.6 4.5 1.3 2.3 
1990s 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.1 1.3 
2000-06 -1.4 1.4 4.2 -0.8 1.5 
Average yield gain (pounds per year)
Entire period 11.9 49.9 4.9 9.6 58.4 
Through 1935 1.5 -4.6 1.1 0.1 29.5 
1936-2006 22.2 104.4 8.8 19.1 65.5 
1936-1990 29.7 103.6 8.1 26.1 60.1 
1990-2006 -3.0 107.1 11.3 -4.6 83.7 
1980s 36.0 154.0 23.0 27.9 111.6 
1990s 15.0 103.0 -0.2 2.6 75.2 
2000-06 -33.0 113.9 30.3 -16.7 97.8 
Table 8.7. Yield growth for various commodities, 1866-2006
Source: Beddow, Pardey, and Hurley 2009.
aRice values are for 1919-2006; other values are for 1866-2006.
Table 8.6. Annual growth rates in partial productivity measures, various 
subperiods
Source: Alston et al. 2010.
 Capital Labor Land Materials
 (average annual percentage growth) 
1949-1960 1.30 4.88 1.82 -1.99
1960-1970 2.20 4.19 1.44 -1.76
1970-1980 1.61 3.71 2.14 1.60
1980-1990 3.26 3.03 1.86 0.87
1990-2002 0.78 1.54 1.50 0.35
   
1949-1990 2.07 3.98 1.82 -0.36
1949-2002 1.78 3.42 1.74 -0.20
 ProductIon And ProductIvIty In the unIted stAtes  221
the index. The second was proportional, calculated as the annual change in the 
logarithm of the index. The first method for estimating the growth rate used 
the simple average of the annual state-specific estimates of MFP growth. The 
second used a regression of each state-specific MFP index against a time trend 
such that the estimated coefficient on the time trend (a function of the coef-
ficient, for proportional growth measures) provides an estimate of the average 
growth in the MFP index. We computed these four alternative measures for 
each state and for various time periods, defined in Table 8.8. Finally, we con-
ducted paired t-tests for statistically significant differences in the state-specific 
growth rates before and after the split points. 
The upper half of Table 8.8 refers to proportional growth in MFP, measured 
either as the average of year-to-year growth rates or a function of the slope co-
efficient from a regression of the logarithm of the index against a time-trend 
Table 8.8. Statistical tests for a slowdown in MFP growth
Source: Alston et al. 2010.
Time Period 
During 
Period 
After  
Period  Difference P-value 
 (average annual percentage change in index) 
Using differences in logarithms  
1949-1960 2.04 1.59 -0.45 0.00 
1949-1970 2.01 1.47 -0.54 0.00 
1949-1980 2.01 1.23 -0.78 0.00 
1949-1990 2.02 0.54 -1.48 0.00 
   
Using regression of logarithms 
1949-1960 2.06 1.77 -0.29 0.06 
1949-1970 1.90 1.53 -0.37 0.02 
1949-1980 1.99 1.00 -0.99 0.00 
1949-1990 2.06 0.57 -1.49 0.00 
 
(average annual change in index) 
Using differences in levels  
1949-1960 2.34 3.03 0.69 0.00 
1949-1970 2.62 3.07 0.45 0.13 
1949-1980 2.87 2.93 0.06 0.82 
1949-1990 3.28 1.56 -1.72 0.00 
   
Using regression of levels  
1949-1960 2.33 3.45 1.12 0.00 
1949-1970 2.46 3.29 0.83 0.01 
1949-1980 2.86 2.43 -0.43 0.16 
1949-1990 3.36 1.54 -1.83 0.00 
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variable. In every case, with either measure, the tests indicate a substantial and 
statistically significant (at the 10% level of significance in every case, and in most 
cases at a level of significance well under 1%) slowing of productivity growth for 
any period that includes the years 1990-2002 compared with any prior period. 
The slowdown is most pronounced for 1990-2002 compared with 1949-1990. 
An absolute increase in productivity is necessary but not sufficient to sustain 
proportional productivity growth. The lower half of Table 8.8 indicates a slow-
down in absolute productivity growth in 1990-2002 compared with 1949-1990, 
but the evidence is more mixed for the earlier breakpoints.
6. CONCLUSION
U.S. agricultural production changed remarkably over the past 100 years. 
Agricultural output and productivity grew very rapidly in the post–World War 
II era. Those changes in production and productivity were enabled by dramatic 
changes in the quality and composition of inputs, important technological 
changes resulting from agricultural research and development, and wholesale 
changes in the structure of the farming sector. However, mounting evidence 
indicates that the structural slowdown in the growth rate of U.S. agricultural 
productivity has been substantial, sustained, and systematic. Over the most re-
cent 10 to 20 years of our data, the annual average rate of productivity growth 
was half the rate that had been sustained for much of the twentieth century. 
Compounding over decades, the difference will have serious implications. Un-
less other countries with competing agricultural production experience com-
parable slowdowns in agricultural productivity growth, the United States will 
suffer a widening competitiveness gap. On the other hand, if other countries do 
experience comparable slowdowns in agricultural productivity growth, the con-
sequences will be felt in a widening gap of a different sort: between growth in 
global supply and growth in global demand for agricultural products.
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CHAPTER 9
Agricultural Productivity in China
Songqing Jin, Jikun Huang, and Scott Rozelle 
1. INTRODUCTION
Few scholars would question the positive and substantive role that agricul-
ture played in substantially expanding the supply of food and fiber and spur-
ring the broader economic development of the Chinese economy, beginning 
with the modern reforms of the agricultural sector that were first launched in 
the late 1970s (Rozelle, Huang, and Otsuka 2005). Based in part on the in-
centives embodied in the Household Responsibility System, farm output and 
productivity grew by 5% to 10% per annum between 1978 and 1985 (McMil-
lan Whalley, and Zhu 1989; Lin 1992). Huang and Rozelle (1996) and Fan and 
Pardey (1997) showed that the output-promoting effects of these improved 
incentives were enhanced by new technologies. Input use also rose as farm-
ers had greater access to fertilizer and other farm inputs (Stone 1988) and 
improved water control, especially because of the emergence of groundwater 
privatization (Nickum 1998; Wang, Huang, and Rozelle 2005).
During the mid-1990s, at a time when China’s rapid growth was trans-
forming people’s livelihoods, another debate arose concerning China’s abil-
ity to feed itself over the medium to long run. Brown (1994), among others, 
pointed out that the intensity of input use was already high in China and that 
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continued growth in agricultural output would increasingly rely on growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP). The pessimists (e.g., Wen 1993) suggested that 
TFP had stopped growing and that the output of China’s farming sector might 
soon stagnate. In response, several efforts (e.g., Fan 1997; Jin et al. 2002) used 
more rigorous methods and showed that while inputs in aggregate had indeed 
stopped growing (as labor shifted off the farm and sown area stagnated), out-
put continued to grow, resulting in positive TFP growth at a respectable rate of 
around 2% per year. Although there were many challenges facing the Chinese 
agricultural economy, investments in agricultural research and development 
(R&D) over several decades contributed to a stream of new technologies (in-
cluding new seed varieties) that was continuing to fuel TFP growth as the de-
cade of the 1990s came to an end given the long lags linking R&D spending to 
productivity growth.
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, little effort has been devoted to assessing 
the productivity performance of Chinese agriculture in recent years. The most 
recent relevant studies only covered the data up to the mid-1990s (e.g., up to 
1995 in Jin et al. 2002; and up to 1997 by Fan and Zhang 2002). The task of 
meaningfully measuring China’s agricultural productivity performance is espe-
cially challenging. There have been (and continue to be) tremendous changes 
within the sector, particularly, rapidly evolving institutional structures, that 
make it difficult to gauge agricultural productivity developments within China. 
For example, research spending has waxed and waned (Hu et al. 2007), poli-
cies to encourage the import of foreign technologies have been unevenly ap-
plied (Pray, Rozelle, and Huang 1997), and structural adjustment policies have 
also triggered wrenching changes in the sector (Rosen, Huang, and Rozelle 
2004). In addition, horticulture and livestock production has boomed, while 
the output of other crops, such as rice, wheat, and soybeans, has stagnated or 
fallen (CNBS 2005). At a time when China’s millions of producers are faced 
with complex decisions, the extension system is crumbling and farmer profes-
sional associations remain in their infancy (Huang, Hu, and Rozelle 2003). In 
short, there are just as many reasons to be pessimistic about the productivity 
trends in agriculture as to be optimistic. 
The overarching goal of this chapter is to provide a better understanding 
of input, output, and productivity trends in China’s agricultural sector during 
the reform era that began in the late 1970s, with an emphasis on the period 
1990-2004. To do so, we pursue three specific objectives. First, relying on the 
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National Cost of Production Data Set—China’s most complete set of farm input 
and output data—we chart the input and output trends for 23 of China’s main 
farm commodities. Second, using a stochastic production frontier function ap-
proach we estimate the rate of change in TFP for each commodity. Finally, we 
decompose the changes in TFP into two components: changes in efficiency and 
changes in technical change. 
To keep the assessment manageable, we limit the scope of our analysis to 
the major staple grains and oilseeds, cotton, several vegetable and fruit crops, 
and most of the major livestock commodities. In total, the commodities we 
include accounted for more than 65% of China’s gross value of agricultural 
output in 2005 (CNBS 2006). Our analysis of TFP developments omits a con-
sideration of several major commodities, including aquaculture, sugar, edible 
oils beyond soybeans, and many fruits, vegetables, and more minor livestock 
commodities. In addition, we measure productivity performance on a com-
modity-by-commodity basis. As deBrauw, Huang, and Rozelle (2004) and Lin 
(1992) suggested, if farm specialization is occurring in China, as more recent 
work by Rozelle et al. (2007) confirmed, then we would expect allocative ef-
ficiency gains. In this case our evaluation approach will underestimate the rate 
of growth in farm productivity within China since we will not pick up produc-
tivity gains that would arise from producers shifting crops. In our presentation 
of our results, we also ignore regional differences in productivity, even though 
our analysis was done at a provincial level and then aggregated to form the na-
tional totals reported here.
In the following sections we first present a brief review of our methodology. 
Then we discuss the data, followed by a brief review of recent changes in Chi-
nese agriculture and how these might be expected to affect TFP. Understanding 
these trends will be helpful in interpreting the results. TFP growth results and 
their decomposition are then presented for the 23 commodities. 
2. METHODOLOGY
Indexed, number-based studies of productivity growth in agriculture 
compute productivity as a residual after accounting for input growth. If an 
economy is (or its producers are) operating efficiently, the growth in produc-
tivity can be interpreted as the contribution of technical progress. However, 
this interpretation is valid only if firms are technically efficient and realizing 
the full potential of the technology. The fact is that for various reasons firms 
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do not operate efficiently. When this is so, measured changes in TFP will 
reflect both technological innovation and changes in efficiency. Therefore, 
technical progress may not be the only source of total productivity growth, 
and it will be possible to increase productivity through improving the meth-
od of application of the given technology—that is, by improving technical 
efficiency.
To study production efficiency, the stochastic frontier production function 
approach introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977) has been widely deployed, with more recent exten-
sions to this basic approach described by Battese and Coelli (1995). Stochastic 
production function analysis allows for the possibility that firms may exhibit 
technical inefficiency, in so much as firms may operate below an envelope or 
efficient frontier. A host of theoretical and empirical studies of production ef-
ficiency/inefficiency have used stochastic frontier production approaches (see, 
e.g., Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1998, and Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000 for a re-
view of the various approaches that have been used).
As panel data sets (i.e., a combination of time-series and cross-section 
data) permit a richer specification of technical change, and obviously contain 
more information about a particular firm than a single cross-section of firm 
data, recent developments in measuring changes in productive efficiency over 
time have focused on the use of panel data (Kumbhakar, Heshmati, and Hjal-
marsson 1999, and Henderson 2003). Panel data also enable some of the strong 
assumptions related to efficiency measurement in a cross-sectional framework 
to be relaxed (Schmidt and Sickles 1984), and so we adopt a panel data ap-
proach to measuring and decomposing TFP growth for the 23 commodities 
included in our study. 
Formerly (and following Kumbhakar 2000), a stochastic frontier production 
function for panel data can be expressed as
 ( , )exp( )it it it ity f x t v u= −  (1)
where yit is the output of the ith firm (i=1,2,…,N) in period t (t=1,2,…,T);  f(·) is 
the production technology; x is a vector of J inputs; t is the time trend variable; 
vit is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed random variable 
20( , ),vN σ  independently distributed of the uit ; and uit is a non-negative random 
variable and output-oriented technical inefficiency term. There are several speci-
fications that make the technical inefficiency term uit time-varying, but most of 
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them have not explicitly formulated a model for these technical inefficiency ef-
fects in terms of appropriate explanatory variables.1  Battese and Coelli (1995) 
proposed a specification for the technical inefficiency effect in the stochastic 
frontier production function as
 it it itu z wδ= +  (2)
where the random variable wit is defined by the truncation of the normal dis-
tribution with zero mean and variance σ2, such that the point of truncation is 
,itz δ−  that is, .it itw z δ≥ −  As a result, uit is obtained by truncation at zero of 
the normal distribution with mean itz δ and variance σ2. The conventional as-
sumption that the uits and vits are independently distributed for all i=1,2,…,N 
and t=1,2,…,T is obviously a simplifying but restrictive condition. 
Technical inefficiency, uit , measures the proportion by which actual output, 
yit , falls short of maximum possible output or frontier output, f(x,t). Therefore 
technical efficiency (TE) can be defined as
 1/ ( , ) exp( )it it it itTE y f x t u= = − ≤ . (3)
Time is included as a regressor in the frontier production function and used 
to capture trends in productivity change—popularly known as exogenous tech-
nical change—and is measured by the log derivative of the stochastic frontier 
production function with respect to time (Kumbhakar 2000). That is, technical 
change (TC) is defined as 
 
ln ( , )it
it
f x t
TC
t
∂
=
∂
. (4)
Productivity change can be measured by the change in TFP and is defined as
 jitit it J jitTFP y S x
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= − ∑  (5)
where Sjit is the cost-share of the jth input for the ith firm at time t. Kumbha-
kar has shown that the overall productivity change can be decomposed by 
differentiating equation (1) totally and using the definition of TFP change in 
equation (5). This results in a decomposition of the TFP change into four com-
ponents: a scale effect, pure technical change, technical efficiency change, and 
an input price allocative effect.
1See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, Chap. 7), and Cuesta (2000) for a review of recent approaches 
to the incorporation of exogenous influences on technical inefficiency.
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 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR CREATING TFP MEASURES
Historically, estimates of China’s cropping TFP have been controversial, ar-
riving at significantly different conclusions.2 Poor data and ad hoc input weights 
that are constant over time may account for the debates and uncertainty over 
pre- and post-reform productivity studies (Fan and Zhang 2002). Researchers 
gleaned data from a variety of sources; they warn readers of the poor or ques-
tionable quality of many of the input and output series (Stone and Rozelle 1995).
In this chapter, we overcome some of the shortcomings of the earlier studies by 
utilizing a set of data that has been collected in a more-or-less consistent fashion 
for the past 25 years by the State Price Bureau. Using a sampling framework that 
includes more than 20,000 households, enumerators collected data on the farm-
level costs of production of all of China’s major crops. The data set includes infor-
mation on the quantities used and total expenditures of all major inputs, as well as 
expenditures on a large number of miscellaneous items for farms in all provinces 
spanning the period 1985 to 2004. Farmers also report output produced  and the 
total revenues earned from each crop. Provincial surveys by the same statistical 
unit also report unit costs for labor that reflect the opportunity cost of the daily 
wage forgone by crop farmers. During the last several years, these data have been 
published by the State Development and Planning Commission (“The Compiled 
Materials of Costs and Profits of Agricultural Products of China,” SPB, 1988-2004). 
The same data have been used in analyses of China’s agricultural supply and input 
demand (see studies by Huang and Rozelle 1996; Huang, Rosegrant, and Rozelle 
1995; World Bank 1997; and Jin et al. 2002).
To facilitate comparisons with previous studies that mostly examined grain 
crops, we examine TFP developments for rice, wheat, and corn in addition to a 
wide array of other important crops in China. Because production characteris-
tics of the major types of rice vary markedly, we provide separate TFP analyses 
for early and late indica varieties (or long grain rice) and for japonica varieties 
(short/medium grain rice). We also examine productivity trends for China’s larg-
est non-grain staple crops, namely, soybeans and cotton. 
The rise of China as a major producer (and exporter) of horticultural crops, 
plus its evident comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive farm com-
modities led us to also include four vegetables (capsicum, eggplant, cucumbers, 
2For example, in Stone and Rozelle (1995), studies by Tang and by Lin and Weins are reviewed. 
The different studies have arrived at strikingly different conclusions. Tang argued that productiv-
ity was stagnant; Lin and Weins demonstrated that productivity growth was positive. 
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and tomatoes) and two fruit crops (mandarins and oranges). Because cucumbers 
and tomatoes are grown in large quantities, both as a field and a greenhouse 
crop, we also examine TFP trends separately for these two crops. 
The increasing importance of livestock products in China and the prospect 
for ever-increasing demand for these products motivated the inclusion of hogs, 
egg, beef cattle, and dairy in this study. Because of the substantial differences in 
the technologies used by China’s backyard producers versus specialized house-
holds versus commercial sectors, we segregate our sample of farm households 
to enable TFP trends to be measured for these different modes of production. 
In particular, we formed separate TFP measures for hog production stratified by 
backyard producers, specialized households (those raising relatively large num-
bers of hogs), and commercial hog producers (called state- and collective-owned 
farms). We also stratified egg production into specialized household and com-
mercial producers. Absent information on the different modes of beef cattle pro-
duction, the TFP analysis for this commodity deals with beef cattle in aggregate. 
Finally, we examined TFP trends for two types of dairy producers: specialized 
household milk producers and commercial farms. 
Data for the livestock sector were particularly problematic, requiring that we 
make a number of assumptions (e.g., about the relatively higher quality of the 
consumption statistics compared to production statistics) and resort to the use of 
external pieces of information (e.g., from China’s 1996 Census of Agriculture) to 
construct a data set that facilitated an analysis at the province level. These gener-
al adjustments are described in detail in Appendix A. Some specific adjustments 
were also needed for the dairy sector, and these are described in Appendix B and 
in Ma et al. (2006). 
Notwithstanding the considerable merits of this data set, it nonetheless has 
several important limitations. First, given China’s “grain-first” emphasis in the 
1980s, the coverage of non-grain crops is extremely spotty during this period. 
This limitation meant that TFP estimates for the 1980s could only be formed 
for rice, wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton. For these five commodities and the 
remaining 18 commodities, we also report TFP estimates for the period 1990-
2004 (or in some cases to 2003). Given that some of the required data for sev-
eral commodities were unavailable for some provinces, we had no option in a 
number of instances but to use unbalanced panel estimation methods. The data 
coverage (i.e., the number of provinces and the number of years) for each com-
modity is detailed in Appendix C. Despite these limitations the commodities 
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included in our analysis accounted for more than 62% of total gross agricultural 
value (excluding forestry and fishery) during the 2000-2005 period. 
4. ECONOMIC FACTORS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND PRODUCTIVITY
There are three major influences likely to affect the rate of change and the 
sources of those changes for our commodity-specific estimates of productivity 
growth: (a) investments in the domestic agricultural R&D system and the inter-
national trade and transfer of new ideas and new technologies, (b) the perfor-
mance of the agricultural extension system, and (c) other economic factors that 
affect the incentives of farmers to choose different crop mixes and modes of pro-
duction (e.g., backyard versus commercial operations) and different technologies 
(e.g., greenhouse versus field operations). 
4.1. Technology Development
After the 1960s, China’s research institutions grew rapidly, from almost 
nothing in the 1950s to a system that now produces a steady stream of new 
varieties and other technologies. China’s farmers were using domestically pro-
duced semi-dwarf rice varieties several years before the release and uptake of 
such green revolution varieties elsewhere in the world (Huang and Rozelle 1996). 
Yields of Chinese-bred conventional rice, wheat, and sweet potato varieties were 
comparable to yields being achieved in some of the most productive agricultural 
economics in the world (Stone 1988). 
Agricultural research and plant breeding in China are almost completely 
funded and conducted by the government (Huang, Hu, and Rozelle 2003). Reflect-
ing an urban bias in most food policies, most crop breeding programs continued 
to emphasize small grains (specifically rice and wheat) until the 1990s. For na-
tional food security considerations, high yields were a dominant target for Chinese 
research and remain so, although in more recent years quality improvement has 
also become a target in the nation’s development plans. As demand for agricultural 
output continues to diversify and average per capita incomes continue to grow, in-
creasing attention has also been given to horticultural and livestock breeding.
A nationwide reform in research was launched in the mid-1980s (Pray, 
Rozelle, and Huang 1997; Fan and Pardey 1992). The reforms sought to spur 
research productivity by shifting funds from institutional support to competi-
tive grants, supporting research deemed useful for economic development, and 
by encouraging applied research institutes to support themselves by selling the 
 AgrIculturAl ProductIvIty In chInA 237
technology they produce. In addition, beginning in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a more open approach to the importation of new horticultural seeds, ge-
netics for improving the nation’s livestock inventories (Rae et al. 2006), and new 
dairy technologies (Ma et al. 2006) were instigated.
After waning for more than a decade—between the early 1980s and mid-
1990s—investment in agricultural R&D finally began to rise (Pray, Rozelle, and 
Huang 1997). Funding was substantially increased for plant biotechnology, al-
though only Bt cotton has been commercialized to any significant extent (Huang 
et al. 2002). Government investment in agricultural R&D increased by 5.5% an-
nually between 1995 and 2000, and by more than 15% annually after 2000 (Hu 
et al. 2007).
4.2. Extension System
While the pace of spending on agricultural R&D has picked up considerably 
in the past decade or so and the efforts to restructure and reform the institutions 
engaged in R&D have met with some success, the country’s extension system has 
seen few if any major successes of late. The extension system in China was once 
seen as an effective agency in moving technology from the experiment station to 
the farm and for giving cogent advice for dealing with pests and diseases and other 
production-limiting problems. A publicly funded system, extension had agents at 
the county and township levels, supported by ties to provincial research agencies 
that maintained experiment stations in almost every prefecture. Most villages (or 
in the pre-reform socialist era, most communes) appointed one or more representa-
tives to be liaisons between the farmers in that village and the extension system. 
After the mid-1980s, however, fiscal pressures at all levels of government 
induced local officials to commercialize the extension system. In most locali-
ties this meant partially privatizing the position of extension agents (Park and 
Rozelle 1998). In exchange for working part of the time doing traditional exten-
sion activities, extension agents were allowed to go into business, most often sell-
ing seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. The profits from their business activities were 
supposed to cross-subsidize their extension activities. Many extension agents 
found their salaries reduced by half or more as a consequence of these changes, 
and in many areas, payments from the public purse eventually ceased (but often 
with no commensurate change in their public extension responsibilities).
As might be expected, these arrangements meant that extension agents 
eventually spent most or all of their time on their income-earning activities, and 
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so the extension system almost completely collapsed. Surveys found that most 
cropping farmers rarely, if ever, saw extension agents. Other studies have docu-
mented extension agents “overselling” pesticides and providing farmers with 
inaccurate information when the emergence of new technologies (e.g., Bt cotton 
seeds) conflicted with their business practices, specifically the sale of pesticides 
(Huang, Hu, and Rozelle 2003). In fact, Jin et al. (2002) found that the greater 
the extension effort, the lower the productivity. A recent survey showed that 
dairy, livestock, and horticulture farmers received little if any support from the 
formal extension system (which is still staffed largely with agronomists trained 
during the grain-first years of China’s agricultural policy). 
4.3. Other Factors
There are other economic factors affecting the nation’s agricultural produc-
tivity. Not least of these is the fact that China’s agricultural economy has been 
steadily transforming itself from a grain-first sector to one producing higher-
valued cash crops, horticultural goods, and livestock and aquaculture products. 
In the early reform period, output growth—driven by increases in yields—was 
experienced in all subsectors of agriculture, including grains. For example, be-
tween 1978 and 1984, grain production generally increased by 4.7% per year 
and production rose for each of the major grains, specifically rice, wheat, and 
corn. However, after the mid-1990s, with the exception of corn, which is now al-
most exclusively used for feed, the area sown to rice and wheat has fallen, as has 
the production of these two staple crops.. Although this may concern old-time 
grain fundamentalists inside China, in fact, the contraction in grain supply was 
preceded by a reduction in demand as increasing per capita incomes, rural to 
urban migration, and a reduction in government marketing controls have shifted 
the pattern of consumption away from staple food grains.
Like the grain sector, cash crop production in general and production of 
specific crops such as cotton, edible oils, vegetables, and fruits also grew rapidly 
in the early reform period compared with the 1970s. Unlike the grain sector 
(with the exception of land-intensive staples such as cotton), the growth of the 
non-grain sector continued throughout the reform era. For example, between 
1990 and 2004, the increase in vegetable production capacity has been so rapid 
that China has been adding the equivalent of the production capacity of Califor-
nia every two years. Moreover, the share of cultivated area in China dedicated 
to fruit orchards (over 5% in 2000) is more than double the share of the next-
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closest major agricultural producer (e.g., the share of fruit orchards in sown 
area is lower in the United States, the European Union, Japan, and India). 
The growth in livestock and fisheries output outpaced the growth in output 
from the cropping sector in total and in most subcategories. Livestock produc-
tion increased by 9.1% per year in the early reform period and has continued to 
grow at between 4.5% and 8.8% per year since 1985. Fisheries production has 
been the fastest-growing component of agriculture, increasing by more than 10% 
per year during the 1985-2000 period. Today, more than 70% of the world’s 
freshwater aquaculture is produced in China. These differential growth rates are 
bringing about substantial structural shifts in the Chinese agricultural economy. 
After remaining fairly static during the socialist era, the cropping share of Chi-
nese agriculture gross domestic product fell from 76% in 1980 to 51% in 2005. 
Over this same time period, the combined livestock and fisheries share increased 
to 45%, more than double the corresponding 1980 share (20%). Dairy demand is 
also rising extremely rapidly (Fuller et al. 2006), and so it is clear by the trends 
that within a few years crop-related outputs will account for less than 50% of the 
total value of agricultural output in China. 
Simultaneously with these changes, China has also experienced an explo-
sion of market-oriented activities (Rozelle et al. 2000). While the pace of policy 
change was gradual throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the state in 
China’s agricultural markets has diminished. In its place there has been a rise of 
private traders and wholesale markets staffed by private traders (Huang, Rozelle, 
and Chang 2004). Wang et al. (2006) have documented the emergence of com-
petitive markets in the horticultural sector, and the dairy and livestock sectors 
have followed this trend as well. 
5. INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY BEFORE 1995
The slowdown in the rate of growth of output experienced in the 1985-1994 
period compared with the pace of growth in previous years as the Household 
Responsibility System came into force (McMillan, Whalley and Zhu 1989; Lin 
1992) raised concerns among policymakers that the underlying rate of TFP 
growth had also slowed after 1984.3 Notwithstanding these broad input, output, 
and productivity trends, our evidence suggests the general patterns of growth 
3The relatively rapid growth in aggregate output during the late 1970s and early 1980s was cou-
pled with a much slower growth in total input use, not least because much labor left the sector, 
resulting in a rapid growth in TFP (see, e.g., Fan and Zhang 2002).
240  JIn, huAng, And roZelle
do not necessarily reflect commodity-specific developments. For example, be-
tween 1985 and 1994, output growth for early and late indica rice and soybeans 
fell to less than 1% per year (Table 9.1, Column 1), while the total production of 
early indica rice actually declined. At the same time, the rate of growth of input 
use for these three crops was in the range of 1% to 2% per year; thus, the corre-
sponding crop-specific TFP growth rates were low to negative. 
In contrast, for other staple grain crops, including japonica rice, wheat, and 
corn, the slowdown in the rate of growth of output during the 1985-1994 pe-
riod was less pronounced (such that output for these three crops still increased 
at rates in excess of 2% per year) and exceeded the rate of increase in input use. 
However, to the extent there is suitable evidence available, it appears that many 
of the commodities for which we have comparable data experienced a slowdown 
in their respective rates of TFP growth from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Cotton 
production fell by 0.06% per year while input use soared (by more than 3% per 
year)—reflecting responses to widespread pest outbreaks—such that TFP fell 
(Table 9.2, row 1). Input use rose more rapidly than output for hog production as 
well during this decade (Table 9.3, rows 1-3). 
The input, output, and TFP growth assessment just presented demonstrates 
that the policy concerns regarding the relatively poor performance by Chinese 
agriculture during the decade of 1985-1994 were justified. Tables 9.4, 9.5, and 
9.6 provide estimates of the rate and source of TFP change using the stochastic 
production function method previously described (and assuming linear input and 
Crop 
1985-1994 1995-2004 
Output Input Output Input 
 (percent per year) 
Early indica -0.37 2.00 0.58 -1.78 
Late indica 0.42 2.30 0.67 -2.00 
Japonica 2.30 1.21 1.88 -3.52 
Wheat 2.04 1.89 1.01 0.21 
Corn 2.06 0.30 0.86 -0.92 
Soybeans 0.57 1.18 1.07 -0.89 
Table 9.1. Annual growth rate of output and total cost of production, main 
grain crop, 1985 to 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on National Agricultural Production Cost Survey data. See 
data section for an overview and Appendix D for complete annual series of cost of production at 
the national level.
Note: Growth rates generated by regression method. 
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Crop 
1985-1994 1995-2004 
Output Total Cost Output Total Cost 
 (percent per year) 
Cotton -0.06 3.42 2.81 -3.93 
Horticultural crops     
Capsicum n.a. n.a. 2.87 2.22 
Eggplant n.a. n.a. 1.47 2.90 
Field cucumber n.a. n.a. -0.40 -1.79 
Field tomato n.a. n.a. 1.36 1.94 
Greenhouse cucumber n.a. n.a. 1.11 0.60 
Greenhouse tomato n.a. n.a. 2.95 1.50 
Mandarin orange n.a. n.a. 1.30 0.13 
Orange n.a. n.a. -1.77 0.30 
Commodities 
1985-1994 Early or Mid-1990s-2004 
Output 
Total 
Cost Output Total Cost 
 (percent per year) 
Backyard hog production 1.24 2.47 5.29 -5.12 
Specialized hog production 3.80 5.53 5.54 -5.37 
Commercial hog production 0.29 0.86 13.05 -4.60 
Specialized egg production n.a. n.a. 1.95 -1.87 
Commercial egg production n.a. n.a. 2.43 -0.57 
Beef production 10.2 -1.29 9.30 -0.92 
Specialized milk n.a. n.a. 2.02 3.21 
Commercial milk n.a. n.a. 5.19 0.71 
Table 9.3. Annual growth rate of output and total cost of production of 
livestock and dairy output, 1985 to 2004
Table 9.2. Annual growth rate of output and total cost of production cash 
crops (cotton and horticultural crops), 1985 to 2004
Source and note:  See Table 9.1.
Source and note:  See Table 9.1.
output trends). This analysis estimates that TFP growth rates for early and late 
indica rice and soybeans during the 1985-1994 period were 1.84%, 1.85% and 
0.11% per year, respectively (Table 9.4, Column 1). TFP growth estimates for wheat 
and corn were also positive (although small). In contrast (and somewhat at odds 
with the aforementioned relative input and output growth rates) we estimated TFP 
growth for japonica rice to have fallen by 0.12% per year from 1985 to 1994. 
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 1985-1994 1995-2004 
 TFP TE TC TFP TE TC 
Early indica 1.84 -0.03 1.88 2.82 0 2.82 
Late indica 1.85 0.26 1.59 2.92 0.21 2.71 
Japonica -0.12 -0.37 0.26 2.52 0.15 2.37 
Wheat 0.25 1.08 -0.83 2.16 1.06 1.10 
Corn 1.03 0.61 0.42 1.70 -0.23 1.94 
Soybeans 0.11 0.19 -0.09 2.27 -0.08 2.35 
Table 9.4. Annual growth rate of main grain crops production and total 
factor productivity (TFP), and decomposition into technical efficiency (TE) 
and technical change (TC) in China, 1985 to 2004
Source and note:  See Table 9.1.
Table 9.5. Annual growth of cash crops (cotton and horticultural crops) 
production and total factor productivity (TFP), and decomposition of TFP 
into technical efficiency (TE) and technical change (TC), 1985 to 2004
 
Growth Rate  
(1980s-1990s) 
Growth Rate  
(1990/91-2003) 
 TFP TE TC TFP TE TC 
Cotton -0.34 -2.54 2.21 4.16 -3.47 7.63 
Horticultural crops       
Capsicum n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.86 -0.42 2.28 
Eggplant n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.24 -3.14 5.37 
Field cucumber n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.15 -1.27 6.42 
Field tomato n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.23 -0.50 3.73 
Greenhouse cucumber n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.86 0.62 5.24 
Greenhouse tomato n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.02 -2.43 6.45 
Mandarin orange n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.33 -2.19 4.52 
Orange n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.31 -3.20 7.50 
Source and note:  See Table 9.1.
The estimated sources of TFP growth vary among the crops. Positive tech-
nology change (albeit less than 2% annually in all cases) was a major influence 
on TFP growth for early and late indica rice and accounted for about half the 
measured growth in corn TFP. In contrast, some or all of the modest rises in 
TFP for wheat, corn, and soybeans are accounted for by increased technical ef-
ficiencies. While we cannot pinpoint the underlying sources of efficiency gains, 
these rates of increase are consistent with the measurements of deBrauw, Huang, 
and Rozelle (2004), which showed that the gradual liberalization of China’s grain 
markets after 1985 generated efficiency gains for producers. 
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Table 9.6. Annual growth of livestock and dairy production and total factor 
productivity (TFP), and decomposition into technical efficiency (TE) and 
technical change (TC), 1985 to 2004
 
Growth Rate  
(1980s-1990s) 
Growth Rate  
(1990/91-2003) 
Products TFP TE TC TFP TE TC 
Backyard hog production 4.80 1.26 3.54 3.72 1.01 2.72 
Specialized hog production 5.58 -0.14 5.72 5.35 -0.72 6.07 
Commercial hog production 5.67 0.09 5.58 4.40 -0.38 4.78 
Specialized egg production n.a n.a n.a 3.78 0.32 3.46 
Commercial egg production n.a n.a n.a 4.83 1.44 3.39 
Beef production n.a n.a n.a 4.41  0.01  4.40  
Specialized milk n.a n.a n.a 0.48 -6.09 6.58 
Commercial milk n.a n.a n.a 1.31 -3.26 4.57 
Source and note:  See Table 9.1.
The record is mixed for non-grain crops. The fall in cotton TFP (Table 
9.5, Columns 1 to 3) shows that China’s cotton production sector lost its 
international competitive edge during the 1985-1994 decade (as described 
in Huang et al. 2002). Although the research system helped stem the fall by 
producing some new conventional cotton varieties, the efficiency of produc-
tion fell (likely because of the uncontrolled rise in the myriads of pesticides 
that appeared on the market to control for the emergence of the cotton boll-
worm population that was becoming increasingly resistant to conventional 
pesticides). Some of the new pesticides appear to have been ineffective (such 
that for a given level of input, output fell short of the production frontier—
which by definition is measured as inefficiency). According to our estimates, 
changes in TFP for hog production were driven largely by improvements in 
technology, and, contrary to the direct input-output estimate previously dis-
cussed, the frontier production function approach has TFP growing during 
this period. 
6. INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY AFTER 1995
The relatively slow rates of growth of output experienced in 1985-1994, 
compared with the pace of growth in previous years, raised concerns that the 
underlying rate of TFP growth had systematically slowed after 1984. Thus far, 
information has been lacking on the pace of productivity growth for the major 
grain crops for the decade after 1995. In addition, there has never been a sys-
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tematic analysis of the productivity performance of rapidly emerging agricultural 
sectors, such as horticulture, poultry, and dairy. 
6.1. Outputs and Inputs after 1995
Agricultural output growth for most commodities rebounded during the 
period 1995-2004. For 20 of the 23 commodities for which we have more-
complete data, output grew at a faster rate than inputs (Tables 9.1-9.3), so the 
TFP growth was positive for all these commodities (Tables 9.4-9.6). This was so 
for all the grain crops as well as for soybeans. Other sectors within agriculture 
showed similar trends. Cotton production expanded by 2.81% per year, whereas 
measured inputs declined by 3.93% per year, so that TFP grew by an impres-
sive 4.16% per year. Most likely, the widespread uptake of Bt cotton—which al-
lowed farmers to dramatically reduce pesticide use and labor for spraying while 
increasing yields—is a large part of the story. Setting aside the specialized milk 
sector that is mostly made up of large commercial dairies, the livestock sector 
also saw output growing faster than inputs during 1995-2004. 
The horticultural sector has a more mixed record. The pace of output growth 
exceeded the pace of growth in input use for five of the horticultural crops, 
namely, capsicum, field cucumbers, greenhouse cucumbers, greenhouse toma-
toes, and mandarins, whereas the opposite held for eggplants, field tomatoes, 
and oranges. The fact that greenhouse tomatoes and other greenhouse vegetables 
experienced positive rates of TFP growth compared with negative TFP growth 
for field tomatoes and some other crops might reflect the greater efficiencies of 
those commercial farmers who adopted greenhouse technologies.
6.2. TFP and Its Sources, 1995-2004
TFP growth during 1995-2004 was positive for all 23 commodities and in 
all cases was greater than the measured TFP for the pre-1995 period (Tables 
9.4, 9.5, and 9.6). With just a few exceptions, TFP growth for these commodi-
ties exceeded 2% per year after 1994. In fact, using the respective value shares 
of output as weights when aggregating these 23 commodities, the implied rate of 
growth of TFP for Chinese agriculture exceeded 3% per year between 1995 and 
2004. Coupling these estimates with the corresponding TFP estimates for 1978-
1994 implies that TFP growth in China over the period 1978-2004 sustained an 
average rate of increase in excess of 3% per year, a remarkable achievement over 
a quarter of a century (see also Jin et al. 2002). 
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Our estimates suggest that technical change was the dominant source of 
TFP growth during both 1978-1994 and 1995-2004. Technical change ac-
counted for nearly all the TFP gains for soybeans and all the grain crops except 
wheat, and for wheat it accounted for about half the TFP growth (Table 9.4). 
These findings are consistent with the evidence presented by Jin et al. (2002), 
wherein the rate of uptake of locally bred varieties was substantial during the 
entire period 1978-2004. 
The increasing share of TFP growth after 1995 in cotton and horticultural 
crops attributable to technical change is also indicative of the effects of domes-
tic and foreign breeding efforts (Table 9.5). Notably Bt cotton varieties ema-
nating from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and foreign firms 
had measurable productivity-promoting effects in the Chinese cotton sector 
throughout this period (Huang et al. 2002). Similarly, the increased produc-
tivity-promoting effects of technical change in the Chinese horticultural sector 
appear to stem from the spread of new varieties, many of which were imported 
from foreign firms. 
Foreign technologies also appear to have played a role in the rapidly increas-
ing share of TFP growth in the livestock sector attributable to technical change in 
more recent times (Table 9.6). During the 1990s, China encouraged the importa-
tion of large amounts of new genetic material for the hog, beef, poultry, and dairy 
industries. The quality of the genetic stock in China’s livestock industry has greatly 
increased through the introduction of new hog varieties from the United States and 
Japan; new beef and dairy cattle genetics from Canada, New Zealand, and Austra-
lia; and poultry technology from around the world, including the United States. 
Apparently these new innovations have found their way into individual farms in 
Chinese villages as well as in fledgling commercial operations.
Our evidence that an increasing share of TFP growth is attributable to 
changes in technology, be they new crop varieties, improved livestock breeds, or 
other innovations, nonetheless also exposes some serious weaknesses in Chinese 
agriculture. For more than one-half the commodities in our study (specifically 14 
of 23), TFP growth would have been higher during 1995-2004 if producers had 
not become less efficient. Producers of corn, soybeans, cotton, seven of the eight 
horticultural crops, and half of the livestock commodities were less efficient in 
2004 than they were in 1995. While the analysis cannot identify the specific 
sources of the fall in efficiency, we believe that the disintegration of the exten-
sion system may have contributed to the measured efficiency losses. 
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7. CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that agricultural TFP in China grew at a relatively 
rapid rate since 1994 for a large number of commodities. TFP for the staple 
commodities generally increased by about 2% per year; TFP growth rates for 
most horticulture and livestock commodities were even higher at between 3% 
and 5% per year. The rate of increase in agricultural TFP in China over the 
quarter century 1978-2004 was high by historical standards and compared 
with corresponding rates of TFP growth reported for many other countries 
around the world. We ascribe much of this TFP growth to changes in the tech-
nologies flowing to and being used by these sectors. Both domestic and foreign 
technologies have played a role. Sustained and increasing support to Chinese 
agricultural research has been vital to this success, as has an openness to trade 
in technologies produced by public research agencies in foreign countries and 
foreign firms. 
APPENDIX A: DATA DETAILS FOR THE LIVESTOCK TFP ANALYSIS
An ongoing problem for the study of livestock productivity in China is ob-
taining accurate data. The majority of studies of Chinese agricultural productiv-
ity have used data published in the China Statistical Yearbook. While this source 
disaggregates gross value of agricultural output into crops, animal husbandry, 
forestry, fishing, and sideline activities, input use is not disaggregated by sector. 
For this study we drew on additional farm-level data to facilitate the construction 
of a time-series of input use for livestock production, stratified by farm type. A 
further problem with livestock data from the statistical yearbooks is the apparent 
over-reporting of both livestock product output and livestock numbers (Fuller, 
Hayes, and Smith 2000). We also address this issue in this study.
We specify four inputs to livestock production, specifically, breeding ani-
mal inventories, labor, feed, and non-livestock capital. We describe in what fol-
lows our data construction methods as well as our approach to addressing the 
over-reporting of the count of animals on farm and livestock output.
Livestock Output
Concerns over the accuracy of official published livestock data include 
an increasing discrepancy over time between supply and consumption fig-
ures and a lack of consistency between livestock output data and that on feed 
availability. Ma, Huang, and Rozelle (2004—henceforth MHR) provided an 
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adjusted series for livestock production (and consumption) that are internally 
consistent by recognizing that the published data do contain useful, albeit 
somewhat inconsistent, information. To adjust the published series, new in-
formation from several sources was introduced. Specifically, MHR used the 
1997 National Census of Agriculture as a baseline to provide a more accurate 
benchmark estimate of the size of China’s livestock economy for at least one 
time period. The census is taken to provide the most accurate estimate of the 
size of the livestock economy since it covers all rural households and non-
household agricultural enterprises. The census also collected information on 
the number of slaughterings (by type) during the 1996 calendar year. A sec-
ond source of additional information is the official rural Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (HIES) that is maintained by the China National 
Bureau of Statistics (CNBS). Information collected in that survey includes 
the number of livestock slaughtered and the quantity of meat produced for 
swine, poultry, beef cattle, sheep and goats, and eggs. MHR assumed that the 
production data as published in the China Statistical Yearbook were accurate 
for the period 1980-1986. Beyond this date, the data are adjusted to both 
reflect the annual variation as found in the HIES data and to agree with the 
census data for 1996. Further details of these adjustment procedures can be 
found in MHR. The adjusted series includes provincial data on livestock pro-
duction, inventories, and slaughterings. 
Animals as Capital Input
Following traditional practices, we recognize the inventory of breeding 
animals as a major capital input to livestock production. Thus, opening inven-
tories of sows, milking cows, laying hens, and female yellow cattle are used as 
capital inputs in the production functions for pork, milk, eggs, and beef, re-
spectively. Provincial inventory data for sows, milking cows, and female yellow 
cattle are taken from official sources and adjusted for possible over-reporting as 
described earlier.
Additional problems exist with poultry inventories. China’s yearbooks and 
other statistical publications contain poultry inventories aggregated over both 
layers and broilers. No official statistical sources publish separate data for layer 
hens. MHR (2004), however, provide adjusted data on egg production, and the 
State Development Planning Commission’s Agricultural Commodity Cost and 
Return Survey provides estimates of egg yields per hundred birds. Thus, layer 
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inventories, at both the national and provincial levels, are calculated by dividing 
output by yield.4 A simple test shows that the sum across provinces of our pro-
vincial layer inventories is close to our estimate of the national layer inventory in 
each year.5 
Feed, Labor, and Non-livestock Capital Inputs
Provincial data for these production inputs are obtained directly from the 
Agricultural Commodity Cost and Return Survey.6 Thought to be the most 
comprehensive source of information for agricultural production in China, 
these data have been used in many other studies (e.g., Huang and Rozelle 
1996; Jin et al. 2002). Within each province, a three-stage random sampling 
procedure is used to select sample counties, villages, and, finally, individual 
production units. Samples are stratified by income levels at each stage. The 
cost and return data collected from individual farms (including traditional 
backyard households, specialized households, state- and collective-owned 
farms, and other larger commercial operations) are aggregated to the provincial 
and national level data sets that are published by the State Development Plan-
ning Commission.
The survey provides detailed cost items for all major animal commodi-
ties, including those covered in this chapter. These data include labor inputs 
(days), feed consumption (grain equivalent), and fixed asset depreciation on a 
“per animal unit” basis. We deflated the depreciation data using a fixed asset 
price index. We calculated total feed, labor, and non-livestock capital inputs by 
multiplying the input per animal by animal numbers. For the latter, we used 
our slaughter numbers for hogs and beef cattle, and the opening inventories 
for milking cows and layers since these are the “animal units” used in the cost 
survey. It is clear that this procedure, necessitated by the available data, ex-
cludes some input usage. 
4The cost and return survey did not contain egg yields for every province for each of the past 15 
years. Provincial trend regressions were used to estimate yields in such cases.
5Data on inventories of breeding broilers are available only from 1998, and we could not discover 
any way of deriving earlier data from the available poultry statistics. This severely limited our 
ability to analyze productivity developments in this sector.
6This survey is conducted through a joint effort of the State Development Planning Commission, 
the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture, the State Forestry 
Administration, the State Light Industry Administration, the State Tobacco Administration, and 
the State Supply and Marketing Incorporation.
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Livestock Production Structures
China’s livestock sector is experiencing a rapid evolution in production 
structure, with potentially large performance differences across farm types. 
For example, traditional backyard producers utilize readily available low-cost 
feedstuffs, while specialized households and commercial enterprises feed 
more grain and protein meal. The trend from traditional backyard to special-
ized household and commercial enterprises in livestock production systems 
therefore implies an increasing demand for grain feed (Fuller, Tuan, and Wailes 
2002). To estimate productivity growth by farm type requires that our data be 
disaggregated to that level. This was not a problem for the feed, labor, and non-
livestock capital variables, since they are recorded by production structure in 
the cost surveys. However, complete data on livestock output and animal inven-
tories by farm type do not exist. 
Our approach to generating output data by farm type was to first construct 
provincial “share sheets” that contained time-series data on the share of animal 
inventories (dairy cows and layers) and slaughterings (hogs) by each farm cate-
gory (backyard, specialized, and commercial).7 Inventories of sows by farm type 
were then generated by multiplying the aggregate totals (see earlier section) by 
the relevant farm-type hog slaughter share. We note that this assumes a constant 
slaughterings-to-inventory share across farm types for hog production and there-
fore assumes away a possible cause of productivity differences in this dimension 
across farm types. However, it proved impossible to gather further data to ad-
dress this concern.
To disaggregate our adjusted livestock output data by farm type, it is impor-
tant to take into account yield differences across production structures. From 
the cost surveys we obtained provincial time-series data on average production 
levels per animal (eggs per layer, milk per cow, and mean slaughter live weights 
for hogs). This information was then combined with the farm-type data on cow 
and layer inventories and hog slaughterings to produce total output estimates by 
farm type that were subject to further adjustment to ensure consistency with the 
aggregate adjusted output data.
Information that enabled us to estimate the inventory and slaughter shares 
by farm type and by province over time comes from a wide variety of sources. 
These include the 1997 China Agricultural Census, China’s Livestock Statis-
7We did not disaggregate beef data by farm type, since the cost survey presented beef information 
for just a single category—rural households.
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tics, a range of published materials (such as annual reports, authority speeches, 
and specific livestock surveys) from various published sources, and provin-
cial statistical Web sites. The census publications provide an accurate picture 
of the livestock production structure in 1996 (Somwaru, Zhang, and Tuan 
2003). However, the census defines just two types of livestock farms: rural 
households and agricultural enterprises (including state- and collective-owned 
farms). We interpret the latter as “commercial” units, but additional informa-
tion is used to disaggregate the rural households into backyard and specialized 
units. The agricultural statistical yearbooks and China’s Livestock Statistics 
provide data on livestock production structure during the early 1980s, when 
backyard production and state farms were prevalent. These sources, plus the 
animal husbandry yearbooks and provincial statistical Web sites also provide 
estimates of livestock shares for various livestock types, provinces, and years. 
When all these data are combined with 1996 values from the census, many 
missing values still existed. On the assumption that declining backyard pro-
duction and increasing shares of specialized and commercial operations are 
gradual processes that evolved over the study period, linear interpolations 
were made to estimate a number of missing values.
APPENDIX B: DATA DETAILS FOR THE DAIRY SECTOR TFP ANALYSIS
Since dairy sector official statistics face the same over-reporting problem as 
described in Appendix A and the data adjustments for the dairy sector were not 
included in Ma, Huang, and Rozelle (MHR 2004), we have to adjust data on milk 
output and dairy cattle inventories before estimating dairy sector TFP. To main-
tain the consistency with the livestock commodities, we use a similar approach 
to adjust milk output and the dairy cattle numbers. In order to adjust the pub-
lished series, new information from several sources is introduced. 
First, the 1997 National Census of Agriculture is used as a baseline to pro-
vide an improved estimate of the size of China’s dairy sector economy in at least 
one time period. As described in MHR, the census is assumed to provide the 
most accurate measure of dairy cattle inventory in 1996 since it covers all rural 
households and non-household agricultural enterprises. 
Second, we also used the official annual HIES. Information collected in that 
survey includes the number of cows producing milk output.
We also assumed that the dairy cattle numbers and milk output data as pub-
lished in the statistical yearbooks are accurate from 1980 to 1986. Beyond this 
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Commodity 
Time 
Periods 
Covered 
Provinces per Year
Total 
Observations 
Minimum
Number 
Maximum 
Number 
Hogs     
Backyard households 1980-2001 15 27 491
Specialized households 1980-2001 3 25 285
Commercial 1980-2001 2 25 224
Layers     
Specialized households 1991-2001 10 22 160
Commercial 1991-2001 8 16 132
Beef     
Rural households 1989-2001 4 10 97
Milk     
Specialized households 1992-2001 5 16 91
Commercial 1992-2001 10 23 155
Crops     
Corn 1985-2004 19 22 418
Wheat 1985-2004 21 25 459
Early rice 1985-2004 7 11 179
Late rice 1985-2004 4 9 155
Japonic 1985-2004 14 17 313
Soybeans 1985-2004 13 18 302
Cotton 1985-2004 14 17 308 
Horticulture     
Capsicum 1990-2003 6 28 260
Eggplant 1990-2003 12 28 306
Field cucumber 1990-2003 10 26 266
Field tomato 1990-2003 9 25 259
Greenhouse cucumber 1990-2003 6 21 186
Greenhouse tomato 1990-2003 5 20 193
Mandarin 1990-2003 2 6 118
Orange 1990-2003 3 11 160
Table 9.C1. Summary of data sample and size
Note: Vegetable data include only urban areas of provincial capital cities.
date, we assume that the data are adjusted to both reflect the annual variation as 
found in the HIES data and to agree with the census data for 1996. 
The adjustment procedure for dairy sector production data is the same as 
described in MHR. The adjusted series includes provincial data on dairy cattle 
inventory and milk output.
APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF DATA SAMPLE SIZE
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economic and institutional reforms have dramatically affected the agricul-
tural performance in all Central and Eastern European countries and Former 
Soviet Union republics. Not only did agricultural output fall dramatically in 
the region but also efficiency decreased during the transition, according to 
some studies.
In a review of the evidence, Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) found that despite 
the dramatic fall in agricultural output, agricultural productivity in Central 
Europe and parts of the Balkans and the Baltics started to increase in the 
early years of transition. Both labor productivity and total factor productivity 
sharply increased, whereas these productivity measures continued to decline 
much longer in most countries of the Former Soviet Union. Initial declines in 
productivity were associated with disruptions due to price liberalization and 
subsidy cuts (Macours and Swinnen 2000a), land reforms and farm restructur-
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ing (Macours and Swinnen 2000b), poor incentives and soft budget constraints 
in some countries of the Former Soviet Union (Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade 
1999), and the disruption of the previously vertically coordinated supply chain 
(Gow and Swinnen 1998).  
Increases in both agricultural output and productivity are important for 
two reasons. First, higher production and productivity are crucial to meet the 
growing demand for food and nonfood agricultural products in both domestic 
and foreign markets (Coelli and Rao 2003). Second, an increase in output and 
productivity drives up agricultural incomes and improves the competitive-
ness of the sector (McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu 1989). In regions, such as 
the Former Soviet Union and some of the less economically advanced Central 
and Eastern European countries, where a considerable proportion of the rural 
population still depends on agriculture as its primary source of income, an in-
crease in competitiveness is crucial to enhance the viability of the rural areas 
and reduce the poverty gap between urban and rural populations.
In this chapter we first analyze the evolution of agricultural output in the 
different Central and Eastern European countries and Former Soviet Union 
republics over the past two decades (Section 2).1 Then we consider changes in 
input use (Section 3) and, by combining the information on changes in output 
and input use, we discuss the evolution of agricultural productivity in Section 
4. In Section 5, we discuss the reform policies that caused the changes in ag-
ricultural output and productivity. Finally, in Section 6, we offer conclusions 
and draw some lessons on the links between policy and performance.
2. CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
The evolution of agricultural output is similar in all countries (Figure 10.1). 
In general, we observe an initial decline in agricultural output and a recovery 
later on. However, the magnitude of the decline and the length of time until 
1To analyze the evolution of output and productivity, we classify the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and the Former Soviet Union republics into six regions: Central and Eastern 
Europe consists of Central Europe and the Balkan countries, whereas the Former Soviet Union 
republics consist of the Baltic states, the European Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. Table 10.1 gives an overview of the classification of the different 
countries within the regions. Additionally, we refer to and compare input use, output, and pro-
ductivity (changes) in four periods: the pre-reform period, early transition (year 1-5, roughly the 
first half of the 1990s), mid-transition (year 6-10, the second half of the 1990s), and the recent 
period (after 1999). In Central Europe and the Balkan countries, the start of the reforms is as-
sumed to be the year 1989, while in the Baltic states, European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central 
Asia the start is assumed to be 1990.
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Central Europe Czech Republic Transcaucasia Armenia 
 Hungary Azerbaijan
 Poland Georgia
 Slovakia 
Balkans Albania 
Central Asia Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan
 
 Bulgaria 
 Romania 
 Slovenia 
Baltics Estonia  
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
European CIS Belarus   
 Russia 
 Ukraine 
Table 10.1. Classification of the Central and Eastern European countries 
and the Former Soviet Union republics in different regions
Figure 10.1. Evolution of gross agricultural output (GAO)
Sources: FAO (2008), Asian Development Bank (2008), Eurostat (2008).
Note: Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 
(=year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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recovery differed significantly among regions and even among countries within 
regions (Table 10.2).
In the early transition period, gross agricultural output decreased in all 
regions by at least 20%. The transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-orientated economy coincided in all countries with subsidy cuts and 
price liberalization, which in general caused input prices to increase and output 
prices to decrease. Purchased inputs were no longer affordable at the new relative 
prices, and the decrease in input use caused a decrease in agricultural output. In 
the Baltic states and the European CIS, output decreased to about 50% to 60% 
of the pre-reform output. In Central Europe and Central Asia, output declined 
by 25% to 30%. Output stabilized in the mid-1990s in Central Europe and later 
also in the other regions. Currently, agricultural output is close to the pre-reform 
output level in most countries.  
3. CHANGES IN INPUT USE
Changes in output and especially productivity are partly caused by changes 
in input use. Therefore we discuss in this section changes in the most important 
inputs, namely, labor, land, and capital.
3.1. Labor Use
In the Communist system, labor was inefficiently employed in most sectors 
of the economy, and several studies suggest that this was especially the case in 
agriculture (Brada 1989; Bofinger 1993; Jackman 1994). Consequently, the shift 
to a more efficient allocation of labor in the economy was expected to coincide 
with a re-allocation of agricultural labor and, more specifically, an outflow of la-
bor from agriculture to other sectors.
This prediction did not totally coincide with the reality. In some regions, 
agricultural employment indeed dramatically declined in the early transition pe-
riod (Figure 10.2). In Central Europe and the Baltic states, agricultural employ-
ment declined, respectively, by 40% and 20%. However, in other regions, such 
as the Balkan countries and the European CIS, agricultural employment was rel-
atively stable, and it even increased in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In these 
regions, agriculture is said to have provided a buffer role during transition, both 
in terms of labor allocation and in terms of food security (Seeth et al. 1998). By 
the end of the mid–transition period, agricultural employment in Transcaucasia 
had increased on average by almost 30% compared to the pre-reform period.
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Table 10.2. Growth in gross agricultural output (GOA) (Index=100 in first 
year of reforms)
Source: FAO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
 
GAO Index  
Average Annual Growth Rate 
(% per year) 
 After 5 
Years  
After 10 
Years  
After 15 
Years  
Year 
0-5 
Year 
 5-10  
Year 
10-15 
Central Europe    
Czech Republic 75 77 70 -5.0 0.5 -1.6 
Hungary 70 73 82 -6.4 0.8 3.2 
Poland 77 85 97 -4.9 2.2 3.2 
Slovakia 77 68 76 -5.0 -2.3 3.0 
    
Balkans    
Albania 100 113 133 0.7 2.9 3.2 
Bulgaria 63 62 64 -8.4 0.1 1.2 
Romania 93 93 116 -0.1 0.4 5.4 
Slovenia 81 79 97 -3.0 -0.4 4.3 
    
Baltics    
Estonia 55 42 58 -10.1 -5.1 6.8 
Latvia 50 38 55 -12.4 -4.5 7.7 
Lithuania 69 65 89 -6.8 -1.0 6.8 
    
European CIS    
Belarus 61 58 71 -8.8 -1.2 4.5 
Russia 64 62 70 -8.5 -0.3 2.5 
Ukraine 69 55 58 -7.1 -4.0 1.5 
    
Transcaucasia    
Armenia 82 80 100 -3.3 -0.3 4.8 
Azerbaijan 55 72 94 -10.9 5.7 5.4 
Georgia 62 51 66 -8.2 -3.4 6.0 
    
Central Asia    
Kazakhstan 53 52 55 -10.5 1.1 1.2 
Kyrgyzstan 79 110 109 -4.6 6.9 -0.1 
Tajikistan 61 53 n.a. -9.0 -2.6 2.0 
Turkmenistan 106 99 151 1.4 0.8 9.6 
Uzbekistan 98 97 125 -0.3 -0.2 5.4 
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Also among countries, agricultural employment evolved differently (Table 
10.3). In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, agricultural employment declined in 
the early transition period on average by, respectively, 11% per year and 6% per 
year, whereas in Poland the decline was only 2% per year in the same period.
A similar pattern to that of Poland is found in some Balkan countries, such 
as Romania and Bulgaria. In these countries, agricultural employment initially 
increased, as rural labor was absorbed by the agricultural sector. However, from 
2000 on, the reduction of the agricultural labor force became a constant element 
in all countries in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic states.
In the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, the pattern is rather 
mixed. In Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, agricultural employment started 
to decline immediately after the start of the reforms and continued to decline in 
the mid-transition and recent periods. In most other countries in Transcaucasia, 
Central Asia, and the European CIS, the agricultural sector absorbed surplus 
labor in the early transition period, but unlike in Poland and the Balkan coun-
tries, there is no strong decrease in agricultural employment observed in the 
mid–transition period. In some countries in Central Asia, such as Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, agricultural employment increased even further in 
Figure 10.2. Evolution of agricultural employment
Sources: Asian Development Bank 2008, Eurostat 2008, ILO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 
(=year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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Table 10.3. Growth in agricultural employment (Index=100 in first year     
of reforms)
Sources: Asian Development Bank 2008, Eurostat 2008, and ILO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
aAfter 14 years of reform.
 Labor Use Index 
Average Annual Growth Rate
(% per year) 
 After 5 
Years  
After 10 
Years  
After 15 
Years  
Year 
0-5 
Year  
5-10 
Year  
10-15  
Central Europe    
Czech Republic 54 39 32 -11.10 -6.27 -3.90 
Hungary 43 35 27 -15.26 -3.68 -5.33 
Poland 89 83 77 -2.19 -1.30 -1.40 
Slovakia 71 47 33 -6.22 -7.74 -6.81 
    
Balkan    
Albania 92 92 93 -0.83 -0.09 0.21 
Bulgaria 92 95 96 -1.45 0.72 0.24 
Romania 118 115 78 3.44 -0.39 -7.27 
Slovenia 95 93 89 -0.77 0.19 -0.22 
    
Baltics    
Estonia 40 27 21 -16.37 -6.99 -5.00 
Latvia 79 56 51 -4.47 -6.20 -1.63 
Lithuania 113 89 70 2.59 -4.55 -4.26 
    
European CIS    
Belarus 86 67 54 -2.99 -4.68 -4.19 
Russia 100 113 92 0.08 2.75 -3.80 
Ukraine 106 100 123 1.33 -1.10 4.43 
    
Transcaucasia    
Armenia 194 179 174 14.96 -1.44 -0.62 
Azerbaijan 97 137 136 -0.38 8.11 -0.07 
Georgia 74 65 58 -5.76 -2.72 -1.96 
    
Central Asia    
Kazakhstan 89 n.a. n.a. -2.24 n.a. n.a. 
Kyrgyzstan 135 164 140 6.36 4.06 -2.99 
Tajikistan 131 134 155 5.65 0.66 2.92 
Turkmenistan 121 140 157a 3.92 2.96 2.88 
Uzbekistan 112 99 91 2.35 -2.33 -1.70 
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the mid–transition period. In the recent period, agricultural employment started 
to decrease in most countries in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the European 
CIS. However, in some countries, such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, agricul-
tural employment is still increasing.
3.2. Land Use
The evolution of land use was different among regions (Table 10.4). In 
Central Europe, the Balkan countries, the Baltic states, and the European 
CIS, agricultural land use was relatively stable in the early transition period. 
In the same period, land use in Transcaucasia and Central Asia decreased 
by, respectively, 6% and 10%. After this decrease, agricultural land use sta-
bilized, and in Transcaucasia agricultural land use recently reached the pre-
reform land-use level.
3.3. Capital Use
The most dramatic changes in input use in the first years after transition 
were changes in capital use. In this section we discuss changes in tractor and 
fertilizer use.
The evolution of tractor use in the different countries is shown in Table 10.5. 
In the early transition period, tractor use in Central Europe declined by 17%, 
and in the Balkan countries the decline was even larger, namely, 24% compared 
to the pre-reform level. In the subsequent periods tractor use stabilized, and in 
some countries it even increased. In the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Cen-
tral Asia, tractor use initially declined less compared to use in Central Europe 
and the Balkan countries. However, in the subsequent years, the decline in trac-
tor use accelerated, and, for example, after 15 years of transition, tractor use in 
the European CIS reached only 50% of the pre-reform level.
Fertilizer use declined even more dramatically than tractor use, although the 
pattern of decline in the different regions is similar (Table 10.6). In Central Eu-
rope and the Baltic states, fertilizer use declined in the early transition period by 
almost 80%, and in the Balkan countries, it declined by 65%. In the European 
CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, fertilizer use also declined in the first four 
years of transition, but in the succeeding years the decline accelerated, and by 
2002 fertilizer use fell to approximately 20% of pre-reform fertilizer use. In some 
countries, such as Kazakhstan, Armenia, or Russia, it declined to less than 10% 
of pre-reform fertilizer use.
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Table 10.4. Growth in land use (Index=100 in first year of reforms)
Source: FAO 2008
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
 Land Use Index  
Average Annual Growth Rate
(% per year) 
 After 5 
Years  
After 10 
Years  
After 15 
Years  
Year 
0-5 
Year  
5-10 
Year  
10-15  
Central Europe   
Czech Republic 103 103 103 0.67 0.03 -0.08 
Hungary 94 95 90 -1.12 0.21 -1.04 
Poland 99 98 87 -0.12 -0.29 -2.34 
Slovakia 100 100 86 -0.03 -0.02 -2.74 
   
Balkan   
Albania 101 103 101 0.29 0.34 -0.40 
Bulgaria 100 105 110 0.05 0.98 0.93 
Romania 100 100 96 0.05 -0.02 -0.88 
Slovenia 91 83 82 -1.84 -1.82 -0.29 
   
Baltics   
Estonia 107 107 90 1.49 -0.07 -2.27 
Latvia 99 97 106 -0.18 -0.45 1.77 
Lithuania 100 100 111 0.01 -0.11 2.25 
   
European CIS   
Belarus 98 97 93 -0.48 -0.19 -0.88 
Russia 98 99 98 -0.34 0.07 -0.14 
Ukraine 100 99 98 -0.08 -0.21 -0.05 
   
Transcaucasia   
Armenia 102 108 116 -2.90 1.17 1.45 
Azerbaijan 96 103 106 -0.73 1.39 0.63 
Georgia 86 85 71 -0.14 -0.31 -3.22 
   
Central Asia   
Kazakhstan 96 93 93 -2.90 -0.70 0.10 
Kyrgyzstan 99 102 102 -0.73 0.46 0.09 
Tajikistan 97 94 94 -0.14 -0.67 -0.11 
Turkmenistan 73 74 75 -0.52 0.14 0.26 
Uzbekistan 89 89 87 -5.78 -0.01 -0.34 
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Table 10.5. Growth in tractor use (Index=100 in first year of reforms)
Source: FAO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia and Central Asia.
aAfter 14 years of reform.
bAfter 13 years of reform.
 Tractor Use Index 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
(% per year) 
 After 5 
Years 
After 10 
Years 
After 15 
Years 
Year 
0-5 
Year 
5-10 
Year  
10-15 
Central Europe   
Czech Republic 58 71 80 -6.34 -2.02 -1.96 
Hungary 72 72 86 2.75 0.03 -0.51 
Poland 114 113 118 -2.22 -0.26 1.12 
Slovakia 89 65 60 -5.26 -3.65 -1.52 
   
Balkan   
Albania 74 67 62 -6.86 -2.05 -1.67 
Bulgaria 69 75 58 1.55 1.65 -2.13 
Romania 106 108 113 -9.97 0.08 1.80 
Slovenia 56 72 69 1.13 5.8 -1.66 
   
Baltics   
Estonia 106 108 119 -3.77 0.11 0.02 
Latvia 82 91 91 3.48 -2.84 0.21 
Lithuania 118 138 169 -1.58 2.83 5.31 
   
European CIS   
Belarus 92 58 44a -3.94 -7.97 -29.66 
Russia 82 58 37 -1.68 -6.21 -8.93 
Ukraine 92 62 69 3.62 -7.82 -3.93 
   
Transcaucasia   
Armenia 119 117 128 -1.92 0.27 0.22 
Azerbaijan 90 91 52 -6.54 -1.08 -10.70 
Georgia 71 73 64 -4.64 4.00 -1.48 
   
Central Asia   
Kazakhstan 78 23 21 -0.04 -22.19 -2.96 
Kyrgyzstan 99 102 88b -3.21 6.93 -3.71 
Tajikistan 84 65 59 -4.21 -5.13 -0.42 
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Table 10.6. Growth in fertilizer use (Index=100 in first year of reforms)
Source: FAO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
 Fertilizer Use Index  
Average Annual Growth Rate 
(% per year) 
 After 4 
Years  
After 8
Years  
After 12
Years  
Year 
0-4 
Year 
4-8 
Year  
8-12  
Central Europe   
Czech Republic 27 27 35 -26.6 1.0 6.9 
Hungary 13 20 21 -36.3 12.9 2.2 
Poland 33 42 39 -21.7 6.4 -1.8 
Slovakia 16 18 20 -33.7 3.4 4.5 
   
Balkan   
Albania 25 7 23 -21.6 -27.9 99.9 
Bulgaria 26 22 22 -27.1 2.7 3.2 
Romania 29 23 27 -22.7 -4.9 7.5 
Slovenia 61 49 48 -11.5 -4.6 -0.5 
   
Baltics   
Estonia 27 20 16 n.a. -3.8 -2.9 
Latvia 21 48 48 -29.0 23.6 2.4 
Lithuania 16 12 17 -32.6 -4.5 8.8 
   
European CIS   
Belarus 34 44 35 -21.5 9.7 -5.0 
Russia 30 8 9 -24.4 -23.1 4.2 
Ukraine 29 14 16 -24.7 -14.5 4.7 
   
Transcaucasia   
Armenia 23 15 17 -30.4 -4.7 18.7 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Georgia 39 24 20 -20.1 -8.0 -2.3 
   
Central Asia   
Kazakhstan 42 2 11 -18.9 -39.7 59.1 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tajikistan 32 16 12 n.a. -16.2 19.8 
Turkmenistan 51 23 30 n.a. -11.4 7.1 
Uzbekistan 46 59 52 -17.7 14.8 -3.4 
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4. CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
Total factor productivity (TFP) is often calculated using index number meth-
ods described in the growth accounting literature. Typically, these measures 
account for growth in output by measuring the impact of changes in input quan-
tities. The unexplained residual, which is called TFP, measures changes in total 
output not accounted for by changes in inputs. 
For the agricultural sector in the Central and Eastern European countries 
and the Former Soviet Union republics, TFP estimates are limited. Macours and 
Swinnen (2000b) estimated TFP for the Central and Eastern European countries 
for the period 1989-1995. Swinnen and Vranken (2009) extended this series to 
2002. Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2004) estimated TFP indices for the Former 
Soviet Union republics. Other studies on a wide variety of countries performed 
farm-level productivity analyses based on farm survey data (see Gorton and Da-
vidova 2004 for a review).
Given the limited TFP estimates, we first discuss partial productivity esti-
mates, such as labor productivity, land productivity, and output per livestock 
unit. Then we discuss the available TFP studies in the region, and although only 
limited TFP comparisons can be made between countries and over time, the 
available evidence on TFP is roughly consistent with the evidence from the par-
tial productivity indicators. 
4.1. Partial Factor Productivity
4.1.1. Labor Productivity
A first partial measure of productivity that we consider is agricultural labor 
productivity (ALP), measured as output per farm worker (Figure 10.3). Despite 
a decrease in agricultural output in total, output per worker in Central Europe 
strongly increased during the past two decades. This increase was driven by 
the dramatic decrease in agricultural employment in the early transition pe-
riod. As output stabilized at the end of the mid–transition period and agricul-
tural employment continued to decline, the increase in ALP continued.
However, this was not the pattern followed by all countries in Central 
Europe (Table 10.7). In Poland, the agricultural sector acted as a social buffer 
and absorbed rural labor in the early transition period (Swinnen, Dries, and 
Macours 2005). ALP decreased initially, as much labor was absorbed in agri-
culture. In the mid–transition period, outflow of agricultural labor started, and 
ALP began to increase.
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A similar pattern to that of Poland is found in some Balkan countries, such as 
Romania and Bulgaria. Initially, ALP decreased, as rural labor was absorbed by the 
agricultural sector. However, in the late 1990s, labor began to flow out from agri-
culture, and this outflow of labor, in combination with increased investments in 
the farming and agri-food industry, resulted in a gradual but consistent improve-
ment in ALP.
Farther east, ALP strongly decreased in the first decade after transition. On 
average, ALP decreased by 33% in the European CIS and by 30% in Central 
Asia in the early transition period. The strong decline in ALP was the result 
of two effects. First, agricultural output declined strongly in both regions, and 
second, the outflow of agricultural labor was limited and in some regions ag-
ricultural employment even increased. In the mid–transition period, however, 
the decline in ALP started to slow down, and since the beginning of 2000, ALP 
has recovered slowly.
4.1.2. Land Productivity
A second partial productivity measure is land productivity or yield. Fig-
ure 10.4 gives the evolution of the average yield in the different regions. In all 
Figure 10.3. Evolution of agricultural labor productivity (ALP)
Sources: FAO 2008, Asian Development Bank 2008, Eurostat 2008, ILO 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 
(=year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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Table 10.7. Growth in agricultural labor productivity (ALP) (Index=100 in 
first year of reforms)
Sources: FAO 2008, Asian Development Bank 2008, Eurostat 2008.
Note: Reforms started in 1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
aAfter 13 years of reform.
bAfter 14 years of reform.
 ALP index 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
(% per year) 
 After 5 
Years  
After 10 
Years  
After 15 
Years  
Year 
0-5 
Year 
5-10 
Year  
10-15 
Central Europe    
Czech Republic 140 198 222 9.06 7.30 2.56 
Hungary 164 207 307 10.84 4.78 9.18 
Poland 86 102 126 -2.66 3.80 4.67 
Slovakia 110 145 230 2.26 5.83 10.88 
   
Balkan   
Albania 108 124 143 3.31 2.89 3.02 
Bulgaria 69 64 67 -6.90 -0.53 1.04 
Romania 79 81 157 -3.34 1.06 15.55 
Slovenia 85 85 110 -1.51 0.55 5.73 
   
Baltics   
Estonia 138 153 274 10.18 2.47 12.96 
Latvia 64 68 107 -8.38 2.22 9.97 
Lithuania 61 73 126 -8.88 3.87 12.30 
   
European CIS   
Belarus 72 85 132 -5.79 3.75 9.19 
Russia 63 55 76 -8.50 -2.45 6.91 
Ukraine 65 55 47 -8.34 -2.93 -2.94 
   
Transcaucasia   
Armenia 42 45 57 -14.34 1.25 5.39 
Azerbaijan 57 53 69 -9.99 -0.78 5.50 
Georgia 84 79 113 -2.60 -0.73 8.10 
   
Central Asia   
Kazakhstan 60 n.a. n.a. -8.23 n.a. n.a. 
Kyrgyzstan 58 67 78 -9.98 2.88 3.43 
Tajikistan 46 39 40a n.a. -2.95 1.01a 
Turkmenistan 88 71 84b -2.40 -2.00 5.42b 
Uzbekistan 88 98 138 -2.33 2.31 7.22 
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regions, average yield fell in the early transition period and recovered later. 
However, the depth and the length of the decrease differed strongly among 
countries. Average yields recovered considerably in the mid–transition period 
in countries such as Hungary, nations with relatively more large-scale farm-
ing and investments in the food industry. In contrast, average yield grew more 
slowly and more modestly in countries such as Romania, which has a large 
number of small-scale family farms with difficult access to inputs. Average 
yield declined the most in the European CIS and Central Asia, where yields 
started to increase from the beginning of 2000, and only recently have yields 
reached their pre-reform levels.
The aggregate figures on the evolution of the average yield in the different 
regions hide important differences among commodities. Therefore, we consider 
average grain yield and its evolution in the different regions and countries. In ad-
dition, we also analyze sugar beet yields in Central Europe, the Balkan countries, 
the Baltic states, and the European CIS, as well as and cotton yields in Central 
Asia (Table 10.8 and Table 10.9).
Figure 10.4. Evolution of average agricultural yield
Source: FAO 2008.
Notes: Average yield is the average yield index of milk, grains and sugar beet. Calculations are 
based on the average of the milk yield, a three-year moving average of the grain yield, and a 
three-year moving average of the sugar beet yield. Balkan does not include Slovenia.
Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 
(=year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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Table 10.8. Average grain, sugar beet, and cotton yields in 2005-2007
Source: FAO 2008.
Change in grain productivity. In the early transition period, grain yield de-
creased by more than 20% in all regions (Figure 10.5). After five years, grain 
yield started to recover in all countries, except in the European CIS, where yield 
remained for the next decade at approximately 75% of the pre-reform yield. 
There are large differences in yields among countries (Table 10.8). Yields of 
arable crop production are the highest in the Central European countries and the 
lowest in the European CIS and Central Asia, reflecting differences in productiv-
ity and soil quality.
Changes in yields of sugar beet and cotton. In Central Europe and the Baltic 
states, sugar beet yield decreased by 10% and 20%, respectively (Figure 10.6). In 
the mid–transition period, yield started to gradually increase, and in 2005 sugar 
 Barley Corn Wheat Sugar Beet Cotton
 (tons/ha) (tons/ha) (tons/ha) (tons/ha) (tons/ha) 
Central Europe   
Czech Republic 3.87 6.91 4.80 52.68 -
Hungary 3.55 7.03 4.06 50.18 -
Poland 3.02 5.49 3.71 45.56 -
Slovakia 3.41 5.50 3.99 48.84 -
   
Balkan   
Albania 2.66 4.74 3.26 21.67 -
Bulgaria 2.56 3.77 2.92 17.18 -
Romania 2.07 3.09 2.46 28.31 -
Slovenia 3.75 7.60 4.35 42.56 -
   
Baltics   
Estonia 2.50 n.a. 3.03 n.a. -
Latvia 2.29 n.a. 3.32 37.28 -
Lithuania 2.44 3.41 3.34 41.40 -
   
European CIS   
Belarus 2.87 4.33 3.13 35.98 -
Russia 1.86 3.48 2.00 29.99 -
Ukraine 1.90 3.98 2.57 27.57 -
   
Central Asia   
Kazakhstan 1.18 4.45 1.13 - 2.22
Kyrgyzstan 1.96 6.06 2.10 - 2.64
Tajikistan 1.60 3.94 2.10 - 1.64
Turkmenistan 1.05 1.07 3.29 - 1.44
Uzbekistan 1.52 5.88 4.30 - 2.53
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Table 10.9. Growth in land productivity (Index=100 in first year of 
reforms)
Source: FAO 2008.
Notes: Calculations are based on a three-year moving average of grain yield, a three-year moving 
average of sugar beet yield, and a three-year moving average of cotton yield. Reforms started in 
1989 in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 in the Baltic states, the European 
CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
 
 
Grain Yield Index
Sugar Beet Yield 
Index Cotton Yield Index 
Years after the 
Reforms 5 10 15 5 10 15 5 10 15 
Central Europe    
Czech Republic 86 85 97 110 126 140 - - - 
Hungary 69 71 87 67 91 107 - - - 
Poland 86 89 100 101 109 123 - - - 
Slovakia 84 75 84 99 103 131 - - - 
    
Balkan    
Albania 86 90 104 62 77 78 - - - 
Bulgaria 62 62 69 55 57 90 - - - 
Romania 88 92 101 75 70 98 - - - 
    
Baltics    
Estonia 75 84 100 89 n.a. n.a. - - - 
Latvia 82 93 102 79 107 126 - - - 
Lithuania 66 84 89 83 109 130 - - - 
    
European CIS    
Belarus 79 68 87 65 84 110 - - - 
Russia 70 79 95 69 86 131 - - - 
Ukraine 67 62 73 83 74 110 - - - 
    
Central Asia    
Kazakhstan 54 93 76 - - - 69 74 83 
Kyrgyzstan 63 93 99 - - - 74 111 124 
Tajikistan 81 101 150 - - - 51 57 67 
Turkmenistan 76 70 123 - - - 72 58 53 
Uzbekistan 98 55 228 - - - 90 82 95 
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beet yield increased by 30% compared to the pre-reform level. In the Balkan 
countries, sugar beet yield declined by almost 40% in the first years of transition, 
and also in the mid–transition period yields were substantially below the pre-
reform level. Recently, sugar beet yields gradually increased, and in 2005 yield 
reached the pre-reform level. The evolution of sugar beet yield in the European 
CIS followed a similar pattern as in the Balkan countries until the beginning of 
the 2000s. From then on, yield increased very strongly, and by 2005 yield had 
increased by almost 20% compared to the pre-reform period.
In Central Asia, cotton yield decreased by 30% compared to the pre-reform 
period, and after a slight increase in the beginning of the 2000s, yield stabilized 
at 85% of the pre-reform cotton yield.
4.1.3. Output per Livestock Unit
Except for the Balkan countries, milk yield initially declined in all regions 
(Figure 10.7). Yield reached a minimum for Central Europe and the Baltic states 
at, respectively, 90% in 1992 and 80% in 1993 of the pre-reform milk yield. 
Figure 10.5. Evolution of grain yield
Source: FAO 2008.
Notes: Calculations based on three-year moving average of the grain yield. Balkan does not 
include Slovenia. Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries 
and in 1990 (= year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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Figure 10.6. Evolution of sugar beet yield
Source: FAO 2008.
Notes: Calculations based on three-year moving average of the sugar beet yield for Central 
Europe, the Balkan countries, the Baltic states, and the European CIS. Reforms started in 
1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990  (= year 0) in the 
Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
Figure 10.7. Evolution of milk yield
Source: FAO 2008.
Notes: Balkan does not include Slovenia. Reforms started in 1989 (= year 0) in Central Europe 
and the Balkan countries and in 1990 (= year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, 
Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
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Source: FAO 2008.
Table 10.10. Output per livestock unit in 2007
From then on, milk yield in both regions steadily increased, to 136% and 120% 
respectively in 2007. Productivity fell farthest in the European CIS and contin-
ued to decrease when productivity in all other regions started to recover. In the 
mid–transition period, milk yield in the European CIS slowly began to recover 
after it had decreased to less than 68% of the pre-reform milk yield, and in 2005, 
milk yield reached the pre-reform level.
Milk yield is highest in the Central European and Baltic countries where the 
average yearly milk yield is between 4 and 7 tons per livestock unit (Table 10.10). 
In the Balkan and European CIS, milk yield is between 2 and 3 tons per live-
stock unit per year, whereas in Central Asia milk yield is very low. In Tajikistan, 
milk yield is below 1 ton per livestock unit per year.
4.2. Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
4.2.1. Evolution in TFP in Central Europe and the Balkan countries, 1989-2002
Macours and Swinnen (2000b) and Swinnen and Vranken (2009) estimated 
TFP for the four Central European countries and the four Balkan countries based 
on crop production (Table 10.11).
 Milk production Milk production 
 (tons/animal/year) (tons/animal/year) 
Central Europe  European CIS 3.90
Czech Republic 6.72 Belarus 3.50
Hungary 6.88 Russia 3.66
Poland 4.44 Ukraine
Slovakia 5.81 
  Central Asia 2.20
Balkan  Kazakhstan 2.05
Albania 2.28 Kyrgyzstan 0.72
Bulgaria 3.28 Tajikistan 1.37
Romania 3.39 Turkmenistan 1.70
  Uzbekistan
Baltics  
Estonia 6.38 
Latvia 4.60 
Lithuania 4.84 
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In Central Europe, TFP grew slightly in the first years of transition—0.4% 
annually between 1989 and 1992—and significantly afterward—by 2.2% an-
nually between 1992 and 1995 and by 4.4% annually between 1995 and 1998. 
Studies find a slowdown of TFP growth in the period 1998-2001. The slowdown 
was probably due to substantial investments in agricultural machinery and capi-
tal inputs in this period (Swinnen and Vranken 2009).   
In the Balkan countries, the TFP evolution fluctuated much more. TFP 
decreased strongly, by 4.1% per year, from 1989 to 1992. Later TFP recov-
ered more strongly when it increased by 7.5% per year in the period 1992-
1995, but it fell again in the late 1990s, with bad macro-economic policies 
resulting in TFP declines of 1.3% annually from 1995 to 1998. After 1998 
when a series of important reforms were implemented in the region, there 
was a strong recovery in productivity—from 1998 to 2001, TFP grew on av-
erage by 2.3% per year. 
The TFP numbers of Albania and Slovenia are remarkable (Swinnen and 
Vranken 2009). Although Slovenia was one of the richest Balkan countries, its 
average annual growth rate of TFP was negative for the period 1989-2001. This 
is in contrast with Albania. Albania was one of the poorest Balkan countries after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, despite a small decline in TFP in the period 
1989-1992, TFP strongly increased beginning in 1992, reflecting successful land 
reforms and farm restructuring.
Table 10.11. Growth in TFP in Central Europe and the Balkans (% per year)
Source: Swinnen and Vranken 2009.
 
Average 
annual 
change 
1989-2001 
Average 
annual 
change 
1989-1992 
Average 
annual 
change 
1992-1995 
Average 
annual 
change 
1995-1998 
Average 
annual 
change 
1998-2001 
Overall 1.6 -1.9 4.9 1.4 2.0
Central Europe 2.1 0.4 2.2 4.2 1.7
Czech 1.4 1.3 2.3 3.9 -1.5
Hungary 4.0 1.9 3.4 5.1 5.6
Poland 0.8 -1.7 0.5 3.3 0.9
Slovakia 2.2 0.1 2.4 4.3 2.1
   
Balkan 1.1 -4.1 7.5 -1.3 2.3
Albania 2.6 -1.1 5.6 2.1 3.9
Bulgaria -0.4 -1.3 4 -4.1 -0.2
Romania 2.5 -4.2 11.6 -4.8 7.5
Slovenia -0.4 -9.9 9.0 1.6 -2.2
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4.2.2. Evolution in TFP in the other Former Soviet Union republics
Few TFP estimates have been published for the Former Soviet Union re-
publics. The only study that allows some comparison among all Former Soviet 
Union republics is by Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2004) (Table 10.12). They 
showed that in two Baltic states, Estonia and Lithuania, and two Transcauca-
sian countries, Armenia and Georgia, TFP strongly increased. In the Central 
Asian countries, TFP growth was negative.
More work has been done on TFP estimates in Russia and Ukraine; howev-
er, the results are less consistent. In these countries, Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 
(2004) found an increase in TFP during 1992-1997, while partial measures of 
productivity decreased. In the same period, other studies found a decrease in 
TFP in both countries (Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade 1999; Trueblood and 
Osborne 2001; Kurkalova and Jensen 2003).
5. SOURCES OF CHANGES IN OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
Several studies have tried to explain changes in output and productivity that 
occurred after the reforms. In general, post-reform changes in output and produc-
tivity are related to the choice of the reform instruments (Roland 1997; Aslund, 
Table 10.12. Growth in TFP in the Baltic states, the European CIS, 
Transcaucasia, and Central Asia (% per year)
Source: Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 2004.
 
Average annual 
change 1992-1997  
Average annual 
change 1992-1997 
Overall 0.4 
Baltics 1.7 Central Asia -2.4 
Estonia 2,8 Kazakhstan -1.0
Latvia -1.2 Kyrgyzstan -0.4
Lithuania 3.6 Tajikistan -2.4
  Turkmenistan -5.8
European CIS 0.8 Uzbekistan -2.2
Belarus 0.6 
Russia 1.4 
Ukraine 0.4 
  
Transcaucasia 3.5 
Armenia 4.6 
Azerbaijan -0.8 
Georgia 6.6 
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Boone, and Johnson 1996), the pre-reform economic conditions (Sachs and Woo 
1994; Woo 1994; Macours and Swinnen 2002), the disruption of previously verti-
cally coordinated supply chains (Blanchard 1997; Gow and Swinnen 1998), the 
inflow of foreign direct investments in the agri-food industry restructuring (Gow, 
Streeter, and Swinnen 2000; Dries and Swinnen 2004), and regional tensions and 
conflict (de Melo and Gelb 1996). Other authors, such as Jackson and Swinnen 
(1994), also mention the importance of the statistical bias that is caused by over-
reporting of the effective output in the pre-reform period and underestimation of 
the actual output because of limited statistical coverage after the reforms.
In this section we discuss the most important factors that have affected agri-
cultural output and productivity in the past few decades. First, we analyze the role 
of the initial conditions and the institutional framework. Second, we discuss the 
role of price liberalization and subsidy cuts. Third, we consider privatization and 
land reform. Fourth, we analyze the role of farm restructuring. And finally, we 
analyze a more recent evolution, the inflow of foreign direct investments and the 
introduction of vertically coordinated supply chains.
5.1. Initial Conditions and Institutional Framework
At the start of the transition, there were substantial differences among regions 
and even countries in the performance of the overall economy, the importance of 
the agricultural sector in the overall economy, the technology used in the agricul-
tural sector, and the number of years under central planning (Table 10.13). 
The initial conditions affected the transition in two important ways. On the one 
hand, they affected the impact of reform policies; on the other hand, through insti-
tutional and political constraints, they affected the choice of the reform policy. For 
example, the collectivization of agriculture and the introduction of central planning 
occurred in the 1920s in the Former Soviet Union but only after World War II in 
Central Europe and the Balkan countries. Consequently, rural households in Central 
Europe and the Balkan countries had much more experience with private farming 
than their counterparts in most of the Former Soviet Union. This difference affected 
not only the emergence and dynamics of the new private farms but also the prefer-
ences for land reforms: in Central Europe and the Balkan households wanted their 
land back, while in a large part of the Former Soviet Union households had never 
owned land, since feudalism had directly preceded collectivist farming.  
Another condition that played an important role was that in Central Europe 
and the Baltic states, countries were generally richer and agriculture was less 
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Source: Macours and Swinnen 2002.
Note: Pre-reform indicators are for 1989 for the Central and Eastern European countries and for 
1990 for the Former Soviet Union republics.
aNumber of full-time agricultural workers in agriculture.
Table 10.13. Pre-reform indicators
 
Share of 
Agricultural 
Employment 
in Total 
Employment 
(%) 
GNP Per 
Capita 
(PPP $ 1989)
Labor/Land 
(persons per haa)
Years of 
Central 
Planning 
(number) 
Central Europe  
Czech Republic 9.9 8,600 0.122 42
Hungary 17.9 6,810 0.131 42
Poland 26.4 5,150 0.258 41
Slovakia 12.2 7,600 0.139 42
Balkan     
Albania 49.4 1,400 0.627 47
Bulgaria 18.1 5,000 0.132 43
Romania 28.2 3,470 0.204 42
Slovenia 11.8 9,200 0.116 46
Baltics     
Estonia 12.0 8,900 0.072 51
Latvia 15.5 8,590 0.085 51
Lithuania 18.6 6,430 0.098 51
European CIS     
Belarus 19.1 7,010 0.105 72
Moldova 32.5 4,670 0.269 51
Russia 12.9 7,720 0.044 74
Ukraine 19.5 5,680 0.118 74
Transaucasia     
Armenia 17.4 5,530 0.218 71
Azerbaijan 30.7 4,620 0.203 70
Georgia 25.2 5,590 0.217 70
Central Asia     
Kazakhstan 22.6 5,130 0.008 71
Kyrgyzstan 32.6 3,180 0.054 71
Tajikistan 43.0 3,010 0.185 71
Turkmenistan 41.8 4,230 0.015 71
Uzbekistan 39.2 2,740 0.109 71
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important in the overall economy, compared to countries in Transcaucasia and 
Central Asia, which were much poorer with relatively more important agricul-
tural sectors. The general economic situation in a country influenced the extent 
to which other sectors could absorb surplus labor from agriculture and the de-
velopment of the social safety net system. Finally, the outflow of surplus agricul-
tural labor was much stronger in Central Europe than in other countries in the 
1990s, in part because the social safety net system was much better developed in 
Central Europe and the agricultural sector was relatively small.  
Finally, the resource endowments and technology use affected farm restruc-
turing and the relative efficiency of farm organizations (see Section 5.4).
5.2. Price Liberalization and Subsidy Cuts
In all regions, prices of outputs and inputs were determined by the central 
planning authority. Generally, trade and price liberalizations caused a dramatic 
fall in the agricultural terms of trade in all regions, because output prices were 
well above equilibrium prices and input prices were heavily subsidized. This 
contributed to a fall in input use at the start of the reforms, which caused a de-
crease in productivity of labor and land (Macours and Swinnen 2000). 
However, the implementation of these reforms and thus the effect on productiv-
ity differed substantially among regions. Governments in Central Europe and the 
Baltic states dramatically reduced agricultural subsidies in the early transition period, 
whereas in some European CIS and countries in Central Asia reforms were more 
gradual (Hartell and Swinnen 1998; Csaki and Nash 1997; Csaki and Fock 2001). 
For example, in the early transition period, Russia liberalized its output prices but 
retained some input support. In other countries, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Belarus, agricultural support remained intact until the end of the 1990s. In Cen-
tral Europe, economic recovery triggered the demand for the reintroduction of more 
agricultural support. In most countries agricultural support started to increase at the 
end of 1990s (Figure 10.8), and more recently these countries have benefited from 
EU subsidies.2
2In all of the Central and Eastern European countries (expect Slovenia), the accession to the Eu-
ropean Union led to the implementation of a simplified income support scheme, the Single Area 
Payments Scheme (SAPS). In principle, SAPS consists of a fixed per hectare payment, uniform over 
all types of land. Although the payments are uniform within one country, they differ substantially 
among countries. These variations stem from the fact that the rate of per hectare payments is de-
termined based on historical yields (2000-2002) in the different countries. These different yields 
resulted in substantial differences in the payments per hectare among the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries.
304  swInnen, vAn herck, And vrAnken
Figure 10.8. Evolution of producer support estimate (PSE) in Central Europe
Source: OECD 2008.
Notes: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia from 2004: %PSE of the EU25-27.
Reforms started in 1989 (=year 0) in Central Europe and the Balkan countries and in 1990 
(=year 0) in the Baltic states, the European CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.
5.3. Privatization and Land Reform
A very important element of the reform packages was land reform. Differ-
ent approaches to land reforms affected the restructuring and structural change 
in the agricultural sector. In general, three approaches to land reforms were ap-
plied: restitution, physical distribution, and distribution of paper shares or cer-
tificates (Macours and Swinnen 2002).
First, except for Poland and Albania, land was restituted to the former 
owners in the Central European countries, the Baltic states, and the Balkan 
countries. In these countries, where collectivization was imposed only after 
World War II, land was restituted to the former owners (or their heirs) within 
the historical boundaries. If restitution was not possible, former land own-
ers (or their heirs) received a plot of comparable size and quality. Second, in 
Albania, Romania (partly), Armenia, and Georgia, land was physically distrib-
uted on an equal basis to agricultural workers or rural households. Third, in 
the European CIS and Central Asia, paper shares or certificates were distrib-
uted equally to collective farm members or state employees. This land reform 
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process consisted of two steps: first, land ownership rights were transferred 
from the state to the collective farm, and second, land ownership rights were 
transferred from the collective farm to the individuals. The land rights were 
transferred as paper shares or certificates, without any direct link between the 
individual and a specific plot of land. 
In general, the process of privatization and land reform was complicated and 
slow, which slowed down effective liberalization and prolonged the uncertainty 
of property rights. As long as property rights were uncertain, markets could not 
develop, and the decapitalization of the agricultural sector continued through 
livestock slaughtering and reduced investments (Macours and Swinnen 2000a). 
The first and second types of land reform, restitution and the physical dis-
tribution, ended up with relatively strong and well-defined property rights. Yet, 
it was expected that restitution of land would lead to a decrease in productivity, 
because it entailed fragmentation of agricultural land ownership. However, in 
many countries restitution contributed to a greater consolidation of land use. 
Mathijs and Swinnen (1998) explained this using a measure of transaction costs 
associated with land markets. Restitution of land transferred land rights to the 
former owners, many of whom were often no longer active in agriculture. These 
new landowners, except those in poor countries, were not interested in engaging 
in farming activities. Because the costs of negotiation and search associated with 
finding new potential renters were too high, the new owners rented out the land 
to the farm that had been using the land, which was typically the large-scale 
farmer-cooperative farm. So despite the great fragmentation of property rights, 
restitution did not lead to more fragmented land use.
In the regions that implemented land reforms by distributing certificates, 
property rights were less clearly defined, and, at least in the first decade of the 
reforms, output and productivity were affected as a result. First, restrictions were 
placed on selling and purchasing shares, and in many countries it was not pos-
sible to buy or sell land, which significantly slowed down structural changes and 
thus productivity growth (Lerman 2001). Second, owners had little incentive to 
put in effort and undertake investments because property rights on specific plots 
were not clearly defined (Uzun 2000). Uncertainty on the property rights re-
sulted in a decrease of agricultural output and productivity. However, at the end 
of the 1990s the situation started to improve when land policies were further lib-
eralized, and limited land transactions became possible, for example, in 2002 in 
Russia (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004).
306  swInnen, vAn herck, And vrAnken
5.4. Farm Restructuring
Important productivity gains and losses were associated with farm restruc-
turing. The effects of these gains and losses depended on the initial conditions, 
such as farm structure and technology used, and the reform policies that were 
implemented, such as the land reform policies and the general macroeconomic 
reforms.
The initial conditions, in particular resource endowments and use of tech-
nology, affected the relative efficiency of farm organizations and thus incentives 
for farm restructuring. Resource endowments affect the costs and benefits of 
shifting from corporate farms to family farms. If labor/land ratios are high, as 
in countries with labor-intensive technologies, such as in Transcaucasia and the 
Balkans, the benefits from better labor governance by shifting to family farms 
from corporate farms are larger, while the losses in scale economies of shifting 
to smaller farms are lower. These productivity incentives resulted in a strong 
shift to small-scale farming. In contrast, in more capital- and land-intensive 
agricultural systems, such as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the benefits 
from shifting to family farms were lower so that large-scale corporate farming 
remained more important. In these situations, productivity gains came mostly 
from laying off corporate farm workers. The impact of privatization and farm 
restructuring also depended on accompanying policy reforms, both in the agri-
cultural sector and in the general economy. First, it depended on the way land re-
forms were implemented (see section 5.3).3 Second, it depended on other economic 
reforms. Labor can flow out from the agricultural sector only if there are sufficient 
employment alternatives and social security payments. If the unemployment rate is 
high and unemployment benefits are low, agriculture serves as a social buffer and 
attracts young, often unmotivated individuals. Low pensions have a similar effect 
because old people start farming to complement their pensions.
5.5. Foreign Direct Investments in the Agri-Food Industry
An important factor in the decline of both output and productivity was the 
disruption of vertically coordinated supply chains (Blanchard 1997; Gow and 
3In Transcaucasia the shift toward more individual land use was limited in the early years of 
transition because the privatization process was slow, but later there was an increasing number 
of small, individual farms. In many countries in the region the share of output from individual 
farms is much larger than their share in land use, suggesting that the individual farmers are 
more efficient producers and typically produce more labor-intensive products with a higher value 
added (Table 10.14).
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Swinnen 1998). Investments by private processors and the reintroduction of ver-
tically coordinated supply chains have been important in improving output, pro-
ductivity, and quality of agricultural products. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the agri-food sector has played a leading role in these developments through 
both horizontal and vertical spillover effects on, respectively, domestic proces-
sors and farmers.
Table 10.14. Privatization and land reform
Sources: Csaki and Tuck 2000 and Macours and Swinnen 2002.
 Individual Land Use (%) Individual Production (%) 
 Pre-reform 
After 5 
years 
After 
8/9/10 
years Pre-reform 
After 7 
years 
Central Europe  
Czech Republic 1 19 26 n.a. n.a.
Hungary 13 22 54 n.a. n.a.
Poland 76 80 84 n.a. n.a.
Slovakia 2 5 9 n.a. n.a.
  
Balkan  
Albania 3 95 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria 14 44 56 n.a. n.a.
Romania 14 71 82 n.a. n.a.
Slovenia 83 90 94 n.a. n.a.
  
Baltics  
Estonia 4 41 63 n.a. n.a.
Latvia 4 81 87 n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 9 64 85 n.a. n.a.
  
European CIS  
Belarus 7 16 12 25 45
Russia 2 8 13 24 55
Ukraine 6 10 17 27 53
  
Transaucasia  
Armenia 7 95 90 35 98
Azerbaijan 2 5 n.a. 35 63
Georgia 12 50 44 48 76
  
Central Asia  
Kazakhstan 0 5 24 28 38
Kyrgyzstan 4 34 37 34 59
Tajikistan 04 5 9 23 39
Turkmenistan 2 3 8 16 30
Uzbekistan 5 13 14 28 52
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Prior to the reforms, the entire agri-food chain, from input supplier to con-
sumer, was planned and controlled by a higher central authority. The reform to a 
market-oriented economy led to the disruption of the agri-food chain, and because 
of macroeconomic instability and institutional reforms, contract enforcement was 
no longer guaranteed and all parties in the supply chain were confronted with 
hold-up problems (Gow and Swinnen 1998; Stiglitz 1993; Hart 1995).
Farmers were not willing to supply to a processor because they feared pay-
ment delays or even no payments at all (Gorton, Buckwell, and Davidova 2000; 
Cungu et al. 2009). If they wanted to supply they often lacked the basic input 
factors or expertise to produce a certain quantity or quality. Vertical coordina-
tion of the supply chain was the solution for processors to guarantee to supply a 
certain quantity and, later on, also a certain quality.
FDI companies were the first to reintroduce vertically coordinated supply 
chains through the introduction of an input supply program and farm extension 
services. In the early stage of transition, processors first wanted to ensure their 
supplies by introducing input supply and credit programs. In the more advanced 
stage, they also tried to ensure product quality and offered farmers extension 
services and training programs. Examples of the first stage can be found in Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and some countries in Central Asia, whereas the second stage 
is widely seen in the Central European countries. The existence of these differ-
ent stages indicates that the development of economically more advanced input 
supply programs is positively correlated with the extent of institutional reform 
in the countries, because the introduction of these programs requires well-func-
tioning institutions.
Case studies have indicated that there are important horizontal spillovers 
from these contract innovations on domestic companies that quickly start imi-
tating successful contracting and vertical integration programs introduced by 
foreign firms (Dries and Swinnen 2004; Gow, Streeter, and Swinnen 2000). 
Besides horizontal spillovers to other processors, the introduction of the input 
supply programs also had vertical spillovers to the agricultural producers. The 
use of input supply programs by agricultural producers who are often credit-
constrained led to significant improvements in output, productivity, and qual-
ity. A case study of sugar production in Slovakia found that the introduction of 
farm assistance schemes in the mid-1990s led to an annual increase of sugar 
beet yields of 9% in the period 1993-1997 (Gow, Streeter, and Swinnen 2000). 
In a case study on Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, White 
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and Gorton (2004) found that contracting resulted in an annual increase of 3% 
in productivity and a 4% increase in high-quality output on average over the 
period 1997-2003.
Empirical evidence on FDI per capita in the different Former Soviet Union 
republics (Figure 10.9) indicates that in the mid–transition period, FDI strongly 
increased in Central Europe and the Baltic states. In the Balkan states, the inflow 
of FDI lagged behind that of Central Europe and the Baltic states. However, after 
the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, FDI started to increase. In the most 
recent years, FDI increased even more strongly in Central Europe and the Balkan 
countries, suggesting that accession to the European Union has led to a more sta-
ble institutional environment, which is necessary to attract FDI. In the European 
CIS, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, FDI inflow has been very low, although in 
the most recent years it increased slightly.
6. CONCLUSION
There have been dramatic changes in agricultural productivity over the past 
two decades in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In 
general, we observe a “J” (or “U”) effect: an initial decline in productivity and a 
recovery later on. However, the depth of the decline, the time until recovery, and 
Figure 10.9. Evolution of FDI per capita in selected Former Soviet Union 
republics
Source: UNCTAD 2008.
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the growth in productivity afterward differed strongly among countries and were 
influenced by the initial conditions, reform policies, and investments in the agri-
food industry. We can distinguish four groups with similar patterns.
In the first group are the most economically advanced countries in Central 
Europe and the Baltic states, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Estonia, which implemented radical reforms. These countries are charac-
terized by relatively high incomes, a capital-intensive agricultural sector, and a 
big-bang approach to reforms and privatization, including restitution of land to 
former owners. The loss from forgone economies of scale was limited because 
the restitution of agricultural land to the previous owners led to consolidation 
of land in large farming enterprises. In addition, a massive outflow of agricul-
tural labor occurred early in transition, facilitated by a well-developed social 
safety net system and radical reforms, which stabilized the macroeconomic 
environment. This outflow of labor caused substantial gains in labor produc-
tivity in the early transition period. Later, productivity gains were reinforced 
by spillovers from the large inflow of FDI in the agri-food sector. Investments, 
through vertically integrated supply chains, improved farmers’ access to credit, 
technology, inputs, and output markets. 
A second pattern can be seen in the poorer countries in Central Europe 
and the Balkan states, including Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland. 
These countries were very diverse in their initial farm structure. Before transi-
tion, Poland already had mainly small family farms, whereas in Lithuania, Ro-
mania, and Bulgaria the agricultural sector was concentrated in large corporate 
farms. However, in all countries, labor outflow from agriculture was limited 
in the early transition period. In these countries, agriculture served as a social 
buffer in times when overall unemployment was high and social benefits were 
low. The restitution of land to the former owners constrained access to land for 
young farmers, since that land was given to older people who started farming 
to complement their small pensions. Because the agricultural sector in these 
countries was relatively capital-intensive, the breakup of the corporate farms 
into small family farms caused significant losses in economies of scale and 
yielded only limited gains from the shedding of labor. Initially, both output 
and productivity declined. In countries such as Poland and Lithuania, output 
and productivity started to recover in the mid–transition period stimulated by 
FDI. In Romania and Bulgaria output and productivity recovered only slowly, 
and at the end of the 1990s they decreased again as a result of the financial 
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crisis. From the beginning of 2000, the outflow of inefficient labor and the in-
flow of FDI started a sustained recovery.
Third, a group of poor Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries, such as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, followed yet another pat-
tern. These countries are characterized by their poverty and the absence of a good 
social safety net system, their labor-intensive agricultural systems, and their slower 
progress in overall reforms. In these countries, agriculture also provided a buf-
fer role and a labor sink. Reforms caused a strong shift from large scale toward 
individual farming—especially when land distribution in kind to households was 
introduced after the failure of the share distribution system became evident. The 
reforms also caused a substantial inflow of labor into agriculture and growth in the 
importance of more labor-intensive sectors, such as horticulture and livestock. This 
caused a decrease in labor productivity, while land productivity grew. Although 
there has been substantial growth in yields, labor productivity is still substantially 
below pre-reform levels in Transcaucasia.
A fourth pattern is seen in a group of middle-income Former Soviet Union 
countries, including Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In these countries, there 
was almost no outflow of agricultural labor and, since output fell substantially in 
the 1990s, agricultural labor productivity declined strongly. Reforms were imple-
mented only slowly, and soft budget constraints continued, which favored the 
large-scale farms and constrained restructuring, with limited efficiency gains. Only 
after the Russian crisis in 1998 did the macroeconomic situation improve, with en-
hanced competitiveness of the domestic agricultural sector through exchange rate 
devaluations and the inflow of revenues from increasing oil and mineral prices. 
This particularly affected Russia and Kazakhstan. Ukraine implemented a series 
of important reforms in the late 1990s. Since then, agricultural productivity has 
increased in these countries, as liquidity in the economy and investments in agri-
culture increased. Surplus employment started to decline gradually. An important 
factor in the growth of productivity since 2000 was increased investments in the 
food industry, which benefited agriculture through vertical integration. 
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CHAPTER 11
The Changing Pattern and Sources of 
Agricultural Growth in India
Alka Singh and Suresh Pal
1. INTRODUCTION
The Indian economy has moved decisively to a higher path of growth in re-
cent years, making it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. The rate 
of economic growth measured in real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
(1999-2000 prices) averaged less than 5% per year during the 1980s and 1990s, 
increasing to more than 7% per year during the period 2003-07 (Planning Com-
mission 2008). The economy is now poised to sustain these more rapid rates of 
expansion, with the potential to bring significant improvements to the lives of 
millions of the country’s poor. 
In contrast, the country’s agricultural economy has performed erratically 
during the past several decades. Indian agricultural output, especially that of 
rice and wheat in irrigated areas, recorded a quantum jump in growth during 
the 1970s and 1980s in response to the widespread adoption of new seed- and 
fertilizer-based technologies. This was accompanied by substantial growth in 
rural infrastructure, mainly through public investments. The growth stimulus 
spread into rain-fed agricultural production beginning in the 1980s with the 
rapid adoption of high-yielding varieties of coarse cereals, oilseeds, pulses, and 
cotton. Rising yield growth and cropping intensities greatly contributed to buoy-
ant agricultural growth, despite frequent instability due to weather events. The 
livestock sector, the second-largest component of India’s agricultural GDP, also 
Alka Singh is a principal scientist and Suresh Pal is head of the Division of Agricultural Economics, 
Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi.
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has had exemplary growth since the 1980s. However, this impressive overall 
growth performance obscures very different growth rates across different sectors, 
states, and social groups. 
In recent years, agricultural growth has slowed, with wide year-to-year fluc-
tuations. Beginning in the early 1990s, agricultural growth was substantially 
below that of the non-agricultural sector, and the gap is widening. The com-
paratively slow growth of agriculture would perhaps have been of less concern 
if there had been a commensurate decline in the percentage of the population 
dependent on agriculture. But this has not been the case; in fact, the official sta-
tistics showed that the agricultural population has continued to increase. This 
widening gap may seriously jeopardize the national goal of inclusive economic 
growth, as two-thirds of India’s population still depends on agriculture and al-
lied sectors for gainful employment and a secure livelihood. 
The difficulty of improving agricultural productivity on a sustainable ba-
sis is further compounded by increasing pressure on natural resources and 
the environment, the vulnerability of agriculture to external shocks like cli-
mate change, and the fragmentation and small scale of Indian farms. Given 
these natural resource and structural constraints, agricultural growth must 
increasingly rely on sustained and improving productivity growth through 
continued technological and institutional innovations. There are some positive 
developments on these fronts that have helped maintain agricultural growth 
at a reasonable level and have thereby insulated the country from the recent 
global food crisis. In this chapter we examine the broad pattern of agricultural 
growth in the country, its sources and regional dimensions. We particularly 
underscore the recent success stories, diversification patterns, and binding 
constraints. 
In the next section we present the main characteristics of Indian agriculture 
and its changing contribution to India’s national economy. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion of the pattern of growth in agriculture, and the regional and 
commodity dimensions of that growth. Trends in total factor productivity are 
also reviewed at length in Section 3. An in-depth analysis of sources of growth 
in Indian agriculture—particularly recent trends in public investment such as 
irrigation, research, and infrastructure development—is provided in Section 4. 
In Section 5, we address challenges faced by Indian agriculture and the possible 
strategies for dealing with them. We conclude the chapter with some observa-
tions about options for accelerating India’s agricultural growth.
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2. AGRICULTURE IN THE INDIAN ECONOMY
The Indian economy has grown at an impressive rate in recent times. This 
sharp uptrend in growth can be attributed in (perhaps significant) part to a se-
ries of economic reforms initiated by the government in the early 1990s. The 
composition of growth has also changed substantially. In earlier times, agricul-
tural and manufacturing sectors fueled much of the country’s economic growth. 
Since the 1990s, a newly emerging services sector has been the main driver of 
growth, along with manufacturing, while the relative contribution of agricul-
ture to current economic growth has shrunk significantly. Agriculture’s share 
of Indian GDP fell from 37.9% during the early 1980s to less than half of that 
share (17%) during 2008-09. However, in real terms, Indian agriculture has con-
tinued to grow, albeit at varying rates, owing to several factors. Agriculture has 
an impressive long-run record, from delivering the country from serious food 
shortages, to becoming food self-reliant, to growing a food-surplus economy. 
Agriculture still contributes significantly to export earnings and is an important 
source of raw materials and demand for the booming non-agricultural sector. 
The country is increasingly taking its place in the global production marketplace 
as a leading producer of many agricultural commodities, including milk, wheat, 
rice, and cotton. 
The shifting contribution of agriculture and other sectors of the economy is 
quite consistent with the evolution of economic growth witnessed in the devel-
oped countries. In contrast to the slowdown in the rate of growth of agricultural 
output, non-agricultural GDP shows a robust and rising growth trend. And while 
agriculture’s share of total employment has declined, it is still a dominant source 
of employment, from employing 73.9% of the economically active population in 
1973-74 down to 56.5% in 2004-05. A comparison of agriculture’s share of do-
mestic output and employment shows that the decline in agriculture’s share of 
the labor force is slower than the decline in its share of output (Table 11.1). This 
clearly indicates the increasing gap between average incomes of workers engaged 
in agricultural and non-agricultural occupations and also highlights the inability 
of the non-agricultural sector to provide gainful employment to the masses. 
Agricultural GDP grew by 3.5% per year during the 1980s (characterized by 
wider technology dissemination), which was substantially slower than the rate of 
growth of either the non-agricultural sector or the overall economy (Table 11.1). 
The 1980s pace of growth carried through to the middle of the 1990s, but there-
after agricultural growth slowed to 2.5% for the following decade against a target 
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growth of 4% per year1 (Planning Commission 2008). The main challenge to In-
dia’s agricultural sector continues to be the failure to meet growth targets, along 
with degraded natural resources, the predominance of rain-fed agriculture, and a 
preponderance of small farmers.
2.1. Structural Changes in Agriculture
Though the relative contribution of agriculture to the national economy 
has changed, the basic characteristics of Indian agriculture have not. Indian 
agriculture continues to be dominated by smallholders; in fact, their number 
has risen much faster in the recent period. As a result, there has been a sig-
nificant reduction in the average size of a farm holding—close to one hectare 
at present (Table 11.2). Net cultivated area remains at around 140 million 
hectares, and more than half of this area is rain-fed. Much of the agricultural 
production is for domestic consumption, and only about one-tenth of the to-
tal value of production is exported. The output of food grains has registered 
a two-fold increase since the early green revolution period (1970), and output 
has jumped again in recent years. One significant shift in the growth process 
has been its source, with much of the more recent (post-1980) increase in 
output attributable to yield growth, followed by changes in cropping patterns, 
with a minimal contribution of area growth. 
Table 11.1. Share of agriculture in India’s gross domestic product and 
employment 
Source: MoF (Economic Survey, 2007-08).
Note: Nominal values deflated to 1999-2000 prices.
aThe share was computed only for the terminal years.
bData pertain to 1993-94, 1999-00, and 2004-05, respectively.
1The Government of India envisaged annual growth of 4% per year in the agriculture sector in its 
National Agricultural Policy, 2000, and Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012). 
 
Agriculture and Allied 
Sector’s Sharea 
Real Average  
Annual Growth Rate 
Period 
Total 
GDP at 
Factor 
Cost 
Share in 
Employmentb 
Total 
GDP 
GDP 
Agriculture 
and Allied 
Sector 
GDP Non-
agriculture
 (percentage) (percent per year) 
1981-82 to 1990-91 31.4 61.0 5.4 3.5 6.4 
1991-92 to 1996-97 27.8 56.6 5.7 3.7 6.6 
1997-98 to 2006-07 18.5 52.1 6.6 2.5 7.9 
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The crop sector continued to be a principal component of overall agricultural 
output, accounting for more than two-thirds of the value of agricultural output 
in 2008, with the livestock sector accounting for about one-quarter of total out-
put (Table 11.3). Since the early 1980s there has been a modest decline in the 
crop sector’s share of agricultural output while the livestock and fisheries sectors 
increased their respective market shares. The increasing share of output coming 
from the livestock sector—17.5% in the triennium ending (TE) 1981 to 24.5% in 
2006 (Table 11.3)—reflects both supply-side and demand-side factors. Livestock 
production is considered to be remunerative and labor intensive, and thus it suits 
the needs of smallholders. At the same time, Indian farmers are responding well 
to opportunities in commercial agriculture and diversifying to meet the rising 
demand for livestock products. Milk and milk products now make a major contri-
bution to livestock output, such that India is now the largest milk producer in the 
world. The livestock sector has also diversified, with more production of poultry 
meat and eggs over recent years. The fishery sector still accounts for less than 5% 
of agricultural GDP, albeit with a steadily increasing share over the past several 
decades. However, the sector saw a considerable shift from marine to inland pro-
duction, with inland production becoming increasingly important of late. 
The crop sector is dominated by food grains production, which accounted 
for about 64.5% of the total cropped area during 2005-06. Food grains pro-
duction increased markedly, to total 230 million metric tons in 2008, through 
Indicator 1971 1981 1991 2001 2006
Average size of holding (ha) 2.30 1.84 1.57 1.33 n.a. 
Net cultivated area (mha) 139.72 141.93 141.63 141.45 141.89 
Total cropped area  (mha) 165.19 176.75 182.24 189.75 192.80 
Total irrigated area (mha) 38.43 51.41 65.68 78.73 82.63 
Share of rural population (%) 80.1 76.7 74.3 72.2 n.a. 
Share of exports in AgGDP (%) 2.7 3.9 4.4 6.1 9.1 
Share of agriculture in 
    national GDP (%) 
40.6 34.4 29.6 23.2 18.2 
Total food grain production 
    (million tons) 
105.17 133.30 168.38 212.85 217.28 
Food grain yield (metric tons/ha) 0.85 1.03 1.38 1.73 1.76 
Table 11.2. Major trends in Indian agriculture
Sources: Compiled from MoA (various years) and CSO (various years).
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tripling the average yield of principal crops since the early 1950s. The share of 
cereals production decreased from 39% in TE 1981 to 30% in TE 2006, while 
that of fruits and vegetables increased from 16% to 25% during the same period. 
Oilseeds peaked in terms of their market share in TE 1991 and then lost ground 
thereafter. These trends show that the crop sector is diversifying toward non-food 
grains and high-value commodities such as fruits and vegetables. The share of 
overall output coming from pulses and fibers changed little over the years, while 
sugar marginally increased its share of total crop output (Table 11.4). The chang-
ing composition of agricultural output is well reflected in the growth of value of 
agricultural output, which has shown a significant increase since the early 1990s 
(Figure 11.1). On the input front, the share of purchased inputs in value of output 
from agriculture including livestock hovered around 22% during the same period. 
Gains in rice yields were higher than those of wheat during the period. More sig-
nificant is the marked increase in the yields of cotton and coarse cereals, indicat-
ing rapid diffusion of new technologies even in rain-fed areas. (Table 11.3). 
Indicator TE 1981 TE 1991 2008
Share in the total value of production (%) 
Crop  75.5 70.6 67.1 
Livestock 17.5 22.0 24.5 
Forestry 5.2 4.7 3.6 
Fishery 1.7 2.7 4.8 
Agricultural production 
Food grains production (mt) 124.20 172.45 230.67 
Milk production (mt) 31.60 51.23 100.87 
Fish production (mt) 2.44 3.55 6.87 
Egg production (billion, number) 10.06 20.10 50.66 
Crop yields (t/ha) 
Rice 1.25 1.72 2.20 
Wheat 1.71 2.33 2.79 
Coarse cereals 0.69 0.88 1.42 
Pulses 0.46 0.58 0.64 
Cotton 0.16 0.23 0.47 
Groundnut 0.84 0.88 1.46 
Table 11.3. Production shares and amounts by category, and selected 
crop yields
Sources: Share of value of production from CSO (various years) and remaining data from MoA 
(various years).
Note: TE indicates triennial ending. 
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2.2. Agricultural Trade 
India’s agricultural trade is diverse, ranging from raw products to processed 
and ready-to-eat items. The share of India’s agricultural exports in total exports 
has varied between 11% and 15% since 2000. During 2007-08, the value of agri-
cultural exports totaled more than U.S.$7 billion, of which marine products and 
oil meal were among the largest contributors. The composition of agricultural 
trade has changed significantly in the recent period. The proportion of Indian 
agricultural exports coming from fruits and vegetables, flowers, cotton, sugar 
Figure 11.1. Value of agricultural output and input (1999-2000 prices) 
Source: Period from CSO (various years, www.mospi.gov.in).
Note: Nominal values deflated to 1999-2000 prices. 
Crop Group TE 1981 TE 1991 TE 2001 TE 2006
 (percentage)
Cereals 38.7 35.9 33.8 30.1
Pulses 6.1 6.4 4.9 5.2
Oilseeds 8.6 12.0 7.9 8.5
Fruits and 
   vegetables 
16.3 17.2 24.1 25.0
Sugar 5.1 4.9 6.4 7.3
Fibers 4.4 4.3 3.3 4.0
Table 11.4. Compositional changes within crop sectors
Sources : CSO (various years), NAAS (2009).
Notes: TE indicates triennial ending. Data are percent shares of value of crop productions.
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and molasses, and livestock products has increased considerably. Cereals (mostly 
basmati and non-basmati rice), tea, coffee, cashews, and spices are other promi-
nent products, each accounting for between 5% and 10% of the country’s total 
agriculture exports. India’s agricultural imports, on the other hand, have consti-
tuted only a small portion of the country’s total imports (less than 5%) during 
the current decade. The country imports mainly vegetable oil and pulses, which 
alone account for about 70% of total agricultural imports. 
3. AGRICULTURAL GROWTH PATTERN
Agricultural growth was significant during the 1980s and early 1990s, as 
evidenced by the performance of the crops, livestock, and fisheries sectors (Table 
11.5). The crop sector showed modest (but still substantial) growth during the 
early 1990s, but it consistently slowed down thereafter. The rate of growth in 
livestock production also began to slow in the mid-1990s but has remained 
higher than the corresponding rate of growth in food grains and oilseeds. There 
is a noticeable decline in growth rates after the mid-1990s across all agricultural 
sectors, with growth in some sectors (including pulses and oilseeds, livestock, 
and fisheries) rebounding in recent years. A substantial cause for concern has 
been the ratcheting down in the pace of growth of cereals output in recent de-
cades, given the fact that the substantial share of agricultural output still derives 
from this sector and is the mainstay of India’s food security. Consequently, the 
 Crops 
Period Cereals 
Pulses 
and 
Oilseeds 
Fruits and 
Vegetables 
Other 
Crops 
All 
Crops Livestock Fishery
 (percent per year) 
1981-82 
to 1990-91 
3.52 5.41 2.84 1.71 2.97 4.78 5.74 
1991-92 
to 1996-97 
2.36 2.92 6.07 2.18 3.09 4.00 7.05 
1997-98 
to 2001-02 
1.49 -1.43 4.11 3.82 2.25 3.53 2.63 
2002-03 
to 2006-07 
1.28 4.29 2.97 2.25 2.46 3.69 3.23 
Table 11.5. Period average growth of real agricultural output by sector
Source: Planning Commission (2008).
Note: Respective nominal totals deflated to 1999-2000 prices.
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overall rate of growth of agricultural GDP has been well below a target rate of 4% 
per year. The annual data suggest that the rate of growth of crop output peaked 
by the mid-1990s and has slowed afterward. In contrast, the horticulture sector 
exhibited impressive output growth throughout the entire 1990s. Although it, 
too, slowed thereafter, it has sustained a rate of output growth that is more than 
twice as fast as the corresponding growth in cereals output. However, food grain 
production spiked in 2008 as global commodity prices soared, while the high-
value livestock, fisheries, and fruits and vegetables sectors sustained growth rates 
of at least 3% per year. 
One fact concealed in these period averages is the wide year-to-year fluctua-
tions in growth performance. In some years, growth rates increased by as much 
as 10% (between 2002-03 and 2003-04) compared with the average growth 
of 4.5% between 2002-03 and 2006-07. Unfavorable weather conditions cor-
responded with low-growth years, and these lowered the overall growth rate. 
However, excluding the abnormally poor years of 2002-03 and 2004-05, the av-
erage growth of GDP from agriculture and allied sectors (1999-2000 prices) dur-
ing the 1997-98 to 2008-09 period was estimated at 3.7% per year.
3.1. Agricultural Diversification 
Indian agricultural production began to diversify gradually in the 1980s, 
as reflected by changes in sectoral and crop contributions to the total value of 
agricultural output, and this trend began to accelerate during the 1990s. This 
pattern is visible in the distinctly different growth patterns between food grains 
and non-food grains. The share of area under food grains has declined since 
the early 1980s, with a small decline in the share of area under rice and wheat, 
compounded by a marked decline in the area under coarse cereals (Table 11.6). 
Notwithstanding these shifting area shares, the yields of coarse cereals grew at 
markedly higher rates than yields for other grains such as rice and wheat, espe-
cially during the 1990s (Table 11.6). The official statistics show that about 60% 
of the cropped area for coarse cereals in the late 1990s was planted to high-yield-
ing varieties, even though the coverage of irrigation was much lower for coarse 
grains. Among the food grains, the growth scenario is completely different for 
pulses, as shown by the crop’s declining growth in output, area, and yield, espe-
cially during the 1990s. However, during the last decade, there was appreciable 
acceleration in the growth of pulse production, owing to growth in both area 
and yield. The growth performance of oilseeds as a group surpassed that all of 
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other crop groups during the 2001-07 period and was distinctly superior to its 
past rates of growth. Both area and, particularly, yield components contributed 
significantly to this dramatic expansion in output. More importantly, unlike 
the slowdown in output growth of cereals and pulses during the 1990s, oilseed 
output continued to expand. Of India’s major cash crops, cotton merits special 
mention because of its strong growth performance, especially in recent years. 
This was made possible mainly through significant advances in seed technology, 
especially Bt cotton and the resulting high growth in yield per hectare (Qaim et 
al. 2006; Gandhi et al. 2006). 
The livestock sector is also noteworthy, as its overall growth performance 
outpaced that of the crop sector by a wide margin, enabling the country to enjoy 
higher per capita availability of milk and other livestock products. However, the 
pace of growth dropped steadily, from 4.8% in the 1980s to 3.7% during 2002-06 
(Table 11.5). Milk and milk products constitute around two-thirds of all livestock 
output (by value) and thus heavily influence the overall trend for the sector. How-
ever, considerable diversification toward production of poultry meat and eggs has 
occurred, as evident from the spectacular growth of these commodities since the 
1980s. The share of meat and meat products in total agricultural output has re-
mained fairly stable over the last three decades (Chand and Raju 2008). 
What are the major drivers of agricultural diversification toward high-value 
commodities? There are a number of factors responsible for this shift. The most 
important among these is greater demand for high-value commodities such as 
fruits, vegetables, and livestock products as per capita incomes increase. As in-
comes rise, people consume more higher-value commodities and less traditional 
food items such as cereals. This effect has been more pronounced in the recent 
past because of the spectacular growth in the Indian economy. Demographic 
changes are also at play, including increased urbanization, increased female 
literacy, and increased participation of women in the workforce, especially in 
urban areas and small towns. These demand-side factors were matched by posi-
tive developments on the supply side. Farmers responded to the incentives of-
fered by high-value commodities, both for domestic and international markets. 
This was particularly true for the fruits and vegetables, poultry, and fisheries 
sectors, in which new farming opportunities and technologies emerged. Imports 
of improved seed varieties and planting materials were permitted under a new 
seed policy introduced during the late 1980s. Because these commodities pro-
vided comparatively high and regular returns to smallholders in a short period, 
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farmers directed resources to these areas. Finally, the participation of the private 
sector in retail marketing and input supply and other production-enhancing un-
dertakings, including new forms of contractual arrangements with growers, pro-
vided further impetus to the growth of high-value commodities (Joshi, Gulati, 
and Cummings 2007).
3.2. Regional Patterns of Agricultural Growth
The structure and regional distribution of agricultural production varies mark-
edly among regions and states. At the national level, the rate of growth in net state 
domestic product (NSDP)2 from agriculture slowed significantly when comparing 
the period 1984-85 to 1995-96 with the period 1995-96 to 2004-05 (Table 11.7). 
Almost all the major states of India, except Bihar and Orissa, the two poorest 
states, exhibited impressive rates of growth during the earlier period. This period 
is in fact a turning point in Indian agriculture, as the sector witnessed not only im-
pressive growth rates but also better distribution of growth among different states 
of the country. Notable was the growth performance of the rain-fed states of Mad-
hya Pradesh and Rajasthan, primarily because of large shifts from coarse cereals 
to oilseed production. The shift toward oilseeds reflected the commodity’s relative 
profitability fueled by an appreciable increase in administered prices coupled with 
a faster rate of yield growth compared with coarse cereals. Both these effects were 
realized through concerted government efforts under the Oilseed Mission.3 Anoth-
er important development was the impressive growth performance of West Bengal, 
especially in rice production. The spread of modern seed varieties and an increase 
in area cultivated under summer (boro) paddy with improved irrigation and input 
management contributed to this performance. Gujarat also deserves special men-
tion, as it has attained 9.6% growth per year in agricultural state domestic product 
since 1999-2000. The main sources of its growth are a massive boom in cotton 
production, growth in high-value commodity groups like livestock, and fruits and 
vegetables, and wheat production (Gulati, Shah, and Shreedhar 2009).
The national slowdown in agricultural output growth during the post-1995-
96 period was evident in all states except Bihar. The slowdown even affected 
2NSDP is one of the important indicators for measuring economic growth in states and union ter-
ritories of the country.
3The Oilseed Mission was launched by the Indian government in 1986 to increase oilseed 
production and achieve self-sufficiency in edible oils. Subsequently, pulses, oil palm, and corn 
were also brought within the purview of the Mission in the early 1990s.
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the comparatively well developed northwestern region of the country, including 
states such as Punjab and Haryana. Many other states in rain-fed regions of the 
country, which account for 60% of the total cultivated area, also saw signifi-
cantly poorer growth performances during this period. These rain-fed areas are 
characterized by relatively higher incidences of poverty, more limited (off-farm) 
employment opportunities, higher production risks, and high rates of out-migra-
tion, and thus the slowdown in these areas is particularly problematic. 
Although growth in agricultural output has slowed in recent years, there 
are some significant exceptions to this general trend. For example, corn pro-
duction has increased rapidly (5% per year from 1997 to 2007) as the intro-
State 
Growth of Net State 
Domestic Product in 
Agriculture 
Net State 
Domestic 
Product 
Yield of 
Food 
Grains  
Rural 
Population 
Below the  
National 
Poverty 
Line  
1984-85 to 
1995-96 
1995-96 to 
2004-05 2007-08 2006-07 2004-05 
 (percent per year) (Rs/ha, 1000s) (t/ha) (percent)
Punjab  4.00 2.16 53.4 4.02 9.10 
Haryana 4.60 1.98 48.5 3.39 13.60 
Uttar Pradesh 2.82 1.87 37.4 2.06 33.40 
Tamil Nadu 4.95 -1.36 64.2 2.61 22.80 
West Bengal 4.63 2.67 69.0 2.51 28.60 
Bihar -1.71 3.51 35.2 1.66 42.10 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
3.18 2.69 56.4 2.23 11.20 
Gujarat 5.09 0.48 34.1 1.42 19.10 
Rajasthan 5.52 0.30 19.1 1.12 18.70 
Orissa -1.18 0.11 27.7 1.36 46.80 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
3.63 -0.23 17.7 1.17 36.90 
Maharashtra 6.66 0.10 34.1 0.94 29.60 
Karnataka 3.92 0.03 28.4 1.29 20.80 
Kerala 3.60 -3.54 74.6 n.a. 13.20 
Assam 1.65 0.95 47.3 1.29 22.30 
All India 3.62 1.85 40.6 1.76 28.30 
Table 11.7. Measures of state agricultural and economy-wide activity
Sources: State domestic product from CSO (various years); yield from MoA (2008); poverty 
indicator from Planning Commission.
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duction of winter corn and use of modern hybrids has spread rapidly. The area 
under corn also continues to expand, even in the states that typically have 
grown little if any corn such as Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in southern 
India. Much of the crop was used as feed in the flourishing poultry sector in 
these southern states. Beginning in the 1980s, the production of boro rice also 
increased markedly, especially in the eastern part of the country. This was 
further enhanced by the spread of hybrid rice, which offers significant yield 
advantages (up to two metric tons per hectare) over conventionally bred variet-
ies. The northern states have had no significant spurt in productivity growth, 
but they have maintained their comparatively high yields, with impressive 
improvement in the grain quality of rice. Yields have not improved in the 
pulses at the aggregate level but crop duration has been reduced, particularly 
in pigeon peas and chick peas, which has extended their reach into several 
non-traditional areas. The spread of Bt hybrids has improved yields in cot-
ton. Similarly, farmers’ access to improved varieties of vegetable seeds has led 
to increased production in the eastern, southern, and hill states characterized 
by predominantly small farms. All of these developments, among others, have 
contributed to the growth of Indian agriculture.
3.3. Partial and Total Factor Productivity Trends 
Crop growth performances clearly show that the relative roles of area expan-
sion and yield growth varied among crops. As a general rule, yield growth con-
tributed more than area expansion to the growth in output for most crops, with 
the exception of cotton during the 1990s when yield growth was negative (Table 
11.6). However, yield growth for all principal crops taken together slowed from 
an average of 2.56% per year during the 1980s to 1.33% per year during the 
1990s, and the same pattern held true for most of the crops. The growth in crop 
yield, especially of coarse cereals and non-food grains, showed signs of recovery 
in more recent years. Cotton yields continued to decline during the 1990s, but 
development of hybrid cotton varieties, better pest management practices, and 
the introduction and rapid adoption of Bt cotton led to a rapid turnaround, with 
double-digit growth in yield and production after 2000. 
Although yields have tended to increase over time in most of the states, and 
for all of India, there remains large spatial (state) variation in crop yields. The 
states with the highest productivity measured in terms of net state domestic 
product (measured in rupees [Rs] per hectare of total cropped area in the state in 
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the year 2007-08) are Kerala (Rs 74,600/ha), West Bengal (Rs 69,000/ha), Tamil 
Nadu (Rs 64,200/ha) and Andhra Pradesh (Rs 56,400/ha). 
A number of studies on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Indian ag-
riculture, and an assessment of the factors explaining those changes, have been 
carried out (Table 11.8). They clearly show evidence of robust growth in partial 
factor productivity and TFP as major drivers of output growth in the crop sec-
tor during the 1980s. Estimates of various studies show that the average rates of 
growth in TFP in the agricultural sector, including livestock, ranged from 0.90% 
to 2.29% per year during the 1980s and 1990s (Table 11.8). However, the report-
ed rates of growth in TFP vary considerably in terms of the methodologies, time 
periods, and data series used. None of the studies reports TFP growth for India 
after the latter half of the 1990s. In addition, little research explores whether the 
source of growth is technical change or purely gains in efficiency. However, the 
study by Kalirajan and Shand (1997), following a frontier production function 
approach, found that during the 1980s much of the slowdown in the TFP con-
Table 11.8. Summary of total factor productivity studies of Indian agriculture
Source: Compiled from NAAS (2009).
aIndicates share of respective output growth attributable to growth in TFP.
   Total Factor Productivity
Author(s) Commodity Period Annual Growth 
Share of TFP 
Growtha 
   (percent per year) (percent)
Evenson, Pray, and 
Rosegrant 1999 
Crops 1966-76 1.40 50.2
1977-87 1.05 48.8
Fan, Hazell, and 
Thorat 1999 
Crops and 
livestock 
1980-89 2.52 66.5 
1990-94 2.29 72.2
Coelli and Rao 
2003 
Crops and 
livestock 
1980-2000 0.9 - 
Kumar, Kumar, 
and Shiji 2004 
Aquaculture 1992-98 4.4 71.7 
Marine 1987-98 2.0 48.8
Birthal et al. 1999 
 
Livestock 
 
1951-70 
1970-80 
1980-95 
-0.04 
0.93 
1.79 
- 
33.2 
45.0 
Joshi et al. 2003 Rice (IGP) 1980-90 
1990-99 
3.5 
2.1 
- 
- 
Wheat (IGP) 1980-90 
1990-99 
2.4
2.1 
-
- 
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tribution to output growth could be attributed to low rates of technological prog-
ress, together with gradual improvements in technical efficiency, but the output 
growth in the sector had become increasingly dependent on input growth. 
As with crop yields, the measured rates of growth of TFP varied markedly 
throughout the country. For example, the Indo-Gangetic Plains witnessed im-
pressive TFP growth in rice (3.5% per year) and wheat (2.4% per year) during 
the 1980s, thus underscoring the key role of technology in making the country 
food secure (Joshi et al. 2003). However, the study showed deceleration in TFP 
growth, especially for rice, during the 1990s, thus raising concerns about the 
sustainability of the rice-wheat cropping system. Kumar, Kumar, and Mittal 
(2004) also found that TFP grew more rapidly in the agricultural sector during 
the 1980s relative to the 1990s in the Indo-Gangetic Plains. By way of contrast, 
TFP in the livestock sector grew little before the 1970s. The sector saw the pace 
of productivity growth picking up during the 1980s when TFP growth reached 
nearly 1.8% per year, contributing 45% to total output growth (Birthal et al. 
1999). In the fisheries sector, TFP growth was much higher in aquaculture as 
compared to marine production during the 1990s. The TFP index for aquacul-
ture grew by 4.4% annually and accounted for more than 70% of the growth in 
aquaculture production (Kumar, Kumar, and Shiji 2004). 
In an effort to explain the rate of productivity growth, Kumar, Kumar, and 
Mittal (2004) identified research, extension, literacy, and infrastructure as the 
most important sources of TFP growth in the Indo-Gangetic Plains. Extension 
accounted for about 45% of the TFP growth, followed by public research (36%) 
and literacy (10%). Investment in agricultural research and development (R&D) 
also made a significant contribution to Indian productivity growth according to 
Evenson, Pray, and Rosegrant (1999) and Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999). 
4. SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL GROWTH
4.1. Public Investment in Agriculture
Public investment in agriculture targeted to infrastructure and the provision 
of farm services has been an important element of agricultural policy in India. The 
experiences of the green revolution showed that a strategy of strong public support 
for agriculture has paid rich dividends. Initially most public investment in India 
was directed toward irrigation infrastructure, particularly surface irrigation. Invest-
ment eventually extended to such areas as R&D, public provision of critical inputs 
like seed and fertilizer, rural electrification, animal health, and agricultural prod-
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uct markets. Empirical evidence supports a positive correlation between public 
and private investment (Roy and Pal 2002). This positive correlation could be seen 
in the development of groundwater irrigation in India, whereby public investment 
in rural electrification encouraged farmers to invest in tubewell installation. This 
led to rapid growth in the adoption of groundwater irrigation, beginning especially 
in northwest India and then spreading to other parts of the country.
The broad trends in public investment constitute three phases during the 
post-independence period. First, although investment has increased signifi-
cantly over the years since independence, it rose rapidly during the food crisis 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Second, driven by the objective of food security, the 
government invested heavily in agriculture during the early 1970s, and this 
level was sustained during the subsequent period. Third, spurred by a slow-
down in agricultural growth beginning in the mid-1990s, the government once 
again stepped up its investment in agriculture, leading to a spike in investments 
during the first decade of this millennium (Figure 11.2). An upward trend in 
private investment commenced in the mid-1970s and a sharper rise was further 
witnessed in the 1990s.
The pattern of public investment has changed significantly over time. It be-
came more broad based (spatial coverage and items of investment), and the share 
of centrally funded and state-operated schemes also rose over time. The rising 
Figure 11.2. Gross capital formation in agriculture from the public sector, 
1999-2000 prices
Source: CSO (various years). 
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burden of subsidies eroded the government’s ability to invest in agriculture, and 
there is an emerging consensus that these subsidies should be rationalized and 
the resulting savings diverted to public investments in the sector. 
4.2. Irrigation
Most of the public investment in agriculture has been for development 
of irrigation infrastructure, mainly surface irrigation. But investment in rural 
electrification has also expanded and in turn stimulated investments into tube-
well technologies, thereby affecting crop productivity. Studies indicate that the 
increased use of irrigation and the spread of high-yielding crop varieties have 
been major sources of growth in Indian agriculture. This trend has continued, 
but a number of issues have emerged requiring immediate attention. Per capita 
demand for water is projected to increase markedly, but without commensurate 
increases in its availability. It is estimated that the latent demand for water for 
various purposes will far exceed availability by 2050, and other sectors (urban 
domestic, industries, etc.) will compete with agriculture for water (NAAS 2009). 
The first major issue for agriculture is the optimal use of surface irrigation 
(canal and tank irrigation) and increased technical efficiency in water use, which 
is currently estimated at about 25% to 35% in most irrigation systems (Planning 
Commission 2008). Substantial investment is needed for upgrades in irrigation 
infrastructure to reduce water losses. In addition, better distribution of irrigation 
water and recovery of irrigation charges are envisaged through participation of 
farmers in water user associations. These associations, in partnership with ir-
rigation departments, can effectively maintain irrigation channels, manage water 
distribution at the farm level, and recover costs from member farmers. Successful 
joint management has yet to materialize, especially in terms of cost recovery.
The second major issue is improvement of water use efficiency through 
water-saving technologies like drip and sprinkler irrigation and conservation ag-
ricultural practices (zero tillage and aerobic rice). These technologies can reduce 
pressure on groundwater irrigation. Technological advancements are also needed 
to address poor quality water. A large part of India (northwest plains and coasts) 
is facing the problem of salt-affected water, and any technological advancement 
to reclaim and use this and other poor quality water will help sustain crop pro-
ductivity in these regions. Besides technological options, policy and institutional 
options are needed to control groundwater depletion. The state of Punjab has en-
acted a ban on summer paddy, a crop that is transplanted in May, while Haryana 
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has withdrawn price supports for summer paddy. There is also a move to shift to 
volumetric pricing of electricity for tubewell irrigation to control water extraction.
4.3. Agricultural R&D
The creation of a strong R&D system for agriculture has been an important 
policy goal of the Government of India. As a result, India is one of the few devel-
oping countries to sustain a positive rate of growth in real public investment in 
agricultural research. Research funding increased from 0.3% of agricultural GDP 
in 1971 to more than 0.5% in 2004 for both agricultural research and education, 
and all signs point to a continuation of this uptrend. India has seen two structural 
changes in funding and the use of this investment. First, the central government’s 
share of funding has risen over time and now accounts for nearly half of total 
funding. Second, allocation to the dryland regions, for such things as natural re-
source management research and livestock development, has been increasing. The 
only region that continues to receive low investment is the eastern region, where 
funding by state governments is very low. Another noteworthy trend is that an 
increasing amount of funding is being allocated competitively, thus opening up ac-
cess to funding to a broader set of public institutions (Pal and Byerlee 2003).
Besides raising the amount of public investment, the government, through 
the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), has addressed organiza-
tional issues to enhance research effectiveness. The government has made a 
number of policy reforms recently, and the focus is now on accelerating the pace 
of implementation of these reforms. Highlights of these institutional reforms are
• strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of institutes and their pro-
grams and the use of information communication technology in research 
management;
• strengthening the research and development continuum through stronger 
linkages between research, technology transfer, and end-users; and
• managing intellectual property for rapid transfer of technology and foster-
ing partnership among actors in R&D, especially between the public and 
private sectors.
Management of intellectual property rights (IPRs) represents a major shift 
in R&D, and these measures warrant further elaboration. India has put in place 
legislation to comply with the agreements related to IPRs under the World Trade 
Organization. Among these, protection of plant varieties, farmers’ rights, and 
other innovations are of great significance to agriculture. ICAR has established a 
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unit for IPRs management and has developed IPRs policy and guidelines for their 
implementation. The main elements of the policy are as follows:
• ICAR will seek and maintain ownership rights for all intellectual proper-
ties, such as plant varieties, process and product innovations, research 
data, computer programs, designs, and publications, generated by its in-
stitutes.
• ICAR will encourage its institutes to use IPR policy to accelerate tech-
nology flow to farmers, promote competitive markets for innovations/
technologies, especially in the private domain, and promote inclusive and 
sustainable agricultural growth.
• ICAR will offer incentives for innovation by sharing the benefits of re-
search with researchers, entrepreneurs, and farmers.
With the establishment of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act, a large number of extant and new varieties have been registered for 
protection. These varieties are being commercialized through partnership with 
state and private seed agencies. In addition, efforts are being made to conserve 
and protect genetic resources through in situ and ex situ measures. ICAR also en-
courages conservation of animal and fish genetic resources by registering species.
Networking and partnership for pooling of resources, expertise, and skills 
are important for generating synergies in research. This concept is promoted 
through a number of network projects involving ICAR institutes and other insti-
tutions. These projects are in high-priority research areas and complement the 
network of coordinated research projects in India. 
The private sector role in many facets of agriculture has expanded, from sup-
plying inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, animal feed, etc.), to product marketing 
and value chain development, to commercialization of technologies. For instance, 
the private sector provides 58% of total commercial seeds (Planning Commission 
2008). The non-profit private sector, such as research foundations and civil society 
organizations, is also active in agricultural development, including R&D. All of 
these organizations will increasingly depend on public R&D organizations for a 
variety of support. ICAR has instituted initiatives to foster partnerships with pri-
vate and civil society organizations. These efforts have been accelerated to promote 
partnership with the private sector under externally funded projects of the World 
Bank. An emphasis on commercialization of technologies is also encouraging part-
nership with the private sector, whereby public research institutions license their 
technologies to the private sector on a non-exclusive basis. 
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4.4. Use of Inputs
Table 11.9 illustrates the rapid uptake of new seed and fertilizer technol-
ogy during the green revolution. Average per hectare use of fertilizer doubled in 
every decade from 1971 to 1991. Subsequently the rate of increase was not as 
high but was still impressive; in fact, in absolute terms the increase in the ap-
plication rate of fertilizer during the 1990s equaled that of the 1970s. Currently, 
the average rate of fertilizer application is 113 kg/ha, which is still much below 
the recommended level. Another notable feature of fertilizer use is that there is 
considerable interregional variation, especially in irrigated areas. For example, 
in the Punjab, average fertilizer use is as high as 209 kg/ha. Nitrogen fertilizer is 
most commonly used by farmers, with a high imbalance in the use of other plant 
nutrients (e.g., phosphorus and potassium). Recently, the government has pro-
vided price subsidies to encourage a more balanced use of plant nutrients. Simi-
lar trends are echoed in the use of other purchased inputs, and this is somewhat 
reflected by the growth in institutional credit to agriculture.
Private investment in farm mechanization and tubewell irrigation has been 
another major driver of economic growth. There were only 148,000 tractors in 
India in 1971 (Table 11.9). The number rose to more than two million tractors 
by 2006. Similarly, the share of cropped area irrigated by tubewells increased 
from 16.6% in 1971 to 26% in 1981, and rose further to 44% in 2006. This in-
vestment in farm mechanization and irrigation has not only contributed to an 
increase in crop productivity but also has helped raise the intensity of cropping. 
Another advantage of the expansion of tubewell irrigation has been a greater 
 1971 1981 1991 2001 2006
Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 16.5 34.24 69.84 91.13 113.26
Number of tractors 
(000)a 
148.2 275.9 738.4 1,221.8 2,361.2
Share of tubewells in 
irrigated area (%) 
16.63 26.2 38.42 40.84 43.86 
Quality seed 
distribution 
(000 tons) 
n.a. 450 575 918 1,550 
Institutional credit 
(Rs/ha) 
53.58 232.42 631.39 3,261.40 10,544.45 
Table 11.9. Inputs use in Indian agriculture, 1971-2006
Source: MoA (various issues).
aData pertain to 1972, 1977, 1987, 1992, and 2003, respectively.
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stability in crop yields, thereby reducing the size of government interventions to 
maintain buffer stock. However, as with fertilizer use, the most disquieting fea-
ture of farm mechanization and irrigation is that these developments have been 
mostly concentrated in the northwestern region of the country (in states such as 
Punjab and Haryana). This has led to charges of over-investment in mechaniza-
tion (which results in a higher cost of production and lower farm income), and 
overuse of irrigation water in this region has led to questions about the long-
term sustainability of the rice-wheat production system in this part of India. 
One recent development concerning input use and crop establishment 
practices has been the adoption of resource conservation agriculture, mainly in 
the rice-wheat system. The most widely adopted technology is direct sowing of 
wheat after paddy in untilled fields, which is known as zero tillage. Estimates 
place more than three million hectares under zero-till wheat in 2005. The main 
advantages of this technology are (a) tractor fuel savings and a reduction in car-
bon emissions; (b) savings in the use of irrigation water, mainly groundwater; 
(c) carbon sequestration and low or delayed carbon dioxide emissions; and (d) a 
reduction in herbicide use (Laxmi, Erenstein, and Gupta 2007). 
4.5. Price Support and Terms of Trade
Government interventions in providing price support to farmers and im-
proving the physical and economic access of poor consumers to food have been 
important elements of agricultural price policy in India since 1965 when the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP, formerly the Agricultural 
Price Commission) was established. The government procures food grains at a 
predetermined price called the Minimum Support Price announced by the gov-
ernment on the recommendation of the CACP. Although the price is announced 
for two dozen commodities, there is procurement of only a few select commodi-
ties (rice and wheat). The commodities are distributed to the public at a price 
lower than market price through fair price shops managed by the state govern-
ments. Part of the stock is used as a buffer to reduce temporal variations in avail-
ability of food grains. 
These government interventions have been successful in improving food ac-
cess and ensuring a fairly stable price environment. This in turn has encouraged 
farmers to adopt new technology and use modern inputs and crop practices and 
thereby helps improve crop productivity, which in turn strengthens national 
food security, which is a significant impact of agricultural price policy (Acharya 
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1997). This, coupled with other interventions, such as development of market 
infrastructure and regulation of markets to control exploitative practices of trad-
ers, has helped in providing incentives to farmers and reducing margins in the 
market. This effect has been so significant that some observers have charged that 
the government has discouraged private corporate participation in food grain 
markets (Chand 2003). However, because government operations are confined to 
so few food grain surplus states, there is tremendous opportunity for the corpo-
rate sector to participate in food grain trade.
With the demand side of the Indian food economy developing rapidly, a 
number of initiatives have been enacted recently to attract corporate investment 
in agricultural marketing. An act prohibiting direct purchase of produce from 
farmers by traders was relaxed, and model legislation was prepared in 2003 to 
allow participation of the corporate sector. Since then, most states have adopted 
this legislation, and some private firms are directly procuring produce from 
farmers. Some firms have established terminal markets,4 mainly for high-value 
commodities like fruits and vegetables, while others are procuring produce from 
farmers through dissemination of market information using informational tech-
nology (for example, the e-Choupal program of ITC Limited). Another related 
development has been the practice of contract farming, in which a processing or 
agricultural company enters into a contract with farmers to purchase produce 
at a pre-agreed price. The company also provides crop information, inputs on 
credit, and other support for better yields and produce quality. Although there 
have been some instances of both companies and farmers failing to comply with 
contracts, the arrangements have worked well, especially for high-value com-
modities (Joshi, Gulati, and Cummings 2007). 
In addition to these major policy changes, several other market reforms initi-
ated by the government have improved the discovery and stability of agricultural 
prices. These reforms relate to relaxation of control over movement and storage of 
food grains and of futures markets, attracting investment in market infrastructure 
and agro-processing, and liberalization of trade. Although the impact of these re-
forms will not be clear for some time, all signs point to improvement in incentives 
for farmers. The domestic terms of trade (i.e., farm output to input prices) did not 
favor agriculture during the 1980s but started to improve in the early 1990s. Also, 
4These are professionally managed enterprises that provide complete market services to farmers 
at their door step and operate in hub-and-spoke format.
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domestic agricultural commodity prices have remained much more stable than 
international prices, which have shown a high degree of volatility. A stable price 
environment and better incentives will encourage farmers to invest in productivity-
enhancing inputs and practices and thereby contribute to agricultural growth. 
5. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY
Notwithstanding the impressive performance of Indian agriculture in the 
past, there are a number of challenges which, if not addressed, in time may hold 
back not only the agricultural sector but also the entire Indian economy. We 
have seen this in the recent past when impressive economic growth but moder-
ate agricultural growth puts upward pressure on food prices and exacerbates 
rural-urban income disparities. The first and foremost challenge is to attain and 
sustain a target growth of 4% per year in agricultural output as envisaged by 
the Planning Commission. This growth should be inclusive and geographically 
widespread in terms of participation of smallholders and those in marginal pro-
duction environments. Most of this growth will be realized through higher pro-
ductivity through the application of modern technology. However, participation 
of smallholders will also entail institutional innovations to enable aggregation of 
their production and to link them with markets.
The second most important challenge is to address the vulnerability of Indian 
agricultural production. Currently, two-thirds of agricultural lands are rain-fed 
and subject to the vagaries of weather and other vulnerabilities. This vulnerabil-
ity is further accentuated by the degradation and depletion of natural resources, 
which are also seen in irrigated production environments (NAAS 2009 ). A two-
pronged strategy is needed. First, the severity and long-term implications of these 
challenges are not well understood by farmers. Therefore, a national program 
should be created to educate farmers about long-term sustainability issues. Sec-
ond, farmers should be empowered with the appropriate technologies to address 
sustainability and vulnerability concerns. This should be backed with policy in-
terventions to manage risk and strengthen social safety nets. 
Climate change is a recent challenge, and its likely impacts are becoming 
better understood and local responses are evolving. Responses include a contin-
ued partnership with the international community to assess the challenge as the 
events unfold and further work on adaptation and mitigation strategies consis-
tent with local realities. A considerable amount of resources will be needed for 
technological solutions and their adaptation by farmers and other stakeholders. 
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Finally, development of human capital is the key to innovation and accel-
eration of agricultural growth. The government should invest more in building 
this capacity within various government departments, development agencies, 
and with farmers. Efforts to accelerate the flow of technologies to farmers and 
improve their skills and ability to innovate will go a long way toward strengthen-
ing the long-term productive capacity of Indian agriculture. But this requires the 
mobilization of resources in the public and private sector, ensuring the participa-
tion of farmers, and encouraging technology-led solutions.
6. CONCLUSION
Despite the impressive performance of Indian agriculture during the period 
of the green revolution supported by significant public investments and associ-
ated institutional developments, agriculture has failed to meet its growth target 
over the last decade. However, if we exclude some years of abnormally adverse 
weather (specifically the years 2002-03 and 2004-05), an adjusted annual 
growth rate of more than 3% per year was sustained over the period 1997-98 to 
2008-09. This is a notable achievement, especially considering India’s severe re-
source and production environment constraints. The trend toward commercial-
ization and diversification of agriculture is increasing, and most of the growth 
in output in recent years was realized through productivity growth. Given the 
increasing demand for high-value commodities, as well as the need to produce 
more food grains to feed a still growing population, the goals of food security 
and diversification for high-value agriculture should be pursued through tech-
nological interventions. An increase in the productivity of food grains would en-
able land to be used to grow high-value crops like fruits and vegetables without 
compromising domestic food production. Continued government support for 
agricultural R&D and higher public investment in infrastructure are welcome 
steps in increasing productivity. Encouraging business interests in food and ag-
riculture and fostering institutional innovations to improve smallholders’ access 
to technology are current policy thrusts. A supportive policy environment with 
well-structured incentives can be a major driving force to promote innovation 
in agriculture, and lessons from any localized successes in this regard also need 
to be well understood and replicated. Enhanced efforts to sustain India’s natural 
resources, provide productive infrastructure through better technological and in-
stitutional solutions, and develop human capital capacity will help accelerate the 
country’s agricultural growth. 
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CHAPTER 12
Indonesia: From Food Security 
to Market-Led Agricultural Growth
Keith O. Fuglie
1. INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the twentieth century, rising output per hectare 
replaced expansion of cropland as the predominant source of agricultural 
growth in most of the world (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). This transition from 
agricultural extensification to intensification was particularly noticeable in 
Asia, where population density is relatively high and land scarcity is acute. 
Indonesia is something of a special case, possessing both very densely popu-
lated, land-scarce agriculture on Java, and relatively land-abundant agriculture 
elsewhere on the large islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. 
The country achieved considerable success in agriculture during the 1970s and 
1980s through the diffusion of high-yielding varieties of food crops, although 
this source of growth appeared to stagnate by the early 1990s (Fuglie 2004). 
Meanwhile, land devoted to agriculture continued to expand, with virtually all 
new cropland coming from Indonesia’s outer islands, and principally for tropi-
cal perennials like oil palm and cocoa. In this chapter, I examine the sources 
of agricultural growth in Indonesia over the 45 years from 1961 to 2006. I use 
a growth accounting method to examine how resource expansion, technologi-
Keith O. Fuglie is an economist with the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.
The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. 
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cal improvements, commodity diversification, and human capital contributed 
to growth in real agricultural output. 
The approach used in this chapter builds on my earlier work (2004), which 
was the first to develop a Tornqvist-Thiel index of total factor productivity 
(TFP) for Indonesian agriculture. The present work expands commodity cover-
age to include cultured fisheries in addition to crops and livestock. Cultured 
fisheries, an increasingly important component of agriculture in many Asian 
countries, compete directly with crops and livestock for land, labor, feed, and 
other resources but have been largely ignored in assessments of agricultural 
productivity. In addition, this work includes improved data on agricultural 
cropland with more complete coverage of land planted to tropical perenni-
als. Finally, the chapter develops a measure of labor force quality as a factor 
in production. In many developing countries in Asia, the rate of growth in the 
agricultural labor force has sharply declined or turned negative over the past 
several decades. However, labor force quality, in the form of higher literacy 
rates and universal primary education, has improved. Jamison and Lau (1982) 
compiled ample micro-level evidence to demonstrate the link between farmer 
education and agricultural productivity in developing countries; the present 
study accounts for the contribution of improvements in farmer education to 
productivity growth at the sector level. 
The Tornqvist-Thiel indexes of output, input, and productivity are measures 
of changes in the real economy and avoid the index number bias arising from 
the use of fixed weights in input and output aggregation. Some previous studies 
of agricultural productivity in Indonesia have used agricultural gross domestic 
product (GDP) as a measure of output (Van der Eng 1996; Mundlak, Butzer, and 
Larson 2004), but GDP confounds quantity and price effects on output growth 
and thus may not reflect true changes in productivity. Other studies have es-
timated Malmquist TFP indexes for Indonesia using the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) output and input quantity data (Arnade 1998; Suhariyanto 
2001; Coelli and Rao 2005). However, the FAO output measure is a Laspeyres 
index using a fixed set of international prices as weights to aggregate commodi-
ties and may result in biases if there are significant changes in relative prices or 
commodity mix over time (Fan and Zhang 2002). Moreover, the Malmquist in-
dex measure of agricultural TFP is sensitive to the dimensionality issue (e.g., the 
number of countries and input-output quantities included in the analysis) and 
may give implausible results (Lusigi and Thirtle 1997). 
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For this study I develop time series of output and input quantities and prices 
and use moving averages of revenue and cost shares to aggregate output and input 
quantities, respectively. Agricultural output is composed of 75 crop, animal, and 
fish commodities. The agricultural input index consists of 42 types of land, labor, 
capital, and intermediate inputs used in crop, livestock, and aquaculture produc-
tion. The Tornqvist-Thiel TFP index is given by the ratio of aggregate output to input 
quantities, and thus TFP rises when the growth in the quantity of outputs exceeds 
the growth in the quantity of inputs. TFP is the residual component of growth after 
accounting for changes in factor inputs. It can be interpreted as a measure of the gain 
in efficiency with which inputs are used, including technological progress. 
In the next section, I review the role of agriculture in Indonesia’s economy and 
provide detail on changes in agricultural production and input use over time. 
2. AGRICULTURE IN THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY
2.1. Agriculture’s Contribution to GDP, Employment, and Trade
Indonesia is a Southeast Asian archipelago consisting of some 17,500 equato-
rial islands (6,000 inhabited) stretching in an east-west direction for over 5,000 
kilometers. It has a land area of 1.83 million square kilometers supporting in 
2005 a population of 221 million (the fourth-largest in the world), which was 
growing at about 1.4% per annum. 
The extent of structural changes in the Indonesian economy between 1965 
and 2005 is shown in Table 12.1. The population more than doubled over this 
period. Real GDP increased by about 10 times and real per capita income by 
about 480%. By 2005, Indonesia had a per capita income of $3,209 (2005 inter-
national dollars) and was classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income 
country. Large changes have occurred in the sectoral shares of GDP, with agri-
culture’s share declining from 56% to 17%, accompanied by significant increases 
in the shares of the services sector (now the dominant sector with a 40% share 
in 2005); manufacturing (25%); and mining, oil, and gas (19%). Agriculture’s 
share of total employment also declined, from nearly 70% in 1965 to 44% in 
2005. It still remains the dominant sector of employment. While Indonesia’s 
economy has become much more dependent on trade overall, agriculture’s share 
in total merchandise exports fell from 57% to 20% between 1965 and 1975 but 
has fluctuated at around 20% since then. 
Broad trends in the agricultural sector are shown in Table 12.2. Real agricul-
tural GDP nearly tripled between 1961-65 and 2001-05 and averaged $95 bil-
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lion (2005 international dollars) per year during 2001-05, making Indonesia the 
fifth-largest agricultural producer in the world (WDI Online). Food crops (par-
ticularly rice) constitute the largest component of agricultural output, but food 
crops’ share of total output has gradually declined over time.
Rice production dominates the food-crop sector, and production increased four 
and a half times between 1961 and 2005, mainly as a result of yield increases. Adop-
tion of modern varieties and fertilizers played an important role in securing higher 
yields. Rice remains the staple food, and national self-sufficiency carries great politi-
cal significance. Estate crops, such as rubber, oil palm, sugarcane, and cacao, are 
becoming an increasingly important component of Indonesia’s agricultural sector. 
Livestock and aquaculture production are also growing rapidly in response to the 
rising demand for animal protein, commensurate with rising per capita incomes.
According to the Indonesian Agricultural Census (done every 10 years since 
1963), the number of farm households steadily increased between 1963 and 
2003 in both Java and elsewhere, reaching a total of nearly 25 million house-
holds in 2003. According to census figures, average farm size has been decreas-
ing in Indonesia, to about 0.4 hectares per household in Java and 1.3 hectares 
Table 12.1. Agriculture in the Indonesian economy since 1965
Sources: WDI Online, except for agricultural exports. Agricultural exports include crop, animal, 
fish and seafood, wood and plywood products and are from the UN Comtrade Database. 
Indicators 1965 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005
Population (millions) 105 133 163 193 206 221
Per capita income (2005 
international dollars) 
663 1,032 1,616 2,816 2,724 3,209
Gross domestic product 
   (billions of 2005  
 international dollars)    
69 137 263 543 562 708 
Share of GDP (percent) 
  
Agriculture 56 30 23 17 17 17
Services 31 36 41 41 37 40
Manufacturing 8 10 16 24 25 25
Mining, Oil, and Gas 4 24 20 18 21 19
Share of employment (percent) 
 
Agriculture 69 62 55 44 45 44
Industry 7 8 13 18 18 18
Services 24 30 32 48 37 38
Trade as share of GDP (percent) 11 45 43 54 71 64 
Ag share of total merchandise 
exports (percent) 
57 20 21 27 16 18
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per household outside of Java. The landholdings reported by the Agricultural 
Census include land in annual crops but exclude land in estate crops (although 
most estate crops are grown by smallholders), so these figures underestimate av-
erage agricultural landholdings per household. 
Many household members that depend on agriculture do not own land of their 
own (or have only very small holdings) and work as laborers on other farms or cor-
porate estates. Daily agricultural wages, measured in terms of the amount of rice 
afforded, rose more than six-fold between 1961-65 and 2001-05. Part of this rise in 
real wages can be attributed to Indonesia’s success in raising its domestic rice sup-
ply, making rice more plentiful and cheap. Part of the rise in real agricultural wag-
es is also due to growth in non-farm wages and a rising opportunity cost of labor. 
Since the 1990s (earlier data are not available), trade in agricultural com-
modities has played an increasingly important role for Indonesia. The share of 
exports as a percentage of agricultural GDP rose from 24% in the early 1990s to 
37% in 2001-05 while the value of agricultural imports rose from 11% to 14% 
of agricultural GDP (Table 12.2). Table 12.3 gives three snapshots (1976, 1996, 
and 2006) of the changing composition and value of major agricultural trade 
products. By 2006, oil palm products had replaced plywood and rubber as the 
dominant agricultural export. Fish, shrimp, cocoa, and coffee were other major 
export earners. For food and agricultural imports, in the 1960s Indonesia was 
the world’s largest importer of rice, but by 2006, wheat, sugar, cotton, and feed 
grains (corn, soybeans, etc.) had become far more significant import items than 
rice. Indonesia enjoys a positive trade balance in food and agricultural products.
2.2. Changing Composition of Agricultural Outputs and Inputs
Table 12.4 describes the growth and composition of agricultural output 
and input use in Indonesia. Output figures are measured in terms of millions of 
tons of “rice equivalents” produced per year, averaged over a five-year period. To 
obtain rice equivalents, the output of each commodity is multiplied by its price 
relative to that year’s price of (unmilled) rice and then aggregated across com-
modities (in other words, the price of paddy rice is a numéraire price). Thus, dur-
ing 2001-05, Indonesian farmers produced a gross output of 143.6 million tons 
of rice equivalents annually, of which 52 million tons was rice itself. Oil palm 
was the second most important commodity, with gross production of palm oil 
and palm kernel oil together worth an equivalent of 10 million tons of rice. The 
importance of oil palm to the Indonesian agricultural sector is relatively new, 
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having increased by a factor of six just over the last decade. Cocoa, horticultural 
crops, animal products, and aquaculture were other fast-growing components of 
the agricultural sector. Rice production grew rapidly during the green revolution 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s, but growth in rice and other food crop produc-
tion slowed after 1990. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Indonesia added significant 
amounts of land, labor, and other inputs to agriculture (Table 12.4). Cropland 
expanded by an average of 1.4% per year during 1961-2005 and was still grow-
ing by more than 1% per year in the 2001-05. Figure 12.1 shows trends in 
cropland for densely populated Java and for other islands since 1961. While Java 
constitutes only 7% of Indonesia’s land area, it holds about 60% of the nation’s 
population and in 2000 had a population density of 856 persons/km2 (BPS, 
Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia). Virtually all of the expansion of cropland since 
1961 has occurred outside of Java, especially on the islands of Kalimantan, Su-
matra, and Sulawesi. Nationally, agricultural cropland expanded to 38 million 
hectares by 2005. Irrigation had been extended to 4.8 million hectares and cov-
ered about 60% of the wetland rice (sawah) area, or about 23% of total cropland. 
Land resources devoted to aquaculture (brackish and freshwater ponds) grew 
Figure 12.1. Agricultural cropland in Indonesia (million hectares)
Source: BPS Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, supplemented by data from Van der Eng (1996) 
and MOA.
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from 0.3 million hectares to 0.7 million hectares between 1961-65 and 2001-05, 
with expansion of ponds accelerating over time. But the largest increase in crop-
land was for estate crops. The new estimates of area planted (including area in 
immature trees) show that estate cropland grew from 4.6 million hectares in the 
early 1960s to over 18 million hectares by 2006. By the late 1990s, oil palm had 
replaced rubber and coconut as the dominant estate crop and by 2006 accounted 
for about one-third of the total area in estate crops. About 14 million hectares 
out of a total of 18 million hectares in estate crops were held by smallholders 
with 1-2 hectares of estates and the rest by large private and state-owned planta-
tion companies (MOA).
FAO reports that the number of persons employed in agriculture in Indo-
nesia grew from 28 million to 51 million persons between 1961-65 and 2001-
05 and was still growing by about 0.6% per year in 2001-05. However, many 
of these persons only work part-time in farming, earning a large share of their 
household income from non-farm activities. In densely populated Java, time 
spent in farming per agricultural worker probably declined over time, as census 
data has shown that the share of non-farm income in the total income of farm 
households has risen (Booth 2002). However, outside of Java, area in crops ex-
panded more rapidly than the agricultural labor force so that area farmed per 
worker rose (Van der Eng 1996). In these regions, average time spent farming 
per worker may have increased, as mechanization levels remained very low. This 
is where most of the expansion in estate crop production occurred, and, unlike 
annual crops for which labor demand tends to be seasonal, labor required in 
tree-crop production is often more evenly spaced throughout the year. Oil palm 
bunches, for example, ripen continuously throughout the year and need to be se-
lected and picked manually when ripe. It is difficult to say how per capita labor 
allocated to agriculture may have trended nationally, but it is worth noting that 
cropland per capita grew, from about 0.8 ha per person in 1960-65 to 1.1 ha per 
person in 2000-05 (Table 12.2). 
Use of manufactured inputs used in agriculture, such as fertilizer, machinery, 
and animal feed, grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s but from almost negligible 
initial levels. Fertilizer use increased by 11% per year during 1961-1980, when 
high-yielding, fertilizer-responsive varieties of rice were widely adopted and the 
government introduced subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides. The level of fertil-
izer subsidy was as much as 50% from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s but then 
gradually declined and ended in 1999 (although subsequently it was reintroduced 
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but at a relatively modest level). Average fertilizer application reached 105 kg/ha of 
harvested area by 2005 but was still low by international or even Asian standards 
(Mundlak, Butzer, and Larson 2004). Adoption of farm machinery accelerated af-
ter 1970, first for mechanical rice millers that replaced hand pounding and more 
recently for two-wheel walking tractors that are beginning to replace draft animals 
in tillage operations. However, the ratio of tractor horsepower to workers remained 
very low compared with other Asian countries like China and India. By 2002, 
there was only about 1 tractor in use per 250 farm households.
3. YIELD TRENDS
In this section, I examine yield trends of agricultural land and labor. I first 
describe resource productivity trends for the sector as a whole and compare land 
and labor productivity trajectories between densely populated Java and other 
land-abundant regions of the country. I then show yield trends for specific ag-
ricultural commodities over the 1961-2007 period, starting with food and hor-
ticultural crops. Nearly all of these crops are produced by farm families, most 
possessing less than two hectares of land. Next, I examine yield trends in estate 
crops and compare productivity levels between large plantations and smallholder 
estates. There is a wide range in the scale of estate holdings in Indonesia, from 
smallholders operating 1-2 hectares to large corporate and state farms that may 
operate over 100,000 hectares. The relation between scale and productivity in 
estate crop production has received considerable policy attention in Indonesia, 
as smallholder tree-crop producers are thought to have generally lagged behind 
large estates in technology, management, and yield (Barlow and Tomich 1991; 
Hartemink 2005). I compare yield and yield trends between smallholders and 
large estates for those commodities for which both have significant shares in pro-
duction. Finally, I examine some productivity indicators for animal and cultured 
fish production, namely, meat and milk produced per head of stock and fish per 
hectare of area in ponds.
3.1. Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity
Hayami and Ruttan (1985) hypothesized that countries with different resource 
endowments would follow different paths of technological development in agricul-
ture. Population-dense (land-scarce) Asian countries, they argued, would develop 
and adopt land-saving technologies like high-yielding crop varieties and fertilizers. 
Indonesia represents something of a special case, possessing both densely popu-
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lated agricultural areas, mainly in Java, and large but sparsely populated regions in 
other islands. Figure 12.2 plots the trends in land and labor productivity (averaged 
over five-year intervals) for each decade from 1961-65 through 2001-05. Plotted 
along the vertical axis is average output per hectare of cropland while the horizon-
tal axis shows output per worker. The plots show the productivity trajectories for 
Java and non-Java regions of the country as well as the average for the country as 
a whole. In Java, land and labor productivity both grew substantially between the 
1960s and 2001-05, as farmers intensified production, first through green revolu-
tion rice technologies and later by shifting more resources into higher-valued hor-
ticultural, livestock, and aquaculture commodities. Land per worker fell over time 
as the agricultural population grew while agricultural land fell. On other islands 
(Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, primarily), expansion of land area was the 
primary source of growth, and land productivity hardly improved. Labor produc-
tivity increased, however, as the average cropland per worker rose. While the aver-
age productivity of farmland has been much higher on Java, the increasing area 
Figure 12.2. Land and labor production in Java and non-Java regions of 
Indonesia
Source: Author’s estimates using data from BPS Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, MOA and Van 
der Eng (1996).
Notes: RE = rice-equivalent value of total crop and livestock production. The points are the 
average annual values over the indicated five-year period. 
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worked per farm on non-Java islands served to close the gap in labor productivity 
between these regions. 
3.2. Food Crops
Yield trends for rice and other food and horticultural crops are given in Table 
12.5. Rice, which alone accounts for about half of the gross value of agricultural 
output, benefited considerably from dissemination of high-yielding green revolu-
tion varieties in the 1970s and 1980s. There are about 8 million ha of wetland 
paddy area (4.5 million ha of which are irrigated) and 1 million ha of upland 
(unterraced) rice area in Indonesia. Much of the irrigated area is double-cropped, 
and total rice area harvested reached 11 million ha by 2005. Between the 1960s 
and 1980s, average yield per hectare of harvested area doubled from 1.9 tons/
ha to 4.0 tons/ha. But yield growth slowed markedly in the 1990s, and rising 
to only 4.5 tons/ha by 2001-07. Growth in yield accounted for more than two-
thirds of the total growth in rice production over most of the 1961-2007 period, 
with growth in area harvested accounting for the other third. Presently, the gov-
ernment of Indonesia is cooperating with a number of private breeding compa-
nies to develop hybrid rice varieties in an effort to raise yield. 
Corn and cassava are the second most important food crops in Indonesia 
and are staple foods in certain regions of the country. They are also important co-
staples with rice for poor households as well as used for animal feed and starch 
production. These crops (and other secondary food crops) are mostly grown on 
rain-fed cropland. Corn yield started to increase in the 1970s and has experienced 
steady growth, doubling from 1.2 tons/ha in 1971-80 to 3.3 tons/ha in 2001-07 as 
improved hybrid varieties became widely adopted (Table 12.5). Cassava yield has 
also grown, although yield growth has been uneven over time. Some improved 
varieties have been developed but adoption rates remain low, restricted mainly 
to Lampung Province in Sumatra where cassava is used by agro-processors to 
produce commercial starch and animal feed. Area planted to cassava has trended 
downward, so that production has grown at a slower rate than yield. 
There has been virtually no yield growth in soybeans and mungbeans since 
the 1960s, with yield of both crops averaging around 1 ton/ha. Groundnuts, on 
the other hand, have seen some modest yield growth of about 1% per year, to 
rise from 1.2 tons/ha in the 1960s to 2.0 tons/ha in 2001-07. These crops are 
often grown in rain-fed paddy fields during the dry season following the rice 
harvest or in upland fields. 
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Vegetable and fruit production has grown rapidly in Indonesia, especially since 
the 1980s. Growth in per capita income has increased the demand for high-valued 
fruits and vegetables. Principal vegetable crops include chilies, shallots, potatoes, 
and cabbages. Temperate zone vegetables like potatoes and cabbages are grown 
in cool tropical highlands. Yield improved following adoption of improved variet-
ies, better-quality seed, fertilizers, and pesticides. Principal fruit crops include 
bananas, mangoes, oranges, and papayas. Typically, farmers grow many varieties 
of these fruits for home consumption and market sales. Average yield of fruits has 
improved somewhat as farmers have increased commercial fruit production. 
3.3. Estate Crops
Estate crops have played an important role in the Indonesia archipelago since 
the sixteenth century, when the country was the sole source of global supply of 
exotic spices like nutmeg, cloves, and pepper. In the nineteenth century, Indonesia 
emerged as a leading exporter of sugar and coffee. In the early twentieth century, 
colonial and smallholder estates responded to the raw material demands of the 
emerging global auto industry by greatly expanding area in rubber production, and 
by the 1920s rubber had become the dominant export crop of Indonesia (Kano 
2008). Export-oriented estate production suffered a major reversal when commod-
ity prices collapsed during the Great Depression. Production was further disrupted 
by World War II and the War of Independence (1945-49), although it began a 
modest recovery in the 1950s until foreign estates were nationalized in 1957. In the 
1970s the government of Indonesia initiated major programs to expand estate crop 
production, especially in sparsely populated regions of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Su-
lawesi and Papua. A “transmigration” program resettled farm families from densely 
populated Java, and elsewhere to these regions. A “nucleus-estate” program pro-
vided corporations with subsidized capital and long-term leases to public lands for 
estate crop production, on condition that these companies provide technical and 
marketing services to smallholder estates surrounding the company plantations. 
Nucleus estate schemes were especially important for the oil palm industry, which 
greatly expanded after 1980. By 1999, oil palm became the dominant estate crop, 
surpassing both rubber and coconut in total area planted. The government of In-
donesia estimates that more than 7.2 million ha were planted to oil palm in 2009, 
accounting for about one-third of the total area in estate crops. Cocoa also has also 
undergone a major expansion since the 1980s, with area planted rising from less 
than 40,000 ha in 1980 to an estimated 1.47 million ha in 2009. 
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While smallholders dominate production of a number of estate crops, both 
smallholders and large private and state-owned companies participate in the 
production of oil palm, rubber, cocoa, sugarcane, and tea. Table 12.6 shows the 
percentages of total area planted by smallholders for these commodities and 
compares the average yields obtained on smallholder farms and large estates 
over time. Smallholders have dominated rubber production (with over 80% of 
total area) since before the 1960s and account for nearly all of the growth in co-
coa area since 1980. Large estates (mostly privately owned) account for most of 
the area in oil palm, but the role of smallholder producers has steadily risen. By 
2001-07, smallholders accounted for 40% of the total area planted to oil palm in 
Indonesia. State-owned estates play a major role in tea and sugarcane produc-
tion, and shares of smallholders in these crops have fluctuated over time but 
show no pronounced trend. 
While family-owned or managed farms are the dominant (and most efficient) 
form of farm structure, Binswanger and McIntire (1987) identify conditions un-
der which large corporate estates may achieve economies in agricultural produc-
tion. Large estates can usually access lower-cost capital and thus will have some 
cost advantages over smallholders (at least initially) in crops for which a signifi-
cant capital investment with a long payoff period is required, such as with tree 
crops. Large estates may also have advantages with certain crops that require 
close coordination between harvesting and processing due to rapid perishability 
of the harvest. Crops that fit this category include oil palm fruit, sugarcane, and 
tea leaves. However, large estates also have disadvantages, particularly in the 
management and oversight of labor. Hired labor is likely to have weaker incen-
tives than family labor to perform myriad farm tasks in a timely and efficient 
manner. 
Table 12.6 indicates that while smallholders initially had smaller yields than 
large estates, the yield gaps have diminished over time. By 2001-07, average 
smallholder yields in oil palm, sugarcane, and cocoa approached or exceeded av-
erage yields on large estates. Only in rubber and tea production did large estates 
obtain consistently better yields than smallholders. However, the lower average 
yield of smallholder rubber growers partly reflects lower tree density on these 
farms rather than yield per tree. Unlike large estates, which emphasize mono-
cropping, smallholder estates typically use a mixed cropping system in which 
rubber trees are planted with lower density to accommodate other species of 
crops on the same land (Tomich et al. 2001). 
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3.4. Livestock and Fisheries
Table 12.7 shows production and yield trends for meat, milk, and aqua-
culture in Indonesia. Rising per capita income has increased demand for these 
products domestically while shrimp is an important export item. Meat produc-
tion doubled between the 1970s and 1980s, and more than doubled again by 
2001-06 to more than 2.2 million tons per year. The total stock of animals, 
measured in “cattle equivalents” averaged 34 million head in 2001-06.1 The 
fastest-growing component of meat production has been for poultry. Advances 
in production efficiency, particularly in commercial broiler production, have 
steadily increased annual meat production per head of cattle-equivalent animal 
from 40 kg/head in the 1970s to 66 kg/head in 2001-06. 
Dairy is a relatively small industry in Indonesia but has grown over time, espe-
cially between the 1970s and 1990s. Improved breeds, feed, and veterinary care has 
helped raise milk output per cow. During 2001-06, each cow produced on average 
1,471 liters of milk per year, more than double the average milk yield in the 1970s. 
Table 12.7. Production and yield trends in meat, milk, and fish production
Sources: Meat and milk statistics from FAOSTAT. Fisheries statistics from BPS Statistical Yearbook 
of Indonesia.
Commodity 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-06 
Meat  (annual average over period) 
 Production (thousand tons) 551 1,068 1,803 2,233 
Animal stock (million cattle 
equivalents) 14 22 31 34 
 Yield (kg per head of stock) 40 50 58 66 
Milk       
 Production (million liters) 53 209 403 536 
 Milking cows (thousand head) 85 216 331 364 
 Yield (liters per cow) 627 967 1,215 1,471 
Cultured fisheries (brackish & freshwater)    
 Production (thousand tons) 161 344 648 1,062
Area in ponds, cages, and paddy 
fields (thousand ha) 
267 370 548 736 
 Yield (kg per hectare) 602 930 1,181 1,442 
Capture fisheries (marine & inland)     
Production (thousand tons) 1,489 2,502 4,210 5,645 
1“Cattle equivalents” are estimated by weighting various species of livestock and poultry by their 
size relative to cattle. Weights are from Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and are as follows: cattle = 
1.00, buffalo and horses = 1.25, pigs = 0.25, small ruminants = 0.13, and poultry = 0.0125. 
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Fish production is an important industry in the Indonesian archipelago. 
Although marine and inland capture fisheries account for most fish production, 
output from capture fisheries has stagnated and growth in fish production now 
comes almost entirely from cultured fisheries. By 2001-06, farmers had devel-
oped over 700,000 hectares of ponds, which produced more than 1 million tons 
of fish and shrimp, or about 16% of total fisheries output in Indonesia (BPS, Sta-
tistical Yearbook of Indonesia). Output per hectare of land in ponds also rose over 
time, because of adoption of technologies that allowed shrimp and other species 
to be farmed in higher densities. Since 2001, white shrimp (Penaeus vannamei) 
have largely replaced black tiger prawns (P. monoden) in Indonesia and other 
Asian fisheries as a result of advances in white shrimp pathogen-free propagation 
and breeding methods (Shaun Moss, Oceanic Institute, Hawaii Pacific University, 
personal communication 2008). 
4. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY OF INDONESIAN AGRICULTURE
In a multi-output, multi-input enterprise like agriculture, land and labor 
productivity trends like those described in the previous section give an imperfect 
measure of technical change, since they are also influenced by how intensively 
other inputs are used in production. In this section, I develop a measure of total 
factor productivity for the agricultural sector as a whole. Changes in TFP reflect 
an improvement in efficiency with which all inputs are employed and provide a 
more robust measure of technical change in the sector. 
4.1. Methodology
For assessing changes in TFP, I construct Tornqvist-Thiel indexes of ag-
gregate output and input quantities, and then take the ratio of these as an index 
of TFP. In other words, TFP measures the average product of all inputs. Let the 
total quantity of outputs be given by Y and the total quantity inputs by X. Then 
TFP is simply
 .YTFP X=  (1)
Changes in TFP are found by comparing the rate of change in total output 
with the rate of change in total input. Expressed as logarithms, changes in equa-
tion (1) over time can be written as
 = −
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
.
d TFP d Y d X
dt dt dt
 (2)
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Since X and Y are composed of multiple inputs and outputs, an aggregation 
procedure is needed to construct the index. Solow (1957) showed that under the 
assumptions that (i) producers maximize profits and (ii) markets are in long-run 
competitive equilibrium, then equation (2) can be written as
 
1 1 1− − −
    
= −             
∑ ∑, ,
, ,
ln ln lni t j tt i j
i jt i t j t
Y XTFP
R S
TFP Y X
 (3)
where Ri is the revenue share of the ith output and Sj is the cost-share of the jth 
input. Output growth is estimated by summing over the output growth rates 
for each commodity after multiplying each by its revenue share. Similarly, input 
growth is found by summing the growth rate of each input, weighting each by 
its cost share. TFP growth is just the difference between the growth in aggregate 
output and aggregate input. A discrete time approximation of the Divisia index 
given in equation (3) is the Tornqvist-Thiel productivity index:
 ( ) ( )1 1
1 1 12 2
− −
− − −
+ +    
= −             
∑ ∑, , , ,, ,
, ,
ln ln ln .
i t i t j t j ti t j tt
i jt i t j t
R R S SY XTFP
TFP Y X
 (4)
Denny and Fuss (1983) showed that the Tornqvist-Thiel TFP index in equation 
(4) can be derived from a translog production function that exhibits Hicks-
neutral technical change. Because the translog is a flexible function form, the 
Tornqvist-Thiel index provides a superior measure of productivity change than 
alternatives that assume a more restrictive production relationship.
A further modification of the index construction is to account for changes 
in labor quality over time. I construct a labor quality index based on the average 
schooling level achievement of the male and female agricultural labor force. Spe-
cifically, let Lt* = λt Lt, where Lt* is the observed number of work days in year t, 
λt is a quality indictor of educational achievement, and Lt is the labor force mea-
sured in constant-quality units. Using a Mincerian-type earnings function, the 
labor force quality indicator is specified as
 ( )λ α= expt ts  (5)
where st is the average educational level of the farm labor force and α is the per-
cent increase in labor productivity due to education (i.e., λ α=ln( ) )t td ds . This 
allows us to decompose the effects of changes in labor quantity and quality on 
agricultural growth over time. The Mincerian interpretation of equation (5) is 
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that s is the average number of years of schooling and α is the rate of return to 
an additional year of schooling (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). 
4.2. Data
Recent improvements in the quality and coverage of data on agricultural pro-
duction and input use have facilitated measurement of agricultural productivity 
change in Indonesia. Van der Eng (1996) developed long-term series (1880-1992) 
for outputs and prices of major crop and livestock commodities as well as land 
and labor inputs. For the post-1960 years, Van der Eng’s (1996) data, which are 
based on Indonesian government sources, provide superior estimates of cropland 
for Indonesia than FAO estimates (which substantially underestimate historical 
land-use changes for this country). I recently (Fuglie 2010) further improved on 
these series by developing a more complete measure of area in perennial crops 
since 1961. 
For agricultural output, I use FAO data to measure annual gross production 
of 55 crop commodities and 19 livestock commodities since 1961.2 I also include 
output from cultured fisheries (which include brackish and freshwater ponds, 
cages, and paddy fields) using estimates from the Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 
(BPS). Production figures are given in total metric tons and do not distinguish by 
species. However, FAO’s FIGIS dataset3 breaks down cultured fisheries produc-
tion by species (diadromas, pelagic, demersal, crustacean, mollusks, cephalo-
pods, other marine fishes, and other freshwater fishes),  which I use to estimate 
the value of production together with species-specific price data. 
For commodity prices, the ideal measure would be the average price received 
by farmers, but the only data series with sufficient coverage available for Indone-
sia are wholesale prices. The FAO “producer price” series (available for most crop 
and livestock commodities since the mid-1960s) and Van der Eng’s (1996) “rural 
2I follow the Indonesian classification system for crop commodities whereby food crops (palawija) 
include rice, corn (maize), cassava, soybean, mungbean, and sweet potato; horticultural or gar-
den crops include other vegetables and fruits; and estate crops include oil palm, rubber, coconut, 
sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea, tobacco, fiber crops, nuts, spices and other specialty crops.
3FIGIS and BPS’s Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia define marine and freshwater fisheries differently 
but report nearly identical aggregate estimates of fish production for Indonesia (FIGIS includes 
harvest of aquatic animals, plants, and corals in aggregate fisheries production while the BPS 
yearbook excludes these species). In terms of resource use, BPS assigns all production from 
aquaculture (brackish or freshwater) to cultured fisheries while FIGIS allocates production to 
either marine fisheries (including brackish pond aquaculture) or inland fisheries (including 
cultured production and open water catches).
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bazaar prices” for selected crops closely track the Jakarta wholesale commod-
ity prices published by BPS (Statistical Yearbook). For this study I used Statistical 
Yearbook annual price series for 14 commodities (major food and estate crops, 
beef, and eggs) and FAO producer prices for horticultural crops and minor estate 
crops. Supplemental price data for some estate crops (cane sugar, kapok fiber, 
and ginger) are from the Indonesia Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Van der Eng 
(1996) price data were used to fill in for gaps in the series, especially for the early 
1960s. Fish prices for the eight categories of fish outputs are export prices de-
rived from FAO trade data. For some commodities, consistent price series were 
established in Indonesia only in the late 1960s or early 1970s. For missing years, 
the average normalized price (commodity price relative to the price of rice) for 
the nearest five-year period for which price data were available were used to ex-
tend the series back to 1961. The normalized (relative) prices were then used to 
construct revenue shares for those years. 
To account for marketing margins between prices received by farmers at har-
vest and at wholesale, I assume an average marketing margin for all commodities 
of 20%. Mears (1981), in a comprehensive study of rice marketing in Indonesia, 
estimated marketing costs between farm and wholesale levels in the late 1970s 
to be between 15% and 25% of the farmgate price of rice. While only one com-
modity, rice does account for about half of agricultural output in Indonesia. For 
the purposes of forming the agricultural output index, this assumption about the 
marketing margin is innocuous since it does not affect the relative prices among 
commodities, which are used to aggregate outputs. However, it does affect the 
cost share attributed to land, which is estimated as a residual after other costs are 
deducted from total revenue. 
The land input measure includes five classes of agricultural land: irrigated 
cropland, other (rain-fed) terraced rice lands, area in garden and upland crops, 
area planted to perennial crops (including immature trees), and area in cultured 
fisheries. These data are from the Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia (supplemented 
with data from Van der Eng 1996 for some years), except for area planted to 
perennials, which is from MOA. The MOA data provide a more complete cov-
erage of total area planted to perennial crops, including immature and other 
non-producing trees. The annual growth rate in total agricultural land is derived 
from a quality-adjusted aggregation of the different land classes. I assign quality 
weights to each type of land based on the average gross value of output per hect-
are of resource. Letting the quality weight for uplands be 1.00, the weights for 
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the other land classes are as follows: 4.0 for irrigated wetland rice, 2.0 for non-
irrigated wetland rice, 1.5 for cropland planted to perennials, 2.0 for freshwater 
ponds, 1.0 for brackish water ponds, and 0.5 for paddy fisheries. One way to in-
terpret these weights is that they reflect (relative) returns to investments in land 
improvement. Agricultural land with more improvements in the form of irriga-
tion, terracing, tree planting, and pond structures are more productive than land 
without these features and have a higher quality weight. The weight on paddy 
fisheries reflects the augmentation in resource value when fish are produced 
jointly with paddy rice. 
For agricultural labor, I use FAO estimates of the number of economically 
active male and female adults in agriculture. Wages for male and female work-
ers are average daily wages paid for crop weeding (BPS, Farm Cost Structure of 
Paddy and Secondary Food Crops). To find total annual labor costs, daily wages are 
multiplied by 300 days worked per year for men and 250 days worked per year 
for women. I adjust for improvements to labor quality by considering the average 
years of schooling of the agricultural labor force. To derive the effect of schooling 
on labor quality, I assume the increase in productivity from an additional year of 
schooling to be 7% for men and 8% for women, using Kawuryan’s (1997, p. 218) 
estimate of the marginal private rate of return to primary schooling. Kano (2008) 
reports the share of the agricultural labor force with various schooling levels in 
1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000, based on population censuses and SAKERNAS sur-
veys. I estimated the average years of schooling for a worker in the agricultural 
labor force from these data by multiplying 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 years of school-
ing times the share of farm workers with no schooling, incomplete primary, 
completed primary, incomplete secondary, completed secondary, and post-sec-
ondary schooling, respectively, and interpolate for intervening census years. 
Annual applications of chemical fertilizers (N, P2O5, and K2O) are from FAO. 
Prices paid by farmers for fertilizers are from BPS Agricultural Indicators. Pub-
lished data on pesticide inputs in agriculture are fragmentary. FAO reports tons 
of active ingredients of fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, and other chemicals 
consumed for 1990-1993 only. But these figures are substantially lower than 
those reported for 1980-1996 by Oudejans (1999), who obtained data from the 
agro-chemical industry. Based on Oudejans’s figures and my estimate of aggre-
gate agricultural revenue, it appears that pesticide costs did not exceed an 0.5% 
factor share in any year up through 1996. Because of the incompleteness of pesti-
cides data, the data are not included in the input aggregation. 
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Mechanization in Indonesian agriculture remains relatively low compared 
with other Southeast Asian countries, and information on farm machinery capi-
tal inputs and their related costs is quite limited. In the 1970s there was wide-
spread adoption of mechanical rice millers that replaced hand-pounding, which 
generated considerable controversy over rural labor displacement (Timmer 
1998). In the 1990s the number of two-wheel walker tractors and water pumps 
grew rapidly from low initial levels. By 2001-05, only about 100,000 tractors 
(nearly all two-wheel) were in use among nearly 25 million farms, or about 1 
tractor per 250 farm households. To measure agricultural machinery input, I es-
timate total tractor horsepower in use using the number of tractors by size (BPS, 
Statistical Yearbook) times the average horsepower per tractor for each size class. 
The annual cost of capital services is determined by estimating an annual ser-
vice flow per horsepower and multiplying this by the total stock of horsepower 
of farm tractors. To estimate the annual service flow per horsepower, I use FAO 
data for the average import price for tractors and then amortize this price assum-
ing a 10-year life span and a 10% discount rate. I then divide this cost by the 
average horsepower/tractor in service for each year to derive the annual depre-
ciation cost of 1 horsepower of capital services. I then double this to account for 
other farm implement costs as well as fuel and repair costs. 
Animal capital is measured as the annual stocks of buffalo, beef cattle, dairy 
cows, horses, pigs, small ruminants, and poultry (FAOSTAT). The relevant price 
weight for an animal input is the value of services from that animal in a given 
year. Prices for live animals are FAO import values for cattle, buffalo, horses, 
and sheep and export values for pigs and poultry. To derive annual service flows 
for long-lived species (large ruminants), the purchase prices are amortized over 
three years using a 10% discount rate.
Seed and feed inputs are from the FAO commodity balance sheets supple-
mented with feed data from the USDA’s Production, Supply and Distribution 
database (PSD Online). The USDA data, which primarily cover raw materials 
used by commercial feed manufacturers, are used to measure feed from domestic 
and imported corn, by-products from wheat milling, and meal by-products from 
soybeans, oil palm, and copra and fish processing. FAO data are used for other 
sources of feed and include by-products from rice milling (bran and broken rice), 
molasses from sugar processing, tuber crops, meat meal, and milk fed to young 
animals. Feed prices are domestic commodity prices for rice, corn, and milk; 
FAO export values for rice bran, dried cassava, copra meal, oil palm meal, and 
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molasses; and FAO import values for soymeal and fishmeal. Seed prices are set at 
1.5 times the corresponding domestic commodity prices. 
4.3. Results: Tornqvist-Thiel Indexes of Agricultural Output, Input, and TFP
Tornqvist-Thiel annual index series for aggregate agricultural output, input, 
and TFP are given in Table 12.8. The contribution of TFP to agricultural growth 
was relatively high during the 1960s and 1970s when green revolution crop va-
rieties were widely adopted. During the 1980s, TFP growth slowed but resource 
expansion accelerated to sustain overall growth of the sector. The low growth 
during the 1990s partly reflects stagnation in productivity and the impact of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 when a sharp devaluation of the Indonesian 
currency caused the livestock sector, which was heavily dependent on imported 
feed, to sharply contract. In recent years (2001-2006), TFP growth rose to lev-
els as high as or higher than the peak years of the green revolution. A number 
of factors may have contributed to the return to high TFP growth: adoption of 
improved technology, diversification into high-valued commodities, and land 
expansion into tree crops. The latter two factors affect TFP through resource-
use efficiency rather than through technical change. By shifting the allocation 
of farm resources from production of lower-valued to higher-valued products, 
more real output is obtained per unit of input. Tree crop production can employ 
farm labor more fully over an entire year, especially when done in conjunction 
with food crop production on a farm, and thus increase hours worked per farm 
worker. Since labor is measured as the number of economically active workers, 
an increase in output due to a rise in average hours worked per capita appears in 
the estimation as an increase in TFP. 
4.4. Policies and Productivity in Indonesia’s Agricultural Development
In this section, I divide 1961-2006 into four periods, each reflecting a differ-
ent policy orientation toward agriculture, and compare the growth performance 
of the sector during each period. The first period, 1961-1967, marks the final 
years of the Sukarno Guided Democracy era during which Indonesia suffered 
from macroeconomic and political instability. The second period, 1968-1992, 
reflects the early policies of Suharto’s New Order regime when agriculture and 
food security were given precedence in economic policy. These policies included 
large state subsidies for agricultural inputs, intervention in markets for food sta-
ples, and the promotion of green revolution crop varieties. However, by the mid-
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Table 12.8. Output, input, and total factor productivity (TFP) indexes for 
Indonesian agriculture
 Crops, Animals, and Aquaculture 
Year  Output Input TFP 
1961 100 100 100
1962 106 102 105
1963 101 102 99
1964 106 102 104
1965 108 105 102
1966 112 105 106
1967 108 104 103
1968 126 112 112
1969 130 108 120
1970 139 109 128
1971 143 111 128
1972 144 113 128
1973 156 113 137
1974 161 115 140
1975 161 116 139
1976 161 117 138
1977 169 120 140
1978 178 124 144
1979 186 127 146
1980 203 129 157
1981 218 135 161
1982 217 139 157
1983 234 147 159
1984 253 154 165
1985 262 156 168
1986 281 162 173
1987 285 170 168
1988 299 173 173
1989 313 178 176
1990 326 184 177
1991 332 188 177
1992 359 193 186
1993 362 197 184
1994 364 204 179
1995 397 209 190
1996 401 213 188
1997 386 212 182
1998 383 205 186
1999 392 205 192
2000 404 207 196
2001 412 210 196
2002 435 216 202
2003 464 219 212
2004 486 219 222
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1980s trade and fiscal imbalances led to a gradual shift in economic policies in 
favor of export-led manufacturing. Moreover, public subsidies and investments 
in agriculture began to wane (Fuglie and Piggott 2006). Diffusion of modern 
rice varieties and irrigated area as a share of total cropland both plateaued in the 
early 1990s (at about 80% of rice area and 14% of total cropland, respectively). 
Although there is no single date in which Indonesia’s agriculture-first policy end-
ed, I choose 1993 as the beginning date for what I call the “stagnation” period 
for Indonesian agriculture. Following the severe economic contraction and politi-
cal crisis caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the country emerged 
with a new “reform” government and a more market-oriented agricultural policy. 
A sharp devaluation of the currency, liberalization of food crop markets, and 
changes in land-use policy shifted comparative advantage in agriculture toward 
export commodities like tropical perennials. The fourth period, 2002 to the 
present, I call a “liberalization” period in which market forces played a larger role 
in allocating resources to and within the agricultural sector. 
The sources of agricultural growth during each of the four periods are 
shown in Table 12.9. For each period I decompose growth into the share ex-
plained by resource expansion and the share due to productivity improvement. I 
further decompose growth in labor productivity (output per worker) into chang-
es in land per worker, capital per worker, education, and TFP. 
During the first period of political and macroeconomic instability (1961-
1967), agricultural output grew by only 1.24% per year, less than the rate of 
population growth. There were very few modern inputs employed in production 
and very little improvement in TFP. The estate crop sector was still depressed 
Source: Author’s estimates.
Table 12.8. Continued
 Crops, Animals, and Aquaculture 
Year  Output Input TFP 
2005 495 224 221
2006 510 225 226
Average annual growth rates (%)  
1961-1970 3.66 0.96 2.70 
1971-1980 3.78 1.67 2.10 
1981-1990 4.74 3.54 1.20 
1991-2000 2.16 1.18 0.98 
2001-2006 3.86 1.43 2.43 
1961-2006 3.62 1.80 1.82 
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following the nationalization of foreign-owned estates in 1957 (Booth 1988), and 
efforts to boost productivity of food crops suffered from a lack of appropriate 
new technologies (Jatileksono 1987). 
The growth performance of agriculture improved significantly during the 
green revolution period (1968-1992). The priority given by the New Order gov-
ernment to food crop production was greatly aided by the timely development 
of high-yielding rice varieties by the International Rice Research Institute in the 
Philippines. These varieties were well-adapted to irrigated agriculture in tropical 
Southeast Asia and responded well to higher levels of fertilizer (Darwanto 1993). 
Using revenues from oil exports, the government promoted the new varieties and 
heavily subsidized fertilizers and irrigation development (Jatileksono 1987). It 
also intervened in agricultural markets by restricting food imports and guaran-
teeing prices received by farmers (Timmer 2003). The New Order government 
also encouraged the expansion of cropland in sparsely populated regions of the 
country by subsidizing migration from Java and the planting of estate crops. A 
major program was the “nucleus estate” scheme in which plantation companies, 
in exchange for state-backed financing and long-term leases to public land, were 
obliged to provide processing and other services to smallholders in the areas 
surrounding the large estates (Potter and Lee 1998). During this green revolu-
tion stage (1968-1992), agricultural output growth accelerated to 4.8% per year. 
About half of this growth was due to resource expansion (including expansion 
of cropland, irrigated area, and fertilizer use) and about half to TFP growth. 
Growth in output per worker averaged 4.5% per year, which was driven by the 
increase in TFP as well as growth in material inputs (especially fertilizer) per 
worker. The growth in output per agricultural worker had a major impact on re-
ducing rural poverty and food insecurity in the country (Timmer 2004).
By the early 1990s, modern crop varieties had been widely disseminated, but 
further sources of technological progress were not immediately forthcoming. The 
agricultural research system was apparently not sufficiently developed to deliver 
post–green revolution technologies that could sustain productivity growth (Fuglie 
and Piggott 2006). Further, the redirection of national priorities from agriculture to 
manufacturing reduced investments in the sector. Although food crops continued 
to receive trade protection and price supports, Indonesia became a large importer 
of cereal grains (wheat and feed grains, primarily). The livestock sector severely 
contracted during the Asian economic crisis when the currency was devalued 
and feed imports became prohibitively expensive (Simatupang et al. 1999). Dur-
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ing the “stagnation” period (1993-2001), agricultural output growth averaged only 
1.5% per year and TFP growth only 0.6% per year. Resource expansion slowed 
markedly, in part because of fewer resources for fertilizer subsidies and estate crop 
schemes, the end of government-sponsored migration, and the contraction in live-
stock capital during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. 
By 1999 a new “reform” government was in power and the economy gradu-
ally recovered from the Asian financial crisis. One outcome of the crisis was 
liberalization of the agricultural sector: import restrictions on food crops were 
removed and fertilizer subsidies ended (Fuglie and Piggott 2006). Other policy 
changes, such as the 1999 Forestry Law and the 2001 Local Autonomy Law, 
affected control and access to public lands for agricultural development (Con-
treras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). Between 2002 and 2006, agricultural growth 
resumed a rapid pace of over 4% per year and TFP growth accounted for about 
60% of this growth. While the labor force remained almost constant, land per 
worker and other inputs per worker each grew by about 0.6% per year. The 
growth in cropland per worker occurred entirely outside of Java. Land expansion 
was particularly pronounced for tree crop plantings. By expanding area in estate 
crops, farmers could make fuller and more productive use of their labor during 
the agricultural season. Farmers who settled previously forested or degraded 
forest lands may have initially emphasized subsistence food crop production in 
“swidden” or shifting agricultural systems but gradually established mixed food-
tree cropping systems involving oil palm, rubber cacao, coffee, and other peren-
nials (Tomich et al. 2001; Belsky and Siebert 2003). The planting of tree crops 
was also a means of establishing tenure over these newly opened lands (Otsuka 
et al. 2001). On Java, meanwhile, agriculture also underwent intensification and 
diversification, with resources shifting from food and estate crops toward higher-
valued horticulture, animal, and aquaculture production. However, the expan-
sion of crops onto previously forested areas has raised environmental concerns. 
Soil erosion from cropland (Lindert 2000), biodiversity losses from forest conver-
sion to oil palm monoculture (Koh and Wilcove 2008), and greenhouse gases 
emitted from peatland drainage (Couwenberg, Dommain, and Joosten 2009) 
have been found to be substantial, although these changes appear to primarily 
affect the supply of ecological services and not agricultural productivity. 
Finally, Table 12.9 shows a steady but growing contribution of farmer educa-
tion to productivity growth. Over the 1961-2006 period, the increase in average 
farmer education accounted for about 10% of the total growth in agricultural 
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labor productivity. Moreover, the contribution of education to growth gradually 
increased over time. Since the early 1990s, the agricultural labor force has in-
creased primarily in quality rather than quantity. It is likely that before the end 
of this decade agricultural employment in Indonesia will be in absolute decline. 
Raising the educational level of agricultural workers can offset this decline so 
that the transfer of labor from agriculture to other sectors will not be a drag on 
agricultural growth.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the early years of the twenty-first century, agriculture in Indonesia re-
emerged as a dynamic sector of growth following a decade of post–green revo-
lution stagnation. Once heavily dominated by rice production, the country’s 
agriculture has become increasingly diversified, with perennials, horticultural 
crops, livestock, and aquaculture growing in relative importance over time. 
Indonesia has become a significant global supplier of tropical vegetable oil, rub-
ber, cocoa, coffee, fish, and shrimp. Although the country continues to rely on 
imports for a significant share of its cereal grain needs for food and feed, it main-
tains a positive agricultural trade balance overall. 
Resource expansion and productivity improvement have been important 
sources of growth in Indonesian agriculture. Agricultural land continues to 
expand in the sparsely populated regions of the country where area planted to 
perennial crops, oil palm especially, has undergone rapid expansion in recent 
decades. These regions include the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
and Papua. Both smallholder farms and large estate companies are heavily in-
volved in the perennial-crop sector. Large estate companies, with better access to 
capital and technology, often dominate the early stages of perennial crop devel-
opment, but over time, smallholders catch up. Presently, smallholders dominate 
the production of rubber, coffee, cocoa, and coconut and are gaining market 
share in oil palm. Yield gaps between smallholders and large estates have also 
diminished over time. Nonetheless, cropland expansion into previously forested 
areas and peatlands has raised serious concerns about the loss of ecological ser-
vices such as greenhouse gas sequestration and biodiversity preservation. The 
trade-off between agricultural and environmental outputs from these resources 
is an important issue needing further exploration.
Growth accounting provides a useful tool for assessing and decomposing 
sources of economic growth. Using the Tornqvist-Thiel index method, I find 
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that Indonesia achieved an annual growth rate in agricultural production of 
3.6% over the 1961-2006 period. Slightly more than half of this growth can be 
attributed to improvement in total factor productivity and the rest to resource 
expansion (increases in land, labor, capital, and intermediate inputs). Over the 
course of 1961-2006, agricultural labor productivity (in quality-adjusted units) 
increased at an average annual rate of 3.5%, and higher levels of schooling in the 
farm population accounted for about 10% of this growth. Continued improve-
ment in the quality of labor can offset the expected decline in the size of the 
farm labor force in coming years.
Total factor productivity growth in agriculture accelerated during the green 
revolution period (1968-1992) when the government followed an agriculture-
first development strategy and modern varieties of food crops were widely dis-
seminated. However, TFP growth stagnated in the 1990s and did not resume 
until the country recovered from the Asian financial crisis and liberalized its 
policies toward agriculture. It appears that commodity diversification has been 
an important source of measured TFP growth in recent years. Farmers increased 
productivity by moving to more intensive production systems involving peren-
nials, horticulture, animals, and aquaculture as well as food crops. This not 
only shifted resources to the production of higher-valued commodities but also 
made fuller use of farm labor. Moreover, the private sector rather than the state 
appears to be the driving force behind the reemergence of growth in this sec-
tor. Nonetheless, the gains from diversification were preceded by an impressive 
improvement in productivity of rice and other food staples. Having first secured 
food security may well have encouraged smallholder farmers to allocate more re-
sources to producing non-staple commodities for the market. 
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CHAPTER 13
South African Agricultural Production 
and Productivity Patterns
Frikkie Liebenberg and Philip G. Pardey
1. INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century saw substantive shifts in the structure of agriculture 
and agricultural production in South Africa. Average farm size grew, farm num-
bers eventually declined, and production increasingly emphasized higher-valued 
commodities, notably a range of horticultural crops. Real agricultural output 
grew steadily, by 2.6% per year from 1910 to 1980, but growth slowed thereaf-
ter (to just 0.19% per year from 1980 to 2008). Here we document and discuss 
developments regarding aggregate input, output, and productivity developments 
within South Africa. To do so we draw on an entirely new set of production data 
stretching back to 1910/11 reported in Liebenberg 2010, as well as related evi-
dence reported by other studies for South Africa and other countries within sub-
Saharan Africa.1
Frikkie Liebenberg is an agricultural economist in the Economic Services Unit of the South Afri-
can Agricultural Research Council and a PhD student at the University of Pretoria. Philip Pardey 
is a professor in the Department of Applied Economics and Director of the International Science 
and Technology Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center at the University of Minnesota. 
The research supporting this paper was funded principally by the South African Department 
of Agriculture and the Agricultural Research Council, with additional support from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, InSTePP, the University of Pretoria, and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. The authors thank Colin Thirtle, Dirk Blignaut, and Ruan Stander for 
their assistance in the analysis leading to this chapter.
1Parts of this chapter also draw heavily on Liebenberg, Pardey, and Khan 2010. 
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2. AGRICULTURE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
After adjusting for inflation, South African agricultural gross domestic 
product (GDP) contracted by 1.1% per year from 1981 to 2006, compared with 
growth of 2.62% per year for GDP overall. Thus, agricultural GDP represents a 
declining share of the South African economy. Since 2005, its share has varied 
between 2.4% and 2.8%, compared with 12.3% in 1961, although the agricul-
tural economy still employed more than 1.32 million farm workers, about 10.6% 
of the South African labor force, in 2006.
In 2006, South Africa’s agricultural GDP was U.S.$6.9 billion, placing it 35th 
worldwide on this score (World Development Indicators Database). Agricultural 
trade constituted 2.7% of South Africa’s GDP in 2006, with agricultural exports 
accounting for about 6.9% of total exports (DAS 2009). This is significantly less 
than its export share in 1932, when agriculture accounted for 78.4% of total South 
African exports. Since then, agricultural exports as a share of the country’s total 
exports have declined steadily, to bottom out at 6.5% in 1993, after which the 
agricultural share grew to an average of 8.2% for the period 1994 to 2007. South 
Africa has always been a net exporter (by value) of agricultural products. In 1975, 
agricultural exports exceeded imports by R20.7 billion,2 but the lingering effects 
of sanctions on imports from South Africa due to the apartheid regime combined 
with a failure to remain internationally competitive have left the country barely 
able to sustain its net agricultural exporter status in recent years. 
In 1910, agricultural output (as indexed by AgGDP, a value-added measure 
of agricultural output) accounted for 19.3% of total economic output (GDP) 
(Table 13.1).3 The agricultural share of total economic output declined steadily 
throughout the twentieth century, to just 2.5% by 2006. The absolute size of the 
agricultural economy grew almost every decade until the 1970s—at an overall 
average annual rate of 3.38% per year, from U.S.$2.4 billion (R9.3 billion) in 
1910 to U.S.$11.8 billion (R45.9 billion) in 1974 (both measured in 2000 prices). 
From 1910 to 1928, real agricultural output grew by 1.8% per year. After the 
depression of the early 1930s and a severe drought for four years that ended in 
1934, the agricultural economy experienced a period of strong growth in con-
2Here, and throughout this chapter, “R” denotes rand, the local currency unit of South Africa.
3AgGDP excludes output from the (processed) food sector. The combined output of the farm and 
agribusiness sectors (including food and fiber processors, distributors, and the relevant parts of 
the beverage industries like wine and beer—all of which are reported in the national accounts as 
part of the manufacturing sector) would almost double the sectoral share, such that the combined 
food and agricultural industries would constitute about one-third of total GDP.
 south AfrIcAn AgrIculturAl ProductIon And ProductIvIty PAtterns  385
T
ab
le
 1
3.
1.
 T
h
e 
ch
an
gi
n
g 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 o
f 
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
an
 a
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
, 1
91
0-
20
07
 
U
n
it
 
19
10
s 
19
20
s 
19
30
s 
19
40
s 
19
50
s 
19
60
s 
19
70
s 
19
80
s 
19
90
s 
20
00
 t
o 
20
07
 
F
ar
m
in
g 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
10
-Y
ea
r 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
F
ar
m
 n
u
m
be
r 
N
u
m
be
r 
76
,6
22
 
88
,3
05
 
10
1,
29
9
11
1,
93
8
11
2,
30
5
99
,1
14
79
,8
42
64
,5
40
 
59
,2
89
44
,5
75
T
ot
al
 a
re
a 
10
00
 h
a 
77
,0
42
 
81
,8
10
 
84
,3
39
87
,3
92
88
,1
50
89
,2
56
86
,8
14
85
,8
62
 
82
,4
04
83
,7
01
A
ve
ra
ge
 f
ar
m
 
si
ze
 
h
a 
1,
00
6 
92
8 
83
3
78
1
78
8
81
7
1,
09
4
66
7 
1,
26
0
1,
40
0
E
co
n
om
ic
 C
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
 
 
A
gG
D
P
 
R
 m
il
li
on
 
(2
00
0)
 
9,
20
7 
 
10
,5
96
  
10
,3
79
 
18
,2
23
 
33
,1
36
 
35
,5
08
 
37
,5
94
 
35
,8
77
  
30
,2
01
 
31
,2
17
 
C
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
 t
o 
G
D
P
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
19
.0
 
17
.6
 
12
.0
12
.7
15
.2
9.
9
6.
8
5.
0 
3.
7
3.
0
L
ab
or
 
 
 
 
 
E
co
n
om
ic
al
ly
 
ac
ti
ve
 in
 
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 
'0
00
 
- 
- 
-
1,
91
3
1,
50
9
1,
63
5
2,
48
3
1,
18
1 
1,
21
3
1,
40
6
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l 
sh
ar
e 
of
 t
ot
al
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
- 
- 
-
42
33
29
31
14
 
10
12
F
ar
m
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
'0
00
 
55
3 
48
8 
74
9
88
7
88
2
96
8
1,
63
9
1,
23
5 
1,
18
5
83
5
V
al
u
e 
of
 P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
 
F
ie
ld
 c
ro
ps
 
R
 m
il
li
on
 
(2
00
0)
 
4,
06
3 
4,
56
8 
5,
33
9
8,
93
8
14
,9
82
20
,2
67
26
,5
24
23
,6
58
 
15
,6
77
16
,7
22
H
or
ti
cu
lt
u
re
 
R
 m
il
li
on
 
(2
00
0)
 
1,
18
0 
1,
55
2 
2,
04
3
3,
59
3
5,
32
2
7,
65
9
9,
52
6
10
,3
23
 
11
,3
92
14
,4
93
L
iv
es
to
ck
 
R
 m
il
li
on
 
(2
00
0)
 
5,
99
1 
6,
70
0 
6,
74
8
11
,6
28
19
,6
03
20
,5
31
21
,7
60
24
,7
75
 
20
,5
18
24
,3
52
T
ot
al
 
R
 m
il
li
on
 
(2
00
0)
 
11
,2
34
 
12
,8
20
 
14
,1
30
24
,1
59
39
,9
06
48
,4
58
57
,8
10
58
,7
56
 
47
,5
86
55
,5
67
386  lIeBenBerg And PArdey
T
ab
le
 1
3.
1.
 C
on
ti
n
u
ed
So
ur
ce
: L
ie
be
n
be
rg
, P
ar
de
y,
 a
n
d 
K
h
an
 2
01
0.
N
ot
e:
 D
at
a 
w
er
e 
de
fl
at
ed
 u
si
n
g 
th
e 
G
D
P
 d
efl
at
or
 f
ro
m
 S
A
R
B
 2
00
9.
 
U
n
it
 
19
10
s 
19
20
s 
19
30
s 
19
40
s 
19
50
s 
19
60
s 
19
70
s 
19
80
s 
19
90
s 
20
00
 t
o 
20
07
 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 V
al
u
e 
 
F
ie
ld
 c
ro
ps
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
36
 
36
 
38
37
38
42
46
40
 
33
30
H
or
ti
cu
lt
u
re
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
11
 
12
 
14
15
13
16
16
18
 
24
26
L
iv
es
to
ck
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
53
 
52
 
48
48
49
42
38
42
 
43
44
 south AfrIcAn AgrIculturAl ProductIon And ProductIvIty PAtterns  387
junction with expanded farmer settlement and agricultural development support 
and reached U.S.$9.1 billion (R35.4 billion) in 1951, an increase of 8.95% per 
year for the 1934 to 1951 period. During the period 1951 to 1974, output growth 
slowed to an average of 2.27% per year. The agricultural economy then declined 
to a low point of U.S.$6.8 billion (R26.1 billion) in 1992, reflecting in part the 
effects of another severe drought in the 1991 and 1992 cropping seasons. There-
after agricultural output rebounded to a peak of U.S.$9.6 billion (R37.1 billion) 
in 2002, after which international market pressures, changing domestic agri-
cultural policies and economy-wide influences, and adverse weather conditions 
drove a period of decline.
The number of people economically engaged in agriculture grew virtually 
uninterrupted for 60 years from 1910 to the 1970s, when it reached 2.4 mil-
lion. As reported, the number of farms increased over the same period from 
76,149 to 90,422 in 1970 after peaking at 119,556 in 1952. With farm num-
bers continuing to decline thereafter, AgGDP per economically active person 
engaged in agriculture continued to grow in inflation-adjusted (2000 prices) 
terms, from U.S.$3,333 (R12,899) per capita in 1970 to U.S.$6,747 (R26,111) 
per capita in 2004.
3. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
The mix of agricultural output changed markedly over the years (Table 
13.1 and Figure 13.1). In 1911 about 55% of the value of South African agricul-
tural output was livestock products, with wool (20%), dairy (19%), and cattle 
and sheep (each contributing 15%) accounting for 68% by value of livestock 
production. By 2008 the livestock share had shrunk considerably, although 
still a substantial 44% of agricultural output by value (with poultry production 
now accounting for 55% of this total). The field crops share was 34% in 1911, 
grew to 47% in 1971 (largely because of an expansion of cereals and sugarcane 
production), declined significantly to 28% in 2004, and then regained some 
market share to reach 33% in 2008. A reduction in corn and wheat production 
accounted for most of the post-1971 decline. The share of horticultural output 
expanded steadily over the entire period since 1910, starting at 10% that year 
and increasing to 23% by 2008. Up until the late 1980s, the growth in the val-
ue of horticultural output averaged 3.9% per year—aided in part by improve-
ments in cold chain management. After a brief downturn in output growth 
from 1989 to 1992, the sector resumed growing at impressive rates, especially 
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in the wine (4.41% per year from 1992 to 2004), deciduous fruit (5.01% per 
year) and citrus fruit (7.34% per year) sectors, partly in response to improved 
access to international markets as rest-of-world sanctions against imports from 
South African were scrapped. 
These aggregate economic changes fail to reveal the different development 
paths followed by black versus white farmers. Throughout most of the post-
unification period (specifically from 1913, but intensively so from the 1930s), the 
sustained and substantial government support to agriculture was biased toward 
white commercial farmers. Lacking a commensurate amount of public support, 
black farmers suffered as a consequence. The Land Act of 1913 and the Co-
operatives Act of 1920 are two key examples of discriminatory public policy. The 
Land Act confined land ownership by blacks to dedicated native reserve, while 
the Co-operatives Act excluded black farmers from participating in farmer coop-
eratives. In 1925 the Farmer Assistance Board (the predecessor of the Agricultur-
al Credit Board) was established to assist farmers with soft loans in the aftermath 
of the recession of the early 1920s. Black farmers were once again excluded from 
accessing these government-backed credit programs, and they were also exclud-
ed from participating in the farmer settlement programs introduced in the late 
Figure 13.1. Sector shares in gross value of agricultural production, 1910-2008
Sources: Liebenberg 2010 based on data from DAS 2009.
Note: Livestock aggregate includes 11 commodities, field crops includes 22 commodities, and 
horticulture includes 12 commodities.   
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1930s.4 Ostensibly, government support structures within the homelands and 
the self-governing territories were to take care of the needs of black farmers, but 
in fact these programs either failed to materialize or were never developed to the 
extent they were for the white commercial farming community.
The effect of these discriminatory policies over time is shown in Table 13.2 
in which the current relative contribution of black farmers to national produc-
tion and land ownership is tracked from 1918 to 2002. The share of farmed area 
owned by black farmers varied little from 1918 to 1991, averaging around 15%. 
This share then doubled to almost 31% of total farmed area by 2000, while the 
share of corn, wheat, sorghum, and pumpkin output produced by black farmers 
was substantially less in 2000 compared with earlier years. Likewise, the share 
4A host of other initiatives were launched after the unification of South Africa to improve the 
productivity of the agricultural sector. Government provision of research, extension, train-
ing, and subsidized soil and veld conservation works were intended to help establish a vibrant 
farming community, often by way of farmer settlement programs and co-sponsored self-help 
schemes. Tenant farmers were provided with the necessary training and post-settlement exten-
sion support. In addition, the government made available start-up packages that included all 
the required means of production, with the repayment of these start-up costs (including the 
cost of purchasing the farmland) beginning after a five-year grace period (with interest for the 
five-year grace period capitalized into the purchase price). These schemes targeted new farm 
settlers according to their soldier status, racial status, and unemployment status, and incum-
bent farmers according to their farm size or farm profitability (or lack thereof). None of these 
attributes is a necessarily good indicator of the potential productivity and profitability of farms 
or the prospective social payoff to public investments in these schemes. Liebenberg (2010) pro-
vides new data on the public investments directed to farmer settlement and survival schemes 
in South Africa during the twentieth century. 
Table 13.2. Black farmers’ share of area farmed and planted and national 
production of selected crops, 1918-2002
Sources: Liebenberg, Pardey, and Khan 2010 based on data from OCS 1919, 1932, and 1939; 
BCS 1952, 1963; CSS 1992; and Statssa 2005.
Year 
Area 
of 
Farms Planted Corn Wheat Sorghum Pumpkins
Number of  
Cattle Sheep Poultry 
Percentage
1918 16.4 27.2 23.2 03.5 74.3 36.3 24.5 14.4 34.9 
1930 - - 23.0 - 77.0 - 51.1 10.8 - 
1937 - - - - 81.0 - - 9.9 - 
1950 - - 18.8 01.7 46.4 - 41.0 11.7 31.3 
1960 15.4 16.9 13.0 01.5 34.7 - 38.8 9.5 38.8 
1991 14.4 15.2 - - - - - - - 
2002 30.9 14.4 3.0 0.0 0.1 17.3 30.1 10.1 29.1 
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of the country’s cattle and poultry stock held by black farmers had contracted a 
little by 2000, although the sheep population on black-owned farms had mar-
ginally increased from 1960 to 2000.
In addition to the Land Reform and Restitution initiatives that were imple-
mented beginning in 1994, the South African government established several 
programs to support black farmers. These include the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development program (launched in 2000); the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Program that provides post-settlement support to targeted 
black farmers, whether they acquired land through private means or as part of a 
land reform program; and the Micro-Agricultural Financial Institutions of South 
Africa (MAFISA) program that extends micro-finance services to economi-
cally active poor rural households, small farmers, and agribusinesses. MAFISA 
provides loans to emerging farmers not served by the Land Bank, although the 
program is administered by the Land Bank on behalf of the Department of Agri-
culture (DOA 2009). The rollout of these programs to date has been slow, and it 
is too early to judge their effectiveness.
Taken as a group these agricultural indicators point to a long period of both 
physical and economic expansion in agriculture stretching from 1910 through 
to the 1950-1970 period. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of transition (at 
least for commercial agriculture), characterized by continued economic growth 
of agriculture, but growth that took place in the context of farm consolidation, a 
continued and perhaps even accelerating change in the composition of farm out-
put, and a movement of labor out of agriculture as opportunities in other sectors 
of the economy competed for labor used within agriculture. These sizable struc-
tural shifts have important implications for—and in turn have no doubt been af-
fected by—the amount and nature of research and development (R&D) and the 
accompanying technical and institutional changes striving to sustain economic 
development and productivity growth in agriculture going forward.
The quantity of total agricultural output grew at an average annual rate of 
2.56% from 1911 to 2008. From 1911 to 1945, output grew by only 1.86% per 
year, accelerating to 3.58% annually over the following three decades, then 
slowing to just 1.52% per year for the period 1982-2000. Since 2000, output 
growth has rebounded, growing by 2.07% per year through to 2008. Over the 
almost one hundred years since 1911, growth in horticultural output (fruit and 
vegetables) outpaced that of field crops and livestock by almost 0.5% per annum 
(Figure 13.2). Field crop production kept pace with livestock output from 1911 
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until the mid-1960s; during the subsequent two decades it grew at a faster rate 
than the livestock sector. However, during the period 1982-2008, field crop pro-
duction grew by only 0.91% per year, lagging behind the corresponding growth 
in livestock output of 1.2% per year. Since 2000, growth in field crop production 
has substantially fallen behind the corresponding growth in livestock output, 
which increased by 2.02% per year.
The overall growth in total agricultural output is thus largely driven by strong 
growth in the horticultural sector, with comparatively slower growth in field crop 
output over more recent decades being a drag on the overall pace of growth of South 
African agriculture. Moreover, the rate of growth in agricultural output (and espe-
cially field crop production, which includes staple food crops such as wheat, corn, 
and grain sorghum) has fallen below the rate of population growth. South Africa’s 
population grew by 2.43% per year from 1982 to 2008, compared with 1.52% per 
year for overall agricultural output (and just 0.91% per year for field crops).5 Notably, 
the slowdown in both total output and crop output in South Africa in recent decades 
parallels similar trends in the United States, where total output grew by 1.63% per 
Figure 13.2. Quantity of agricultural output by sector, 1911-2008
Source: Liebenberg 2010. 
Note: These series are Divisia (specifically Tornqvist) quantity indexes.
5Although the rate of population growth has slowed in more recent years—to 1.34% per year 
since 2000—field crop production has slowed even more dramatically, to just 0.74% per year 
over the same period.
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year during the 1980s (compared with 2.22% per year for the previous decade), slow-
ing to 1.28% per year from 1990 to 2002 (Alston et al. 2010, Appendix Table 4-3).6 
4. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
Figure 13.3 gives an indication of the significant structural changes in farmland 
use in South African agriculture since 1910. Total farmed area grew to a peak of 91.8 
million hectares in 1960, declining steadily to 82.2 million hectares in 1996, where 
it has since more or less stabilized. Total farm numbers followed a similar pattern, 
peaking in 1953 at 119,600, and declining at an average rate of 1.23% per year there-
after, so that by 2002 the number of farms had dropped to less than half the number 
that prevailed five decades earlier. The interplay between changing farm numbers 
and the total area in farms meant that average farm size declined during the first half 
of the twentieth century (from 1,019 hectares in 1910 to 730 hectares in 1952) and 
increased during the second half of the century, to average 1,640 hectares in 2000. 
Average farm size has continued to grow; in 2002 it was 1,833 hectares per farm.7 
Figure 13.4 shows trends beginning in 1947/48 in the total cost shares of 
four agricultural input categories: labor, land, capital, and materials. Material 
6See also Chapter 8 in this volume.
7Preliminary agricultural census results indicate a continuing increase in average farm size, to 
about 2,000 hectares per farm, and a continuing decline in farm numbers, to 39,982 in 2009. 
Figure 13.3. Number, total area, and average size of farms, 1918-2007
Source: Liebenberg, Pardey, and Khan 2010.
Note: Dashed sections of farm size plot indicate estimates (via interpolation). 
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Figure 13.4. Input cost shares, 1947-2008
Source: Liebenberg 2010 based on data from DAS 2009.
Notes: In this compilation, land includes all land in agriculture (irrigated and rain-fed crops, 
permanent and planted pastures, and wood and forest land); labor includes owner-operator, 
hired labor (including domestic workers), and family labor; capital includes tractors, machinery, 
and implements, fixed improvements such as buildings erected, and development work 
undertaken; and materials includes dips and sprays, fuel, fertilizer, packaging, feed, and so on.
inputs (largely purchased from off-farm sources) have claimed an increasing 
share of total costs, around 30% in 1947/48 to 50% in 2006/07. Reported capital 
costs have fluctuated at around a 30% share of total costs over the same period, 
while labor inputs have steadily declined as a share of total costs, from almost 
36% in 1947/48 to less than half that (15.1%) by 2006/07. At the beginning of 
the period, land costs accounted for 6.6% of total costs, growing to 15.5% by the 
mid-1970s, then shrinking to just 3.0% of total costs by 2006/07. Notably, Alston 
et al. (2010) reported land cost shares for the United States that followed a simi-
lar trend, starting at 17% of total cost in 1949, growing to 20% during the late 
1970s and early 1980s (when land prices soared), then falling to 15% by 2002. 
However, according to these data, land cost shares are uniformly lower in South 
Africa compared with the United States, perhaps reflecting a much smaller share 
of cropped to total land in South Africa versus the United States along with a 
smaller share of that cropped land under irrigation.8 
8According to DAS (2009, p. 5), 13.7% of South Africa’s total land area is potentially arable, and 
around 69% of that arable area is only suitable for grazing. Moreover, a large share of the grazing 
area is in the semi-arid Karooveld.
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An assessment of the magnitude of the cost share changes for land and labor 
in isolation reveals more substantive changes than are apparent by inspection of 
Figure 13.4. Looking in more detail at land costs, in nominal terms they grew by 
0.5% per year during the period 1947-1959, when the total area under cultiva-
tion was still increasing, but they declined by 0.23% per year thereafter. Total 
labor costs fluctuated at around an average of R160.3 million during the 1960s 
but then declined by 3.08% per year until 1983. They increased during the pe-
riod 1984-1987 but then began to decline and have continued to do so through 
2007/08 (the last year for which data are presently available).
According to Thirtle, Sartorius von Bach, and van Zyl (1993), during the pe-
riod ending in 1970, the cultivated corn area subject to summer rainfall expand-
ed, as oxen were increasingly replaced by tractors. This spurred the expansion 
of average farm size (as measured by area per farm; see Figure 13.3) along with 
labor use as well as the use of chemical fertilizers and higher-yielding seed vari-
eties (Payne, van Zyl, and Sartorius von Bach 1990). After 1970, the mechaniza-
tion of crop harvesting activities through the increased use of combines began to 
alleviate a peak demand for labor at harvest time, thus contributing to a decline 
in overall labor use.
The general pattern of labor, land, and machinery use in agriculture in 
summer and winter rainfall areas evolved in parallel. The overall expansion of 
cultivated area was largely complete by 1947, with machinery increasingly sub-
stituting for labor throughout South African agriculture during this period. The 
Pass Laws of 1952 may have accelerated this ongoing factor substitution effect 
(especially during the late 1960s when the conditions of the Act were severely 
applied); however, other polices likely had a bigger effect.9 Farmers were given 
access to cheap credit (which for periods of time involved negative real interest 
rates) and tax breaks that allowed capital equipment to be written off within 
the first year after purchase. By the end of the 1981-83 drought, the credit and 
tax concessions were largely gone, the price of gold had plummeted, and the 
rand was drastically devalued. These events had the combined effect of making 
9The Pass Laws Act of 1952 was part of a historical series of such acts that in its earliest incarna-
tion in 1797 sought to exclude all “natives” from the Cape Colony. The 1952 act made it com-
pulsory for all black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a “pass book” at all times. An 
employer was defined under the law and could only be a white person. The pass also documented 
permission requested and denied or granted to be in a certain region and the reason for seeking 
such permission. Under the terms of the law, any governmental employee could strike out such 
entries, basically canceling the permission to remain in the area.
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domestic inputs, especially labor, much cheaper than (imported) capital items, 
causing a dramatic reversal of the historical trend during the late 1980s and into 
the early 1990s, with labor use increasing considerably as a substitute for rela-
tively expensive capital during this period. Since then new legislation regarding 
security of land tenure for agricultural labor tenants working on large farms and 
the stipulation of minimum wages has again caused the sector to shed labor.
5. PARTIAL PRODUCTIVITY PATTERNS
Crop yields in South Africa are susceptible to significant year-on-year varia-
tion given that much of the production comes from rain-fed systems with aver-
age rainfall in the range of less than 250 mm per year in the west to 750 mm 
in the east, at the lower end of the ideal range for the crops in question (DOA 
1957). On average, less than 80% of the country’s total land mass receives an 
average annual rainfall of 750 mm or less, with 30% receiving less than 250 mm 
per annum. Nonetheless, the long-run crop yields summarized in Table 13.3 
reveal substantial gains in average crop yields during the twentieth century. 
Corn yields increased more than 4-fold since the 1910s, wheat by 4.4-fold, and 
sorghum by more than 7-fold. Drought is a recurring reality of South African 
agriculture and had a detrimental impact on crop yields, especially during the 
first half of the 1930s, 1980s, and 1990s. The growth in yields during the first 
half of the twentieth century was associated with increased mechanization and 
increased use of improved seeds (with a corresponding marked increase in the 
use of chemical inputs, including fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides) helping 
to also spur crop yield growth after the 1960s. 
The livestock “yields” presented in Table 13.3 are harder to interpret and 
may reflect the difficulty of meaningfully measuring productivity in these sec-
tors. For instance, the decline in the average slaughter weight of pigs reflects a 
largely demand-driven shift to leaner pork products. The slaughter weight of 
sheep also declined steadily after the Second World War, from an average carcass 
weight of 39.1 kg per head during the 1930s and 1940s to just 19.8 kg per head 
in more recent years. Again the shift in consumer preferences has played a role—
with leaner and much younger (i.e., lamb versus mutton) cuts of meat being 
preferred—but massive structural changes in the sheep industry have also played 
their part. As wool demand slackened over the past three decades or so, growers 
shifted from sheep-for-wool to sheep-for-meat systems of production, with associ-
ated shifts in the average age of the sheep population (i.e., a move to younger and 
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hence smaller animals), and with direct consequences for average carcass weights. 
As evidence of this trend, merino sheep accounted for up to 80% of the national 
sheep herd in the 1960s (and up to 86% if dual-purpose breeds are also included), 
whereas now the merino share has declined to 50% (or 71% if dual-purpose breeds 
are included). The total number of sheep in the country has also declined from 
37.4 million head of sheep in 1966 to 21.9 in 2008, with numbers of merino sheep 
declining from 28.3 million to 11.6 million over the same period (DAS 2009).
From 1911 to 2008, land productivity grew at an average annual rate of 
2.49% per year, slightly slower than the corresponding rate of labor productivity 
growth, which averaged 2.83% per year (see Figure 13.5). Throughout the twen-
Table 13.3. Average yields for selected commodities for various periods
Source: DAS 2009.
Notes: Corn and sorghum includes only the crop grown for grain, and wheat includes all 
types of wheat (mainly durum). Animal weights are slaughtered weights. Growth rates were 
computed by the natural log regression method.
 Cattle Sheep  Pigs  Corn Wheat  
Grain
Sorghum 
 (kg/head)  (kg/ha) 
Five-year averages centered on   
1911/12    765 592 445 
1920/21 235 39  737 501 580 
1930/31 205 30 90 465 717 952 
1940/41 251 29 85 771 488 963 
1950/51 226 33 78 826 518 987 
1960/61 223 29 81 1,235 590 872 
1970/71 217 25 64 1,480 811 1,201 
1980/81 215 25 66 2,082 1,103 1,816 
1990/91 228 22 61 2,074 1,460 2,360 
2000/01 231 18 62 2,606 2,449 2,822 
2005/06 259 20 74 3,326 2,583 3,272 
Average annual growth (percent per year) 
1910/11-1929/30    -1.29 0.30 -1.43 
1930/31-1949/50 0.82 0.59 -0.76 3.39 -2.72 3.29 
1950/51-1969/70 -0.26 -1.25 -1.07 2.04 1.29 -1.89 
1970/71-1989/90 0.53 -0.26 0.13 0.28 2.33 2.27 
1990/91-2007/08 0.98 -0.01 1.19 4.58 3.34 3.03 
1920/21-1949/50 0.75 0.03 -0.58 1.95 -2.10 4.32 
1950/51-2007/08 0.17 -1.03 -0.35 2.05 3.17 2.53 
2000/01-2007/08 2.76 2.34 4.29 4.63 2.64 2.46 
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Figure 13.5. Agricultural labor and land productivity in South Africa, 
1911-2008
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from DAS 2009 and Statssa 2009.
Notes: Labor data were adjusted to consistently include seasonal labor. These series are Divisia 
(specifically Tornqvist) quantity indexes.
tieth century there were three phases of distinct growth patterns in these two 
partial productivity measures. During the pre-WWII years (from 1911 to 1940), 
land productivity grew by 1.95% per year, double the corresponding annual rate 
of growth of labor productivity (0.89% per year). The rate of growth of both land 
and labor productivity picked up over the subsequent four decades following 
WWII (i.e., the period 1947-1981), averaging an impressive 4.91% per year for 
labor productivity and 4.17% per year for land productivity. Since then, produc-
tivity growth rates for both land and labor have slowed considerably, down to 
2.67% per year for labor, and only 1.46% per year for land productivity. 
Figure 13.6 draws on Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data to 
place land and labor productivity measures for South Africa into a broader Af-
rican context. Here we use the graphical technique developed by Hayami and 
Ruttan (1971) in which the horizontal axis measures labor productivity (in 
logarithms) and the vertical axis measures land productivity (in logarithms). 
Productivity loci for five regions in sub-Saharan Africa plus Nigeria and South 
Africa are included. The productivity loci were formed by taking a ratio of the 
value of aggregate output and the respective land and labor inputs. Output is an 
estimate of the total value of agricultural output (spanning all crops and live-
398  lIeBenBerg And PArdey
stock commodities) expressed in 1999-2001 average purchasing power parity 
agricultural prices obtained from FAO (FAOSTAT Database). Land is a measure 
of harvested and permanently pastured area, and labor is a head count of the 
total economically active workers in agriculture. These ratios were then scaled 
by the corresponding value ratios of output and input in the base year 1961, and 
the natural logarithms of the scaled index ratios were then taken.10 Since both 
axes are measured in natural logarithms a unit increase in either direction is in-
10The output and input indexes are all normalized to a value of 1.0 in base year 1961, which 
means the productivity paths for each region would begin from the same value if they were not 
scaled by the respective base-year value ratios. 
Figure 13.6. Agricultural labor and land productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, 
1961-2007
Source:  Calculated from data obtained from FAOSTAT Database.
Notes: Central Africa includes Burundi, Cameroon, Cent Afr Rep, Chad, Congo Dem R, Congo 
Rep, Eq Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome Prn, Sudan; Eastern Africa includes Comoros, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ethiopia PDR, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Reunion, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda; Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) includes Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; and 
Western Africa (excl. Nigeria) includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. See 
text for data construction and plotting details. The land-labor ratio is constant along each grey 
diagonal line, and values for those ratios are given at the terminus of the respective diagonal line 
on the top and right axes.
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terpreted as a proportional increase in land or labor productivity, and the length 
of the productivity locus is an indication of the average annual rate of change in 
productivity. Most, but by no means all, of the productivity paths move generally 
(but not uniformly) in a northeasterly direction, starting in 1961 and ending in 
2005, indicating productivity growth. The diagonals indicate constant labor-to-
land ratios. As the productivity locus for a particular country or region crosses a 
diagonal from left to right, it indicates a decrease in the number of economically 
active workers in agriculture per harvested acre in that region.
The South African and Nigerian productivity loci follow distinctly different 
paths than the other regions of sub-Saharan Africa plotted in Figure 13.6. Both 
countries had increases in land and, especially, labor productivity that were at 
considerably higher rates than the rest of Africa. Moreover, the value of output 
per unit of labor in 2007 for both countries was also considerable higher than 
the rest of Africa: $5,663 per worker in the case of South Africa and $1,576 per 
worker for Nigeria compared with an average of $641 per worker for the rest of 
Africa. South Africa is distinctive in that it is the only entity depicted in Figure 
13.6 for which the land-labor ratio increased to any great extent over time (im-
plying more pronounced growth in labor versus land productivity): from 39.1 
hectares per worker in 1961 to 56.9 hectares per worker in 2007. In Nigeria, the 
land-labor ratio (starting from a much smaller initial value) increased a little: 
from 4.36 to 5.27 agricultural hectares per worker over the comparable period. 
In almost all the other regions depicted, real output per worker stagnated (or 
in the case of Eastern and Southern Africa excluding South Africa) actually de-
clined, although land productivity in all regions improved over time. Thus the 
horizontal spans of the productivity loci were smaller than their vertical spans so 
that land-labor ratios were smaller on average in 2007 than they were a quarter 
of a century earlier. 
West Africa (excluding Nigeria) is an exception compared with the general 
rest-of-Africa (i.e., sub-Saharan Africa minus South Africa and Nigeria) produc-
tivity pattern. This region saw labor productivity grow by 0.78% per year from 
1961 to 2007 (compared with 2.68% per year for South Africa and 3.24% per 
year for Nigeria). Labor productivity in East Africa barely changed, and in South-
ern Africa (excluding South Africa) it declined from $291 per worker in 1961 to 
a lowly $255 per worker in 2007. These productivity trends speak to the dismal 
record of poverty and chronic food insecurity that befall a large share of the 
populations in these parts of Africa. 
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Perhaps ironically, these dismal labor productivity trends in Central, Eastern 
and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) belie their comparatively rapid 
rates of growth in total output. These three regions report real agricultural out-
put growth in the range of 1.35% to 2.85% per year over the period 1961-2007, 
in some instances much faster than the comparative rates of growth in total 
output for South Africa, which averaged just 1.65% per year. However, South 
African agriculture ended the period with fewer agricultural workers than it had 
in 1961, whereas the economically active population in agriculture in the rest-
of-Africa regions (like their populations generally) grew in the range of 0.19% 
to 2.49% per year. Thus, the poor labor productivity performance of Central, 
Eastern, and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) reflects a failure of labor 
to leave agriculture for gainful employment elsewhere in these economies rather 
than a comparatively low rate of growth in agricultural output. Moreover, al-
though the land area in agriculture has continued to expand in these parts of Af-
rica, it has done so at a rate less than the rate of growth in agricultural workers. 
With land-labor ratios ranging from 2.33 to 9.34 hectares per worker, it is dif-
ficult to envisage raising output per worker to substantial levels, especially given 
the generally poor rural infrastructure and other market and environmental con-
straints that limit the transition to higher-valued forms of agricultural output. 
6. MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Table 13.4 reports a series of measures of aggregate input, output, and mul-
tifactor productivity (MFP) growth for South African agriculture over the period 
1947-2007. The bottom half of the table includes estimates reported in several 
studies. They indicate a large disparity in the measured rates of MFP growth for 
South African agriculture, with no apparent consensus or pattern emerging from 
or evident in the different measures. Some of these differences may be attribut-
able to differences in the range of years covered by each study, but differences in 
data coverage and treatment no doubt play a role too, making an overall assess-
ment of these studies problematic.
The upper half of Table 13.4 reports an effort by the authors to extend the 
aggregate input, output, and MFP measures first reported by Thirtle, Sartorius 
von Bach, and van Zyl (1993) for the period 1947-1991 and updated in Schim-
melpfennig et al. (2000) for the period 1947-1997. Thirtle, Sartorius von Bach, 
and van Zyl indicate that their aggregate output measure consists of a Divisia 
aggregation of three pre-aggregated groups of outputs, namely, crops, horticul-
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 Attributes of Study Study Source
Period Output Input MFP Labor Land Authors Date 
 (percent per year)  
1947-1971 3.43 2.81 0.62 3.27 3.36 This study 2010 
1971-1989 3.28 0.70 3.98 4.91 3.50 This study 2010 
1989-2008 0.95 0.95 0.01 3.22 1.11 This study 2010 
1947-2008 2.68 1.20 1.49 3.87 2.78 This study 2010 
     
1947-1991   1.3 Thirtle, Sartorius 
von Bach, and 
van Zyl 
1993 
1947-1997   1.3 Schimmelpfennig 
et al. 
2000 
1965-1994   0.28 Nin, Arndt, 
and Preckel 
2003 
1952-2002   1.35 Conradie, Piesse, 
and Thirtle 
2009a 
Table 13.4. Growth of agricultural output, input, and MFP indexes, various 
estimates, 1947-2008
Sources: See text for details of entries in the upper half of the table.
ture, and livestock. The input index consists of an aggregation of measures of 
land, labor, intermediate inputs (i.e., packing fuel, fertilizer, dips and sprays, and 
other non-farm items), and capital inputs (i.e., fixed improvements and machin-
ery). The update reported here in Table 13.4 and Figure 13.7 spans the period 
1947-2008. It was developed by extending the Schimmelpfennig et al. 1947-1997 
series, and in so doing we sought to faithfully deploy the same methods, data 
types, and sources used in the earlier compilations.11  
According to this measure, South African MFP grew, on average, by 1.49% 
per year from 1947 to 2008. The 1970s and 1980s had the highest rate of growth 
for the period studied, an impressive (and perhaps questionable) 3.98% per year. 
This is substantially higher than the 0.62% per year rate reported for the imme-
diate post-WWII decades. Notably, MFP was stagnant during the period 1989-
11The authors thank Colin Thirtle for kindly providing the data he and colleagues developed for 
the 1947-1997 period. Liebenberg (2010) reports an entirely new series constructed from dif-
ferent data sources and using different methods. For example, Liebenberg found that historical 
capital input and livestock inventory estimates were compromised by especially low participation 
rates in the national agricultural censuses conducted since 1992/93. DOA statistical agencies sub-
sequently adopted alternative estimation methods that resulted in significant changes to the pre-
viously reported national capital and livestock inventory estimates back to the 1980s (personal 
communication with D. Blignaut, Head of Regional Production Statistics, DOA, in 2009). Lieben-
berg is also making an effort to correct for significant inconsistencies in the officially reported 
data on agricultural labor attributable to inconsistencies in the treatment of seasonal, domestic, 
and family labor.
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2008, apparently owing to a decline in the rate of output growth coupled with 
an increase in the rate of input use in agriculture. 
Recent studies by Conradie, Piesse, and Thirtle (2009a,b) extend the earlier 
methods used by Thirtle and colleagues to compile regional estimates of ag-
gregate input, output, and MFP growth for South African agriculture (see Table 
13.5). They focused on the Western Cape region of the country. This region has 
distinctive agro-climatic attributes: specifically, it is the only region within South 
Africa that experiences winter rainfall, and so its agricultural output is dominat-
ed by deciduous fruit and wine grapes whereas output in the rest of the country 
consists mainly of field crops and livestock products.
Conradie, Piesse, and Thirtle (2009b) estimate that during the period 1952-
2002, MFP in the Western Cape grew on average by 1.22% per year. The region-
al rate of growth is roughly the same as the long-run measured rate of growth in 
MFP at the national level. However, there are marked disparities in the regional 
and national growth rates for specific sub-periods. For example, from 1971 to 
2002, the Western Cape region saw productivity growing at 0.89% per year, less 
than half the corresponding rate of growth at the national level (which Conradie, 
Piesse, and Thirtle [2009b, p. 12] put at more than 2% per year). Again differ-
ences in data sources and treatment may account for some of the disparities, but 
it is also likely that differences in the composition of output and inputs and other 
Figure 13.7. Agricultural output, input, and MFP indexes, 1947-2008 
Source:  See text for details.
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factors play a role in these regional differences, as they do regarding the consid-
erable national versus state differences in productivity patterns reported for the 
United States by Alston et al. (2010).
In Table 13.6 we summarize estimates of MFP growth for a series of other 
studies for other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Extracting plausible patterns 
from this evidence is especially problematic, in part because of substantive dif-
ferences in data and methods, but also given the paucity of studies that are 
available. One fairly consistent finding is that the reported rates of MFP growth 
in Africa are generally low compared with those reported for other countries 
worldwide included in this book and elsewhere. That said, differences in sectoral 
coverage and analytical methods may account for the very considerable differ-
ences in reported growth rates for similar periods in the studies by Alene (2009) 
and Ludena et al. (2006). The Africa-wide results of Alene using Malmquist 
methods concord with those reported earlier (Table 13.4, upper half) for South 
Africa using Divisia aggregation approaches, to the extent they suggest that 
the rate of MFP growth has slowed in recent years. However, the “sequential 
Malmquist” results from Alene show no evidence of a slowdown. Irz and Hadley 
(2003) found a marked difference in MFP growth rates for commercial versus 
traditional farmers in Botswana, highlighting the fact that aggregating over dif-
ferent types of farmers may pose substantive measurement and interpretation 
challenges analogous to those confronted when forming national versus state or 
provincial estimates.
7. CONCLUSION
South African agriculture appears to have sustained a competitive edge 
during the decades prior to the late 1980s, with strong growth in agricultural 
exports and more muted, but still pronounced, growth in net agricultural trade 
surplus. However, the country’s agricultural exports and net trade balances have 
declined precipitously in more recent years. These trade trends are loosely con-
cordant with changes in the pattern of MFP growth for South Africa, which grew 
at much slower rates in more recent years compared with earlier decades.
The rate of growth in agricultural output has also slowed since the 1980s, 
largely as a result of a slowdown in the rate of growth in field crop production. 
Indeed, agricultural output growth in South Africa (and, for that matter, South-
ern Africa) has lagged behind the rest of Africa in recent decades, even though 
the country’s agricultural productivity growth has historically outpaced produc-
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Table 13.6. Sub-Saharan Africa multifactor productivity growth rates, 
various studies
Notes: The input distance function used by Irz and Hadley (2003) is a conventional  measure of the 
largest factor of proportionality by which the input vector x can be scaled down to produce a given 
output vector y with the technology that exists at a particular time t. The premise of the sequential 
Malmquist TFP index used by Alene (2009) is that past production techniques are also available 
for current production activities. The distance metrics in this instance are calculated using linear 
programming techniques formulated with respect to a “sequential” technology frontier.
Authors Date Region Crop/Industry Methodology
Sample 
Period 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
(%/year) 
Irz and 
Hadley 
2003 Botswana Agriculture:  
 Traditional 
  Farmers 
 Commercial 
Input 
Distance 
 
1979-1996 
 
1968-1990 
 
-2.3 
 
1.16 
Dhehibi 
and 
Lachaal 
2006 Tunisia Agriculture Tornqvist 1961-2000 3.6 
Ludena 
et al. 
2006 Middle 
East & 
North 
Africa 
Crops 
Ruminants 
Nonruminants 
Average 
Malmquist 
 
 
1961-2000 
1961-2000 
1961-2000 
1961-2000 
-0.03 
-0.02 
0.64 
0.03 
  Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa 
Crops 
Ruminants 
Nonruminants 
Average 
 1961-2000 
1961-2000 
1961-2000 
1961-2000 
0.15 
0.36 
0.5 
0.21 
Alene 2009 Africa Agriculture Malmquist 
     
     
     
1970–1980
1981–1990
1991–2004
1971-2004 
-0.9 
1.4 
0.5 
0.3 
    Sequential 
Malmquist 
     
     
          
1970–1980
1981–1990
1991–2004
1971-2004 
1.4 
1.7 
2.1 
1.8 
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tivity growth elsewhere in the continent. The composition of agricultural outputs 
in South Africa has also changed, with higher-valued horticultural crops gaining 
market share at the expense of (staple food) crops and livestock products.
The composition of input use has change too. Notwithstanding high rates of 
rural unemployment, the evidence reported in this chapter indicates that South 
African agriculture has substantially increased its use of material inputs and 
continued to invest significantly in capital inputs while the use of labor in agri-
culture has declined. 
South African agriculture is important in a regional and continental context. 
In 2006 it accounted for 43.6% of the agricultural GDP of Southern Africa and 
5.93% of the agricultural GDP for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (World Develop-
ment Indicators Database). Thus the recent and substantive declines in the pace 
of South African MFP growth, when coupled with the persistence of historically 
low rates of labor productivity throughout the rest of Africa, are causes for real 
concern. It is difficult to conceive how the chronic hunger and serious bouts of 
food insecurity that befall many people throughout Africa can be ameliorated if 
agricultural productivity fails to pick up pace. Indeed, the evidence presented here 
indicates that the rate of MFP growth in South African agriculture lost consider-
able ground in recent years and is now well below the country’s corresponding rate 
of population growth. The same holds true for Africa generally (at least for the land 
and labor productivity metrics presented here). These realities make it imperative 
to carefully and creatively, and with some urgency, rethink and revitalize those ru-
ral development options that promote long-term productivity growth, most notably 
investments in, and the incentive structures that affect, agricultural R&D. It will 
take time to turn around these poor productivity performances, and so the policy 
choices made now, as well as the details of their implementation over the next few 
years, will determine the destiny of the country’s (and the continent’s) agricultural 
sector for a significant share of the century that lies ahead.
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CHAPTER 14
The Agricultural Sector in Argentina:  
Major Trends and Recent Developments
Sergio H. Lence
1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, Argentina has been among the world leaders in the production 
and/or export of agricultural products. The main reason for this is that it is a 
country relatively sparsely populated but richly endowed with natural resources 
for production agriculture. According to data from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) (FAOSTAT database), in 2006 Argentina accounted for only 
0.59% of the world’s population, but for a much higher 2.10% of the world’s to-
tal land area. Furthermore, Argentina’s shares of the world’s arable land and the 
planet’s area with permanent meadows and pastures were even higher, at 2.23% 
and 2.96%, respectively.
As shown in Table 14.1, Argentina produced 8.4% of world agricultural out-
put and accounted for 2.9% of world agricultural trade over the period 2005-07. 
Such figures make Argentina the eighth-largest producer and the twelfth larg-
est exporter of agricultural commodities in the world. Argentina’s much smaller 
share of world exports (2.9%) compared to its share of world output (8.4%) is 
largely explained by the fact that Argentina tends to export commodities with 
relatively low value-added levels. Commodities for which the country is particu-
larly relevant in world markets are soybeans and its associated products, soybean 
oil and soybean meal. Argentina is the top exporter of soybean oil and soybean 
Sergio Lence, a native of Argentina, is a professor of economics and the Marlin Cole Chair of  
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meal, with 46.9% and 36.1% of the world’s export market, and the third-largest 
exporter of soybeans. For all three commodities, Argentina ranks third among 
all producers, with almost one-fifth of world output. In addition, Argentina is the 
world’s second-largest exporter of corn, sunflower meal, and sunflower oil. The 
country is also the fourth-largest beef producer, with 4.8% of the world’s output, 
but it only ranks seventh among beef exporters. A major reason for this is that 
Argentineans consume the most beef per capita of all world consumers of beef, 
averaging 54 kilograms per capita per year over 2001-03 (FAOSTAT).
Given the relevance of Argentina to world agricultural markets, an in-
depth investigation of the recent evolution of its agricultural sector should be 
of interest. Better knowledge of the main developments that have characterized 
Argentinean agriculture in the past should help in making inferences about its 
 Production Exports
Commodity 
World Share
(%) 
World
Ranking 
World Share
(%) 
World
Ranking 
Total agricultural 
products 8.4 8 2.9 12 
Crop products  
 Apples 2.0 11 2.8 11
 Corn 2.6 5 10.8 2
 Grapes 4.3 8 1.3 16
 Lemons and limes 10.7 3 11.2 3
 Soybeans 19.3 3 13.7 3
 Soybean meal 17.4 3 36.1 1
 Soybean oil 17.4 3 46.9 1
 Sunflower meal 13.9 3 17.5 2
 Sunflower oil 13.9 3 19.8 2
 Sunflower seed 12.3 3 3.3 9
 Wheat 2.4 13 6.7 7
 Wine 5.6 5 1.7 11
Animal products  
 Bovine meat 4.8 4 5.2 7
 Cow milk 1.8 15
 Dairy products  1.4 16
 Poultry meat 1.4 13 0.8 19
Table 14.1. Argentina’s world share and world ranking in production and 
exports of selected agricultural commodities, average 2005-2007 
Source: All figures calculated from FAOSTAT data.
Notes: Production shares and rankings based on physical units, except for “Total Agricultural 
Products” which are based on quantities valued at the 1999-2001 average international 
commodity prices. Export shares and rankings based on actual dollar values of traded 
commodities.
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potential course for the future. In the process, one should also gain a better un-
derstanding of the likely effects on the world markets of the commodities for 
which Argentina is or can be a significant supplier. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to analyze the major output, export, and productivity trends experi-
enced by Argentinean agriculture in recent decades, and to study the main driv-
ers behind such developments. 
First, general background information is provided to put Argentinean agri-
culture in perspective. Second, the evolution of agricultural policies in Argentina 
and their impacts are discussed. Third, the most important developments in 
Argentinean production agriculture since 1990 are analyzed. Fourth, the major 
trends in productivity for individual factors of production are examined. This 
is followed by a review of the measures of Argentina’s total factor productivity 
growth estimated by the recent literature. 
2. ARGENTINEAN AGRICULTURE IN CONTEXT
This section provides basic information about Argentinean agriculture, to aid 
in the analysis provided later. First, the role of agriculture in Argentina’s economy 
is addressed, which should be useful in understanding the policies affecting the 
sector. This is followed by a general characterization of the country’s agriculture. 
2.1. Agriculture and Argentina’s Economy
Table 14.2 reports the evolution of some key economic indicators for Argen-
tina since 1960, as well as some indicators of the role of the agricultural sector 
in the entire economy. With an average gross domestic product (GDP) of about 
U.S.$5,600 per capita in 2005-07, Argentina is classified as an upper middle-
income economy by the World Bank. Consistent with the country’s moderate 
level of development, the services sector is the most important contributor to 
GDP, followed by the industrial sector. As the economy has developed over time, 
agriculture’s share of GDP has tended to fall. However, this share has almost 
doubled since 2000, and over 2005-07 agriculture accounted for a sizable 9% 
of GDP. Agriculture has accounted for an even larger share of total employment, 
indicating that wages in the sector have been smaller than wages in the services 
and manufacturing sectors.
The sector is estimated to have contributed almost one-fifth of Argentina’s 
GDP in 2003-05 if activities directly related to primary agriculture are included 
(Fundacion Producir Conservando 2007). In 2003, about 5.59 million people 
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were either directly employed by the food and agriculture sector or indirectly 
employed by it through upstream and downstream linkages, amounting to about 
one-third of the country’s total employment in 2003 (Llach, Harriague, and 
O’Connor 2004). Furthermore, the taxes paid by agriculture and the activities 
directly related to it accounted for about 40% of the total taxes collected by the 
Argentinean government in 1997-2001, and for more than 45% in 2002-05 (Fun-
dacion Producir Conservando 2007).
The importance of agriculture to Argentina’s economy is most evident when 
examining the country’s balance of trade (see Table 14.2). In the 1960s, exports 
of agricultural and food products amounted to more than 90% of total merchan-
dise exports. This share has steadily declined since then, but over the period 
2000-07 almost half of the exports consisted of agricultural and food products. 
In contrast to exports, imports of agricultural and food products have tradition-
ally been a small percentage of total merchandise imports, averaging only 3% 
over 2005-07. With net exports well in excess of 80% of the sum of exports plus 
imports of agricultural and food products, Argentina is clearly a net supplier of 
such products in world markets.
The large magnitude of exports from the agricultural sector is underscored 
by the fact that total merchandise exports were equivalent to 25% of Argentina’s 
GDP in 2005-07. The agriculture and food index of revealed comparative ad-
vantage, calculated as the agriculture and food share of merchandise exports for 
Argentina relative to the world food share, averaged a value of six in 2005-07. 
This considerably large index value provides strong evidence that the country’s 
relative strength lies in producing and exporting agricultural and food products 
as opposed to manufactured goods. Further, the index has steadily increased, 
from slightly above three in 1960-64, suggesting that, if anything, the compara-
tive advantage of Argentina’s agricultural sector has risen over time.
In addition to its important contributions to GDP, employment, trade, and 
fiscal revenues, the agricultural sector provides three key staples of the Argen-
tinean diet, namely, bread, beef, and milk. As pointed out earlier, on a per-
capita basis, Argentina is the world’s leading consumer of beef. Per capita wheat 
consumption of bread, which averaged 119 kilograms per capita per year in 
2001-03, is among the highest in the world (e.g., only 4 out of the 66 countries 
classified as high-income economies by the World Bank ranked higher). Per cap-
ita consumption of dairy products is also large and significantly above the world 
average. The large incidence of wheat, beef, and milk in the domestic diet has 
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made these products traditionally sensitive from a policy-making standpoint. For 
example, starting in 2007, bans and other types of restrictions on their export 
have been imposed in an attempt to ensure ample supplies and low prices in the 
domestic market (IICA 2007).
2.2. A Succinct Characterization of the Agricultural Sector
According to FAO’s production index number, slightly over 60% of Argen-
tina’s agricultural output value in 2005-07 originated from crops and almost 
40% from livestock. As depicted in Figure 14.1, the value of crop production has 
increased at a significantly faster rate than the value of livestock output over the 
last few decades, implying that the relative incidence of livestock in the sector 
has declined steadily over time. The relative incidence of crops in exports is even 
larger, as crops and their products accounted for 80% of the total exports by the 
sector in 2005-07. As for production, the export share of livestock has exhibited 
a clear downward trend.
Figure 14.2 shows the breakdown of the value of the sector’s output by com-
modity for the years 2005-07. The most striking feature of the graph is the high 
concentration of the value of output in a handful of commodities. In particular, 
beef and soybeans alone contribute more than half of the value of Argentina’s 
agricultural production, each accounting for slightly over a quarter of the total 
value. They are followed by wheat, corn, and milk, with shares of 8%, 6%, and 
5%, respectively. The value of the top five commodities makes up approximately 
three-fourths of the total value of agricultural output.
Underlying the aggregate index trends displayed in Figure 14.1 are sub-
stantial changes in the trends for individual commodities. In the case of crops, 
Figure 14.3 shows that corn and wheat output grew at a relatively constant 
pace since the 1960s. Output of sunflower seed, in contrast, increased sixfold 
between the late 1970s and 2000, only to decline by almost half since 2000. 
Among crops, the most important development was the explosive growth of soy-
beans, which went from being essentially unknown in the early 1970s to becom-
ing by far the most important crop. In 2005-07, more than half of the crop area 
and about 45% of the value of crops produced corresponded to soybeans. The 
evolving patterns in crop output were induced by changes in the relative profit-
ability of the various crops, largely arising from shifts in world supply and de-
mand, the introduction of new technologies, and domestic agricultural policies. 
The latter two topics are discussed in greater detail in later sections.
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Figure 14.1. Production index numbers for agricultural production in 
Argentina, 1961-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
Notes: Production indexes are the sum of price-weighted quantities of different agricultural 
commodities relative to the year 1961. The prices used for weighing the production quantities 
of each commodity are the average international commodity prices over 1999-2001. 
Figure 14.2. Commodity shares of the total value of agricultural production 
in Argentina, 2005-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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Subsectors of the livestock industry fared quite differently (see Figure 14.4). 
Since 1961, sheep and goat meat production declined by two-thirds. Production 
of cattle meat has shown no clear trend since the late 1970s, and the same is true 
of pig meat output. Milk production, in contrast, more than doubled between 
1961 and 2007. Over this period, the livestock industry with the highest growth 
was poultry, as it increased more than 25-fold. The lack of growth in beef pro-
duction over the last three decades can be attributed to the substitution of pas-
tures in the more fertile areas for crops, pushing cattle production toward more 
marginal areas, and unfavorable events such as the closure of the most profitable 
export markets because of foot-and-mouth disease. 
As illustrated by Figure 14.5, agricultural exports are even more concentrat-
ed than output, with shipments of the soybean complex (i.e., soybeans, soybean 
oil, and soybean meal) accounting for 45% of the total in 2005-07. The next larg-
est share corresponds to exports of the cattle complex (i.e., meat and leather), 
with 11%, followed by exports of the wheat and corn complexes, with 8% and 
7%, respectively. Approximately 75% of the total value of exports stems from the 
largest five commodity complexes. In the interest of space, graphs illustrating 
trends for the main agricultural exports are not shown. However, as implied by 
Figure 14.3. Production index numbers for major crops in Argentina, 
1961-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
Note: Production indexes are calculated as the quantities produced relative to the year 1961.
 the AgrIculturAl sector In ArgentInA 417
Figure 14.4. Production index numbers for livestock products in Argentina, 
1961-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
Note: Production indexes are calculated as the quantities produced relative to the year 1961. 
Figure 14.5. Commodity shares of Argentina’s total value of exports of 
agricultural products, 2005-2007
Sources: Prepared using data from Argentina’s Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos 
(INDEC) and the World Trade Organization.
Note: “Complex” means the primary commodity and its products (e.g., the soybean complex 
consists of soybean, soybean oil, and soybean meal). 
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the trends in output values for specific commodities (see Figures 14.3 and 14.4), 
exports for many individual products have evolved quite differently from aggre-
gate exports over the last four decades.
Argentina is a large country, spanning regions of quite different suitability 
for agriculture. From a geographical point of view, its agricultural production can 
be classified into two main categories, namely, output from the Pampean region, 
and output from the non-Pampean region or “regional economies.” The Pampean 
region comprises the center and East of the country and produces most of the 
grains, oilseeds, cattle, and milk. The non-Pampean region consists of the rest of 
the country, and it produces a relatively large range of agricultural goods. These 
include sheep in the South (Patagonia); grapes and other fruits in the irrigated ar-
eas of the West; sugar, citrus, and tobacco leaf in the Northwest; and cotton, tea, 
and mate (a local herbal drink) in the Northeast. The Pampean region accounts for 
most of the value of the output and exports of Argentina’s agricultural sector. Only 
one regional product is among the top eight commodities by output value (grapes, 
with a 3% share), and only two regional commodity complexes are among the top 
eight exports (fruits and grapes, with 4% and 3% shares, respectively). Pampean 
agriculture has been the more dynamic of the two regions, as well. Primary agri-
cultural exports from the Pampas and the non-Pampean regions increased by 46% 
and 29%, respectively, between 2000 and 2004 (World Bank 2006).
A major common denominator of the agricultural products from the non-
Pampean region is that they tend to be mostly consumed by the domestic market 
(Reca 2006). Many of the non-Pampean agricultural products come from perennial 
plants (e.g., fruits, grapes, tea, and mate), rendering them unresponsive to short-
run demand shifts (Reca 2006). Other distinguishing characteristic of agriculture 
in the Pampas region as compared with the non-Pampean is that the Pampas is 
generally more intensive in the use of machinery and management, and more ex-
tensive in the use of land and labor (Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008). Importantly, 
unlike most products from the Pampas, large components of the non-Pampean out-
put have traditionally received some form of government protection (Reca 2006). 
3. EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINEAN AGRICULTURAL 
POLICIES SINCE THE 1940S
Argentina enjoys a very favorable natural endowment for agricultural pro-
duction, consisting of a large area of arable land characterized by temperate 
climate, adequate rainfall, and in close proximity to ports accessible by grain 
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vessels. This favorable environment has allowed Argentinean agriculture to 
grow and prosper, even though, starting in the mid-1940s, the sector has suf-
fered from policies aimed at promoting industrial development by transferring 
resources from the agricultural and rural sectors to the industrial and urban 
ones (World Bank 2006).
Policies transferring resources from agriculture to the manufacturing sector 
started to be implemented immediately following World War II. These policies 
were the result of the difficulties experienced by Argentina’s agricultural export-
ers, and the favorable outlook for manufacturers in the domestic market. Argen-
tina’s agricultural exports had first suffered because of the large drop in world 
agricultural prices that accompanied the Great Depression of the 1930s. Then, 
piles of unsold grain accumulated during World War II because of restrictions 
on naval trade during the war. At the same time, the war also made it extremely 
difficult to import manufactured goods, which greatly improved the outlook for 
producing such goods to satisfy the needs of the domestic market (Sturzenegger 
and Salazni 2008).
The polices that began after World War II were aimed at promoting industrial 
growth by favoring import substitution (i.e., the domestic production of imported 
manufactures), and using resources from the agricultural sector to support them. 
The agricultural sector was taxed by means of a combination of export duties, 
overvalued exchange rates, and public marketing boards (World Bank 2006). In 
the case of wheat, for example, this translated into a discrimination exceeding 50% 
(Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008). Sturzenegger (1990) estimated that as of the early 
1980s, such policies had transferred over 60% of agricultural GDP to other sectors 
in the economy. Several studies have shown that these policies had a substantial 
negative effect on Argentina’s agricultural sector. For example, Reca and Parellada 
(2001) reported that average annual agricultural production over 1950-52 was 20% 
smaller than over the period 1940-42. 
Soon after World War II, a comprehensive set of welfare state policies was 
also introduced by the Peron administration. This was initially financed with 
assets that the government had accumulated during the war, which stemmed 
from the account surplus associated with the lost import opportunities at the 
time of the armed conflict. As those assets were depleted over time, financing the 
welfare state became a recurrent problem for the government. According to Stur-
zenegger and Salazni (2008), this lies at the heart of the chronic fiscal struggle 
and inflationary pressure that Argentina has faced since then.
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In the early 1990s, major policy changes took place that had a substantial 
impact on the agricultural sector. General policy changes included trade liber-
alization, deregulation, privatization of many state enterprises, the creation of 
Mercosur (the Southern Common Market), and, perhaps most important of all, a 
currency convertibility program (Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008). The currency 
convertibility program was designed to eliminate the main source of inflationary 
pressures, that is, the creation of money to finance the public sector deficit. The 
convertibility program consisted of a currency board that fixed a nominal rela-
tion of one peso to one U.S. dollar.
Policy changes directly concerning agriculture involved the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions and the reduction of tariffs on imports of inputs (e.g., 
fertilizers, herbicides, machinery, and irrigation equipment), the removal of ex-
port taxes, the elimination of commodity boards, the significant reduction of 
inefficiencies and red tape in the marketing channel (e.g., transportation and 
ports), and the elimination of tax distortions in fuels (World Bank 2006). As 
depicted in Figure 14.6, these policy changes triggered substantial increases in 
the imports of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery, which trans-
lated into much greater usage of these inputs (see, e.g., Figure 14.7). As a result, 
the area harvested with the main annual crops expanded by about one-quarter 
during the 1990s (see Figure 14.8). Not surprisingly, crop production grew at a 
much faster pace in the 1990s than in previous decades. Livestock production, 
however, did not show faster growth over this decade (see Figure 14.1).
Unfortunately, the economic crisis experienced by Argentina’s main trade 
partner, Brazil, and record low world agricultural commodity prices combined 
to negatively affect the Argentinean economy at the end of the 1990s. The peso 
became increasingly overvalued against the currencies of Argentina’s main 
trade partners (Brazil and the European Union), and problems continued to 
mount within the economy until it collapsed at the end of 2001, along with 
the convertibility program scheme. The economic debacle triggered a huge 
capital outflow, a devaluation in excess of 200%, and a default in external and 
public debts (Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008). According to data from Argen-
tina’s Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC), GDP sunk by more 
than 10% between 2001 and 2002, and in 2002 unemployment and the per-
centage of population living below the poverty line exploded to 22% and 54%, 
respectively, all figures illustrative of the depth of the economic crisis suffered 
by the country. 
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Figure 14.7. Usage of fertilizers and herbicides plus insecticides in 
Argentina, 1961-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT.
Note: Data for herbicides plus insecticides are not available for 1961-1992 and 1999-2007. 
Figure 14.6. Imports of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery by 
Argentina, 1961-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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In the few years following the 2001 collapse, the economy experienced a 
strong recovery, with GDP growing by 41% between 2002 and 2006, employ-
ment falling to slightly less than 10% in 2007, and the percentage of population 
living under the poverty line reduced by almost half in 2006 compared to 2002. 
The recovery was spurred by the restoration of confidence in the economy, in-
duced by sensible macroeconomic measures such as a restructuring of the public 
debt, the restoration of a fiscal surplus, and the accumulation of international 
monetary reserves by the Central Bank. The agricultural sector played a major 
role in regard to the fiscal surplus and the accumulation of reserves, because the 
crisis prompted the government to impose taxes on agricultural exports once 
again to obtain much-needed hard currency. Interestingly, the party in power 
since the crisis has been the one founded by Peron, who was instrumental in 
promoting policies that discriminated against agriculture in favor of the domes-
tic manufacturing sector after World War II.
Fortunately, the years following the crisis were characterized by very favorable 
conditions in the world markets for Argentina’s main agricultural products, which 
allowed a significant expansion of agricultural exports, and with it tax revenues 
and foreign reserves. Between 2002 and 2005, taxes on exports originating in the 
agricultural sector averaged 2.2% of GDP, 9.2% of the value of exports, and 9.9% of 
all tax revenues (Nogues and Porto 2007). Ultimately, however, high international 
Figure 14.8. Area harvested in Argentina, 1961-2007
 Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT.
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commodity prices led to the current tug-of-war between the Argentinean govern-
ment and the agricultural sector (Bisang 2008).In the case of staples of the Argen-
tinean diet, high world prices put pressure on the government to avoid increases in 
their domestic prices. Exports of meat and dairy products, initially taxed at about 
15%, were either banned or restricted to meet this goal (Nogues and Porto 2007, 
IICA 2007 and 2009). For wheat and corn, a complex compensation scheme was 
instituted so that domestic users could buy these grains at a more favorable price 
than that available to exporters (Nogues and Porto 2007; IICA 2007 and 2009). 
In the case of soybeans, which are barely consumed in the domestic market, high 
world prices induced the government to raise the export taxes to increase fiscal 
revenues. Export taxes on soybeans were successively raised from 13% to 23.5%, 
to 27.5% in early 2007, and to 37.5% in mid-2007. At the same time, domestic 
prices of imported inputs continued to increase following the world markets. In 
2008, the government decision to increase soybean export taxes even further to 
45% and to make them variable (so that any world price increases would trigger 
automatic tax increases above 45%) triggered an unprecedented set of farm strikes 
(Bisang 2008; IICA 2009). Eventually, the variable export tax scheme was defeated 
in Congress by the narrowest of margins, and the crisis is likely a major reason for 
the defeat of the Peronist administration in the mid-elections of 2009.
After losing the recent mid-term elections, the present administration has 
successfully managed to stick to its policies of heavily discriminating against 
agriculture. However, large losses in the agricultural sector during the past year 
due to a widespread drought, less favorable world market conditions, and the 
significant taxes on exports have induced the country’s leaders to break with the 
past and seek political alliances aimed at reversing the traditional policies of tax-
ing agriculture to favor the industrial sector. As of the present writing, it is very 
difficult to predict the future course of agricultural policies, because it greatly 
depends upon which of the confronting power groups prevails. If the views of 
the present administration succeed, it seems clear that agricultural policies in 
the future will resemble the ones that characterized the period between World 
War II and 1991. The opposite situation would be more in line with the experi-
ence during the 1990s, during which Argentinean agriculture flourished.
3.1. Quantifying the Discrimination Against Agriculture
The discriminating nature of Argentina’s policies against agriculture were 
quantified by two recent studies conducted by Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008) 
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and Sturzenegger (2007). To this end, the authors computed the nominal rate of 
assistance (NRA) for product j (NRAj), defined as
 NRAj = (RPj – UPj)/UPj. (1)
In equation (1), RPj denotes the (distorted) price received by domestic pro-
ducers of good j, whereas UPj represents the respective undistorted price. That 
is, NRAj measures the percentage by which the actual price of commodity j dif-
fers from its price without government intervention. 
Figure 14.9 depicts five-year averages of NRAs for aggregated tradable prod-
ucts from the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors for 1960-65 through 
2000-05. The graph nicely illustrates the extent to which Argentinean policies 
have historically discriminated against agricultural products and in favor of 
manufactures from the industrial sector. For the period examined, discrimina-
tion against agriculture was at its highest in 1960-65, when NRA was -25.3%. 
This means that, in aggregate, different forms of government intervention effec-
tively reduced prices of agricultural products by one-fourth of the non-distorted 
level over 1960-61. Discrimination against agriculture gradually declined until 
1995-99, when it reached its lowest level, with an NRA of only -4%. Since then, 
however, discrimination against the sector has increased by a large amount, with 
NRA averaging -16.2% in 2000-05. Further, the discrimination worsened after 
the studies were conducted, because of the increase in export tariffs and the im-
position of quantity restrictions on exports that took place after 2005.
The bias against agriculture stands in sharp contrast to the support provided to 
non-agricultural manufactures. In the first half of the 1960s, prices of non-agricul-
tural tradable goods were effectively being subsidized by 61.4%, while agricultural 
tradable prices were taxed at a rate of 25.3%. The favorable treatment toward the 
manufacturing sector has continued since then but at diminishing rate. Over the pe-
riod covered by Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008) and Sturzenegger (2007), support 
of tradable manufactures was at its lowest in 2000-05, when NRA averaged 5.3%.
To better appreciate the extent to which the agricultural sector is being dis-
criminated against by governmental policies, it is instructive to compare the 
agricultural NRA values for Argentina and other countries. To this end, Figure 
14.10 ranks the countries included in the set of the world’s top 20 agricultural 
producers, or the world’s top 20 exporters of agricultural products, or both, ac-
cording to their average NRA indexes for agriculture over the period 2000-05. 
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Figure 14.9. Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for tradable products, five-
year averages, 1960-64 through 2000-05
Source: Prepared from data in Table 2.3 in Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008.
Figure 14.10. Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for agricultural tradables 
and relative rate of assistance to agriculture for selected countries, average 
2000-05
Source: Prepared with data from Anderson and Valenzuela 2008.
Note: The selected countries are among the top 20 producers of agricultural products or the top 
20 agricultural exporters, or both, over 2005-07, according to value of production and trade 
data reported by FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 14.11. Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for major agricultural 
products in Argentina, 1960-2005
Source: Prepared from data in Appendix Table B.1 in Sturzenegger and Salazni 2008. 
Interestingly, only 4 of the 25 countries in the set have negative NRAs, i.e., dis-
criminate against agriculture, and Argentina has the smallest NRA value of them 
all. Figure 14.10 also displays the relative rate of assistance to agriculture (RRA), 
which is defined in equation (2):
 RRA = (1 + NRAAgTrad)/(1 + NRANonAgTrad) – 1, (2)
where NRAAgTrad and NRANonAgTrad are the NRA aggregate indexes for the coun-
try’s agricultural tradable products and non-agricultural tradable goods, respec-
tively. Therefore, RRA quantifies the extent to which policies are biased in favor 
(if positive) or against (if negative) the agricultural sector relative to the non-
agricultural sector. By this measure, only 9 of the 25 countries in the selected 
set shown in the graph had policies biased against agriculture (i.e., had negative 
RRA values) over the 2000-05 period, and Argentina’s policies were clearly the 
most biased against the sector.
The smoothness of the five-year NRA average for agricultural tradables dis-
played in Figure 14.9 masks wide annual variations among the NRA indexes for 
individual commodities. This can be observed in Figure 14.11, which shows the 
annual NRA values for wheat, corn, soybeans, sunflower, beef, and milk. The 
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common denominator among the reported NRA series is that, except for a few 
observations, they are all negative. Based on an econometric analysis of corn, 
wheat, soybeans, and beef, Sturzenegger (2007) found that their NRAs fall when 
the world prices for the respective commodities rise, and when the real exchange 
rate goes up. From this, the author concluded that Argentinean trade policies 
toward agriculture have had a “compensatory” role; more specifically, they have 
tended to smooth the time variability in farmland rents. He also found the 
econometric results consistent with the hypothesis that the level of discrimina-
tion against agriculture has been historically determined by a “political market,” 
consisting of representatives from agriculture on one side and representatives 
from other sectors on the other. At times when profitability for individual agri-
cultural commodities decreased, those in the agricultural sector tended to exert 
more pressure on the political market to reduce the bias against them. The oppo-
site was true when profitability for agricultural products increased.
4. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINEAN PRODUCTION 
AGRICULTURE SINCE 1990
It is evident from the previous discussion that a major structural change seems 
to have occurred in Argentinean agriculture in the early 1990s. For example, 
growth in the value of crop output has been significantly larger after 1990 than 
over the three preceding decades (see Figure 14.1). Similarly, production of oilseeds 
underwent a major expansion relative to grain production, and the total area har-
vested grew at a noticeably faster pace after 1991 (see Figures 14.3 and 14.8). At the 
same time, annual usage of fertilizers and pesticides greatly exceeded the amounts 
used in any year prior to 1990 (see Figure 14.7). Several developments took place 
in Argentinean production agriculture that contributed to the increased growth 
rate in crop value observed after the early 1990s. The most important ones, howev-
er, were (a) the modernization of the technologies used by agricultural producers, 
(b) the expansion of the crop frontier, (c) the greater intensity in the usage of farm-
land in the Pampean region, and (d) the advent of “planting pools.” In the case of 
beef production, the most noteworthy development has been the explosive growth 
of feedlots over the last decade. These developments are discussed next.
4.1. Technological Modernization
After the 1990s, Argentina’s agricultural sector underwent a significant 
technological modernization. Trade liberalization in the 1990s favored imports 
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of less expensive and more efficient machinery for agriculture (see Figure 14.6). 
Liberalization also allowed local producers of agricultural machinery to buy 
foreign inputs, greatly reducing their costs and improving the quality of their 
products (Chudnovsky and Lopez 2005). Greater usage of fertilizers and agro-
chemicals was spurred by the liberalization of trade and the increase in the lo-
cal capacity to produce these inputs (see Figure 14.7) (Chudnovsky and Lopez 
2005). Storage capacity in permanent facilities more than doubled after the late 
1980s, from 32 million tons in 1987, to 56 million tons in 2000, to 70 million 
tons in 2007 (Lopez and Oliverio 2008). The late 1990s also witnessed the in-
troduction and widespread adoption of disposable storage bags, which greatly 
expanded storage capacity and provided crop producers with much greater flex-
ibility in the commercialization of their crops. It is estimated that storage bags 
accounted for 30% of Argentina’s grain storage capacity as of 2007 (Lopez and 
Oliverio 2008).
Another major technological change was the introduction of genetically 
modified (GM) organisms in the mid-1990s, such as glyphosate-resistant soy-
beans and Bt corn. In 1996, glyphosate-resistant soybeans became the first 
transgenic crop commercially released in Argentina (Trigo and Cap 2006). As 
evident from Figure 14.12, glyphosate-resistant soybeans proved to be hugely 
popular among producers, who increased the area planted with it from an al-
most negligible amount in 1996 to essentially 100% after 2004. GM corn was 
also rapidly accepted by Argentinean producers, with an adoption rate of 20% 
in 2000 and stabilizing at about 70% after 2003. The adoption rate for GM cot-
ton, on the other hand, was low for several years, but it exploded to over 90% in 
2006. Notably, Argentina has consistently ranked second in the world (after the 
United States) in terms of area planted with GM crops.
Linked to both the modernization of machinery and the widespread adop-
tion of glyphosate-resistant soybeans is the incorporation of zero-tillage technol-
ogy. According to Ekboir and Parellada (2002), zero tillage constitutes the most 
significant agricultural technology introduced in Argentina over the last 50 
years. Zero tillage consists of planting crops in soil without previous tillage, by 
opening only a slot in the soil with the smallest dimensions consistent with the 
appropriate coverage for the desired seeds. Testing of the zero tillage technology 
started in the 1970s, but it became widely adopted in the late 1990s. In 2001, it 
was estimated that 7.3 million hectares were planted using zero tillage in Argen-
tina, or one-third of the area planted with annual crops at the time (Cetrangolo 
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et al. 2007). A critical factor underlying the widespread adoption of zero tillage 
in Argentina was the introduction of glyphosate-resistant soybeans, because 
glyphosate resistance allows for a very thorough and cost-effective weed control. 
The soybean crop uses zero tillage most prevalently, with 75% of first-crop soy-
bean area and 83% of the second-crop soybean area planted with this technol-
ogy in 2007 (SAGPyA). In 2007, adoption rates of zero tillage for the other major 
crops were 74% for corn, 72% for wheat, and 45% for sunflower (SAGPyA). 
Zero tillage has contributed to the expansion of agricultural production in 
several ways. First, it has significantly reduced production costs. Zero tillage re-
quires costly and specialized planting machines, but it eliminates the need to till 
the soil and perform other types of work associated with conventional crop pro-
duction technologies. Second, zero tillage has allowed planting in areas poorly 
suited to conventional crop production methods, contributing to the expansion 
of the crop frontier and the more intensive use of land (see Section 4.2). Third, 
by reducing the deterioration of land caused by conventional tillage, zero till-
age has permitted the conversion of some land from crop-pasture rotations to 
permanent agriculture. Under traditional tillage, rotations with pastures were 
required to restore soil structure and fertility after several years of cropping. In 
contrast, well-managed zero tillage (i.e., using appropriate rotations of low-stub-
Figure 14.12. Adoption rates of genetically modified crops in Argentina, 
1996-2007 
Sources: Prepared using data from Trigo and Cap 2006; James 2006, 2007; and FAOSTAT.
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ble crops such as soybeans and high-stubble crops such as wheat and corn) can 
preserve soil resources. Finally, zero tillage has also greatly facilitated the plant-
ing of soybeans immediately following the wheat harvest, resulting in two crops 
in the same year.
4.2. Expansion of the Crop Frontier
As illustrated in Figure 14.13, the area planted with crops in the non-
Pampean regions remained relatively stable at slightly over four million hect-
ares until the mid-1990s, but it has essentially doubled since then. The main 
expansion took place in the Northeast and Northwest regions where soybeans 
were planted. According to the national census, between 1988 and 2002 the 
planted area in those two regions jumped from 2.5 to 4.3 million hectares. 
This means that the Northeast and Northwest increased their share of Argen-
tina’s total area with crops from 13.7% in 1988 to 17% in 2002. A key factor 
underlying this expansion was the aforementioned introduction of zero tillage, 
which made it possible to grow crops profitably in areas too marginal for con-
ventional planting technologies.
4.3. More Intensive Land Usage in the Pampean Region
The area planted with annual crops in the Pampas grew by about 50% be-
tween the early 1990s and 2007, from slightly over 15 million hectares to around 
23 million hectares (see Figure 14.13). Land usage in the Pampean region be-
came more intensive by increasing the area planted with crops relative to perma-
nent pastures, and by relying more heavily on double-cropping. In a substantial 
proportion of the area, the traditional scheme of rotating crops with permanent 
pastures, used to restore soil structure and fertility, was changed, either by short-
ening the cycle with pastures or by eliminating it altogether and switching to 
continuous cropping. At the same time, double cropping wheat and soybeans 
(and, to a much smaller extent, barley and soybeans) became a very popular 
choice for agricultural producers in the Pampas. Between 1996 and 2007 the 
area planted with soybeans as a second crop is estimated to have increased by 
about 130%, from 1.9 to 4.4 million hectares (see Figure 14.14). As noted earlier, 
a major contributor to the popularity of second-cropping was the introduction 
of zero tillage together with glyphosate-resistant soybeans and glyphosate. The 
glyphosate technology package preserves soil moisture, saves planting time at a 
critical period, and greatly facilitates weed control.
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Figure 14.14. Area planted with soybeans as first and second crop in 
Argentina, 1996-2007
Sources: Prepared using data from Trigo and Cap 2006 and SAGPyA.
Figure 14.13. Area planted with cereals and oilseeds in the Pampas and the 
rest of Argentina, 1971-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from SAGPyA.
Note: “Pampas” is being approximated here by the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and 
Cordoba. 
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4.4. Planting Pools
In the mid-1990s, a new organizational form of production agriculture ap-
peared in Argentina, namely, the “planting pool.” Planting pools consist of agree-
ments among producers and other agents that provide for various factors that 
enter the production and/or commercialization process (e.g., in-kind inputs, 
labor, and financing). Arrangements may vary greatly, including some in which 
the producer keeps managing the farm and the planting pools provide for tech-
nical assistance, financing, and risk diversification. In other instances, the pools 
rent vast tracts of farmland, which allows them to exploit economies of scale and 
benefit from the geographic diversification of risks. Some pools have even ex-
panded to farm land in neighboring countries (e.g., Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, 
and Brazil). As of 2002, over 50% of operations involved mainly in crop produc-
tion farmed third-party farmland under various contractual arrangements. Plant-
ing pools are now quite common in Pampean agriculture (World Bank 2006).
Planting pools have contributed to the expansion of agricultural output in 
Argentina in various ways. First, they are a major source of financing for agri-
cultural production. Some studies argue that the perennial lack of adequate fi-
nancing in Argentinean agriculture was a major reason for the advent of planting 
pools (World Bank 2006). In recent years, planting pools captured funds from 
both short- and long-term investors outside of agriculture. Some of the largest 
pools have also successfully issued equity shares aimed at attracting capital from 
foreign investors. Second, planting pools tend to incorporate better production 
practices and more advanced technology. Data from the 2002 agricultural census 
shows that planting pools are more likely to perform soil analysis and monitor 
pests. Finally, planting pools tend to use more effective tools to manage risks 
(e.g., insurance, hedging, and geographic diversification), which provides them 
with an edge over more traditional forms of organizing agricultural produc-
tion (World Bank 2006). Overall, planting pools have greatly contributed to the 
separation of land ownership from the management of agricultural production 
(Bisang 2008).
4.5. Beef Production Using Feedlots
In recent years, the most noticeable development in the livestock sector has 
been the widespread use of feedlots to produce beef. Traditionally, Argentinean 
cattle were raised on pastures. However, the strong trend toward the replace-
ment of pastures by crops, which accelerated after 1990, motivated the adoption 
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of feedlots as a way to produce beef using less land. Because the best-suited lands 
for crops are in the Pampas, a relative relocation of cattle from the Pampas to the 
non-Pampean regions took place along with this shift in farmland usage. The 
share of the cattle stocks in the Pampas fell from 62% in 1994 to 58% in 2003, 
and fell further to 50% in 2008 (Canosa, Iriarte, and Tonelli 2009). Together with 
better management of pastures and technology (e.g., fertilization and genetics), 
production of beef in feedlots is one reason why meat production has remained at 
relatively stable levels despite the reductions in pasture area and the total stock of 
cattle (see Figures 14.4 and 14.15) (Canosa, Iriarte, and Tonelli 2009).
Initially, feedlots were used seasonally as a means to counteract the seasonal 
drops in the supply of forage from natural pastures. Over time, however, feedlots 
have tended to become year-round operations, with substantially more uniform 
and higher-capacity utilization rates. In 2008, capacity utilization for the feedlot 
industry reached record levels, with no month falling under a rate of 70% (Camara 
Argentina de Feedlots 2009). In addition to the switch in land use from pastures 
to crops, there are two factors that have contributed to the increased popularity of 
feedlots, one of them driven by demand and the other related to supply. On the de-
mand side, stricter requirements by domestic buyers, in terms of both meat quality 
and uniformity, have clearly favored animals fattened in feedlots over traditional 
grazing-based beef. On the supply side, a scheme of government reimbursements 
Figure 14.15. Stock of cattle and cattle meat yield in Argentina, 1961-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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to feedlots instituted in early 2007, by which registered operations are offered 
partial refunds for the cost of grains used for feeding cattle in feedlots, has been 
instrumental in the recent further surge in feedlot production.
According to official statistics, in September 2008 there were 1,400 regis-
tered feedlots, which produced 3.6 million animals in the previous year, or about 
30% of the total amount of fat cattle slaughtered in Argentina in that year. How-
ever, these figures underestimate the actual incidence of feedlots, as many of the 
operations are not officially registered. It is estimated that slaughter of cattle pro-
duced in feedlots increased from 1.5 million animals in 2001 to between 4.5 and 
5 million animals in 2009. Nowadays, feedlots consume almost one-fifth of the 
total corn output produced by Argentina (Camara Argentina de Feedlots 2009).
5. PARTIAL PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS
As pointed out earlier in connection with Figures 14.1 and 14.3, crop pro-
duction in Argentina has consistently increased since 1960, and its growth 
seems to have accelerated after the early 1990s. Over the same period, land 
planted with crops also went up, particularly since the early 1990s (see Figure 
14.8). Overall, however, growth in crop production outpaced the increase in 
land utilization, resulting in positive trends in the yields of all of the major crops 
(see Figure 14.16). Corn had the largest yield increase, as its output per hect-
Figure 14.16. Yield per hectare of soybeans, corn, wheat, and sunflower 
seed in Argentina, 1961-2007 
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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are almost quadrupled, from 1.8 tons in 1961-63 to 7.0 tons in 2005-07. Next 
was soybeans, whose yield rose from 1.0 ton per hectare in 1961-63 to 2.8 tons 
per hectare in 2005-07, for a gain of over 150%. The yield of sunflower seed 
improved until the mid-1990s, with output per hectare more than doubling be-
tween 1961-63 (0.7 tons) and 1994-96 (1.7 tons). However, sunflower seed yield 
stagnated afterward. Finally, wheat yield increased by about 80%, from 1.5 to 
2.7 tons per hectare between 1961-63 and 2005-07. Overall, the positive trend in 
crop yields can be traced back to the use of better genetic materials, greater use 
of inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides (more to follow), and better technolo-
gies. Among the technologies, worthy of mention is the technological package in-
volving zero tillage, glyphosate-resistant soybeans, and glyphosate. The increase 
in average crop yields is even more impressive considering that it took place at 
the same time that vast areas of more marginal lands were being incorporated 
into crop production.
As shown in Figure 14.6, usage of fertilizers and pesticides rose substantially 
beginning in the 1960s, and particularly so after the early 1990s. Unfortunately, 
partial productivity measures by crop for either input cannot be calculated be-
cause data about usage of pesticides by individual crops are not available. How-
ever, for crops as a whole, it is clear from Figures 14.1 and 14.6 that productivity 
of both fertilizers and pesticides fell over the period under analysis, because use 
of both inputs has grown at a significantly faster pace than crop output.
The evolution of labor and machinery inputs in Argentinean agriculture is 
depicted in Figure 14.17. As with fertilizers and herbicides, there are no disag-
gregated series for labor or machinery by agricultural activity. Overall, however, 
the decline in the number of people employed in the sector indicates that labor 
productivity improved over the period analyzed. The picture is mixed for ma-
chinery inputs as represented by the number of tractors, because this number 
increased until the late 1980s but fell at a small but steady rate afterward (see 
Figure 14.17). Although no better series for machinery inputs is available, it is 
important to note that using the number of tractors to measure machinery in-
puts has severe limitations. For example, the number of tractors does not take 
into account the increase in the average power of individual tractors that has 
taken place since the 1960s. In addition, the adoption of zero tillage has greatly 
reduced the number of operations needed to grow crops. For these reasons, it 
seems premature to reach strong conclusions regarding the partial productivity 
of machinery.
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In the case of beef production, land productivity increased in recent decades, 
because total output remained relatively unchanged (see Figure 14.4) while the 
area devoted to pastures shrunk by a significant amount. Cattle stocks fell by 
about 10 million animals from the late 1970s, to around 50 million head in 2007 
(see Figure 14.15). However, total production of meat remained relatively stable 
because the fall in stocks was offset by the upward trend in meat yield per ani-
mal in stock (see Figures 14.4 and 14.15). The improvement in the productivity 
of the cattle stock can be attributed to the use of better genetics, better usage of 
pastures, and improved overall management (Canosa, Iriarte, and Tonelli 2009). 
Importantly, productivity improved despite the fact that the substitution of crops 
for pastures displaced cattle stocks toward more marginal areas. More recently, 
the adoption of feedlots by a significant proportion of finishing operations has 
contributed to the rise in productivity.
Figure 14.4 shows that milk output increased by about 50% in the three de-
cades following 1960, and then it experienced an explosive and uninterrupted 
growth of 75% in the 1990s. Milk production fell by more than a quarter between 
1999 and 2004, but it improved after that, reaching the peak it had achieved a de-
cade earlier. Between 1960 and the mid-1980s, the productivity of the dairy cattle 
was essentially flat at about 1.9 tons of milk per year per cow in stock (see Figure 
14.18). In the following two decades, however, it increased by more than 150%, 
Figure 14.17. Number of people economically active in agriculture and 
agricultural tractors in use in Argentina, 1961-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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to 4.8 tons of milk per year per cow in stock. The main factors underlying the ad-
vances in productivity are better animal genetics, technology (e.g., artificial insemi-
nation and more advanced milking machines), and management (e.g., fertilization 
and rotation of pastures, and better genetic materials for pastures).
5.1. Some International Comparisons
Figures 14.19 and 14.20 are drawn to compare the productivity of cropland 
and animal stocks, respectively, for Argentina and other relevant countries. The 
countries chosen for this purpose are the United States, overall the largest pro-
ducer and exporter of the main crops and livestock produced by Argentina, and 
the other top five exporters of each commodity. 
Soybean yield in Argentina compares well with the soybean yield that 
characterizes the country’s main competitors in world markets, because it 
is almost the same as in the United States and more than 20% higher than 
the average for the other top five exporters. Further, soybean yield in each of 
the other top countries is below Argentina’s. For corn, yield in Argentina is 
about one-quarter smaller than in the United States. It is important to note, 
however, that the United States has the highest corn yield among the world’s 
largest corn exporters. Relative to the average of the top five corn exporters, 
Argentina’s corn yield is about 20% larger. Wheat yield is about the same in 
Argentina as in the United States, but it is one-third smaller than the average 
Figure 14.18. Stock of dairy cattle and milk yield in Argentina, 1961-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 14.19. Average yield per harvested acre for Argentina and selected 
countries, 2005-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT.
Note: The top five exporters other than Argentina and the United States are (a) Brazil, Paraguay, 
Canada, Uruguay, and China for soybeans; (b) France, China, Brazil, Hungary, and the Ukraine 
for corn; (c) Canada, France, Australia, the Russian Federation, and Germany for wheat; and 
(d) France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Russian Federation for sunflower seed. 
for the other top five wheat exporters. Most noticeably, there is a very large gap 
between wheat yields in Argentina (2.7 tons per hectare) and in Germany (7.2 
tons per hectare), the country with the highest yield from among the other top 
exporters. Finally, yield of sunflower seed in Argentina is 1.7 tons per hectare, 
or almost 10% higher than in the United States and about the same as the aver-
age for the other top five exporters. In terms of sunflower seed yield among the 
world’s largest exporters, Argentina ranks third behind France and Hungary, 
but these two countries have significantly larger yields (2.4 and 2.1 tons per 
hectare, respectively).
According to the graphs displayed in Figure 14.20, Argentina clearly lags its 
main competitors in terms of livestock productivity. Argentina’s meat production 
per animal in stock is less than half relative to the United States, and almost one-
fourth less than the average of the other top five exporters. Among top exporters, 
only Brazil has lower productivity of cattle stocks than Argentina. The situation 
is similar regarding the productivity of Argentina’s dairy cattle compared to that 
of the United States and the other top five exporters. In this instance, New Zea-
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land is the only country among the major milk exporters whose productivity is 
below Argentina’s.
6. TRENDS IN TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
The previous section addressed partial productivity measures for the agricul-
tural sector in Argentina. They quantify the effect on output of individual factors 
of production, without controlling for the usage of other factors of production. 
To analyze the productivity of the entire set of inputs entering agricultural pro-
duction, it is necessary to look at total factor productivity (TFP) measures. This 
section focuses on TFP measures for Argentinean agriculture.
Outputs and inputs can be aggregated following different methods, leading 
to alternative ways to measure TFP. Following Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998), 
such methods can be classified into four categories: (a) econometric estimation of 
models based on production functions, (b) accounting relationships, (c) data en-
velopment analysis (DEA), and (d) stochastic frontiers. Each method has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, based on the data requirements for estimation, un-
derlying assumptions, and purpose of the analysis. For example, to estimate TFP 
Figure 14.20. Average yield of cattle meat and milk per animal in stock for 
Argentina and selected countries, 2005-2007
Source: Prepared using data from FAOSTAT.
Note: The top five exporters other than Argentina and the United States are (a) Brazil, Australia, 
Ireland, New Zealand, and the Netherlands for cattle meat; and  (b) Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Belgium for cattle milk. 
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growth at the country level, the first method assumes that the country production 
is technically efficient, and it only requires a sufficiently long time series of data 
for the country. The second method assumes that payments to all inputs are equal 
to the total value of production but can be estimated with as little data as observa-
tions at two distinct points in time. The third and fourth methods allow for tech-
nically inefficient production but require data on a cross-section of countries.
Table 14.3 summarizes the results of the eight studies that were performed 
over the last decade and reported TFP growth measures for the Argentinean ag-
ricultural sector for a period ending in 1997 or later. Of these studies, three were 
based on the estimation of production functions (Artana, Cristini, and Pantano 
2001; Bravo-Ortega and Lederman 2004; and Lanteri 2005), two used account-
ing relationships (Lema 1999; and Dias Avila and Evenson 2004), two relied on 
DEA (Coelli and Rao 2005; and Nin and Yu 2008), and one estimated a translog 
stochastic frontier production function (Bharati and Fulginiti 2007). The studies 
also differed in the data sources used, as three of them employed mainly data 
from government agencies in Argentina (Lema 1999; Artana, Cristini, and Pan-
tano 2001; and Lanteri 2005), whereas the other five used FAO’s database (Bra-
vo-Ortega and Lederman 2004; Dias Avila and Evenson 2004; Coelli and Rao 
2005; Bharati and Fulginiti 2007; and Nin and Yu 2008). In this regard, it must 
be noted that FAO’s database allows estimation of TFP for Argentina only up to 
2003, because some of the input data series are missing for 2004 and later years.
The numbers shown in Table 14.3 reveal large differences in the TFP growth 
estimates, as these range from a low indicating an average TFP contraction of 
2.7% per year over the period 1980-2000 (obtained by Coelli and Rao 2005) to 
a high postulating an average TFP growth of 2.88% per year over 1964-2003 
(reported by Nin and Yu 2008). The wide range of the reported estimates is no-
ticeable. The earlier discussion about the significant changes that Argentina’s 
agricultural sector experienced after the early 1990s would suggest that such 
changes may have rendered TFP more difficult to measure with reasonable pre-
cision, thus explaining the lack of consensus across TFP estimates. However, the 
literature indicates that this is not the case, as earlier studies show contradictory 
results regarding TFP growth for Argentinean agriculture over previous periods. 
For example, Lanteri (1994) estimated that TFP grew at an average annual rate 
of 1.9% between 1964 and 1992, and Elías (1992) reported average annual TFP 
growth rates of 0.49% and 1.09% over the decades 1960-1970 and 1970-1980, 
respectively. In contrast, according to Arnade (1998), agricultural TFP in Ar-
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gentina contracted at an average annual rate of 1.85% from 1961 through 1993. 
Trueblood and Coggins (2002) also estimated a contraction in TFP over a simi-
lar period (1961-1991), although at a greater average annual rate (2.63%), and 
Fulginiti and Perrin (1997) found an even greater annual rate of TFP contraction 
(4.8%) between 1961 and 1985.
Closer inspection of the estimates reported in Table 14.3 reveals additional 
inconsistencies and/or problems with the recent estimates of TFP growth for Ar-
gentinean agriculture. First, the estimates from Nin and Yu (2008) imply that TFP 
grew at a slower pace over 1984-2003 than over 1964-1983. This is true because 
the authors estimated an average annual growth rate of 1.97% for the first period, 
compared to an average annual growth rate of 2.88% over the entire 1964-2003 
period. In contrast, using data from the same source (FAOSTAT), Dias Avila and 
Evenson (2004) found higher TFP growth over 1981-2001 (with an average of 
2.35% per year) than over 1961-1980 (with an average of 1.83% per year). 
Second, Coelli and Rao (2005) calculated an average annual TFP contraction 
of 2.7% over 1980-2000, whereas Nin and Yu (2008) estimated that TFP grew at 
an average annual rate of 1.97% over 1984-2003. These contradictory results are 
puzzling because the periods they cover largely overlap, they are both based on a 
very large cross-section of countries from FAOSTAT, and their estimates are both 
based on calculating a Malmquist TFP index from DEA. The fact that Coelli and 
Rao (2005) left shadow prices unconstrained for the estimation and Nin and Yu 
(2008) constrained them doesn’t seem to explain the stark difference between their 
results, as Nin and Yu (2008) show that imposing such a constraint only reduces 
the average annual TFP growth from 2.88% to 2.30% over the period 1964-2003.
Third, the studies that simultaneously estimate TFP growth for Argentina 
and other countries show substantially different rankings for Argentina. For ex-
ample, Argentina’s TFP growth ranked 89th among the 93 countries examined 
by Coelli and Rao (2005), whereas it ranked either second (when shadow prices 
are constrained) or fourth (with unconstrained shadow prices) among the 73 
countries analyzed by Nin and Yu (2008). According to Dias Avila and Evenson 
(2004), Argentina’s agricultural TFP growth ranked 25th and 20th among 78 
countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa over the periods 1961-1980 and 
1981-2000, respectively.
Fourth, some of the assumptions adopted for estimation purposes seem 
to have a major impact on the calculated rates of TFP growth. For example, 
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Coelli and Rao (2005) showed that by using a Tornqvist TFP index instead of 
a Malmquist TFP index, the estimated average change in TFP increases from 
a contraction of 2.7% per year to a growth of 0.4% per year. Less dramatic but 
nonetheless substantial is the impact of relaxing the assumption of Hicks-neu-
tral TFP changes, reported by Lanteri (2005). Lanteri found an average annual 
TFP contraction of 0.941% over 1955-2003 when imposing Hicks neutrality, 
compared to virtually no TFP change on average (i.e., an annual contraction of 
0.005%) over the same period when allowing for Hicks non-neutrality.
Fifth, the estimation method may have a major impact on TFP growth esti-
mates. Evidence of this is that using DEA, Fulginiti and Perrin (1997) estimated 
that TFP contracted at an average annual rate of 4.8% between 1961 and 1985. 
In contrast, employing a stochastic frontier approach, Bharati and Fulginiti 
(2007) found that TFP grew at averages of 3.47% per year from 1972 through 
1981 and 1.38% per year from 1982 through 1991. An implausibly large contrac-
tion in TFP over the decade 1961-1971 would be required for the results from 
the two studies to be consistent with each other.
In summary, the results reported in Table 14.3 strongly indicate that existing 
estimates of TFP growth for agriculture in Argentina are quite imprecise. Explor-
ing the reasons for this state of affairs is beyond the scope of the present study, 
but suffice it to say that likely potential culprits include poor quality of data and 
unwarranted theoretical assumptions regarding the theoretical models used to fit 
the data. Regarding data quality, it must be noted that, for example, none of the 
input series employed by the cited studies is adjusted for quality (e.g., one unit 
of land in sub-Saharan Africa is assumed to be the same as one unit of land in 
Argentina). Also, as noted in connection with Figure 14.17, FAOSTAT’s number 
of agricultural tractor series seems a very poor approximation for the usage of 
agricultural machinery. As per the theoretical assumptions, for example, DEA as-
sumes that unexplained residuals are entirely attributable to inefficiencies, which 
seems at odds with the sizable shocks due to weather, pest infestations, and 
other factors so characteristic of most agricultural production activities. 
Unfortunately, the imprecision in the estimates reported by the literature 
does not allow conclusive answers to two very important questions concerning 
Argentina’s agricultural sector, that is, whether TFP contracted or grew in recent 
decades, and whether the rate of change has slowed down or picked up pace 
over the same period. For this reason, efforts to predict the course of Argentin-
ean agriculture’s TFP in the future seem unwarranted at present.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Argentina is a country richly endowed with natural resources appropriate for 
agricultural production. Such resources have allowed it to be a major player in 
international markets, despite the strong discrimination against agriculture that 
characterized the country’s policies since World War II. 
Existing studies have found mixed results regarding the performance of 
Argentinean agriculture in terms of total factor productivity growth. How-
ever, the experience from the 1990s, when discrimination against agriculture 
reached the smallest level in decades, strongly suggests that the sector is 
extremely responsive to economic incentives. The 1990s witnessed a mas-
sive adoption of modern technologies, the expansion of the crop frontier, an 
intensification of land usage in traditional areas, the advent of new forms of 
production organization, and substantial shifts from livestock to crops and 
among crops. More recently, feedlots have been widely adopted for beef pro-
duction. During this period there were substantial gains in the productivity 
of land planted with major crops, and in the stocks of beef and (especially) 
dairy cattle.
The economic debacle experienced by Argentina at the end of 2001 marked 
a reversal toward more discriminatory policies against agriculture. The change 
was motivated by the country’s dire need to obtain hard currency and improve 
fiscal revenues. Historically, the agricultural sector accounted for a significant 
share of the country’s balance of trade and tax revenues, and that share increased 
following the economic crisis. The discrimination against the sector has become 
ever stronger since 2001, particularly after 2007. The current administration 
belongs to the party founded by Peron, who was instrumental in laying out and 
implementing the policies against agriculture and the welfare state that started 
after World War II. As such, despite losing mid-term elections in 2009 (arguably 
in part because of a confrontation with the agricultural sector), the current ad-
ministration seems keen on reverting to the extent possible to the kinds of poli-
cies first instituted by Peron.
As of this writing, it seems unclear whether in the long run Argentina’s ag-
ricultural policies will be as discriminatory as they were through much of the 
country’s history and as they are now, or less so, as in the 1990s. The outcome 
will depend on how political forces shape up in the future. Importantly, the 
present discussion strongly suggests that such an outcome is likely to have criti-
cal implications for the future performance of Argentinean agriculture. The sec-
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tor tended to languish when policies were highly discriminatory against it, but it 
quickly prospered under a more favorable economic environment. 
Some recent studies conclude that Argentina has the potential to significantly 
increase its agricultural output over the next few years (e.g., Cap and González 
2004; Oliverio and Lopez 2008). However, there are studies that also caution 
about the way agriculture has expanded in the recent past and/or question the 
sustainability of some of the current practices used in Argentina’s production ag-
riculture (e.g., World Bank 2006; Pineiro and Lopez Saubidet 2008). Paramount 
among these are the environmental issues connected with the conversion of natu-
ral ecosystems in marginal areas to agriculture, the high threat of soil degradation 
due to more intensive cropping, and the risks associated with having a single crop 
(soybeans) account for such a large share of the sector’s output and trade.
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CHAPTER 15
Shifting Patterns of Global Agricultural  
Productivity: Synthesis and Conclusion
Julian M. Alston, Bruce A. Babcock, and Philip G. Pardey
1. INTRODUCTION
The food commodity price spike of 2008 drew the attention of various 
commentators and policymakers once more to some old questions about the 
long-term capacity of the world to feed itself. Prior to that price spike, some 
economists had already begun asking questions about shifting agricultural 
productivity patterns, and some evidence had begun to emerge suggest-
ing that agricultural productivity growth rates might have slowed.1 The 
food price spike gave force to the existing interest in whether productivity 
growth rates had slowed, to what extent, and where. The future shape of 
the world food equation is sufficient reason to be interested in agricultural 
productivity paths; comparative advantage, or competitiveness, is another 
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reason. In particular, the future competitive position of the United States 
may be threatened if, for instance, the growth rate of U.S. agricultural pro-
ductivity falls far behind the corresponding growth rates of productivity in 
China and Latin America, as some of the numbers reported here would sug-
gest may be happening. 
This book does not provide forecasts about the future path of agricultural 
productivity. However, a quantitative understanding of agricultural productiv-
ity movements over the recent past and in the longer run is a useful first step 
toward gaining a sense of what we can expect in the years ahead. This book 
compiles and evaluates readily available existing information on agricultural 
productivity patterns around the world. Based on this compilation we make an 
assessment and synthesis of what is already known (or can be taken from work 
that has already been done) and thereby draw inferences about what has been 
happening in global and national agricultural productivity. 
This book comprises a total of 15 chapters. It begins with a short in-
troduction (in Chapter 1). Part 1 of the book, “International Evidence and 
Interpretation,” comprises three chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), each of 
which provides a different global perspective on elements of agricultural pro-
ductivity patterns. Part 2 presents “Country-Specific Evidence” in the form 
of 10 chapters (Chapters 5-14), each of which represents a single country, or 
grouping of countries in the case of Chapter 5 (Australia and New Zealand) 
and Chapter 10 (Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). The presentation 
of information varies significantly among the chapters, reflecting differences 
in availability of data and other resources among the countries and regions 
covered, and differences in purposes of and methods used in the foundation 
studies from which the chapters were drawn. This final chapter is a summary 
and conclusion. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize, synthesize, 
and attempt to make sense of the diverse and sometimes contradictory infor-
mation contained in the previous 14 chapters. 
2. METHODS OF MEASUREMENT AND MEASURES  
OF PRODUCTIVITY PATTERNS
Before turning to those specifics, in this section we discuss measures and 
methods used in studies of this nature, aiming to provide a framework to be 
used in interpreting the work presented in the individual chapters. We then 
present a detailed summary and synthesis of the key findings. 
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2.1. Primal Measures of Productivity and Productivity Growth
Much has been written by economists on how to measure productivity and 
how to interpret the measures (e.g., Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Alston, Nor-
ton, and Pardey 1998; Morrison-Paul 1999). Different concepts and correspond-
ing measures of productivity may be appropriate for different purposes, though 
they all express some measure of output relative to some measure of input. 
The simplest measure of all is a measure of output of a single commodity per 
unit of a single input, such as yield in tons per hectare of wheat per year. This 
seems straightforward. However, even such a seemingly simple and intuitive 
measure is prone to conceptual and measurement problems. For instance, land 
quality varies such that individual hectares are quite unequal in their productive 
capacity. Do we use planted or harvested area and measure seasonal or annual 
acreages when forming measures of yields? Should the units of land be adjusted 
for quality to make the individual hectares more nearly comparable? If not, how 
should we interpret changes in observed yields that may reflect changes in the 
intensity of use or average quality of the land input? Similarly, on the output 
side, wheat quality varies significantly, depending on protein content and other 
attributes that are not independent of the physical yield—in particular, higher 
yield tends to be associated with lower quality (James 2000; Alston and James 
2002). What should be done about changes in output quality? If nothing is done 
to correct for variations in the quality mix over space and time, how should we 
interpret the measures? Further complications arise from the implicit aggrega-
tion over time. For instance, in some cases multiple crops are grown on the same 
fields within one year; in other places a crop is grown in a multiyear rotation 
with other crops or with fallow years. How should the measures of yield per 
hectare per year be adjusted to allow for these characteristics of the production 
process so as to make the measures comparable over space and time?  
Problems often arise from difficulties in matching the timing, location, form, 
and coverage of inputs to the corresponding outputs, and prices to quantities. For 
example, sub-national (state or provincial) quantities may be reported, but often 
only national-level prices are available for use as weights to aggregate these quanti-
ties. Sometimes agricultural production aggregates span crop, livestock, and forest-
ry (and possibly aquaculture) products, whereas the available land, labor, or other 
inputs are specific to, say, crops and livestock only, causing a mismatch between 
inputs and outputs. Absent or missing input and output data are prevalent and 
persistent problems in productivity studies, occasioning the use of a myriad of ad 
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hoc data interpolation techniques with direct consequences for the measurement 
and interpretation of the resulting agricultural production aggregates.
Individual grain yield is an example of a partial factor productivity (PFP) measure. 
It is “partial” in the sense that it only accounts for changes in the amount of land used 
in production. It does not account for changes in the quantities of other inputs—such 
as labor, capital, fertilizer, rainfall, or irrigation—that also affect production. By the 
same token, grain yield per hectare of a particular crop also does not account for 
changes in other outputs that might be associated with the output in question, such 
as crop biomass or other by-products. Thus yield and other partial measures can be 
seen as partial with respect to their treatment of outputs as well as inputs. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are measures of total factor productivity 
(TFP), the aggregate quantum of all outputs divided by the aggregate quantum 
of all of the inputs used to produce those outputs. TFP is a theoretical concept. 
All real-world measures omit at least some of the relevant outputs and some of 
the relevant inputs, and therefore it is more accurate to refer to the real-world 
measures as multifactor productivity (MFP) measures. Particular MFP measures 
differ in the extent to which they fall short of the counterpart ideal TFP measure 
because of methodological differences as well as differences in the consequences 
of incomplete coverage of the inputs and outputs. Some of the methodological 
or measurement issues fit under the rubric of “index number problems.” How 
do we add up different outputs—not just apples and oranges but also livestock 
products such as milk and various meats, and a range of grains, oilseeds, fruits, 
nuts, vegetables, and other crops—to create a meaningful measure of the ag-
gregate (agricultural) output quantity? Likewise, how should inputs be added up 
to aggregate across various types and qualities of land, and heterogeneous labor; 
across capital services from buildings, various types of machinery, and livestock; 
as well as a range of purchased inputs including agricultural chemicals? 
Economists have developed a body of theory and a set of approaches that 
use prices (or value shares) to weight quantities to obtain so-called superlative 
indexes of aggregate quantities. Likewise, quantities (or value shares) are used as 
weights to obtain corresponding superlative indexes of prices. Divisia indexes (or 
discrete time approximations to Divisia indexes) of quantities use varying con-
temporary prices as weights and thereby avoid the index-number biases that are 
entailed in using fixed (initial base-period or ending-period) prices as weights.2 
2Fixed-weight quantity indexes using initial base-period prices as weights are commonly called 
Laspeyres indexes, whereas indexes using final-year prices as weights are called Paasche indexes. 
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The quality of these approximations depends on the use of the appropriate price 
weights applied to fully disaggregated quantities. In particular, when the prices 
used by farmers to make production decisions vary significantly across locations 
for a given quality (e.g., states within the United States or countries within a 
region of the world) as well as across qualities in a particular location, it is de-
sirable to use location-specific and quality-specific prices. Many studies do not 
have access to spatially disaggregated prices and use national or regional prices 
as proxies. The extent of index number bias from this source will depend on the 
extent to which movements in the proxy prices represent movements in the dis-
aggregated prices. 
Similar concerns arise with aggregation over qualities or types of goods. 
In most cases, when Divisia approximations are used they are applied to pre-
aggregated quantity data for intermediate categories of goods, for which the cor-
responding prices are average unit values rather than appropriate price indexes. In 
many cases the available quantity data were obtained using methods that are not 
consistent with index number theory and the measures therefore suffer from some 
unknown degree of index number bias. A failure to adjust for quality or other com-
positional differences within an aggregate (such as different ages, sizes, or horse-
power categories of tractors and other machinery used on farms; different qualities 
of agricultural land; or different age, education, and health status of farm labor) 
can be seen as a type of pre-aggregation that may lead to biases that will be worse 
if fixed weight indexes are used, especially if quality or compositional changes 
within categories have been important. Such distortions arise with indexes of PFP, 
MFP, and TFP whenever the quantities in the numerator or the denominator of the 
productivity measure involve aggregation over heterogeneous elements. 
In the present context, as in many others, we are most interested in TFP since 
it is an encompassing measure that represents the full quantity of resources used 
to produce the total quantity of output produced. How well does an MFP or PFP 
measure approximate TFP? The main ideas can be illustrated with some simple 
mathematics. Let us define total output, Q, as the sum of the quantities of outputs 
included in MFP, Qi, and the outputs excluded from MFP, Qe (where Qe / Q = qe), 
and total input X as the sum of the quantities of included inputs, Xi, and excluded 
inputs, Xe (where Xe / X = xe), such that the measures of TFP and MFP are
 
,i
i
Q
MFP
X
=  (1)
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Taking logarithmic differentials of equations (1) and (2) gives measures of 
growth rates of MFP and TFP. Taking the difference between the logarithmic 
differentials gives an equation for the difference between growth in TFP and 
growth in MFP as follows:
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Thus the discrepancy depends on the relative importance of the excluded quan-
tities of outputs and inputs (qe and xe ), and on the differences in the growth rates 
between the included and excluded quantities of outputs and between the in-
cluded and excluded quantities of inputs. 
Importantly, if the excluded quantities of outputs and inputs are growing 
at the same rates as their included counterparts, the MFP measure grows at the 
same rate as the TFP measure. If the growth rates are different, however, the MFP 
growth rate will be different, with the difference increasing with the relative im-
portance of the excluded outputs and inputs unless by chance the distortions in 
the outputs and inputs offset one another. For instance, in the United States, the 
purchased inputs category has been a relatively rapidly growing category of inputs. 
All other categories have been shrinking, especially operator labor. The greenhouse 
and nursery products category has been by far the fastest growing category of 
outputs (see Alston et al. 2010 for details). If we were to exclude purchased inputs, 
we would seriously understate growth in inputs, and therefore overstate growth in 
productivity. Conversely, if we were to exclude greenhouse and nursery products 
we would understate output growth and understate productivity growth. If we 
were to exclude both purchased inputs and nursery and greenhouse products, the 
net effect may be to increase or decrease the measured productivity growth de-
pending on the relative importance of the two biases. 
Of course, all such measures are only as good as the data used to create 
them. In many cases the data on inputs and outputs are sadly incomplete (in 
terms of their coverage), inconsistent (their coverage or definitions may change 
over space or time or both), inaccurate (many countries do not have the where-
withal to maintain reliable data collection systems), or otherwise inadequate. For 
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example, if data exist at all, counts of tractors may be used as a proxy measure 
of total machinery services without any regard for changes in the relative im-
portance of tractors vis-à-vis other forms of capital used in agriculture, quality 
changes in tractors, or variable utilization rates. The extent of these problems 
varies among studies, among countries, and over time. A primary concern is that 
in some cases the measures of quantities, especially for capital inputs, are seri-
ously flawed.3 The omission of key categories of rapidly growing inputs (in many 
instances, inputs that are increasingly purchased from off-farm sources, includ-
ing management and other production-related information services) is also likely 
to have contributed to significantly distorted measures of TFP in some instances. 
Most of the available measures of agricultural productivity growth relate to 
aggregate agriculture for a particular nation or region. Some studies have report-
ed disaggregated measures for parts of agriculture, and the disaggregation can 
entail some additional measurement pitfalls. For instance, Huffman and Evenson 
(1992, 1993) reported U.S. state-level productivity for livestock and crops, but to 
do so they had to allocate aggregate inputs between crops and livestock, with lit-
tle basis for doing so because the input data are reported on a geographic basis, 
not specific to individual outputs. Veeman and Gray (this volume, Chapter 6) ap-
plied a similar partitioning of inputs to infer productivity measures for crops and 
livestock production. It is appropriate to use such estimates carefully, given how 
they are derived. In contrast, Mullen (this volume, Chapter 5) reported estimates 
for a subsector of Australian agriculture (“broadacre” agriculture) that were based 
on a specific survey of farms in that subsector conducted by the Australian Bu-
reau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), as well as the estimates 
for aggregate agriculture developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
A small number of studies have computed measures for individual commodi-
ties. To make such estimates requires apportioning inputs—whether purchased 
inputs such as fertilizer or allocatable fixed factors such as farmers’ time or ma-
chinery—among multiple outputs in a setting where multiple outputs are the 
norm at the level of the firm as well as the region or nation. This can be done by 
applying detailed surveys or making assumptions when using index number ap-
proaches. Alternatively, estimates can be obtained econometrically in a multi-out-
3In many studies, measures of labor use are equally flawed. Often only total counts of workers in 
farming or agriculture are available, rather than hours of labor used in agriculture differentiated 
into various age, education, and other (productivity related) cohorts, with potentially significant 
consequences for the measures of the use of labor in agricultural production.
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put model of agricultural production. For instance, Jin, Huang, and Rozelle (this 
volume, Chapter 9) used data envelopment analysis methods to estimate commod-
ity-specific productivity growth rates, and to partition commodity-specific produc-
tivity growth between gains in allocative efficiency and technological change. 
2.2. Dual Measures of Productivity
The measures of agricultural productivity based on indexes of quantities 
of inputs and outputs are “primal” measures. Alternative measures, based on 
indexes of prices of inputs and outputs, are referred to as “dual” measures of 
productivity. Under certain conditions, the dual and primal measures coincide 
exactly. Why this is so can be demonstrated simply. Specifically, under constant 
returns to scale and all of the other conditions of perfect competition, total ex-
penditure on all inputs will be equal to total revenue from the sale of all outputs. 
Defining the indexes of the price and quantity of output as P and Q, and the 
indexes of the price and quantity of input as W and X, this zero profit condition 
can be stated as follows:4 
 .PQ WX=  (4)
Dividing both sides of (4) by X times P yields the result that
 
.
Q W
X P
=
 
(5)
Thus, the ratio of the price index for inputs to the price index for output (the 
inverse of what is sometimes referred to as the farmers’ terms of trade) is exactly 
equal to the primal measure of MFP as defined in equation (1).5  
Of course, given the lag relationships in agricultural production and the re-
sulting uncertainty about quantities and prices, we do not expect the zero profit 
condition to hold exactly in observed, ex post data, even under competition. In 
addition, especially in the short run, the prices of inputs and outputs in particular 
locations and at particular times may be influenced by idiosyncratic influences, 
including storage and government policies. Even so, given that the assumptions of 
competition and constant returns to scale can be regarded as generally reasonable 
4Here we assume that the price and quantity indexes for inputs and outputs satisfy the “weak fac-
tor reversal test,” which holds for superlative indexes such as the Fisher Ideal and Tornqvist-Theil 
index but does not hold for fixed-weight indexes such as the Paasche or Laspeyres (e.g., see Diew-
ert 1976). 
5See also Hulten 1986 and Roeger 1995. 
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approximations for agriculture, equation (5) should tend to hold fairly strongly in 
the longer run. Consequently, as Alston, Beddow, and Pardey (2009a) observed, 
it is no coincidence that the rate of decline of farmers’ terms of trade is often very 
similar to the rate of increase in MFP. Indeed, this is something that we should 
expect to find globally in the long term, albeit with significant departures in par-
ticular circumstances in the short term (for instance, during the period around 
the price spike of 2008). Hence, even if we cannot obtain good data on quantities 
of agricultural inputs and outputs for some countries, we might still be able to de-
rive a reasonable assessment of the rate of agricultural productivity growth using 
corresponding data on prices of inputs and outputs.6 Of course the quality of the 
dual index of MFP depends on the same kinds of factors that influence the quality 
of the primal measures, so we should use the dual measures with corresponding 
care. But at a minimum, data on trends in relative prices provide a check on the 
plausibility of primal measures in cases in which the underlying data may be in-
complete or otherwise dubious. 
2.3. Measuring and Testing for Structural Change in Productivity Growth
The interpretation of results from testing for structural change in productiv-
ity growth may depend on the methods used and details of the application, as 
discussed briefly by Alston et al. (this volume, Chapter 8). An important first 
step is to be clear about the concept of productivity growth: are we testing for 
constant linear growth, as in a constant annual increase of x bushels per acre, or 
constant proportional growth, as in a constant increase of yield by y% per year? 
A constant proportional growth rate requires an exponential productivity path. 
If productivity is growing linearly, then the proportional (or percentage) rate 
of growth will decline because the denominator is growing. In this book, as in 
most (policy) contexts, the issue is whether the proportional growth rate of pro-
ductivity has declined in the more recent period.
One way to test for a structural change is to compute year-to-year propor-
tional growth by taking first differences in the logarithms of the productivity 
indexes and then averaging these annual values. This can be done for various 
subperiods, and the results can be compared to check for changes between 
subperiods. The year-to-year growth rates in agriculture typically vary signifi-
6Of course, data on prices may be thin or nonexistent in some circumstances, especially for sub-
sistence economies with fewer traded goods, precisely the circumstances in which quantities pro-
duced may also be hard to ascertain. 
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cantly, reflecting the fact that productivity indexes jump up and down from year 
to year as a result of weather and other random (or unmeasured) factors. Con-
sequently, in this approach the measures of average annual productivity growth 
rates, and tests for changes between subperiods, can be sensitive to starting and 
ending points for subperiods. What we make of this sensitivity will depend in 
part on whether we think the year-to-year movements reflect actual variations in 
productivity, or whether they are interpreted as measurement error. If we think 
the year-to-year movements reflect meaningful variations in productivity, then 
no adjustments to the measures should be made. However, if we think the year-
to-year movements substantially reflect measurement errors, or temporary ran-
dom influences, then for some purposes we would prefer alternative measures of 
growth that are less heavily influenced by such movements.
The main alternative approach is to regress the natural logarithm of the mea-
sure of productivity against time. The slope coefficient from this regression is an 
estimate of the rate of productivity growth. These coefficients can be estimated 
for different subperiods and they can be tested for structural changes between 
subperiods. This approach is easy and convenient for hypothesis testing. Com-
pared with the average of annual growth rates, the regression approach is less 
sensitive to starting and ending points of subperiods but more sensitive to other 
outliers in the sample. This method is also subject to bias from specification er-
ror, if the true path of productivity growth is not exponential, or from other fail-
ures of the linear regression model. Given their different weaknesses, we do not 
have a good a priori basis for strongly preferring either approach over the other. 
It may be desirable in practice to try both approaches and explore the sensitivity 
of findings to starting and ending points and extreme values.
A third alternative is to estimate productivity growth in the context of a 
model of production, as done by Jin, Huang, and Rozelle (this volume, Chapter 
9). In this approach the risk is that specification errors in the model, or bias in 
the model estimates arising from problems with the data, could give rise to bias 
in the estimates of productivity growth and its partition between allocative ef-
ficiency and technological change. Such models often yield surprising results. 
When it is difficult to measure a particular parameter with confidence or preci-
sion, it is typically doubly difficult to measure changes in that parameter using 
the same approach. We suspect that the measures of changes in productivity 
growth rates derived from the application of index number approaches are likely 
to be less fragile than those from econometric models.
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3. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS
In this section we summarize the key points, chapter by chapter, and inter-
pret them drawing on the discussion of methods and measures in the previous 
section. Where appropriate we compare, contrast, and attempt to reconcile find-
ings across chapters. 
Chapter 2. Agriculture is an inherently spatial process, with yields and out-
put being greatly influenced by local factors such as weather and climate, soils, 
and pest pressures. Agricultural production and productivity are also influenced 
by the joint decisions of what to produce, when, where, and how to produce 
it. Consequently, spatial variation in the location of production has important 
implications for how productivity metrics can and should be interpreted.7 Such 
considerations apply with more force when we aggregate across larger and more 
diverse spaces, and across outputs, especially if the mix of outputs is changing 
over time and space. Hence, when we study changes over time in aggregate crop 
yields, other PFP measures, or MFP measures, it is important to pay attention to 
the role of changes in the location of production as a contributing factor.
In their analysis of “The Changing Landscape of Global Agriculture” in 
Chapter 2, Beddow, Pardey, Koo, and Wood present data on the shifting location 
of agricultural production both among and within countries and regions. The 
authors begin by presenting a broad assessment of changes in the global foot-
print of agriculture over the past three centuries, drawing on data developed by 
Ramankutty and Foley (1999) and Ramankutty et al. (2008). Next, they use the 
commodity- and country-specific data assembled by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and agroecologically specific data first assembled by You and 
Wood (2005) to undertake a crop-specific assessment of the changing landscape 
of production within and among countries over the period 1961-2007. They 
show that global agriculture is spatially mobile, both over the long run stretch-
ing back several centuries (and into prehistory) and during more recent decades. 
Further, both the location of cropped areas and the quantity of crop production 
vary among countries as well as across agroecological areas within countries. As 
7Even within a country and for a given crop, the spatial location of production and the concomi-
tant choice of production technology have important implications for yield. Consequently, to 
understand changes in national average yields we have to understand the spatial dynamics of 
production. For example, as demonstrated by Olmstead and Rhode (2002) in their study of U.S. 
wheat yields, the fact that yields did not decline over the period 1866 to 1939 (in fact they re-
mained almost constant, growing by just 0.15% per year) was testament to substantial varietal in-
novation to adapt varieties to the much different agroecological conditions as the industry moved 
from the East Coast into the Midwest and the Dakotas. See also Beddow 2010. 
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the authors illustrate, these sizeable shifts in the spatial structure of agriculture 
add substantial complexity to understanding measured changes in agricultural 
productivity, particularly when the location of crop production shifts among 
agroecologies both within and among countries over time.
Chapter 3. Alston, Beddow, and Pardey present an analysis of “Global Pat-
terns of Crop Yields and Other Partial Productivity Measures and Prices.” The 
chapter begins with a review of trends in the U.S. prices of staple food and feed 
commodities (corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat). As well as representing a primary 
consequence from productivity growth, the long-term trends in deflated com-
modity prices can be interpreted as a rough dual index of productivity growth. 
Deflated prices of farm commodities trended down generally through most of the 
twentieth century, with substantial disruptions associated with the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s, several major wars, and the global economic events of the early 
1970s and the past few years. The rate of decline in commodity prices accelerated 
after World War II, especially after the price spike of the early 1970s, but slowed 
in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, especially in the case of the food 
grains, wheat and rice, prior to the spike in 2008. This slowdown in the rate of 
decline of real commodity prices is consistent with a slowdown in the primal rate 
of productivity growth, measured in terms of output versus input quantities. 
The authors present a range of partial productivity measures for a range of 
geopolitical aggregates as well as globally. These measures include yields for 
major crops as well as measures of aggregate agricultural output per unit of land 
or labor employed in production, taken from the FAO (FAOSTAT Database ac-
cessed in May and October 2008). Corn and wheat yields each grew by a factor 
of 2.6 from 1961 to 2007; over the same period, rice yields increased by a factor 
of 2.2. For all three crops, in both developed and developing countries, average 
annual rates of yield growth were much lower in 1990-2006 than in 1961-1990. 
However, the authors noted potential problems of interpretation given multiple 
cropping in some places, and the changing location of production, as discussed 
and documented by Beddow et al. (this volume, Chapter 2). 
Moving beyond crop yields to more broadly construed productivity mea-
sures, global productivity trends show a 2.4-fold increase in aggregate output 
per harvested area since 1961 (equivalent to annual average growth of 2.0% per 
year) and a corresponding 1.7-fold increase (or growth of 1.2% per year) in ag-
gregate output per agricultural worker. These productivity developments reflect 
a comparatively faster rate of growth in global agricultural output against rela-
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tively slower growth in the use of agricultural land and labor (0.3% and 1.1% per 
year, respectively). In parallel with the global crop yield evidence, the longer-run 
growth in land and labor productivity masks a widespread—albeit not uni-
versal—slowdown in the rate of growth of both productivity measures during 
1990-2005 compared with the previous three decades. China and Latin America 
are significant exceptions, both having considerably higher growth rates of land 
and labor productivity since 1990. Worldwide, after 1990 the growth rate of 
land productivity slowed from 2.03% per year to 1.82% per year, whereas the 
growth rate of labor productivity increased from 1.12% per year for 1961-1990 
to 1.36% per year for 1990-2005. These world totals are heavily influenced by 
the significant and exceptional case of China (see also Jin, Huang, and Rozelle, 
this volume, Chapter 9). Netting out China, global land and labor productivity 
growth has been slower since 1990 than during the prior three decades. The 
same period relativities prevail if the former Soviet Union (FSU) is also netted 
out, although the magnitude of the global productivity slowdown net of China 
and the FSU is less pronounced because both partial productivity measures for 
the FSU actually shrank after 1990 (see also Swinnen, Van Herck, and Vranken, 
this volume, Chapter 10). 
In summary, Alston, Beddow, and Pardey find consistent evidence, using a 
range of measures, of an economically significant slowdown in agricultural pro-
ductivity growth in most of the world since 1990. Important exceptions are China 
and Latin America. In the rest of the world—including both the world’s richest 
countries and the world’s poorest countries—the slowdown in agricultural pro-
ductivity growth has been substantial and widespread. Like Alston, Beddow, and 
Pardey (2009b), the authors speculate that an earlier slowdown in agricultural 
research and development (R&D) spending growth might have contributed to the 
recent slowdown in productivity growth. They also argue that, regardless of the 
cause of the slowdown, a revitalized investment in agricultural R&D is justified. 
Chapter 4. In his analysis of “Total Factor Productivity in the Global Agri-
cultural Economy: Evidence from FAO Data,” Fuglie reports an extensive set of 
estimates of productivity growth rates for countries, regions, and for the world 
as a whole. His measures include some of the same types of partial productivity 
measures as reported by Alston, Beddow, and Pardey (this volume, Chapter 3), 
as well as some TFP measures, of the types that some other chapters reported 
for particular countries. In contrast to Alston, Beddow, and Pardey, Fuglie rejects 
the hypothesis of a slowdown in global agricultural productivity growth. This 
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difference in conclusions might reflect differences in interpretation of the same 
or similar evidence, as well as different evidence. And differences in the evidence 
might reflect differences in methods, measures, data used, or time periods cov-
ered. In seeking to reconcile these views, we first consider the nature and extent 
of the differences in findings between Alston, Beddow, and Pardey versus Fuglie 
and then we explore sources of differences. 
The two studies concur generally with respect to crop yields: both find a 
substantial slowdown since 1990, especially for food grains and less so for corn, 
which, in the rich countries at least, has benefited from substantial and sustained 
research attention from private firms for many decades. With respect to other 
partial productivity measures for the world as a whole, both studies report a slow-
down in growth of land productivity and an acceleration in labor productivity 
growth since 1990. The specific estimates differ because they use different mea-
sures and they apply to different time periods, but the essential finding is similar 
with respect to the partial productivity measures for the world as a whole. Both 
chapters also refer to the diversity of results among countries, and the differences 
between the chapters are probably more pronounced in particular instances. 
Alston, Beddow, and Pardey emphasize the role of China in lifting the av-
erage measures for the world and developing countries as a group. When they 
exclude China, they find a slowdown in growth of both land and labor produc-
tivity for the rest of the world as a whole. Fuglie does not report a corresponding 
set of measures for the world excluding China. Both chapters report that, along 
with China, Latin America has done relatively well. Both chapters also point to 
the role of institutional change in China, contributing positively to recent pro-
ductivity growth, and in the FSU, contributing to productivity declines during 
the transition period followed by an uneven pattern of recent recovery. Alston, 
Beddow, and Pardey raise the issue that productivity growth associated with 
institutional changes of this nature may be transient rather than enduring, such 
that one should not presume to extrapolate a recent surge in the rate of growth, 
associated with one-off institutional reforms, into the indefinite future.8  
Even when the two chapters refer to the same concept applied to the same 
place (e.g., crop yields, land productivity, labor productivity) there will be differ-
ences in the measures associated with differences in time periods covered and 
8China has followed these institutional reforms by ramping up its investments in agricultural 
R&D. But the impression is that a similar acceleration in growth-promoting R&D investments 
has not occurred in the FSU, or at least not to the same extent as observed for China. 
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differences in methods. Specifically, although the land and labor productivities 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4 are ostensibly similar in intent and construct, differ-
ences in the details may have empirical consequences. In forming the numerator 
for their partial productivity metrics, Alston, Beddow, and Pardey constructed 
their own measures of aggregate output using quantity data (spanning 185 crop 
and livestock commodities) downloaded from the FAO Web site in conjunction 
with FAO’s 2000 centered international agricultural commodity prices. Fuglie 
directly employed the FAO gross production index, which uses 195 crop and 
livestock categories weighted by the same set of average agricultural prices. Both 
studies used FAO data on cropland (arable and permanent crops) plus pasture-
land to form their respective land productivity measures. They also used esti-
mates of the total economically active (male and female) population in agriculture 
obtained from FAO to form their respective labor productivity measures. 
Comparing average growth rates in the respective output measures de-
veloped by Alston, Beddow, and Pardey in Chapter 3 with the corresponding 
decadal growth rates of the FAO production index used by Fuglie in Table 7 of 
Chapter 4 reveals largely similar, but not identical, results. For example, the FAO 
index has aggregate output for sub-Saharan Africa growing at 2.81% per year 
for the period 2000-2007, compared with 1.55% per year in Alston, Beddow, 
and Pardey.9 In contrast, for the same periods, the FAO production index for the 
United States and Canada grew at a rate below that implied by the data underly-
ing Alston, Beddow, and Pardey (i.e., 1.04% versus 1.44% per year respectively). 
Similar discrepancies occurred for an Australia and New Zealand aggregate 
and an FSU aggregate for most of the decades after 1980. The reasons for these 
discrepancies are hard to discern. Although both the FAO series used by Fuglie 
and the Alston, Beddow, and Pardey measure are gross measures of agricultural 
output, the commodity coverage is different, and it is also likely that the relevant 
data were downloaded at different times and thus could reflect (sometimes sub-
stantial) revisions to the underlying source data.10  
9Fuglie’s sub-Saharan Africa totals exclude South Africa, whereas Alston, Beddow, and Pardey re-
port a sub-Saharan Africa total inclusive of South Africa. Excluding South Africa from the Alston, 
Beddow, and Pardey sub-Saharan Africa total yields an output rate of growth of 1.58% per year. 
In addition, Fuglie calculates his terminal period growth rates for the years 2000-2007, whereas 
Alston, Beddow, and Pardey span the period 2000-2005.
10In addition, Fuglie applied a smoothing procedure to his output series before calculating growth 
rates, whereas Alston, Beddow, and Pardey did not adjust their series before estimating rates of 
growth using the log difference method. 
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The results of Alston, Beddow, and Pardey are limited to partial productivity 
measures. Fuglie also reports measures of TFP. Using FAO data for 171 coun-
tries for 1961-2007, Fuglie (p. 91) finds “no evidence of a general slowdown in 
sector-wide agricultural TFP, at least through 2007. If anything, the growth rate 
in agricultural TFP accelerated in recent decades, due in no small part to rapid 
productivity gains in several developing countries, led by Brazil and China, and 
more recently to a recovery of agricultural growth in the countries of the former 
Soviet bloc.” Fuglie (p. 92) also notes that “it is also clear that agricultural pro-
ductivity growth has been very uneven. . . . TFP growth may in fact be slowing 
in developed countries while accelerating in developing countries.”
To develop his TFP estimates, Fuglie had to address a host of data and mea-
surement problems of the types mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.11 
Fuglie was very conscious of these issues, and much of his effort was spent try-
ing to minimize their undesirable consequences. He was not able to compute 
an approximation to a Divisia index (such as a Fisher ideal index or a Tornqvist-
Theil index), but rather he used a growth accounting approach in which mea-
sures of proportional changes in individual inputs and outputs were weighted 
by their shares of cost or revenue, respectively, in a base year. This approach 
will result in index number biases, but it is difficult to predict the direction let 
alone the size of the resulting distortion in the measure of TFP. For a consider-
able number of countries, data on these shares were not available, so Fuglie ap-
plied (fixed and constant) shares from selected countries for which measures 
were available to countries for which they were not. The distortions resulting 
from this approximation are not easy to predict. For some input categories, data 
on quantities were not available so he applied the growth rate for a subset of the 
category (e.g., riding tractors within the category of all machinery and all other 
capital) as an estimate of the growth rate of the entire category. This approach 
will lead to biases if the item used as a proxy is growing at a significantly differ-
ent rate compared with the other elements of the category. The use of the count 
of tractors is likely to be a downward biased measure of the quantity of tractor 
services because the quality of tractors has generally improved. 
Such measurement problems are unavoidable if the FAO data are to be used 
to derive country-specific estimates of TFP. Fuglie’s efforts to address these many 
11Many of these data and measurement issues were identified initially by Schultz (1956) and 
Griliches (1963) and have been the subject of continuing efforts in the more recent literature, as 
discussed by Alston et al. (2010), for example.
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challenging measurement problems are admirable and his estimates are probably 
as good as can be made with the available resources, but concerns remain.12 One 
check on Fuglie’s estimates is to compare them with those for which more com-
plete data are available, which Fuglie did for eight countries. Among those eight, 
three exhibited statistically significant differences in TFP growth rates, com-
pared with Fuglie’s own in Chapter 4. The remaining five showed differences in 
TFP growth rates that might be economically important, even if not statistically 
significant. Fuglie drew some reassurance from the comparison but this is not to 
say that the comparison implies an endorsement of any of his specific findings. 
And for those countries for which we have detailed results reported in country-
specific chapters in this volume based on more complete data, better methods, or 
both, we would put more weight on those results.
Against this background, it is not clear how much weight should be placed on 
particular findings based on measures of TFP of the types estimated by Fuglie, par-
ticularly in relation to the question of a slowdown in productivity growth. Measuring 
the growth rate of TFP is difficult. Testing for a slowdown, which requires measuring 
significant changes in growth rates between periods, is more difficult. That this is so 
is illustrated in the studies reported in this volume that had access to better and more 
complete (but still not ideal) data and that were able to use the best methods. More-
over, the types of indexes computed by Fuglie might be relatively ill-suited for testing 
for structural changes over time in growth rates as they have inherent biases that are 
time-dependent—because they use fixed, base-period shares to weight quantities, 
because they omit certain categories of inputs, and because they do not accommo-
date changes in the quality and composition of capital.13 Fuglie’s estimates are the 
only available estimates of agricultural TFP growth for many countries of the world 
in the recent period. Even so, they should be used carefully, given the many con-
straints that data and measurement realities and choices place on generating accurate 
estimates, and especially in relation to the question of a slowdown in productivity 
given that we have little basis for assessing their accuracy for that purpose. 
12For instance, Alston et al. (2010) demonstrated the considerable sensitivity of their U.S. MFP 
measures to choices of price weights, input quality or compositional adjustments, and measure-
ment methods, sensitivities that are likely to be magnified in efforts to generate MFP measures on 
an international scale with incomplete and inaccurate measures of agricultural input quantities 
and prices. 
13The literature about index number problems and biases has emphasized errors in the “level” or 
growth rate of the index. Particular types of index number problems may be more serious than 
others when the issue is errors in the size and significance of changes over time in the measured 
growth rate, but the literature has not discussed this aspect.
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Chapter 5. Mullen presents a range of types of evidence on the patterns of 
“Agricultural Productivity Growth in Australia and New Zealand.” The Austra-
lian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) uses national income accounting data to estimate 
and report value-added measures of productivity for sectors in the Australian 
market economy, in which the inputs are labor and capital, at five-year inter-
vals. Using this measure, over the period 1986-2006 productivity in the sector 
comprising agriculture, fisheries, and forestry grew by 3.0% per year, which is 
2.5 times the rate of growth for the market economy as a whole. Mullen finds no 
evidence of a recent slowdown in the ABS measures of Australian agricultural 
productivity.14 Likewise, Hall and Scobie (2006) constructed an MFP series for 
New Zealand agriculture for the years 1927-2001 using a value-added approach. 
Their measure of MFP for the entire period 1927-2001 grew by 1.8% per year. 
The average annual growth rates by subperiod were 1.0% (1927-1956), 2.2% 
(1957-1983), and 2.6% (1984-2001). It is noteworthy that the period of accelerat-
ing MFP after 1984 coincides with a period of major economic reform within the 
New Zealand economy. Using a series published by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Cao and Forbes (2007) estimated that for the period 
1988-2006, MFP in agriculture (not including forestry and fisheries) grew by 
2.7% per year, 1.8 times faster than MFP growth of 1.5% per year for the market 
economy as estimated by Statistics New Zealand. As for Australia, labor produc-
tivity in New Zealand agriculture grew more quickly than capital productivity, 
and total input use declined. There is little evidence from these measures that 
growth in productivity in Australian or New Zealand agriculture has slowed.15
In Chapter 5, Mullen also reports gross value measures based on ABARE 
farm surveys for “broadacre” agriculture, which includes the extensive grazing 
and cropping industries, and for dairying from Nossal et al. (2009). These mea-
sures show a distinct slowdown in productivity growth in broadacre agriculture. 
The index of MFP for Australian broadacre agriculture grew at an average an-
nual rate of 1.5% per year over 1978-2007, but it had grown by 2.0% per year or 
more over the first two-thirds of this period. Productivity growth stalled or went 
negative in the 10 years to 2007. This decade was characterized by widespread 
14These value-added measures are “partial” productivity measures in that they explicitly leave 
out some elements of inputs and outputs that are incorporated in measures based on gross sec-
toral output. 
15The Australian MFP growth rates were estimated as the coefficient on the time trend in a 
regression of the log of MFP against a constant and the time trend whereas the New Zealand 
counterparts were estimated as the average of annual percentage changes.
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drought and poor seasonal conditions generally, which makes it difficult to dis-
cern an underlying slowdown in agricultural productivity growth. Productivity 
growth varied by state, with productivity growth much faster in Western Austra-
lia and South Australia than in New South Wales and Victoria, and also varied 
within broadacre agriculture, with a more pronounced slowdown for cropping 
than for beef and sheep specialists.
Mullen discusses the contrast in patterns between the ABS value-added mea-
sures and the ABARE gross-value measures and concludes that they are broadly 
consistent given the partial coverage of the value-added measures. The remaining 
challenge is to interpret the observed substantial slowdown in productivity growth 
and determine whether it is a temporary consequence of poor seasons—such that 
the prior path of productivity growth will be restored in the event of a return to 
historically normal weather patterns—or a more enduring consequence of other 
factors, such as a change in climate or past changes in research funding.
Chapter 6. Veeman and Gray discuss “The Shifting Patterns of Agricultural 
Production and Productivity in Canada.” Canadian primary agriculture has 
evolved to a sector characterized by fewer and larger farms. Productivity growth, 
reflecting both technological change and economies of size and scale associ-
ated with farm consolidation and specialization, has been an important factor in 
this evolution. Both the study of Canadian crop yields and the analysis of TFP 
growth in the crops sector in the Prairie region of Western Canada indicate a 
slowdown of productivity growth in crop production since 1990. Since the early 
1960s, the yields of several major crops have increased by approximately 60%. 
Yield trends for corn, wheat, canola, and peas exhibit consistent absolute growth 
in yields but declining proportional rates of growth over the period. Labor pro-
ductivity in crop and animal production in Canada grew rapidly at 4.7% per 
year from 1961 to 2005. TFP growth for crops and livestock was considerably 
slower, ranging from 0.6% per year based on gross output to 1.4% per year based 
on value added. In Western Canada’s Prairie region, productivity grew by nearly 
1.6% per year since 1940. Crop productivity growth outpaced that of livestock 
historically, but not from 1990 to 2004. Slower growth in agricultural R&D in 
Canada and at the Prairie level seems to underlie slower agricultural productivity 
growth, at least in the crops sector, in the past two decades.
Chapter 7. One of the first studies to report a slowdown in agricultural pro-
ductivity growth in recent times was done by Thirtle et al. (2004), with reference 
to the United Kingdom. More recent UK evidence is presented by Piesse and 
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Thirtle in this volume in their chapter on “Agricultural Productivity in the United 
Kingdom.” The average annual change in TFP from 1953 to 1992 in the United 
Kingdom was 1.53%. The average annual change in the following decade was 
0.4%. Average annual growth in TFP picked up again from 2003 to 2008 to 1.0%, 
but the cause of this increase was a dramatic decline in reported agricultural labor. 
Piesse and Thirtle argue that this decline in labor probably reflects an unmeasured 
influx of agricultural workers from the new European Union member states. If this 
argument holds true, then the recent surge in TFP growth is illusory. 
Piesse and Thirtle argue that a slowdown in TFP growth was caused primar-
ily by four factors, three of which could be quantified. The first is a slowdown 
and retargeting of public R&D. Growth in public agricultural R&D ended in 
1982. And a growing proportion of available funds were retargeted away from 
cost-reducing and production-enhancing research toward basic research and 
public interest research, which includes research on environmental and animal 
welfare issues. The second was a slowdown in domestic private R&D research 
activity, which seems to be a complement to public R&D research. About half of 
the impact of a decrease in private R&D was made up for by increased applica-
tions of foreign-developed technology. The third factor was a reduction in the 
growth of farm size, which limited the efficiency gains that accrue from larger 
farms. And fourth, Piesse and Thirtle note that decreases in farm-level efficiency 
measures coincided with the general slowdown in productivity growth, and they 
draw an association between these patterns and the fact that free extension ad-
vice was eliminated in 1988. A resulting decline in efficiency and productivity 
growth could have been expected if farmers undervalued such technical advice 
and chose not to pay for the optimal amount of advice, or if private sector exten-
sion advice was a poor substitute. 
Chapter 8. The case of the United States was featured to some extent by 
Alston, Beddow, and Pardey, who in Chapter 3 discussed patterns in U.S. com-
modity prices, yields, and other partial productivity measures that were con-
sistent with a slowdown in productivity growth since 1990. In their analysis of 
“The Shifting Patterns of Agricultural Production and Productivity in the United 
States” in Chapter 8, using state-level MFP measures, Alston, Andersen, James, 
and Pardey also found compelling evidence of a slowdown in agricultural pro-
ductivity growth since 1990. 
U.S. agricultural production changed remarkably during the past 100 years. 
Changes in production and productivity were enabled by dramatic changes in 
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the quality and composition of inputs, important technological changes resulting 
from agricultural research and development, and wholesale changes in the struc-
ture of the farming sector. Reflecting rapid growth in productivity, the quantity 
of U.S. agricultural output grew nearly 2.5-fold during the period 1949-2002, 
even though the measured quantity of aggregate input use declined marginally. 
While U.S. agricultural productivity grew quickly through the 1980s, 
mounting evidence indicates a substantial, sustained, systematic, structural 
slowdown in the growth rate of U.S. agricultural productivity since then. Over 
the period 1949-1990, MFP grew positively in all 48 contiguous states, whereas 
during the period 1990-2002, MFP growth was negative for 15 states, mostly 
in the northeast. MFP grew faster in the more recent period compared with the 
earlier one in only 4 states, with 44 states experiencing lower rates of produc-
tivity growth. U.S. aggregate agricultural productivity grew on average by just 
0.97% per year over 1990-2002 compared with 2.02% per year over 1949-1990. 
The simple average of the 48 state-specific MFP growth rates indicates a larger 
difference between the periods, a paltry rate of 0.54% per year for 1990-2002 
compared with 2.02% per year for 1949-1990. This slowdown in productivity 
growth is statistically significant and economically important. 
Chapter 9. Jin, Huang, and Rozelle discuss “Agricultural Productivity in 
China.”16 According to FAO estimates, China represented 22.5% of the value of 
global agricultural production in 2005, sufficient to have a meaningful impact 
on the global aggregate picture. Like many other elements of the economy, agri-
cultural productivity in China has followed its own path, not always in step with 
the rest of the world, particularly reflecting the changing political regimes and 
changing government policies. In this chapter, the authors describe the produc-
tivity trends in China’s agricultural sector during the reform era that began in 
the 1980s, with an emphasis on the period 1995-2005. The authors discuss the 
influence of changes in government investments in research and extension as 
well as the dramatic transformations in the agricultural sector. 
China’s agricultural economy has been steadily transforming from a grain-
first sector to one producing higher-valued cash crops, horticultural goods, 
and livestock and aquaculture products. In the early reform period, output 
growth—driven by increases in yields—was experienced in all subsectors of 
agriculture, including grains. However, since the mid-1990s, the area sown to 
16This summary draws heavily on the Choices article by the same authors (i.e., Jin, Huang, and 
Rozelle 2009), which itself summarizes the story presented in Chapter 9.
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rice and wheat production has fallen, as has the domestic production of these 
two staple food crops. The contraction in grain supply was preceded by a re-
duction in demand as increasing per capita incomes, rural to urban migration, 
and a reduction in government marketing controls has shifted the pattern of 
consumption away from staple food grains. Like the grain sector, production 
of cash crops in general and specific crops, such as cotton, edible oils, and 
vegetables and fruit, also grew rapidly in the early reform period, but in con-
trast to staple grain crops the output of these other crops continued to grow 
throughout the reform era beginning in the 1980s, some at rates in excess of 
5% per year. The growth in livestock and fishery output outpaced the growth in 
output from the cropping sector, in total and in most of the crop subcategories. 
Livestock production increased by 9.1% per year in the early reform period and 
has continued growing at between 4.5% and 8.8% per year since 1985. Fisher-
ies production increased by more than 10% per year during 1985-2000, and 
the combined share of livestock and fisheries in total agriculture rose to 45% in 
2005, more than doubling their 1980 share. 
In Chapter 9, Jin, Huang, and Rozelle used data envelopment analysis meth-
ods to estimate commodity-specific rates of TFP growth for different subperiods. 
Their estimates indicated that, for early and late indica rice and soybeans, TFP 
grew by an average of 1.8% per year during 1985-1994, slower than in earlier 
years. The TFP growth rate was smaller for wheat and corn, and negative for 
japonica rice (it declined by 0.12%) per year from 1985 to 1994. TFP growth 
during 1995-2004 was positive for all 23 commodities and in all cases was faster 
than for the previous period. With just a few exceptions, TFP growth for these 
commodities exceeded 2% per year after 1994. The implied rate of growth of 
TFP for Chinese agriculture exceeded 3% per year during 1995-2004. Coupling 
these estimates with the corresponding TFP estimates for 1978-1994 implies 
that TFP growth in China over the period 1978-2004 sustained an average rate 
of growth in excess of 3% per year, a remarkable achievement over a quarter 
of a century. The rate of increase in agricultural TFP in China over 1978-2004 
was high by historical standards and compared with corresponding rates of TFP 
growth reported for many other countries around the world. Agricultural TFP in 
China grew at a relatively rapid rate since 1995 for a large number of commodi-
ties. TFP for the staple commodities generally increased by about 2% per year; 
TFP growth rates for most horticulture and livestock commodities were even 
higher at between 3% and 5% per year. 
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Jin, Huang, and Rozelle ascribe much of this TFP growth to changes in the 
technologies flowing to and being used by these sectors. Both domestic and for-
eign technologies have played a role. A significant part of the rapid changes in 
technology and productivity reflected the adaptation and adoption of technolo-
gies from other countries. Such catching-up innovations, which involve adopting 
superior technologies in use in other countries, may allow relatively rapid pro-
ductivity growth for a time, but they are more one-shot changes by nature (albeit 
spread over a number of years) rather than continuing innovations yielding sus-
tained compound growth. It remains to be seen how much of China’s relatively 
rapid agricultural productivity growth can be sustained after the catching-up 
process has become more nearly complete and a series of important institutional 
reforms—beginning with the switch from collectivized to more individualized 
forms of production agriculture, that is, the so-called Household Responsibility 
System that was introduced in the late 1970s—have run their course. Similarly, 
the broad capital intensification and labor-saving changes in Chinese agriculture 
will have diminishing impacts on agricultural productivity as the process of 
change diminishes.
Chapter 10. As in China, changing political regimes and policies have had 
profound impacts on the “The Shifting Patterns of Agricultural Production and 
Productivity in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe,” 
which is the subject of Chapter 10 by Swinnen, Van Herck, and Vranken.17 Ag-
ricultural output and productivity have changed dramatically in Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the FSU since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, exactly 20 years ago.18 Initially, market reforms caused a strong decline in 
agricultural output. In the first years of transition, gross agricultural output de-
creased in all countries by at least 20%. The transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy coincided in all countries with subsidy 
cuts and price liberalization, which in general caused input prices to increase 
and output prices to decrease. In response to the new relative prices, the use of 
17This summary draws directly from the Choices article by the same authors (i.e., Swinnen, Van 
Herck, and Vranken 2009), which itself summarizes the story presented in Chapter 10.
18The review covers more than 20 countries, which the authors organized into six regional 
groups: Central Europe (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia), Baltics (Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia), Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia), European CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), Transcaucasia (Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan), and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Tajikistan).
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inputs decreased and so did agricultural output. The extent to which this output 
decline was associated with changes in productivity depended on the speed with 
which labor could exit agriculture, and agricultural factor and output markets 
could develop. These, in turn, depended on the initial conditions and the reform 
policies that were implemented, both of which were very different across coun-
tries in the region. Swinnen, Van Herck, and Vranken document the changes, 
explain how they were affected by a combination of factors, and identify four 
“patterns” of productivity changes that they relate to differences in initial condi-
tions and reform policies. 
The most economically advanced countries in Central Europe and the Bal-
tics, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia, implemented 
radical reforms. These countries were characterized by relatively high incomes, 
a capital-intensive agricultural sector, and a big-bang approach to reforms and 
privatization, including restitution of land to former owners. The loss from for-
gone economies of scale was limited because the restitution of agricultural land 
to previous owners led to consolidation of land in large farming enterprises. In 
addition, a massive outflow of agricultural labor occurred early in transition, facil-
itated by a well-developed social safety net system and radical reforms, which sta-
bilized the macroeconomic environment. This outflow of labor caused substantial 
gains in labor productivity early on in transition. Later, productivity gains were 
reinforced by spillovers from the large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the agri-food sector. Investments, through vertically integrated supply chains, im-
proved farmers’ access to credit, technology, inputs, and output markets. 
Another pattern was followed by the poorer CEECs, including Romania, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland. These countries were diverse in their initial 
farm structure. Before transition, Poland already had mainly small family farms, 
whereas in Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria the agricultural sector was con-
centrated in large corporate farms. However, in all four countries, labor outflow 
from agriculture was limited in the first years of transition. In these countries, 
agriculture served as a social buffer in times when overall unemployment was 
high and social benefits were low. The restitution of land to former owners con-
strained access to land for young farmers, since that land was given to older 
people who started farming to complement their small pensions. Because the ag-
ricultural sector in these countries was relatively capital-intensive, the break-up 
of the corporate farms into small family farms caused significant losses in econo-
mies of scale and yielded only limited gains from the shedding of labor. Initially, 
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both output and productivity declined. In countries such as Poland and Lithu-
ania, output and productivity started to recover in the mid-1990s stimulated by 
FDI. In Romania and Bulgaria, output and productivity recovered only slowly, 
and at the end of the 1990s they decreased again as a result of the financial cri-
sis. From the beginning of the twenty-first century the outflow of inefficient la-
bor and the inflow of FDI started a sustained recovery.
Third, a group of poor Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries, such 
as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, followed yet another 
pattern. These countries are characterized by their poverty and the absence of a 
good social safety net system, their labor-intensive agricultural systems, and their 
slower progress in overall reforms. In these countries, agriculture also provided 
a buffer role and a labor sink. Reforms caused a strong shift from large scale 
toward individual farming—especially when land distribution in kind to house-
holds was introduced after the failure of the share distribution system became 
evident. The reforms also caused a substantial inflow of labor into agriculture 
and growth in the importance of more labor-intensive sectors, such as horti-
culture and livestock. This caused a decrease in labor productivity while land 
productivity grew. Although there has been substantial growth in yields, labor 
productivity is still now substantially below pre-reform levels in Transcaucasia. 
A fourth pattern is followed by a group of middle-income FSU countries, 
including Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In these countries, there was almost 
no outflow of agricultural labor and, since output fell substantially in the 1990s, 
agricultural labor productivity declined strongly. Reforms were implemented 
only slowly and soft budgets continued, which favored the large-scale farms and 
constrained restructuring, with limited efficiency gains. Only after the Russian 
crisis in 1998 did the macroeconomic situation improve, with enhanced compet-
itiveness of the domestic agricultural sector through exchange rate devaluations 
and the inflow of revenues from increasing oil and mineral prices. This affected 
in particular Russia and Kazakhstan. Ukraine implemented a series of important 
reforms in the late 1990s. Since then, agricultural productivity has increased 
in these countries as liquidity in the economy and investments in agriculture 
increased. Surplus employment started to decline gradually. An important fac-
tor in the growth of productivity beginning in 2000 was increased investments 
in the food industry, which benefited agriculture through vertical integration. It 
took more than 15 years in the European CIS for labor and land productivity to 
recover to their pre-reform levels. 
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Chapter 11. Singh and Pal discuss “The Changing Pattern and Sources of 
Agricultural Growth in India.” The pace of growth of the Indian economy has ac-
celerated over recent decades, averaging less than 5% per year during the 1980s 
and 1990s and more than 7% per year during the period 2003-2007. In contrast 
the agricultural economy has performed erratically. As the technologies of the 
green revolution spread throughout the country and rural public investments (in 
agricultural R&D, extension, and rural infrastructure) grew, agricultural output 
expanded rapidly, beginning mainly in the irrigated areas during the 1970s and 
then extending to rain-fed agriculture beginning in the 1980s. However, begin-
ning in the early 1990s, agricultural output growth slowed and fell well below 
the corresponding rate of growth of the non-agricultural sector. It has also been 
subject to large year-to-year (often weather-induced) fluctuations. 
The composition of agricultural output has changed substantially over re-
cent decades. The crop sector, including food staples such as rice, wheat, millet, 
and sorghum along with higher-valued horticultural crops, still accounts for the 
preponderance of agricultural output—more than two-thirds by value in 2008. 
Nonetheless, the livestock sector grew from a market share of less than one-
fifth in the early 1980s to around a one-quarter share in 2008. India is now the 
world’s largest producer of milk, and poultry meat and egg production has in-
creased markedly over recent years. Output diversification extended beyond the 
changing crops-livestock shares to also affect the commodity mix within these 
broad sectors. As average per capita incomes rapidly rose, urbanization rates 
grew, female literacy and participation in the workforce increased, and agricul-
tural trade expanded, the demand for Indian agricultural outputs also changed, 
and supply responded to meet these new demands. The growth in production of 
cereals (mainly rice and wheat) and pulses has slowed, while production of fruits 
and vegetables has picked up pace, as has the production of flowers, sugar, and 
molasses. Cotton production is notable, with strong growth performance in re-
cent years made possible by significant advances in seed technologies, especially 
the rapid uptake of Bt cotton varieties. 
Singh and Pal present some summary evidence on the patterns of PFP and 
TFP growth and discuss the sources of output growth, but the evidence is mixed 
depending on the measures, time periods, and regions within the country being 
considered, making general patterns difficult to discern. They observe that, as a 
general rule, yield growth contributed more than area expansion to the growth 
in output for most crops. Yield growth generally slowed during the 1990s com-
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pared with the 1980s, although for some crops yield growth recovered in the 
period 2001-2007. None of the reported productivity studies provides evidence 
on Indian agricultural TFP growth beyond the latter half of the 1990s, ruling out 
the prospects of assessing contemporary developments in these broader produc-
tivity metrics. They are also too few in number and lack consistency in coverage 
and methodology to make for much of a meaningful summary, other than the 
observation that for the years they do cover—specifically various periods dur-
ing the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—the majority of the reported TFP growth rates 
were at the upper end of the spectrum that is typically reported, often well more 
than 2.0% per year. 
Chapter 12. In his chapter on “Indonesia: From Food Security to Market-
Led Agricultural Growth,” Fuglie presents and evaluates new agricultural input, 
output, and productivity estimates for Indonesia in the period 1961-2006 and 
places that evidence in a long-run policy context. Economic developments in 
Indonesia have noteworthy and important global consequences. Indonesia is the 
world’s fourth most populous nation, and by 2005 had graduated to a lower-
income country with per capita income averaging $3,209. In agricultural GDP 
terms it is also now the fifth-largest agricultural producer in the world. 
Real agricultural GDP nearly tripled from the early 1960s to 2001-2005, 
while in quantitative terms agricultural output expanded by a factor of five from 
1961 to 2006, equivalent to an annual average growth rate of 3.62% per year. 
Rice production still dominates the food sector. It accounted for around half the 
country’s total agricultural output (measured in “rice-equivalent” units) during 
the period 2001-2005 and occupied almost 29% of the cropped area in 2005. 
However, estate crops such as oil palm, rubber, sugarcane, and cacao, along 
with livestock, capture aquaculture, and horticultural production, have all in-
creased in importance. Much of the growth in estate crops, especially oil palm 
production, which is now the second-most important commodity (again in “rice-
equivalent” units) in Indonesia, took place off Java, especially on the islands of 
Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi. A notable feature of Indonesian agriculture 
is that total cropland area expanded at an average rate of 1.4% per year over 
1961-2005 and is still expanding at more than 1% per year. Irrigated area has ex-
panded too, and now accounts for 23% of the country’s total cropland. 
Both the quantity and quality of labor used in Indonesian agriculture in-
creased since the early 1960s. The economically active labor force almost dou-
bled from 28 to 51 million persons from the early 1960s to 2001-2005, although 
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many of those persons (especially those working on Java) earned an increasing 
and now large share of their income from non-farm sources. Growth in manufac-
tured inputs (including fertilizer, machinery, and animal feed) grew rapidly over 
this same period, albeit from a small base. Fuglie estimates that the quantity of 
total farm inputs more than doubled over the years 1961-2006, equivalent to an 
average rate of increase of 1.80% per year.
Looking at land and labor productivity trends, Fuglie identifies a bifurcated 
pattern of change within Indonesia. In densely populated Java (with 856 persons 
per square kilometer in 2000), both land and labor productivity grew substan-
tially between the 1960s and 2001-2005. Farmers intensified production through 
a rapid uptake of green revolution rice technologies beginning in the 1960s and 
1970s and later shifted resources into higher-valued horticulture, livestock, and 
aquaculture production. In contrast, on other islands (primarily Kalimantan, 
Sumatra, and Sulawesi) land area expansion was the primary source of output 
growth; land productivity hardly improved, but labor productivity increased as 
the average cropland per worker rose. 
Evidence of average yield growth trends reveals a range of commodity-spe-
cific patterns. Rice yields soared during the 1960s and 1970s, but yield growth 
slowed markedly during the 1990s, and that pattern persists. Soybeans and 
mungbeans have had little yield growth since the 1960s, while groundnuts have 
shown a modest growth in yields. Growth in cassava yields has been uneven over 
time (and the area planted to cassava has trended down so that output has grown 
slower than yields), although corn yields have shown consistently strong growth 
in yields since the 1970s. As famers switched from near-subsistence to more com-
mercial modes of operation, coupled with increased use of improved seed, fertil-
izer, and pesticides, average yields of many fruit crops improved over time.
Combining the aggregate agricultural (i.e., crops, livestock, and cultured 
fish) input and output measures developed for this study, Fuglie estimates that 
TFP growth in Indonesian agriculture averaged 1.82% per year for the period 
1961-2006. Partitioning this growth into periods demarked by key political, in-
stitutional, and policy changes, Fuglie notes that agriculture TFP grew by only 
0.54% per year during the political unstable period 1961-1967. During the green 
revolution period 1968-1992, marked by political stability and substantial input 
(especially fertilizer) subsidies, TFP grew by 2.35% per year. The Asian financial 
crises then took hold, and measured TFP growth dropped to just 0.58% per year 
for the period 1993-2001 but rebounded to average 2.95% per year in the period 
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2002-2006, which Fuglie characterizes as a “liberalization” period in which mar-
ket forces played a larger role in allocating resources to and within agriculture. 
Chapter 13. Liebenberg and Pardey discuss “Changes in South African 
Agricultural Production and Productivity,” drawing on a range of new long-run 
input, output, and productivity measures developed by one of the authors of this 
chapter (see Liebenberg 2010) plus evidence on South African MFP trends based 
on estimates gleaned from various other studies. To the extent possible, they also 
place productivity developments within South Africa into a broader sub-Saharan 
Africa context.
The twentieth century saw substantive shifts in the structure of agriculture 
and agricultural production in South Africa. Average farm size grew, farm num-
bers eventually declined, and production increasingly emphasized higher-valued 
commodities. The quantity of total agricultural output grew at an average an-
nual rate of 2.56% over 1911-2008, but growth slowed since the 1980s (to just 
1.52% per year for the period 1982-2000), largely as a result of a slowdown in 
the rate of growth in field crop production. Output growth rebounded a little 
in recent years to average 2.07% per year since 2000. The commodity composi-
tion of agricultural outputs in South Africa has also changed, with higher-valued 
horticultural crops gaining market share at the expense of (staple food) crops 
and livestock products. The composition of input use has changed, too. Notwith-
standing high levels of rural unemployment, during the second half of the twen-
tieth century, and particularly beginning in the 1980s, South African agriculture 
substantially increased its use of material inputs and continued to invest signifi-
cantly in capital inputs while the use of labor in agriculture declined. 
Liebenberg and Pardey extend an earlier MFP series developed by Thirtle, 
Sartorius von Bach, and Van Zyl (1993) to show that South African MFP grew, 
on average, by an estimated 1.49% per year over the years 1947-2008. The 1970s 
and 1980s showed the highest rate of growth for the period studied (averaging 
3.98% per year over these two decades), substantially higher than the 0.62% per 
year rate reported for the immediate post-WWII decades. However, MFP growth 
stalled during the period 1981-2008 (to average just 0.76% per annum dur-
ing these years), reflecting a decline in the rate of output growth coupled with 
an increase in the rate of input use in agriculture. Thus, since the early 1980s, 
MFP growth has fallen well below the corresponding rate of population growth. 
Moreover, the slowdown in MFP over the past several decades mirrors slow-
downs in productivity growth rates for both land and labor. 
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Factor use and productivity patterns in South Africa are not especially repre-
sentative of realities elsewhere on the continent. For example, the average value 
of output per unit of labor in 2007 was $5,663 per worker (2000 prices) in South 
Africa, $1,576 per worker in Nigeria, and just $641 per worker for the rest of 
Africa. South Africa is distinctive in that its land-labor ratio increased from 39.1 
hectares per worker in 1961 to 56.9 hectares per worker in 2007 (implying more 
pronounced growth in labor versus land productivity), whereas in almost all the 
other regions in sub-Saharan Africa considered by Liebenberg and Pardey, real 
output per worker stagnated or (in the case of Eastern and Southern Africa ex-
cluding South Africa) actually declined, although land productivity in all regions 
improved over time. In addition, South African agriculture ended the period 
with fewer agricultural workers than it had in 1961, whereas the economically 
active population in agriculture in the rest-of-Africa regions (like their popula-
tions generally) grew in the range of 0.19% to 2.49% per year. Consequently the 
region’s generally low land-labor ratios have continued to decline and now fall 
within a range of 2.33 to 9.34 hectares per worker. It is difficult to envisage how 
output per worker can be raised substantially, especially given the generally poor 
rural infrastructure and other market and environmental constraints that limit 
the transition to higher-valued forms of agricultural output throughout the re-
gion. However, it is also difficult to conceive how the chronic hunger and serious 
bouts of food insecurity that befall many people throughout Africa can be ame-
liorated if agricultural productivity fails to pick up pace. 
Chapter 14. Lence provides an in-depth look at “The Agricultural Sector in 
Argentina: Major Trends and Recent Developments.” In contrast to most of the 
country-specific chapters, Lence does not attempt to estimate MFP. Rather, he re-
views existing estimates and demonstrates that the methods used, the time period 
examined, and the data source all greatly influence estimates of annual growth 
in productivity. Studies that have compared TFP estimates from the 1960s and 
1970s to the 1980s and 1990s disagree on whether productivity was higher or 
lower in the later periods. Because of the difficulty in obtaining a consistent set 
of input data over time for Argentina by which more consistent estimates of TFP 
could be made, Lence focuses his attention on identifying the major forces at 
work in Argentina that have determined how the sector has evolved over time.
Lence argues that the most important factor affecting Argentina’s agricultural 
sector is government policy. He shows that a sharp reduction in the extent to 
which agriculture was taxed in the 1990s led to dramatic increases in the use of 
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fertilizer and pesticides, adoption of technologies, the conversion of new lands 
into crop production, and adoption of more intensive livestock feeding opera-
tions. Per hectare yields of soybeans and corn increased notably during the late 
1990s. Lence attributes the soybean yield increases to adoption of the comple-
mentary package of no-till and glyphosate-tolerant soybeans. Further evidence 
of productivity increases since 1990 is the sharp increase in milk production per 
cow from around 2,000 kg per cow per year to almost 5,000 kg per year. This 
increase came about through better genetics, improved milking machines, and 
improved pasture productivity. 
The case of Argentina illustrates the importance of government policy in 
determining the extent to which farmers are willing to invest in new technolo-
gies and inputs. Drawing on his knowledge about Argentina’s agriculture along 
with available production estimates, Lence demonstrates that the relaxation of 
agricultural taxes in the 1990s led to a surge in production and productivity, 
although existing TFP estimates do not all reflect such an increase. Whether the 
resumption of high export taxes that accompanied the Argentine financial crises 
in 2001 and 2002 will reverse some of these gains remains to be seen. So far, 
available data suggest that productivity and production do not yet reflect a sig-
nificant reversal. 
4. CONCLUSION
Agricultural productivity is interesting and important but surprisingly 
difficult to measure meaningfully and discuss in simple and definitive terms. 
Concepts range from simple and commonplace partial productivities, such 
as crop yields, to the all-encompassing TFP. Often analysts are interested in 
quantifying the rate of technological change, for developing a sense about the 
economic performance of the sector and the competitive position of one region 
or country vis-à-vis another. For such purposes, the TFP is the most relevant 
concept, but TFP is not a synonym for technological change, and PFPs and 
MFPs can be informative about both technological change and the sources 
and nature of change in TFP. TFP can also be influenced by changes in the 
spatial location of production within a country or region; changes in economic 
efficiency of farms reflecting economies of size, scale, or scope; changes in in-
stitutions; or changes in infrastructure. The implications of a change in TFP 
can depend on the source of the change. In addition, measurement issues have 
implications for interpretation of the measures. At best we can measure MFP 
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indexes that may be only rough approximations in some cases for the TFP con-
cept we have in mind.
In practice, even the simplest productivity notions can be fraught with dif-
ficulty of measurement and interpretation once we allow for the complexities of 
heterogeneous inputs and outputs and multiyear production processes. In the 
typical MFP approximations to TFP, various issues arise from the fact that the 
available data on prices or quantities are incomplete or pre-aggregated, giving 
rise to various kinds of index number bias, or are inadequate for some other 
reason. The importance of these aspects varies from case to case—from study to 
study, time to time, and place to place. This makes it hard at times to compare 
results among cases. 
In this book we are particularly interested in whether agricultural produc-
tivity has slowed recently. The evidence is somewhat mixed, reflecting in part 
the differences in availability of data among countries and time periods as well 
as other differences in measures and methods not dictated by data alone. The 
mixture also reflects the fact that agricultural productivity growth is not uni-
form over space and time. Even so, a few simple lessons have emerged. First, the 
rate of growth of crop yields has slowed in the past 20-30 years compared with 
the previous 20-30 years for the world as a whole, but with some significant 
variation among countries and among commodities. In this context, the recent 
rate of crop yield growth is generally higher in China and Latin America than 
in the rest of the world, and generally slower in the developed countries as a 
group. Similar patterns are evident for other PFP measures. Second, the rate of 
MFP growth appears to have slowed in the developed countries for which bet-
ter quality measures are available (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia). Comparable measures are not available for many coun-
tries. Third, even if we can be confident that we see evidence of a slowdown in 
productivity growth, the interpretation of the finding may not be clear. For in-
stance, the Australian slowdown has been observed during the most severe and 
extended drought in that country’s history. Other countries, too, may have been 
affected by a run of unusually favorable or unfavorable growing seasons. And it 
is hard also to tell the difference between sustained changes in growth and the 
multiyear effects of a change that is really episodic in nature (e.g., the massive 
institutional reforms in China and the former Soviet Union). 
Finally, however, even though we have many reasons for being cautious in 
this area and we have to weigh mixed and sometimes competing pieces of evi-
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dence, we cannot escape the conclusion that agricultural productivity growth 
has slowed, especially in the world’s richest countries. At a minimum, given its 
importance, this finding is reason for further investigation into the issue. It also 
is reason for asking whether the current global investment in agricultural R&D 
will be sufficient to enable the development of innovations and productivity such 
that agricultural supply will grow fast enough to keep pace with the inevitable 
growth in demand.
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